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Abstract 
This thesis engages with recent historical scholarship on occupational health and safety 
by analysing the conditions that shaped the development of British health and safety 
regulation between 1961 and 2001. Drawing upon a rich vein of archival material as 
well as oral history interviews, the thesis focuses on the role played by two regulatory 
bodies, the Health and Safety Commission (HSC) and Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE), in generating and enforcing this framework of laws and standards.  
 The thesis illuminates two major historical trends. Firstly, it explores the gradual 
transformation of the British state in its role as health and safety regulator. Since 1974, 
the focus of British regulation has been to promote ‘self-regulation’ by employers and 
employees, and the thesis analyses the ways in which HSC/E has attempted to foster a 
‘safety culture’ in British industry, in the context of social, political and economic 
pressures. Secondly, the thesis analyses the evolution of risk in health and safety 
regulation, from implicit assumptions and practices in policymaking and enforcement, 
to the formal demand for all employers to conduct written risk assessments. 
 In so doing, the thesis reconciles various paradoxes. One such paradox is that 
while the role of the British state in regulating health and safety has ostensibly ‘rolled 
back’ (e.g. via deregulation), health and safety has in another sense ‘crept forward’, 
extending beyond the workplace to intervene in public safety and environmental 
issues. Another paradox is that while British health and safety legislation has been 
ostensibly ‘successful’ in reducing fatal workplace accidents, it has come under 
unprecedented public and political scrutiny in recent years. Examining the evolution of 
health and safety against an extensive theoretical background (e.g. the ‘risk society’), 
 16 
the thesis explains how health and safety has become increasingly central to our work 
and public lives.     
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1.  Introduction 
 
1.1.  Health and Safety in 21st-Century Britain 
In Britain and many other developed countries, health and safety has become an 
integral feature of work and public life. Over the last forty years, legislation originally 
intended to protect the health and safety of workers has come to protect all of us—
whether at work or not—from risks resulting from work activity. All employees, 
regardless of their occupation or workplace, are now covered by comprehensive laws 
designed to shield them from accidents and ill-health. As we go about our daily lives, 
we are increasingly confronted by rules and regulations meant to take us out of harm’s 
way—an intricate body of law featuring a bewildering array of acronyms such as 
COSHH and MHSWR.  
 If health and safety regulation has become more pervasive in modern society, the 
accompanying bureaucracy and administration has become even more noticeable. New 
regulatory agencies, such as Britain’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE), have been 
established to protect people from occupational risks. New chartered bodies, such as 
the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH) have emerged to regulate 
and certify the health and safety profession.1 More widely, a health and safety or risk 
‘industry’ has developed to provide advice and services to companies.2 Formal risk 
assessments, once the preserve of complex undertakings such as nuclear power 
                                                
 
 
1  IOSH was founded in 1945 as the Institution of Industrial Safety Officers. 
2  Michael Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of 
Uncertainty (London: Demos, 2004), 12. 
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stations, are now a requirement for every employer. All employers are required to 
provide health and safety instruction to their employees—hence the ubiquitous 
training course. On a supranational level, health and safety has been given explicit 
focus in the legislation underpinning the European Union. Throughout our lives, it 
seems, health and safety rules and regulations have become more prominent. As the 
sociologist Frank Furedi has observed, ‘society today has turned safety into a veritable 
religion.’3 
 With the ‘explosion’ of health and safety into every corner of our lives, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that we occupy one of the safest work environments in history. 
Historical comparisons are complicated by the changing nature of reporting 
requirements. However, it is clear that significant improvements have been made over 
the last forty years. In industrial sectors which are directly comparable, 85 people lost 
their lives going about their work in 2013/14.4 In 1974, the figure was 651, a decline of 
87 per cent. The rate of fatal injury in 2013/14 was one sixth the rate in 1974. The 
comparisons for non-fatal injury are no less impressive. In 1974, the year of the Health 
and Safety at Work Act (HSWA), there were 336,701 reports of non-fatal injuries to 
employees. In 2011/12, the comparable figure was 77,310 (see Appendix II). 
Evidently, work does not kill or maim in Britain in the same way it did forty or even a 
hundred years ago. 
                                                
 
 
3  Frank Furedi, The Politics of Fear: Beyond Left and Right (London: Continuum, 
2005), 165. 
4  The overall number of fatalities was 133. See “HSE Statistics: Historical 
Picture,” accessed August 6, 2015, http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/history/. 
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 This is not to say that regulation has been directly responsible for these 
changes—or we should be in any way complacent about risks. The HSE has estimated 
that as much as 50 per cent of the decline in accidents over the past forty years can be 
explained by structural changes in British industry and employment: the transition 
from an economy built around manufacturing and manual labour, to one built around 
services and office work.5 The increasing rate of occupational diseases such as 
mesothelioma dispel any triumphalism about regulation, since people are dying from 
exposure to toxic substances years, even decades ago. Official statistics fail to capture 
the true extent of occupational ill-health, while the recognised problem of under-
reporting prevents the drawing of firm conclusions.6 The economic cost of occupational 
accidents and ill-health to wider society is estimated to be as high as £14.2 billion.7  
 One would expect such figures to generate calls for a renewed emphasis on 
health and safety—on economic, if not ethical grounds. If anything, the reverse has 
happened. Health and safety is now routinely represented by the media as a burden on 
business and society, as the virtual embodiment of bureaucracy and red tape. Stories 
propagated by the media allege that health and safety regulations are responsible for an 
array of petty decisions made by businesses and organisations, ranging from the 
banning of playground games, to restrictions on hanging baskets.8 According to the 
                                                
 
 
5  Rhys Davies and Paul Jones, Trends and Context to Rates of Workplace Injury, 
Research Report 386 (Norwich: HSE Books, 2005), 84. 
6  Steve Tombs, “Death and Work in Britain,” Sociological Review 47, no. 2 (1999): 
345–67. 
7  HSE, “Health and Safety Executive Annual Statistics Report 2013/14,” 2014. 
8  Paul Almond, “The Dangers of Hanging Baskets: ‘Regulatory Myths’ and 
Media Representations of Health and Safety Regulation,” Journal of Law and Society 36 
(2009): 352–75. 
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British Chambers of Commerce, up to a half of British employers find health and 
safety regulations ‘extremely or fairly burdensome.’9 
 In response to such accusations, HSE has set up a ‘Myth Busters Challenge 
Panel’ to challenge these stories.10 However, recent government policy has also 
identified health and safety as a problem of overregulation and unnecessary 
bureaucracy. Following its election victory in May 2010, the Coalition government 
carried out several reviews of health and safety, pledging to restore ‘common sense’ to 
regulation and tackle the ‘health and safety monster’.11 While these reviews supported 
the ‘risk based’ ethos of the regulatory system, they also recommended the removal of 
regulations perceived as unnecessary or outmoded, and the exemption of certain 
groups, such as the self-employed. The HSE may have survived the ‘bonfire of 
quangos’, yet according to the government’s critics, deregulatory ideology has created 
a much smaller organisation, unable to fulfil its statutory functions.12 Since 2010, the 
government has slashed the HSE’s budget by over a third, and the number of HSE 
staff has fallen by over 25 per cent. Moreover, HSE inspectors are no longer carrying 
                                                
 
 
9  British Chambers of Commerce, “Health and Safety—A Risky Business?” 
(London: British Chambers of Commerce, May 2011), 9. 
10  HSE, “Busting the Health and Safety Myths,” accessed August 11, 2015, 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/myth/. 
11  Lord Young of Graffham, Common Sense, Common Safety (London: Cabinet 
Office, 2010); Ragnar E. Löfstedt, Reclaiming Health and Safety for All, Cm 8219, 2011; 
Nicholas Watt, “David Cameron Pledges to Tackle ‘Health and Safety Monster,’” The 
Guardian, January 5, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/jan/05/david-
cameron-health-safety-monster. 
12  James Chapman, “Cameron Vows to Slash Number of Quangos and Cut 
Ofcom’s Power,” Mail Online, accessed August 10, 2015, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1197744/Conservatives-vow-light-bonfire-
quangos-slash-public-spending.html. 
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out routine inspections for many workplaces. According to the Trades Union Congress 
(TUC), ‘the government is hell-bent on trying to reduce health and safety protection.’13 
 An unprecedented and paradoxical situation has thus arisen. Health and safety 
regulation may have penetrated deep into our everyday lives, but its aims and 
objectives have never been more questioned by politicians, the media and public. Forty 
years after the HSWA established a comprehensive system of health and safety 
protection, the need to take stock of historical developments has never been clearer.  
 This thesis thus seeks to address a fundamental historical question: how and why 
did the British system of health and safety regulation develop between 1961 and 2001? 
In order to interrogate the place health and safety has come to occupy in our lives, it is 
first necessary to understand the historical forces that have shaped the system of laws 
and standards that structure efforts to combat accidents and ill-health at work. It is 
also necessary to understand the pressures on the regulatory bodies (both within and 
outside the British government), which have developed national health and safety 
policy, and their approach to workplace hazards. How did the scope of British health 
and safety regulation evolve between 1961 and 2001? What were the principal changes 
and continuities in the way it was regulated? Where did new regulatory concerns 
originate? What were the constraints, if any, on regulators to address these concerns? 
To date, historians remain to answer these questions in any degree of detail or 
sophistication. 
                                                
 
 
13  TUC, “Toxic, Corrosive and Hazardous: The Government’s Record on Health 
and Safety” (London: TUC, April 2014). 
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 This thesis does not seek to evaluate the claim that health and safety has ‘gone 
mad’ or too far. Such evaluations rest on normative assumptions about the purpose and 
scope of health and safety—the field it should legitimately encompass. Nor is this thesis 
concerned with exploring changing public perceptions towards health and safety 
regulation.14 It is neither a history of health and safety legislation, nor an administrative 
history of regulatory agencies. Rather, it is a history of health and safety policy, 
encapsulating legislative, administrative and intellectual-history elements. It charts a 
complex trajectory, bringing into relief the historical conditions (social, cultural, 
political and economic), that shaped the British government’s approach towards health 
and safety, alongside the regulatory agencies ‘hived off’ from central government after 
the HSWA. The work of two independent, but interconnected agencies dominate my 
analysis: the Health and Safety Commission (HSC) and Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE). I refer to the work of these institutions, together with the government, as the 
British regulatory state.  
 The ‘state’, of course, remains a contentious historical concept. There is no 
consensus over its definition, or whether the ‘state’ as an entity even exists.15 In mid-
twentieth-century political theory, it was often abandoned in favour of ‘political 
system’. However, this too was ambiguous, owing to the interface between politics and 
                                                
 
 
14  This is the object of a recent study organised by Professor Paul Almond and Dr 
Mike Esbester of the universities of Reading and Portsmouth, UK. 
15  The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘the state’ as ‘a nation or territory 
considered as an organized political community under one government.’ “State - 
Definition of State in English from the Oxford Dictionary,” accessed August 25, 2015, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/state. 
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wider society.16 This thesis argues that the ‘state’ remains a compelling way to 
approach the subject of health and safety regulation. I visualise the state as the 
extended apparatus through which regulatory power is exercised, encompassing ‘the 
government’ as a discrete political organisation, as well as the wider field of action 
referred to by researchers such as Moran as quasi-government: ‘the world of the 
quango [quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organisation]’.17 
 The HSC and HSE are intriguing objects of study because, as quangos, they 
were at once removed from the British government, yet fundamentally influenced by it. 
They evince the state’s complex and evolving relationship with health and safety 
regulation. Established in 1974 and 1975, respectively, the HSC and HSE were formed 
at arm’s length from central government, to ensure the independence of health and 
safety regulation from political interference (before 1974, health and safety regulation 
was the province of government departments).18 The HSC was established as a 
negotiating body with overarching responsibility to promote the health and safety of 
workers and third persons at risk from work activity, such as members of the public. 
Its duties extended to the provision of information and advice, research and publicity, 
as well as the development of health and safety policy: new standards, codes of 
practice, and regulations. Demonstrating the contemporary influence of corporatism, 
or the formal representation of interest groups in policymaking, the HSC comprised a 
                                                
 
 
16  Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and 
Their Critics,” The American Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (1991): 91. 
17  Michael Moran, The British Regulatory State: High Modernism and Hyper-Innovation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 124. 
18  The HSC was abolished in 2008, when it effectively became the management 
board of the new unified HSE. 
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chair appointed by the Secretary of State, in addition to nine or ten other members 
appointed after consultation with employers’ associations, trade unions and local 
authorities.19 TUC and Confederation of British Industry (CBI) representatives 
assumed the first six of HSC’s positions, with the remainder occupied by persons 
representing local authorities and the ‘public interest’. 
 While the HSC assumed policymaking functions previously exercised by 
government, responsibility for enforcing health and safety legislation in factories, 
construction yards and other industrial premises after 1974 fell to the HSE. The HSE 
united 2,800 staff from nine separate government departments and inspectorates. It 
brought under a single organisation several bodies of inspectors that enforced health 
and safety before 1974, including HM Factory Inspectorate and the Mines and 
Quarries Inspectorate. Under the HSWA, the HSE was given responsibility to 
discharge whatever functions the HSC delegated to it.20 While the HSE was therefore 
legally independent from the HSC, in practice it acted as HSC’s operational arm, 
promoting and enforcing health and safety in industrial workplaces across Britain 
(responsibility for non-industrial premises, including offices, fell to local authorities)21. 
Due to its considerable technical expertise, HSE provided HSC with the advice and 
support it needed to develop health and safety policy. Although the HSC had ultimate 
power to approve or deny particular proposals, it was HSE’s policy branches that 
                                                
 
 
19  The concept of corporatism has been most fully drawn out by Keith 
Middlemas. See, in particular Politics in Industrial Society: The Experience of the British 
System since 1911 (London: Deutsch, 1979). 
20  Health and Safety at Work Etc. Act 1974, 1974, sec. 11(4). 
21  Since they were enforcement, as opposed to policymaking bodies, this thesis 
concerns local authorities only as they were influenced by HSC/E policy. 
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prepared HSC’s consultation and discussion documents, composed its draft regulations 
and codes of practice, and serviced HSC’s advisory committees. HSE staff were also 
present at every fortnightly Commission meeting. The HSE thus played a primary role 
in the development of British health and safety policy. 
 Despite the nominal independence of the HSC/E from central government, 
political control was still exerted over them—thus the need to consider them together 
(Figure 1). As the socio-legal scholar Keith Hawkins notes, ministers controlled 
HSC/E’s financial resources, scrutinised their activity, was responsible to Parliament 
for their work, and enacted policies that required HSC/E to behave in particular 
ways.22 Hence, my thesis serves as an important empirical analysis of how the British 
government influenced health and safety regulation. 
                                                
 
 
22  Keith Hawkins, Law as Last Resort: Prosecution Decision-Making in a Regulatory 
Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 159–61; See also Tony Prosser, The 
Regulatory Enterprise: Government, Regulation and Legitimacy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 92. 
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Figure 1. Relationship between the British government, HSC, HSE and local authorities 
 
 
 In analysing the development of the British system of health and safety regulation 
between 1961 and 2001, this thesis highlights two major trends. First, it shows how the 
British state’s role as health and safety regulator has been reconfigured over the last 
half century. Since 1974, the expressed ethos of British health and safety regulation 
has been to promote greater voluntary effort on the part of employers and workers, 
what was described as ‘self-regulation’.23 Although regulations continued to be made, 
the British state’s role was reconceptualised as providing, in the first instance, a 
supportive framework in which voluntary effort could flourish. Health and safety 
legislation after 1974 was specifically drafted to ensure that employers assumed greater 
responsibility for health and safety, while HSC/E’s role was principally conceived as 
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providing advice and assistance to employers, negotiating and drafting the rules that 
allowed employers to take informed action. While HSE inherited an important 
enforcement role, prosecution was considered a tool of last resort.24 In recent decades, 
the British regulatory state has assumed a risk management role, identifying, assessing 
and communicating risks that are acted upon by employers.25 
 A second major trend highlighted by this thesis is the evolution of the concept of 
risk in British regulatory discourse. It reveals how ideas and practices inherent in pre-
1974 health and safety regulation were made more explicit over the last third of the 
twentieth century. In response to political and economic pressure, regulators 
formalised ideas and approaches which were previously ambiguous, such as the 
demand for employers to carry out risk assessments. Through a process of abstraction 
and post-hoc rationalisation, by the 1990s regulators had established a systematic 
approach to workplace hazards based on the explicit assessment and management of 
risks. This enshrined various assumptions, such as that cost is a valid concern when 
deliberating control measures. 
 This introductory chapter describes the conceptual and methodological approach 
of my thesis. Health and safety is a complex and poorly bounded field of research, 
which requires a degree of ‘unpacking’ before it can be analysed. In order to examine 
how and why the British system of health and safety regulation developed, it is thus 
necessary to ask, what is health and safety?   
 
                                                
 
 
24  Hawkins, Law as Last Resort. 
25  Power, The Risk Management of Everything. 
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1.2.  What is Health and Safety? 
Occupational health and safety refers to rules and regulations that protect workers and 
the general public from accidents and ill-health resulting from work or industrial 
activity.26 This simple definition, however, belies a subject of incredible breadth and 
complexity. Alongside these rules and regulations are a plethora of related activities 
which make health and safety uniquely difficult to characterise. In examining ‘health 
and safety’, simultaneously one can be referring to the rules or regulations themselves, 
which influence and structure behaviour;27 the work of policymakers in government or 
regulatory agencies; enforcement by inspectors; efforts by employers and workers to 
prevent workplace accidents and disease; the activities of voluntary or professional 
organisations (e.g. IOSH); lobbying by campaign groups; the work of insurers or 
lawyers; or any number of other things. One can be referring to the health and safety 
of workers, the wider public, or even the impact of industry on the wider environment. 
In a broader and more colloquial sense, the phrase ‘health and safety’ encompasses all 
of these. In speaking of a health and safety ‘system’, the work of these various groups 
are brought together.28 Popular conceptions of health and safety conflate separate areas 
of statutory regulation: food safety, consumer protection, fire safety and public law and 
                                                
 
 
26  http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/health-and-safety, 
accessed August 13, 2015. 
27  As Baldwin reminds us, ‘those engaged in government may proceed by means 
other than by the application or promulgation of rules.’ (Robert Baldwin, Rules and 
Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 3.) This thesis thus considers ‘regulation’ 
as a broad administrative practice utilizing strategies such as education, research, 
training and guidance, as well as the setting of regulations—legal rules—per se. 
28  The CSHW saw the system as comprising both statutory and voluntary 
elements, i.e. those activities which stem from legal requirements, and those which 
arise from effort on the part of employers and workers themselves. See Robens, Safety 
and Health at Work. 
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order. Thus, without strict qualification, health and safety is an extremely tricky object 
of study. As the Committee on Safety and Health at Work (CSHW) recognised in the 
early 1970s, ‘safety and health at work is a vast, diverse and complex field of study. No 
one can speak authoritatively on all its facets and aspects.’29 
 This thesis concentrates on the approach to health and safety taken by the British 
government and regulatory agencies established to oversee and enforce health and 
safety legislation following the HSWA 1974. A major objective is to analyse the 
changing scope of British health and safety regulation over the last third of the 
twentieth century, and its demarcation with other fields, such as environmental 
regulation. In order to meet this objective, and set the boundaries of my research, a 
working definition of ‘health and safety’ is needed. Perhaps the closest thing we have to 
an ‘official’ definition comes from the ILO and World Health Organisation’s joint 
definition not of ‘health and safety’, but of ‘occupational health’: 
 
Occupational health should aim at the promotion and maintenance of the highest degree of 
physical, mental and social well-being of workers in all occupations; the prevention amongst 
workers of departures from health caused by their working conditions; the protection of 
workers in their employment from risks resulting from factors adverse to health; the placing 
and maintenance of the worker in an occupational environment adapted to his physiological and 
psychological capabilities and; to summarize: the adaptation of work to man and of each man to 
his job.30 
                                                
 
 
29
  Ibid., 2. 
30  G. Coppee, “Occupational Health Services and Practice,” ed. J. Stellman et al., 
Encyclopaedia of Occupational Health and Safety (Geneva: International Labour Office, 
1998). 
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While this definition is normative, it captures the various aims of health and safety, 
which are not necessarily complementary with each other, or have figured consistently 
in government or industrial policy. The ILO/WHO’s definition encompasses both 
physical injury (i.e., the ‘safety’ aspect of health and safety) as well as the prevention of 
illness and disease (the ‘health’ aspect). As Chapter 2 highlights, British government 
policy has demonstrated a historical bias towards ‘safety’ rather than ‘health’, 
primarily, because physical injuries are easier and more economic to control. As a 
Ministry of Labour (MOL) official explained in 1960, ‘in practice we classify the work 
as “safety, health and welfare”, which is a more realistic appraisal of its balance, both 
from the official and industrial point of view.’31 
 In this thesis, I use the term ‘health and safety’ in preference to ‘occupational 
health’. This is for three important reasons. Firstly, I believe it better captures the 
diversity and complexity of the field, as well as the bureaucratic and administrative 
aspects evoked in the popular imagination. Secondly, health and safety regulation is no 
longer purely ‘occupational’. Since 1974, British health and safety regulation has 
widened beyond a concern with working conditions to address the impact of industry 
on the wider public and environment. In recent times, much of HSE’s work has been 
oriented towards public safety rather than workers’ health and safety; health and safety 
regulation has thus become decentralised beyond its traditional area of concern, the 
workplace. Thirdly, ‘occupational health’ is used by professionals to refer to more 
explicitly health-related activities, such as promotional campaigns focusing on the 
                                                
 
 
31  K. Kenney, “Memo,” September 15, 1960, TNA LAB 14/934. 
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prevention of occupational disease. Regulations focusing on first-aid, health 
surveillance or toxic substances can be considered to be occupational health—as 
opposed to safety—regulations. Therefore, it is possible to think of occupational health 
as a distinct agenda or concern within health and safety regulation. 
 These conceptual problems are not only relevant to the aims of my thesis. 
Historically, they have had a substantial bearing on the development of health and 
safety regulation. For example, the proposed extension of health and safety legislation 
in the HSWA posed significant administrative problems for civil servants in Whitehall. 
Health and safety legislation threatened to encroach upon areas of policy under the 
control of other government departments, such as the Department of the Environment 
(DOE). The consequent Whitehall row demarcated the boundaries of the post-1974 
regulatory system, whereby health and safety legislation was concerned with the wider 
impact of work on the general public and environment (such as industrial air 
pollution). 
 
1.3.  Literature Review 
 
1.3.1.  Situating Health and Safety 
This literature review has a dual aim. It primary purpose is to situate my study within 
existing academic literature. However, in so doing, I explain my conceptual approach 
to the subject. I define major concepts such as the ‘regulatory state’ and ‘risk society’, 
which I suggest are useful ways to think about the development of health and safety 
regulation.  
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 In view of the conceptual and definitional problems surrounding health and 
safety, it is perhaps unsurprising that the academic literature on health and safety is 
diverse. Three main bodies of academic literature are directly relevant to my study: the 
historical literature on occupational health and safety itself, including occupational 
disease; studies of government and regulation; and the vast literature on ‘risk’ in the 
social and political sciences (Figure 2). Besides this academic literature, there is a 
considerable professional literature on health and safety, primarily directed at 
practitioners such as occupational hygienists or workplace safety representatives. This 
literature is not directly relevant to my objectives, although professional texts have 
introduced me to the foundations of British health and safety law.32 Professional 
journals such as Annals of Occupational Hygiene have included historical articles or 
retrospectives written by former practitioners or regulatory officials.33 These articles 
are considered below where relevant. Moreover, HSC/E have produced historical 
articles to coincide with landmark events or anniversaries.34 These articles are useful 
historical aids, but their analyses are largely superficial. They tend to present a 
sanitised, official version of events, with little exploration of contemporary debates or 
behind-the-scenes discussions.  
                                                
 
 
32  e.g. Phil Hughes and Ed Ferrett, Introduction to Health and Safety at Work. The 
Handbook for the NEBOSH National General Certificate, 5th ed. (Oxford: Elsevier, 2011). 
33  e.g. Tim Carter, “British Occupational Hygiene Practice 1720-1920,” Annals of 
Occupational Hygiene 48 (June 2004): 299–307; Morris Greenberg, “Revising the British 
Occupational Hygiene Society Asbestos Standard: 1968-1982,” American Journal of 
Industrial Medicine 49, no. 7 (2006): 577–604. 
34  e.g. HSE, Thirty Years on and Looking Forward: The Development and Future of the 
Health and Safety System in Great Britain (Sudbury: HSE Books, 2004); D. J. Buchanan, 
Health and Safety Laboratory. A Pictorial History (HSL, 2005). 
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Figure 2. Location of thesis in existing literature 
  
 Despite the enormous literature on health and safety, the late-twentieth-century 
history of British health and safety regulation, and in particular the origins of the 
HSC/E, remain to be actively studied by historians. In this review, I describe the 
important contributions these existing literatures have made to our understanding of 
health and safety in Britain. 
 
1.3.2.  History of Occupational Health and Safety 
The most directly relevant literature to my thesis is the history of occupational health 
and safety, which includes the study of occupational diseases such as asbestosis. Little 
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Victorian public health).35 However, this is no longer the case. Over the last decade, in 
particular, several monographs and journal articles have brought occupational health 
and safety to the forefront of historical attention.  
 My thesis arguably sits on the crest of a wave of historical interest that began in 
the 1980s. In 1985, The Social History of Occupational Health, edited by Weindling, 
attempted to place occupational health at the heart of a ‘social history of 
industrialisation’.36 As such, it attempted to foreground workers’ experiences of 
accidents and ill-health, and analyse the response of workers, businesses, governments, 
trade unions and (in particular) the medical profession to hazards. Emerging out of a 
Society for the Social History of Medicine conference, the book is notable for 
contributions focusing on particular hazards, workers’ compensation, and accidents, 
which became a distinct focus of social history in the 1990s.37 
 To date, the historical literature on occupational health has largely assumed the 
social-historical mantle laid down by Weindling. McIvor, for instance, has extensively 
used oral history interviews to give voice to workers’ experiences of accidents and ill-
health.38 A common approach by historians has been to focus on the diseases of 
particular occupations, such as asbestosis in the asbestos industry, anthrax in wool-
                                                
 
 
35  Paul Weindling, ed., The Social History of Occupational Health (London: Croom 
Helm, 1985), 2–3; Donald Hunter, The Diseases of Occupations (London: English 
Universities Press, 1955); Anthony Wohl, Endangered Lives: Public Health in Victorian 
Britain (London: J. M. Dent, 1983); Helen Jones, Health and Society in Twentieth-
Century Britain (London: Longman, 1994). 
36  Weindling, Social History of Occupational Health, 2. 
37  See Roger Cooter and Bill Luckin, Accidents in History: Injuries, Fatalities and 
Social Relations, Clio Medica (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997). 
38  Arthur McIvor, Working Lives: Work in Britain since 1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013). 
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sorting, and pneumoconiosis in mining.39 This has generated a large body of evidence 
about how occupational diseases are socially constructed and contested in the 
workplace. Common debates have surfaced, such as whether regulation has been 
timely or sufficient (particularly in the case of asbestos), or whether trade unions have 
prioritised pay or job security over the health and safety of their members.40 In this 
regard, recent evidence suggests that trade unions have played a far more active role in 
promoting workers’ health and safety than previously believed, and that compensation 
claims formed a legitimate part of their campaigns, especially among smaller unions.41 
 The history of occupational health and safety has been most fully elaborated in 
the USA, and works of note here come from Sellers, Aldrich and Corn.42  Sellers’ book 
Hazards of the Job explains the origins of industrial hygiene in the USA, and how it 
evolved to be increasingly environmentally focused, laying the foundations for the 
                                                
 
 
39  Geoffrey Tweedale and Philip Hansen, Magic Mineral to Killer Dust: Turner & 
Newall and the Asbestos Hazard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); J. Stark, 
“Bacteriology in the Service of Sanitation: The Factory Environment and the 
Regulation of Industrial Anthrax in Late-Victorian Britain,” Social History of Medicine 
25, no. 2 (2012): 343–61; Arthur McIvor and Ronald Johnston, Miner’s Lung: A History 
of Dust Disease in British Coal Mining (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). 
40  For the historical debate about asbestos see Peter Bartrip, “Too Little, Too 
Late? The Home Office and the Asbestos Industry Regulations, 1931,” Medical History 
42 (1998): 421–38; Morris Greenberg and Nick Wikeley, “Too Little, Too Late? The 
Home Office and the Asbestos Industry Regulations, 1931: A Reply,” Medical History 
43, no. 4 (1999): 508–13; For trade unions, see Weindling, Social History of Occupational 
Health, 10. 
41  Vicky Long, The Rise and Fall of the Healthy Factory: The Politics of Industrial Health 
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42  Christopher Sellers, Hazards of the Job: From Industrial Disease to Environmental 
Health Science (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Mark Aldrich, 
Safety First: Technology, Labor and Business in the Building of American Work Safety 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Jacqueline Corn, Response to 
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modern environmentalist movement.43 Sellers’ argument about industrial hygiene 
dovetails with arguments made by historians elsewhere about an ‘environmental turn’ 
in mid-twentieth-century health and safety discourse, corresponding with the 
emergence and infiltration of risk-based ideas. Burnham’s intellectual history of 
‘accident proneness’ argues that the concept declined in western industrialised 
countries over the twentieth century, as the safety field became populated by chemists 
and engineers, and the idea of ‘risk grouping’ entered the scientific literature on 
accidents.44 In a monograph on British industrial health between 1914 and 1960, Long 
argues that a more ‘holistic vision’ of workers’ health was lost, as a more 
environmentally focussed, hygienic conception of health surfaced. The 1972 Robens 
Report, Long asserts, heralded ‘a more circumscribed discourse of risk minimisation’.45 
My thesis elaborates this idea of an environmental or risk turn. It shows that as 
workplace risks became delocalised over the twentieth century, extending beyond the 
factory gates, occupational health and safety regulation broached upon issues 
concerning the wider environment and public safety. Further, it highlights how risk-
based ideas came to forefront of regulatory discourse. This was reflected not only in 
the demand for employers to conduct formal risk assessments by the 1990s, but for the 
HSC/E to explain their decision-making in explicit risk terms. 
 In Britain, historians have focused largely on the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and in particular the 1914–1945 interwar period, when statutory 
                                                
 
 
43  Sellers, Hazards of the Job. 
44  John C. Burnham, Accident Prone: A History of Technology, Psychology and Misfits of 
the Machine Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
45  Long, The Rise and Fall of the Healthy Factory, 2, 206. 
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intervention in workers’ health and safety was particularly active, owing to the 
exigencies of national productivity. During this time, Long argues, workers’ health was 
considered more comprehensively, viewed from a wider social and economic 
perspective. Progressive factory owners introduced welfare measures for their 
employees, such as canteens and first-aid facilities. Social medicine in the 1930s and 
1940s saw occupational and community health to be closely linked. The factory became 
seen not only as a site of injury and disease, but health improvement and even the 
delivery of health services.46 Long’s approach to occupational health contrasts with 
other historians, who have tended to focus on the hazardous aspects of the workplace, 
rather than its promotional potential for health and wellbeing. 
 While the history of occupational health and safety has flourished in general, the 
same cannot be said of the post-1960 history of British health and safety regulation, in 
particular developments since the HSWA 1974. This remains a curious area of 
historical neglect, especially considering the controversial status health and safety has 
recently assumed. This thesis thus aims to address a glaring lacuna, showing how the 
British state’s approach to health and safety regulation evolved over the last third of 
the twentieth century.   
 
1.3.2.1.  The Origins of British Health and Safety Legislation 
                                                
 
 
46  Helen Jones, “An Inspector Calls: Health and Safety at Work in Inter-War 
Britain,” in The Social History of Occupational Health, ed. Paul Weindling (London: 
Croom Helm, 1985); Vicky Long and Hilary Marland, “From Danger and 
Motherhood to Health and Beauty: Health Advice for the Factory Girl in Early 
Twentieth-Century Britain,” Twentieth Century British History 20 (2009): 454–81; Long, 
The Rise and Fall of the Healthy Factory, passim. 
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Although the British system of health and safety regulation after 1960 remains to be 
extensively studied by historians, we can glean substantial evidence about its origins 
from existing literature. Professional texts such as Redgrave, Fife and Machin have 
provided detailed accounts of the development of British health and safety legislation, 
while the historical work of Bartrip, in particular, has shown how the British 
government has been concerned about the safety, health and welfare of workers for 
over two centuries.47  
 The British system of health and safety regulation evolved out of attempts in the 
early nineteenth century to protect the working hours and conditions of children. In 
1802, the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act extended basic requirements to 
protect the health of pauper apprentices in textile mills, including ventilation and the 
lime-washing of internal walls (to prevent typhus).48 The 1833 Factory Act was notable 
for creating a permanent inspectorate of four individuals (plus superintendents) to 
inspect factories and mills in Great Britain and Ireland. The post of Chief Inspector of 
Factories was created in 1878, and by 1961 the cadre of HM Factory Inspectorate (as 
it became known) had grown to some 426 inspectors.49   
 The health and safety of adult workers developed as a separate concern. The first 
safety precautions applying to adults appeared in the 1844 Factory Act, which required 
                                                
 
 
47  John Hendy and Michael Ford, Redgrave, Fife and Machin. Health and Safety 
(London: Butterworths, 1993); Peter Bartrip, The Home Office and the Dangerous Trades: 
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the fencing of dangerous machinery and the notification of accidents.50 As medical 
knowledge about the occupational causes of disease developed in the late nineteenth 
century, factory legislation expanded to encompass the health of workers in the 
‘dangerous trades’, such as matchmaking. The first medical inspector of factories, 
Thomas Legge, was appointed in 1898.51 Around the same time, legal developments 
placed industrial accident compensation on an insurance model, allowing certain 
workers to claim compensation regardless of fault. By 1906, certain occupational 
diseases (such as anthrax) were scheduled alongside accidents in the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act.52 
 Outside factories, health and safety legislation was slow to develop. While safety 
requirements applied to coal mines as early as 1850, it was not until the 1950s that 
agricultural workers were given statutory protection from occupational accidents and 
disease, including the toxic effects of pesticides.53 By this time, the notional definition 
of the ‘factory’ under the Factories Acts had swollen to encompass such diverse 
premises as warehouses, docks, workshops and construction yards.54 However, it was 
not until 1963 that certain non-industrial workers were covered by the Offices, Shops 
and Railway Premises Act 1963 (OSRPA).55 The HSWA 1974 established a universal 
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system of health and safety protection applying to almost every worker, regardless of 
occupation or workplace. 
 Health and safety legislation developed in a piecemeal fashion, responding to 
particular problems as they arose, rather than taking a principled approach.56 
Industrial disasters aroused public and political attention, and encouraged the reactive 
extension of legislation. For example, the 1862 Hartley Colliery disaster, which killed 
204 miners, was followed by legislation requiring mines to have two shafts.57 In the 
twentieth century, the Factories Act 1959 contained new fire precautions, following a 
deadly mill fire in Keighley, Yorkshire which killed 8 people. As late as 1969, the 
Mines and Quarries (Tips) Act advanced new requirements for spoil tips following the 
catastrophe at Aberfan, South Wales in 1966.58 As the economist Sidney Webb noted 
in 1910, British health and safety legislation was ‘a typical example of English practical 
empiricism. We began with no abstract theory of social justice or the rights of man…. 
Each successive statute aimed at remedying a single ascertained evil.’59     
 By 1961, the result of this practical empiricism was an intricate, detailed and 
fragmented body of law. Although various attempts had been made since the 
nineteenth century to consolidate the law and make it more comprehensible (notably, 
the Factory and Workshop Act 1901 pioneered a new, more flexible legal language, 
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using terms such as ‘reasonable’ and ‘sufficient’60), as of 1961 some 16 million 
workpeople remained to be given statutory protection against occupational accidents 
and disease. Effectively, there was not one ‘system’ of health and safety regulation, but 
multiple, applying to separate industries and processes. Health and safety was a subject 
pertinent to the regulation of particular industries, rather than a domain of regulatory 
activity in its own right. 
 
1.3.2.2.  Limitations of the Existing Historical Approach 
Although this existing literature has expanded our understanding of health and safety, 
it suffers from a number of shortcomings. Firstly, as I have already described, while 
the nineteenth and early twentieth-century history of health and safety in Britain has 
been widely studied, developments after 1960, particularly since the HSWA, have 
escaped historical attention. One possible reason is that historians’ view of health and 
safety has been coloured by a vision of heavy industry that has declined in Britain. 
Between 1980 and 1990, for example, employment in manufacturing declined by 20 
per cent.61 Health and safety in factories and mines has been well-studied, while non-
industrial workplaces have been studied only indirectly. Correspondingly, the 
literature on occupational health has emphasised acute occupational diseases associated 
with heavy industry, while chronic conditions such as stress and heart disease have 
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been overlooked as occupational health issues (though studied extensively in a wider 
public health context).62  
 Secondly, although the post-1960 history of health and safety has not been a 
distinct period of interest, it has been alluded to in histories focusing on earlier periods. 
A common argument in recent years is that occupational health declined in importance 
in late-twentieth-century Britain, particularly after the failure to institute a national 
industrial health service in parallel to the NHS in 1948.63 However, these historians 
have overlooked the important circumstances that intervened after 1948, such as the 
changing shape of the British economy, employment and industrial relations. The 
HSWA 1974 also introduced a markedly new way of regulating health and safety. My 
thesis argues that after 1974, health and safety developed under a very different 
conceptual framework, where ideas about risk became central to the British regulatory 
approach. It is thus problematic to criticise the post-1974 regulatory system without 
having understood the conditions which gave rise to it. 
 Finally, while this hazard or industry-centric approach has provided detailed 
accounts of efforts to prevent accidents and ill-health in particular areas, what is 
ultimately lost is an understanding of the systemic way in which risks are regulated by 
the state, a subject that has been widely explored in the socio-legal and risk literatures 
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(see below). In examining the development of the British system of regulation between 
1961 and 2001, I aim to contribute to the historical literature on occupational health 
and safety by bringing these systemic dimensions into focus.  
 This is not to argue that a systemic or statist approach, focusing on regulation 
and government, is inherently superior to a social historical, hazard or industry-based 
approach. My thesis does not seek to replace the valuable research conducted in recent 
years, which has brought workers’ agency to the forefront of historical attention. 
Rather, it seeks to complement such approaches, highlighting how efforts to combat 
workplace accidents and disease have been structured and shaped by developments at 
the systemic, regulatory level. In so doing, this thesis seeks to enrich our historical 
understanding of developments in Britain since 1961. 
 
1.3.3.  Government and Regulation 
Of course, regulation has been widely studied in other contexts in the history of 
science, technology and medicine. In his study of the Food and Drug Administration in 
the USA, Carpenter demonstrated how concerns about image and reputation pervade 
regulatory decision-making.64 This finding is apposite to the study of British health and 
safety regulation: as Hawkins discovered in his ethnographic study of prosecution 
decision-making in the HSE, in an attempt to promote voluntary effort or ‘self-
regulation’ among employers and workers, HSE consciously projects an image of itself 
as a ‘watchdog’ and advisor, as opposed to a judge or police officer. HSE is also aware 
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of the symbolic impact of prosecution as a way of deterring employers from breaching 
the law.65 
 In terms of health and safety at work, however, regulation has been most actively 
explored in socio-legal studies. Since the early 1980s, the Oxford Centre for Socio-
Legal Studies has illuminated the politics of British health and safety regulation. More 
widely, it has opened up regulation and government to academic study: here, the focus 
is less on health and safety per se, than health and safety in a legal context and for its 
analytical value in terms of the operation of law and government. As Hawkins makes 
clear in terms of his study, the focus is on ‘the regulatory bureaucracy as a legal 
organization, rather than on the victims or their accidents.’66 Consequently, health and 
safety regulations are analysed for their legal status, rather than the requirements they 
impose in the workplace.  
 The socio-legal literature has deconstructed the political philosophy behind 
British health and safety regulation. Wilson argues that the British system, with its 
emphasis on discretion and consensual decision-making, is inherently less 
confrontational than the American system, presided over by the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA).67 Baldwin criticises Robens’ idea of an ‘identity 
of interest’ between employers and workers, claiming it stems from a naive view of 
rules and enforcement.68 Socio-legal historians have traced this ‘conciliatory’ 
philosophy back to the nineteenth-century Factory Inspectorate. Carson argues that 
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the Factory Inspectorate’s very existence as a prosecuting authority, separate from the 
police, resulted in the ‘conventionalization’ of white-collar factory crime.69 Bartrip 
notes that while the first factory inspectors had sweeping powers by twenty-first-
century standards, including the ability to enter premises at any time, their readiness to 
prosecute declined over the nineteenth century. They fell back on a principle of 
‘negotiated compliance’, whereby employers were persuaded, rather than coerced, to 
meet their legal obligations. This was for several reasons, including the need to 
efficiently allocate scarce resources, avoid alienating middle-class businessmen, many 
of whom were magistrates, and to fit in with the management style of their parent 
department, the Home Office.70 The effect of this, according to Moran, was ‘even when 
the Victorian regulatory state developed the formal apparatus of state regulation—
through inspectorates empowered by law—it nevertheless practised something that 
approximated to self-regulation: that is to say, it developed a style of cooperative 
regulation that disavowed sanctions, especially legal sanctions, in the inspection 
process.’71 As Hawkins has shown, this philosophy persists in the self-regulatory ideal 
of HSE inspectors, who use administrative sanctions (improvement and prohibition 
notices) to encourage compliance with the law, in preference to prosecution.72  
 The political science literature is relevant to this thesis in a more theoretical way. 
To understand the conditions that have shaped British health and safety regulation, it 
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is necessary to study wider changes in the nature of government and regulation over 
the last third of the twentieth century. Over the last two decades, a powerful metaphor 
has come to inform academic understanding of these developments: the ‘regulatory 
state’. 
 The regulatory state does not merely refer to the work of regulatory bodies, such 
as government departments or agencies such as HSC/E. In the work of political 
theorists such as Majone, it refers to an interlinked series of changes—a 
reconfiguration—in the way states have gone about regulation. From their perspective, 
the last third of the twentieth century saw a crisis in centralised state control, and 
traditional modes of regulation inspired by Keynesian notions of economic 
management.73 While the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the state 
intervene in many previously unregulated areas of work and public life (demonstrated, 
for example, by the New Deal in the USA), in the late twentieth century, they argue, it 
began to retreat from many of these activities. Since the 1980s, in particular, 
governments have divested themselves of public ownership of industry, one of the 
principal ways they previously exercised regulatory control. Regulation has been 
devolved from central government departments (such as the Department of 
Employment (DE) or Treasury) to independent agencies (such as the HSC or Bank of 
England) which are nominally free from political interference.74 Command-and-control 
forms of regulation, whereby activities are regulated directly through legislation, have 
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given way to forms based on compliance and regimes of enforced self-regulation.75 As a 
result (in the words of Hutter), government has become ‘less direct and less visible’.76 
A new regulatory state has emerged.77 As Moran explains: 
 
[T]he state’s rhetoric … shifted, becoming ‘regulatory’ in a more or less exact sense. The 
most straightforward meaning of regulation is to govern in the sense of balancing a system: 
the regulator in a mechanical system, like a steam engine or central heating system, works 
in exactly this way. That new image of a state steering and balancing social and economic 
systems is exactly captured in the famous metaphor offered in the most influential public 
management handbook of the 1990s: the metaphor of a new kind of state that concentrates 
on ‘steering’ rather than ‘rowing’—on making strategic decisions about the direction of 
government rather than on delivering services.78 
 
This view of decentralised, almost invisible government has obvious parallels with the 
work of Foucault on ‘governmentality’, which influenced the regulatory literature from 
the 1990s. In Foucault’s work, successful government depended on governments 
exercising their power indirectly, getting the governed to modify their own behaviour, 
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almost unconsciously.79 As I demonstrate, one of the overriding aims of British health 
and safety regulation since 1974 has been to create a self-regulating health and safety 
‘culture’ in British industry, encouraging employers and workers themselves to take 
the initiative in promoting a safe, hygienic work environment. 
 The notion that a new form of state has emerged over the last few decades is 
linked with an associated concept. Since at least the early 1980s, it is suggested, there 
has been an acute ‘regulatory crisis’ in which the fundamental rationale of statutory 
regulation has been questioned. As Hutter argues, 
 
There was a strong deregulatory rhetoric, centring on alleged over-regulation, legalism, 
inflexibility and an alleged absence of attention being paid to the costs of regulation. 
Regulatory officials, policies, agencies and rules were all subject to criticism and political 
attack. They were accused of ‘burdening industry’ and inefficiency and ineffectiveness in 
their own operations. During the mid 1980s Britain witnessed waves of deregulatory 
initiatives concerned with the costs of compliance, the over-regulation of business and 
institutional reforms to control this.80 
  
Political studies of British health and safety regulation have highlighted how a 
‘neoliberal’ deregulatory rhetoric emerged under the Conservative government from 
1979, and was carried over into the policies of New Labour from 1997. Further, they 
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have shown how the ‘consensualist’ philosophy of regulation embodied in the 
HSWA—whereby representatives of trade unions and employers’ associations took the 
lead in developing health and safety policy—exposed health and safety to deregulatory 
pressures.81 As Tombs and Whyte argue, ‘put simply, self-regulation is necessarily 
vulnerable to regulatory degradation: if government withdraws from regulatory 
enforcement … and in the absence of countervailing power of trades union within and 
beyond workplaces, then regulation becomes increasingly reliant upon market-based 
mechanisms.’82 
 These arguments about deregulation tap into a critical strand of expert 
commentary about British health and safety regulation which has existed since the 
early 1970s. As Chapter 3 shows, the 1972 Robens Report, which recommended a 
radical overhaul of the existing system of health and safety regulation, was broadly 
accepted at the time by both the Conservative and Labour parties. However, within 
and outside academia, several experts alleged that the CSHW had made invalid 
assumptions about accidents, regulation and the state: namely, that workplace 
accidents stemmed from ‘apathy’ on the part of employers and workers; that there was 
an ‘identity of interest’ between employers and workers in preventing accidents and ill-
health; and that the overdevelopment of British health and safety regulation had 
                                                
 
 
81  Matthias Beck and Charles Woolfson, “The Regulation of Health and Safety in 
Britain: From Old Labour to New Labour,” Industrial Relations Journal 31 (2000): 35–
49; S. Tombs and D. Whyte, “A Deadly Consensus: Worker Safety and Regulatory 
Degradation under New Labour,” British Journal of Criminology 50, no. 1 (2009): 46–65. 
82  Tombs and Whyte, “A Deadly Consensus,” 5. 
 50 
resulted in widespread confusion about legal responsibilities, promoting inertia.83 
Recent works, such as the 2013 edited volume Safety or Profit?, show how these 
assumptions continue to inform British health and safety regulation.84 
 In the extreme, this critical discourse suggests that the state has withdrawn from 
direct intervention in the workplace. However, this interpretation is too simplistic. 
Deregulation can be considered part of the same series of changes that accompanied 
the ‘regulatory state’: rather than intervening in the workplace through public 
ownership or command-and-control legislation, the state now exercises its power more 
indirectly (though no less powerfully). In recent years, for example, the state has 
assumed a more self-conscious role as ‘risk manager’, identifying, assessing and 
communicating risks. As Power argues, much of regulators’ recent emphasis to open 
up their policymaking and ‘proceduralise’ their approach to risk stems from a need to 
protect their reputation and legitimise their activities.85 
 
1.3.4.  Risk 
As Power’s argument suggests, there is a significant interface between the literature on 
government and regulation and the substantial literature on risk in the social sciences. 
A key text which unites the literature on risk with regulation is The Government of Risk, 
which analyses differences between and within states regarding risk regulation. It does 
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this by advancing the device of the ‘risk regulation regime’—‘the complex of 
institutional geography, rules, practice, and animating ideas that are associated with a 
particular risk or hazard.’86 It thus aims to bring analytical weight to macroscopic 
theories such as the ‘risk society’ which overlook crucial national considerations (see 
below), as well as microscopic approaches which focus on particular hazards.87 It is 
this ‘meso-level’ approach, between transnational histories on the one hand, and 
hazard-focused case studies on the other, that I am broadly seeking to emulate. 
 A key objective of this thesis is to analyse the changing conceptualisation of risk 
in British health and safety regulation. The concept of risk has been studied by 
historians before, in more explicitly health-related contexts, such as epidemiology and 
medical technology.88 The history of risk has also been examined in more popular 
works.89 The sociological literature explores how and why risk has increased in 
salience in modern Western society over the past thirty to forty years, employed in 
diverse contexts ranging from financial services to social welfare and the mass media.90 
A key text in this regard is Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society, first published in German in 
1986.91 Risk Society considers how the institutions of modern Western society, from 
science to marriage, have been reorganised in response to the changing social and 
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technological dimensions of risk. Beck defines risk as ‘a systematic way of dealing with 
hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself.’92 According 
to Beck (and other sociologists sharing his view, such as Giddens93), modern Western 
society has undergone a significant rupture over the last thirty to forty years: we have 
entered a new phase of modernity (the risk society) where society has become more 
concerned with the risks of modernisation—with science and technology—than with 
the risks of nature, or what Beck terms the ‘classical industrial society’. (Giddens refers 
to these risks as ‘manufactured risks’.94) The risks of the risk society have several 
features which set them apart from earlier risks: they are often catastrophic in their 
impact, irreversibly altering the wider environment; delocalised, exerting their effects 
far and wide; invisible, requiring scientific observation to render them comprehensible; 
uncertain, eluding easy representation or characterisation; and insidious, only 
manifesting after several years or generations.95 These new dimensions of risk have had 
profound societal effects: not least, they have generated a paradox whereby science 
and technology are relied upon more and more to identify and control risks, at the 
same time that scientific authority and reputation is eroded.96 
 The fundamental idea that a ‘rupture’ has occurred in industrial society remains 
controversial among historians. Since Beck’s work is theoretical, it has promoted 
empirical research to justify his claims. Historians such as Boudia and Cooper have not 
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only tried to historicise the ‘risk society’, but critique the idea that the risks confronted 
by people in the past differed greatly from those confronted by people today.97 Rather, 
perceptions of risk are historically contingent. As Fressoz argues, ‘the historical 
narrative underlying contemporary literature on technological risk is (in part at least) a 
construction which, for the sake of sociological argument, has reduced past risks to 
somewhat reassuring categories.’98 Notwithstanding these efforts, other academics such 
as Green have claimed that the burgeoning literature on risk no longer serves any 
fruitful purpose. This is because the concept of risk is a ‘second order’ level of inquiry 
which obscures the real object of study, such as citizenship.99  
 Risk might be a second order level of inquiry—in the same respect as industrial 
change, political developments or economic trends—but one which is nevertheless 
central to the development of regulatory systems. British health and safety regulation is 
now specifically couched in terms of risk. Not only is formal risk assessment an 
established part of the regulatory approach to occupational hazards, but HSE has 
produced a sophisticated treatment of the risk-based principles that inform its decision-
making.100 In order to understand the development of the British system of health and 
safety regulation, therefore, it is essential to account for the emergence and evolution of 
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these ideas.101 My concern is with how British regulators (including HSC/E) explicitly 
recognised and responded to the changing dimensions of risk. Thus, health and safety 
provides a critical case study of the emergence and application of risk in a major area 
of regulation and political concern. 
 
1.3.5.  Summary 
My thesis draws upon the contributions of several disciplines. The history of 
occupational health and safety forms the core foundation for my thesis, and is my 
primary field of contribution. However, to date the post-1960 history of health and 
safety regulation in Britain has not received adequate attention. Regulation has been 
extensively studied elsewhere, notably in the political sciences. However, the exercise 
here has not been to understand health and safety per se, but law or government: 
health and safety as a case study. Finally, considering the relevance of risk to health 
and safety—risk assessments are a cornerstone of health and safety regulation today—
it is remarkable that no formal effort has been made within the history of science, 
technology and medicine to integrate it with the historiography of occupational health. 
A history that, inter alia, considers how officials responded to the changing dimensions 
of risk, regulation and governance in Britain, thus has an enormous contribution to 
make to our understanding of health and safety. 
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1.4.  Method 
 
1.4.1.  Chronological Scope 
This thesis covers an eventful forty-year period in the history of British health and 
safety regulation. I decided to concentrate on the period 1961–2001 principally because 
it has received very little historical attention. This is despite significant events during 
the period that shaped the current regulatory system: the HSWA 1974, for instance, 
established a comprehensive system of protection that extended statutory coverage to 
every worker. The forty-year timeframe was sufficiently broad to analyse the evolution 
of particular ideas in British regulatory discourse (such as risk), without the topic 
being unmanageable. The period is bounded by two important events in the history of 
British health and safety regulation: the passage of the Factories Act 1961, the last of 
the Factories Acts dating back to the early nineteenth century, and the publication of 
HSE’s discussion document Reducing Risks, Protecting People in 2001, which outlined its 
risk-based approach to decision-making.102 This is arguably an unusual choice of 
timeframe, because it has been customary for academics and professionals (including 
HSE) to start their studies from either 1972, the publication of the Robens Report, or 
1974, the year of the HSWA.103 However, it is an illuminating one: by commencing my 
research from 1961, I have been able to set developments after 1974 in wider historical 
context. I have been able to analyse the major changes in regulation that accompanied 
the HSWA, and the development of ideas that that informed the current regulatory 
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system. This is vital to understand the development of these ideas over the subsequent 
thirty years. 
 
1.4.2.  Data Collection and Sources 
In order to deconstruct the historical conditions that shaped the British system of 
health and safety regulation, my thesis draws upon a wide range of material, including 
archival sources, published documents, and oral history interviews. It is principally 
comprised of an analysis of written material (both published and archival) pertaining 
to the HSC, HSE and their predecessors in the British government from 1961. The 
goal of my analysis was to identify major events, moments or changes in the regulatory 
system, as well as important developments in regulatory policy (for example, the need 
for regulators after 1980 to carry out formal cost-benefit analyses of new proposals). 
My analysis was also designed to identify the wider historical conditions that shaped, 
influenced or gave rise to these developments: economic factors such as recession, 
political factors such as deregulatory rhetoric, and social factors such as regulators’ 
awareness of the changing public perception of risks.  
 These objectives were achieved by analysing a wide range of primary sources. 
Their historical significance was deconstructed by cross-referencing them with 
alternative sources from the same and other periods. I focused on the informational 
content of the sources (for example proposals for new regulations) and in particular 
the language employed by historical actors, such as HSE officials. I analysed the 
situational and institutional context of the sources (that is, who the sources were 
written by, to whom they were directed, when and in what setting), and I explored 
their wider context by comparing them with sources from ‘outside’ the regulatory 
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system (such as contemporary news stories), and secondary sources such as studies of 
government and regulation.104 Central to my analysis is an understanding of the 
historical connotations of particular concepts, such as ‘health and safety’ and ‘risk’. My 
perspective here was both ‘diachronic’ and ‘synchronic’—that is, I sought to 
understand how the meanings of these terms changed over time, and identified 
multiple expressions of them at particular historical moments and junctures.105 
 My research had two initial starting points. The first was the published annual 
reports of the HSC/E and inspectorates that enforced health and safety legislation 
before 1974 (such as HM Factory Inspectorate). These publications—aimed 
technically at Secretaries of State, but in practice a professional audience—contained a 
wealth of material about contemporary hazards, regulatory activities (such as 
campaigns or initiatives, new regulations or codes of practice), statistical data, as well 
as administrative information such as financing and staffing. Forewords gave concise 
and often frank information about the challenges faced by officials. While intended, in 
part, to influence government ministers and therefore not a completely unbiased 
account of their activities (for example, HSC/E reports in the early 1980s expressed 
concern about the impact of financial cuts), a preliminary analysis of these documents 
enabled me to identify events which had lasting implications for the British regulatory 
system, such as the passing of the European Framework Directive on Safety and 
                                                
 
 
104  Miriam Dobson and Benjamin Ziemann, eds., Reading Primary Sources: The 
Interpretation of Texts from Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century History (Abington: 
Routledge, 2009), 12. 
105  Ibid., 6. 
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Health in 1989.106 Moreover, they allowed me to identify general political and 
economic trends, which were analysed in further depth using archival sources and oral 
history interviews. Annual reports thus formed the surface level of my analysis. 
 My second starting point was the 1972 report of the Committee on Safety and 
Health at Work (CSHW).107 The culmination of a two-year inquiry, the report 
recommended a radical overhaul of the existing regulatory approach, which had 
developed since the nineteenth century. The majority of its proposals were enacted in 
the HSWA 1974, which established the current, ‘risk based’ regulatory system, as well 
as HSC/E. By analysing the report’s proposals, and the rationale for these changes, I 
could identify the ideas and principles on which the current regulatory system rested. I 
could also evaluate the major differences in approach between the current (HSWA) 
and former (Factories Act) models of regulation. An analysis of the Robens Report, 
together with its volume of written evidence, was thus vital to understand the evolving 
dimensions of the British regulatory system. 
 Other essential sources included proceedings into major disasters (such as the 
1966 Aberfan Disaster), HSE discussion, consultation and guidance documents, 
Parliamentary bills and Acts, and major UK statutory instruments (regulations) made 
under the HSWA. The government website, www.legislation.gov.uk was a crucial 
digital resource for historical and current legislation. More generally, this thesis has 
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107  Robens, Safety and Health at Work; Lord Robens, Safety and Health at Work: 
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relied on digitised historical records. House of Commons Parliamentary Papers proved 
indispensable in terms of government reports, command papers and reports of 
Parliamentary committees. Further, Hansard provided a vital gateway into historical 
government policy. While the aim of this thesis was not to analyse changing public 
attitudes towards health and safety in Britain, it has been necessary to consult some 
historical newspaper articles to situate developments in wider social and political 
context. The Times Digital Archive was useful in this respect, as was the digitised 
archive of The Daily Mail.  
 Physical archival material came from two main sources. The National Archives 
(TNA) in Kew, Surrey was the main source of archival material. As the national 
repository for historical government records, it contains the papers of government 
departments, such as the Ministry of Labour (MOL) and Department of Employment 
(DE), which regulated health and safety before 1974. The records of the HSC/E are 
also available. Material of interest from TNA included the memoranda and reports of 
HSC advisory committees, correspondence between civil servants on major aspects of 
health and safety policy, Cabinet Office minutes and the agenda, and the minutes and 
circulated papers of the CSHW. Despite the existence of the ‘thirty-year rule’ for 
disclosure of government records, more recent records of the HSC/E have been 
opened to public access. This meant I was able to access material from as recently as 
2005 without the need to file freedom of information requests.  
   A second major source of archival material was the Modern Records Centre at 
the University of Warwick. This contains the archives of the Trades Union Congress 
(TUC), the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), and its predecessor, the British 
Employers’ Confederation (BEC). An analysis of trade union and employer documents 
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was necessary to explore the wider political dimensions of particular developments, 
such as the making of new regulations. Health and safety policy in these bodies was 
coordinated by two major committees: the TUC Social Insurance and Industrial 
Welfare Committee, and the CBI Safety, Health and Welfare Committee. Due to their 
close relationship with the HSC, however (both the TUC and CBI were represented 
on the Commission), the National Archives also proved a fruitful source for trade 
union and employer material. For instance, consultation documents described in detail 
the reaction of employers, trade unions and other groups to proposed health and safety 
policies. Correspondence between the government, TUC and BEC/CBI also allowed 
me to analyse the political context of particular developments. Since these went back 
and forth, the content of these archives was often complementary (respondents to 
letters or memoranda often keeping copies of the original). This revelation during my 
research enabled me to focus the majority of my efforts on the National Archives, and 
the policy documents that circulated between the major actors (the HSC, HSE, TUC, 
CBI and British government departments such as the DE). Nevertheless, the TUC and 
CBI archives were vital for more private views which were not widely aired. A further, 
more condensed source of ‘political’ material, however, was the records of 
Parliamentary committees such as the House of Commons Employment Committee. 
Their scrutiny of British health and safety legislation and the operation of HSC/E in 
the 1980s and 1990s helped bring employer and union views to the surface.  
 The volume and diversity of archival material meant I had to choose my sources 
carefully. To locate necessary files, I employed keyword searching of archival 
catalogues. Preliminary analysis of published documents enabled me to identify 
relevant keywords and phrases (such as ‘risk assessment’, ‘COSHH’ or ‘European 
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Commission’). These were then inputted into search engines and the results filtered by 
date and department to retrieve documents, which were prioritised for viewing 
depending on their relevance. A limitation of this approach was that it was dependent 
on the extent to which the archive was indexed. However, in cases where meta-data 
was insufficient or vague (for example, the minutes of the CSHW) this was 
counteracted by viewing records chronologically to find material of interest. A 
serendipitous benefit of this approach, however, was that relevant material was found 
outside the archives of the HSC/E; for example, I retrieved material from the Civil 
Service Machinery of Government group, which deliberated the establishment of the 
HSC/E following the publication of the Robens Report between 1972 and 1974. 
 A final source of material was my interviewees, who kindly lent me their private 
books, documents and memoranda. These provided an invaluable snapshot of political 
decision-making at particular points in time, and may never have been made accessible 
through other sources. 
 
1.4.3.  Oral History Interviews 
Health and safety policy makes for dry and impersonal reading without an 
appreciation of the efforts of those who have worked and campaigned for it. 
Supplementing my document analysis was therefore an oral history project collecting 
the spoken testimonials of former staff and policymakers in the HSC/E, including trade 
union and employer representatives. My objective was twofold: to unearth details 
which were unavailable or hidden in documents, and to emphasise the personal 
experiences and memories of those who helped draft, negotiate and implement 
important health and safety policies and legislation. These interviews were patently 
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‘elite’ in character, directed at highly skilled, professional persons. My intention was to 
collate a range of responses from individuals about events and trends in the regulatory 
system. Although I discussed technical topics, my intention was not to elicit ‘official’ 
versions of events, but personal experiences and opinions. This was reflected in my 
decision to adopt a semi-structured rather than closed interview format. 
 The technical nature of health and safety meant that the interviews had a high 
‘barrier to entry’ in terms of factual knowledge. To compensate for this, I conducted 
significant background research before each interview, for example on health and 
safety law. The difficulties posed by ‘barriers to entry’ to my research were very similar 
to those confronted by the labour historian Beatrice Webb (wife of Sidney, quoted 
above), who wrote in 1926: ‘To cross-examine a factory inspector without 
understanding the distinction between a factory and a workshop … is an impertinence. 
Especially important is a familiarity with technical terms and a correct use of them. To 
start interviewing any specialist without this equipment will not only be a waste of 
time, but may lead to more or less courteous dismissal, after a few general remarks and 
some trite opinions….’108 
 Initially, informants were identified through word of mouth (including LSHTM 
professional networks) and archival research. After initial contact was made with 
respondents, identification proceeded in a naturalistic ‘snowball’ fashion so that access 
to further informants was granted. As a supplementary source of data designed to 
illuminate the personal agency of individuals rather than to construct generalisations 
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Oxford University Press, 2000), 224. 
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about policymakers, my aim was not to gather a ‘representative sample’ of 
interviewees. However, over the course of two years I managed to interview eight 
individuals from HSC/E, including TUC and CBI representatives. Unfortunately, it 
proved difficult to arrange interviews with certain individuals who have been 
outspoken in their criticism of British health and safety policy. Nevertheless, through 
personal correspondence I was able to take account of their opinions, and I was also 
pointed in the direction of valuable journal articles, news stories, interviews and other 
documents.  
 My interviews were tailored to each individual, and drew on a mixture of direct 
and open-ended questions. This allowed the informant to guide the conversation into 
areas they found interesting, as opposed to relying on prompts.109 While each interview 
was conducted separately, on one occasion, the interview was conducted in the 
presence of another individual I had previously interviewed. This generated a different 
dynamic to my other interviews, but a productive one: according to Berridge, the 
presence of a familiar individual ‘can strike sparks and give material which would 
never come from an individual interview.’110 At the same time, however, I was 
conscious that my informants could (re)write their own histories. Some of my 
interviewees had well-documented opinions on particular events or phenomena in the 
British regulatory system, although these were not necessarily ‘official’ narratives. For 
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that reason, the necessity to gather different opinions and perspectives on particular 
topics was paramount. 
 With the exception of one interview, conducted at LSHTM, all interviews were 
conducted at mutually convenient times at the informants’ own homes. This was not 
merely for my informants’ convenience (though this was important), but to promote an 
atmosphere conducive to candour. The length of each interview was decided by my 
informants. They ranged from one hour to over three and a half. 
 My original intention was not to fully transcribe these interviews, due to time 
constraints. Nevertheless, over the course of writing this thesis it proved useful to 
partially transcribe them, primarily to bring to the fore personal agency, but also to 
facilitate analysis. I transcribed my interviews with varying degrees of detail, 
depending on the content of the discussion: they ranged from more note-like records of 
conversation, to more in-depth transcripts. 
 Naturally, ethical considerations were central to my methodology. Aside from the 
‘expert’ status of my informants, their age and health were important factors: while 
giving them ample opportunity to contribute their experiences, I did not want to put 
undue pressure on them. Thus, in addition to deciding the time, length and location of 
our meeting, my informants could decide to stop the interview, or withdraw from the 
study, at any time. Memory was a significant additional issue, with retirees in their 
seventies and eighties being prompted to reflect back on events thirty or even forty 
years ago. This demanded that I pay particularly close attention to the subjectivity of 
my informants’ accounts: their artificiality, variability and partiality as well as 
intersubjective factors arising out of the interaction between interviewer and 
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informant.111 To ensure that I developed a considered account of historical events and 
trends, I cross-referenced my informants’ accounts with each other and with historical 
documents. 
 My project was granted ethical approval from the LSHTM Observational 
Research Ethics Committee. The approval process ensured that I had fully considered 
my informants’ legal and moral rights: these included their right to know my aims, the 
purpose of their contribution, any resulting copyright implications, and what would 
happen to research material at the end of the study. Informed consent was therefore 
vital. To achieve this, a detailed information sheet and consent form was sent to my 
informants in advance of the interview, and further explained in person. The consent 
form explicitly required my informants to specify whether they gave me permission to 
audio record the interview, publish direct named quotations (consulting with them 
where appropriate), and whether I could deposit the recordings and related material in 
a public archive. If so desired, my informants could choose to remain anonymous. 
However, all chose to ultimately waive this right to allow me to directly attribute their 
experiences. An example consent form is found in Appendix VI. This form closely 
followed the ethical guidelines for historians laid down by the UK Oral History 
Society.112  
 While the majority of my informants gave unqualified permission for me to 
publish direct quotes, three requested that I consult them in the event of publication, to 
give them opportunity to clarify, amend or expand on certain remarks. As a result of 
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the electronic publication of this thesis, minor alterations have been made to certain 
quotes to reflect my informants’ preferences, although none of these alterations change 
the overall meaning of the quotes in any significant way.113  
 Respecting the wishes of my informants, and following ESRC funding guidelines, 
arrangements will be made to deposit the audio recordings at the UK Data Archive in 
Colchester, Essex, following completion of the study. 
 
1.5.  Thesis Overview 
With multiple overlapping and intersecting themes, the history of British health and 
safety regulation eludes both a straightforward chronological narrative and thematic 
approach. To structure this thesis, I have therefore taken advantage of major 
developments, ruptures and periods of transformation in British health and safety 
legislation. For example, Chapter 2 focuses on the period leading up to the 
appointment of the CSHW, under the pre-1974 Factories Act model of regulation. In 
contrast, Chapter 4 focuses on HSC/E’s inaugural decade. Between 1974 and 1984, 
HSC/E operated under the same chair and Director-General. It therefore forms a 
discrete period where I can analyse the impact of the new regulatory bodies. 
                                                
 
 
113 It is commonplace for many historians to return transcripts back to informants 
for correction, especially when the subject-matter is highly technical. This was not 
done in my case, but the implications for ‘approved quotations’ are the same: 
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authenticity’ of my oral evidence, my informants’ original comments will be made 
available through the archived audio recordings. See Thompson, The Voice of the Past, 
263.  
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 The thesis is presented chronologically where possible, with temporary diversions 
to set particular developments in wider context. For example, in explaining how and 
why the HSC/E systematised their approach to risk management in Chapter 6, I break 
away from the wider timeframe of the chapter (1992–2001) to show how developments 
in British government and society since the early 1980s encouraged regulators to open 
up their policymaking process. To aid navigation, however, I have adopted certain 
conventions. For instance, following the introduction and overview in every chapter, I 
have a contextual section analysing the wider influences on regulation, such as changes 
in British politics, the economy or structure of industry. 
 Chapter 2 analyses the period between the Factories Act 1961 and the 
appointment of the Committee on Safety and Health at Work (CSHW). It highlights 
how a distinct set of political, economic, legal and epidemiological pressures converged 
over the 1960s to call into question the state’s existing approach to health and safety 
regulation, which was largely based on the piecemeal development of detailed and 
prescriptive laws. These encouraged the British government, by 1970, to seek an 
entirely new approach to regulation. 
 Chapter 3, focusing on the period 1970–1974, considers the enormous changes 
set in motion by the CSHW and HSWA 1974. During this time, important decisions 
were made, including by Whitehall officials, which determined the subsequent shape, 
scope and style of the British regulatory system, as well as the roles of the proposed 
HSC/E. The CSHW’s fundamental conclusion was that the existing regulatory 
approach was no longer adequate to protect workers and others who could be injured 
or made ill by work activity. It therefore recommended a radical overhaul of 
regulation, including a new, single comprehensive statute. Chapter 3 shows that British 
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health and safety regulation became dominated by concerns about voluntary effort or 
‘self-regulation’, and that the HSWA implicitly incorporated risk-based ideas and 
principles.  
 Chapter 4 focuses on the newly established HSC/E, and charts their efforts to 
improve health and safety over their inaugural decade (1974–1984). Examining the 
impact of the Thatcher government from 1979, it reveals how scientific and political 
demands were instrumental in establishing the conditions for an explicit ‘risk 
management’ approach to regulation. Not least, techniques of risk analysis and 
assessment were pioneered during these years that were later promoted across British 
health and safety regulation as a whole. The emergence of a strong deregulatory 
rhetoric under the Thatcher government (1979–1990) also placed pressure on the 
HSC/E to justify new regulations on the basis of risk, through formal cost-benefit 
analysis. 
 Chapter 5 examines the period 1984–1992, corresponding to the time between 
the passing of the Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazard Regulations 1984 
(CIMAH), and the European ‘six-pack’ of 1992. This package of six sets of regulations 
contained provisions, such as for display screens and manual handling, which are now 
an integral part of British (and European) health and safety regulation. During this 
period, HSC/E’s responsibilities increased significantly, promoted by factors beyond 
their direct control (such as industrial disasters). At the same time, the British 
government stepped up pressure to deregulate the system and make it more efficient. 
The European Commission began to play a dominant role in setting the British policy 
agenda, supplanting the HSC as the primary source of health and safety regulations. 
Most importantly, the language and practice of risk management began to crystallise, 
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as an explicit and formalised means for employers to evaluate and control hazards.  
Risk assessments became an overt requirement for employers under a host of new 
regulations, most notably the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 
1988 (COSHH). 
 The final chapter, Chapter 6, analyses the period between the passing of the six-
pack and the publication of HSE’s discussion document, Reducing Risks, Protecting People 
in 2001.114 During this time, HSC/E elaborated and systematised their approach to risk 
management as a way of justifying their decision-making to government, interest 
groups and the wider public. Occupational health rose up the policy agenda, and was 
linked to wider public health strategies. Further, the Labour government (1997–2007) 
introduced a new strategy to ‘reboot’ the British health and safety system as it entered 
the twenty-first century. However, while the British workplace was in some respects 
safer than ever before, the right-wing British media began to criticise health and safety 
regulation as a problem of bureaucracy and red-tape. As the twentieth century drew to 
a close, the foundations for the current public and political malcontent with ‘elf and 
safety’ had been firmly laid. 
 This thesis presents a complex argument of continuity and change. It shows that 
many of the principles that informed pre-1974 health and safety regulation, and even 
Victorian regulation, were alive and well under the HSWA, and continue to influence 
regulation. However, the state’s role in promoting health and safety has been 
completely reconfigured. Over the last forty years, it has sought to progressively 
distance itself from direct intervention in the work environment, promoting self-
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regulation on the part of employers and workers, and delegating regulatory 
responsibility to quangos outside the central government machine, overseen by 
representatives of interest groups. Yet, this must not be interpreted as a complete 
withdrawal, or abrogation of responsibility: through risk, the state has assumed a new 
supervisory role that allows it to take heed of public opinion, and conduct its 
policymaking in an ostensibly transparent, informed manner. Ultimately, the British 
system of health and safety regulation has been shaped by a host of political, economic, 
social and cultural pressures. However, by analysing the system’s changing 
dimensions, we can examine the increasingly central but controversial position health 
and safety has assumed in our lives. 
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2.  A Broken System, 1961–1970 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
Chapter 2 highlights how a distinct set of political, economic, legal and epidemiological 
pressures converged over the 1960s to call into question the British state’s approach to 
occupational health and safety regulation.1 As Chapter 1 described, the British state’s 
interest in protecting the safety, health and welfare of workers evolved piecemeal since 
the nineteenth century. In 1961, the Factories Act consolidated a series of measures 
developed over the twentieth century to safeguard workers in factories, construction 
yards and other industrial premises. The 1961 Act formed the last in a long line of 
statutes dating back to 1802, and advanced a detailed, prescriptive approach to 
working conditions. By 1967, Ministry of Labour (MOL) officials had identified the 
need to revise the 1961 Factories Act. However, by this time political concerns had 
emerged that questioned the effectiveness of the Factories Act model of regulation. In 
1970, the Employment and Productivity Secretary, Barbara Castle, appointed the 
Committee on Safety and Health at Work (CSHW) to review the existing approach. 
The CSHW’s appointment marks the point at which the British government lost faith 
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with the ability of the existing system to address the evolving problems of safety and 
health in the British workplace, and sought an entirely new solution to these problems. 
 Considering the lengthy history of British statutory intervention in working 
conditions, this chapter seeks to understand why it was only in the 1960s that the 
Factories Act model of regulation began to be openly questioned by government 
officials, trade unionists and others with an interest in health and safety. It 
demonstrates how several trends particular to the 1960s came together to promote a 
reappraisal of the British state’s role in regulating health and safety. In particular, 
Britain’s industrial accident record and changing industrial landscape exposed the 
deficiencies of a detailed, prescriptive approach. New, more complex risks emerged 
that required new solutions on the part of government and industry. Together with 
concerns about Britain’s low productivity and deteriorating industrial relations, 
regulatory attention turned to the management of health and safety, and the promotion 
of voluntary effort by employers and workers. By the late 1960s, factory inspectors and 
other officials believed that the further proliferation of health and safety law was no 
longer viable. 
 While the British state’s role in regulating occupational hazards came under 
political scrutiny, the scope of health and safety legislation also increased dramatically. 
The Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963 (OSRPA) extended legal coverage 
to an estimated 8 million workers in non-industrial premises for the first time. 
However, by 1970 some 5–8 million workers still remained outside its protective remit, 
and government efforts began to extend comprehensive statutory protection to all 
employees. Questions also emerged towards the end of the decade about the health and 
safety of non-employees who could be harmed by work activity. Industrial disasters, 
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such as the landslide at Aberfan, Wales in 1966, revealed how occupational hazards 
could extend beyond the work gates to devastate entire communities. Such 
catastrophes highlighted the delocalised nature of risks in a fast developing industrial 
society, and how employers needed to consider the impact of their activities on the 
wider populace. 
 Despite these questions about the nature and scope of health and safety 
legislation, Castle’s decision to appoint the CSHW was ultimately taken strategically. 
In the political climate of the day, the appointment of an ‘independent’ committee 
representing a broad spectrum of political opinion was one of the few ways that radical 
solutions could be sought which were acceptable to ‘both sides of industry’: trade 
unions and employers. The CSHW was thus used as a device to break through the 
political impasse that inhibited earlier reform efforts.  
 During this period, trade unions and employers assumed different beliefs about 
the direction of health and safety. Trade unions, represented by the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC), thought that existing health and safety law needed strengthening, 
while large employers, represented by the British Employers’ Confederation (BEC) 
and its successor, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), believed that the law 
was too complex, discouraging individual responsibility. Regardless of these 
differences, health and safety was an active area of cooperation between the TUC and 
BEC/CBI in the 1960s. They were represented on several committees and councils at 
industry and national level that advised the government on health and safety issues. 
They also carried out joint initiatives to promote industrial accident prevention. The 
question of whether a true political ‘consensus’ existed between government, industry 
and the trade unions at this time is a fiercely debated historical topic (see below). 
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However, the close relationships evidenced in the health and safety field demonstrate 
that it was one area where employers and trade unions could fruitfully engage with 
each other, if not always agree. 
 
2.2.  Overview 
The nature of the political relationship between the British government, trade unions 
and employers is analysed below. My evidence demonstrates that attempts by the 
British government to intervene in workplace health and safety closely followed its 
wider industrial relations policy. In section 2.4, however, I continue the historical 
discussion of health and safety legislation in Chapter 1 by describing the regulatory 
landscape in the 1960s: a labyrinthine and fragmented mass of law which left up to 16 
million workers without statutory protection from industrial harms. The chapter 
proceeds to analyse the two major trends outlined above: the calling into question of 
the prevailing model of regulation, and the growing need to extend statutory coverage 
to all British workers and ‘third persons’ at risk from work activity.  
 
2.3.  The Politics of Safety and Health in 1960s Britain 
While there is a vast literature on 1960s British industrial relations, little has been 
written on the politics of health and safety immediately prior to the CSHW. As 
Chapter 1 explained, historians have tended to concentrate on the nineteenth and 
early-twentieth-century history of health and safety. The Committee and its report is 
often viewed as the de facto start of the ‘modern’ system of health and safety 
regulation, rather than the product of longer-term historical trends. Consequently, its 
1972 report is often viewed in isolation.  
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 There are two notable exceptions. In a work on safety management and self-
regulation, Dawson and her colleagues attempt to place the CSHW in contemporary 
political and legislative context.2 They note that efforts to legislate for safety 
committees in the late 1960s were intimately bound with moves by the British 
government to intervene more strongly in industrial relations. The CSHW’s 
appointment, they suggest, could only occur at a time when the prevailing philosophy 
of voluntarism in industrial relations was under political attack. Beck and Woolfson 
have similarly placed the CSHW in the contemporary industrial relations context.3 
They argue that the CSHW was prompted by rising political concern about industrial 
accidents, and trade union demands for worker safety representatives to be given a 
statutory right of inspection. 
 This chapter offers a more nuanced understanding of the rationale for regulatory 
reform, drawing upon a rich vein of archival material. It shows that while reform was 
indeed prompted by rising concern about accidents, factory inspectors and other 
government officials had lost confidence in the system’s effectiveness. By 1967 
administrative needs had also emerged that required revision of existing health and 
safety legislation. 
 Demand for reform emerged from a unique set of economic and political 
circumstances. During the 1960s, the trade unions were at their strongest, politically 
and in terms of membership. As of 1964, 10 million workers—44 per cent of British 
                                                
 
 
2  Sandra Dawson et al., Safety at Work: The Limits of Self-Regulation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 10–11. 
3  Beck and Woolfson, “The Regulation of Health and Safety in Britain,” 37. 
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employees—were trade union members.4 This compared to 7.4 million workers, 29.1 
per cent, in 2003.5 Historians often interpret the early 1960s to constitute a period 
when the alleged ‘post-war consensus’ in British politics remained intact. Definitions of 
‘consensus’ vary, but in general, it is argued that both Conservative and Labour 
governments after the Second World War shared certain convictions, for instance a 
belief in the welfare state, full employment, economic management, and the close 
incorporation of trade union and employer viewpoints in policymaking (corporatism).6 
In the sphere of industrial relations, both Conservative and Labour governments 
adopted laissez-faire or abstentionist policies, believing that collective bargaining was 
best pursued voluntarily.    
 Towards the end of the 1960s, it is suggested, the post-war consensus began to 
come under strain.7 From 1965, Harold Wilson’s Labour government attempted to 
intervene more strongly in industrial relations to arrest the growing problem of strikes. 
While the 1965–68 Donovan Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations broadly endorsed the voluntarist approach (see below), the 1969 white 
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paper In Place of Strife proposed several contentious new policies, including a 
mandatory 28-day cooling-off period for strike action.8 
 The issue of whether a true political consensus, or corporatist system of 
government existed at this time is hotly debated.9 Certainly, it is the case that trade 
unions and employers’ associations were closely consulted by the government on health 
and safety and other issues, sitting on several bodies at industry and national level 
which advised ministers. These included the Industrial Safety Sub-Committee of the 
National Joint Advisory Council (NJAC), a tripartite body that advised the MOL on 
industrial relations, first established in 1939.10 Employers and trade unions were also 
represented on the Industrial Health Advisory Committee (IHAC), a body charged 
with coordinating and promoting the development of industrial health services, first 
established in 1943.11  
 Despite growing disagreement between the government, trade unions and 
employers over economic and industrial relations policy in the late 1960s, Chapter 2 
demonstrates that health and safety was relatively uncontentious. This interpretation is 
supported by other studies, which emphasise the relative harmony of the British 
approach to health and safety, in comparison to the ‘adversarial’ approach of other 
                                                
 
 
8  In Place of Strife. A Policy for Industrial Relations, Cmnd. 3888, 1969. 
9  Richard Toye, “From ‘Consensus’ to ‘Common Ground’: The Rhetoric of the 
Postwar Settlement and Its Collapse,” Journal of Contemporary History 48, no. 1 (2013): 
3–23; David Marsh and Wyn Grant, “Tripartism: Reality or Myth?,” Government and 
Opposition 12, no. 2 (1977): 194–211. 
10  In 1967 this was replaced by the Industrial Safety Advisory Council (ISAC), a 
body with wider membership drawn from professional and voluntary organisations, 
including the British Insurance Association, Royal Society for the Prevention of 
Accidents, and nationalised industries. 
11  Long, The Rise and Fall of the Healthy Factory, 161–173. 
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countries, especially the USA.12 While the TUC and CBI disagreed on particular 
issues, such as safety committees, a broad consensus emerged by the end of the 1960s 
that the regulatory system needed urgent reform.  
 
2.4.  The Regulatory Landscape in the 1960s 
British health and safety legislation in the 1960s was highly complex. A multitude of 
separate Acts protected workers in separate industries and occupations. These Acts, 
along with their subordinate regulations, had their own unique histories: they were 
administered by separate government departments, and enforced by several 
government inspectorates. Effectively, there was not one ‘system’ of health and safety 
regulation, but multiple competing and overlapping systems.  
 As of 1961, four Acts directly legislated for workers’ health and safety ( 
Figure 3). Mines and quarries were regulated by the Mines and Quarries Act 1954, 
which was administered by the Ministry of Power, and enforced by HM Mines and 
Quarries Inspectorate. Work in agriculture was covered by two Acts: the Agriculture 
(Poisonous Substances) Act 1952, and the Agriculture (Safety, Health and Welfare 
Provisions) Act 1956. These were enforced by officials reporting to the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), in England and Wales, and the Department 
of Agriculture and Fisheries in Scotland. A diverse range of other industrial premises, 
including factories, workshops, docks and construction yards, were regulated by the 
Factories Act 1961. This was administered by the MOL and enforced, primarily, by 
                                                
 
 
12  e.g. Wilson, The Politics of Safety and Health. 
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HM Factory Inspectorate.13 The Factory Inspectorate was by far the largest of the 
government inspectorates in the health and safety field, employing 426 inspectors as of 
December 1961.14 The Inspectorate was organised on a regional basis throughout the 
country, and had responsibility for 230,000 registered premises.15 Across Britain, local 
authorities had additional responsibilities under the Factories Act. These included 
enforcing provisions relating to sanitary conveniences in factories, and health 
provisions, such as the prevention of overcrowding, in factories without mechanical 
power, usually small workshops. 
                                                
 
 
13  Robens, Safety and Health at Work, 5–6. 
14  MOL, Annual Report of Chief Inspector of Factories 1961, 44. 
15  Ibid., 102. 
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Figure 3. Statutory coverage of workers (millions) under pre-1974 health and safety legislation.16 
 
 At this time, occupational health and safety legislation was for all intents and 
purposes industrial health and safety legislation. Excluding agriculture (historically 
deemed non-industrial employment), the Factories and Mines Acts constituted a 
special sphere of legislation, laying down detailed minimum standards and 
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requirements for industrial workers which were not shared by workers in non-
industrial premises, such as offices and shops. Other forms of legislation, such as 
public health, did notionally cover these workers, but as the Gowers Committee on 
Non-Industrial Employment had concluded in 1949, this legislation was too vague and 
indiscriminate to offer workers any real protection.17 Legislation was highly 
prescriptive: section 3(1) of the Factories Act, for example, specified that: 
 
Effective provision shall be made for securing and maintaining a reasonable temperature in 
each workroom, but no method shall be employed which results in the escape into the air of 
any workroom of any fume of such a character and to such extent as to be likely to be 
injurious or offensive to persons employed therein.18  
  
(Here, the use of the phrases ‘shall’ and ‘shall not’ indicated that employers had little 
choice over how they complied with the requirement.)  
 Despite this complex web of legislation, in 1961 as many as 16 million British 
workers fell through the gaps of protective coverage.19 Since coverage was principally 
based on workplace or industrial process, even workers in ostensibly ‘industrial’ 
workplaces could be excluded, if they happened to work in part of a building that fell 
                                                
 
 
17  Home Office and Scottish Home Department, Health, Welfare and Safety in Non-
Industrial Employment; Hours of Employment of Juveniles; Report by a Committee of Enquiry, 
Cmd. 7664, 1949, 10–12. 
18  Factories Act, Ch. 34, 1961, sec. 3(1). 
19  Figures vary as to the number of people newly covered by health and safety 
legislation after 1961. However, it is estimated that 8 million workpeople were covered 
by the OSRPA 1963, and a further 5–8 million by the HSWA 1974. See HC Deb 15 
November 1962 vol. 667 col. 589; MOL, Annual Report of HM Chief Inspector of Factories 
1962, Cmnd. 2128, 1963, 9; Robens, Safety and Health at Work, 10; HSC, Report 1974-76 
(London: HMSO, 1977), 2. 
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outside its strict legal definition.20 An example was factory offices, where clerical 
workers were unprotected under the Factories Act while employees on the factory 
floor were covered. This was a glaring omission when, under the same Act, inspectors 
were empowered to enter factory offices to inspect statutory registers of accidents and 
employed young persons.21 
 The 1961 Factories Act was the latest addition to this body of legislation. It was a 
consolidation exercise, amalgamating earlier Acts of 1937, 1948 and 1959 as well as 
Acts relating to lead paint and the employment of women and young persons. As a 
consolidating measure, it could not amend the existing law, and thus advanced no new 
requirements.22 The last major revision of the Factories Act was in 1959, which 
advanced new fire precautions following a mill fire in Keighley, West Yorkshire in 
1956.23 The 1961 Act is notable for being the last in a long line of Factories Acts dating 
back to the advent of the factory system of production. The HSWA introduced a 
markedly new style of legislation that largely superseded the 1961 Act, although the 
Act is still nominally in force today. 
 A dominant feature of 1960s health and safety legislation was a preoccupation 
with physical conditions. Legislation was oriented to the elimination or control of 
hazards: that is, anything that had the potential to cause harm to people in the 
workplace, regardless of their likelihood or severity. The word ‘risk’ was not a major 
                                                
 
 
20  Agriculture is an exception: here, legislation applied to employees themselves. 
See Agriculture (Safety, Health and Welfare Provisions) Act, Ch. 49, 1956, sec. 1. 
21  Factories Act 1961, Ch. 34, sec. 140, 146. For definition of “factory”, see sec. 175. 
22  Sutherland, “Letter to Honey (BEC),” April 7, 1961, TNA LAB 14/934. 
23  Robens, Safety and Health at Work, 4. 
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feature of the legal language at this time.24 This hazard-centric approach manifested 
itself in provisions relating to ‘health’, ‘safety’ and ‘welfare’, the boundaries of which 
were ill-defined. The Factories Act 1961 propagated the concern with physical 
conditions, laying down detailed requirements for such matters as temperature, 
overcrowding and cleanliness (under ‘health’); machinery, dangerous substances and 
fire prevention (under ‘safety’); and washing facilities and first-aid (under ‘welfare’). 
The layout of the Act—‘health’ provisions coming first, then ‘safety’, then ‘welfare’—
was less a reflection of the relative importance attached to these subjects than an 
outcome of the Act’s piecemeal evolution: as one MOL official explained in 1960, ‘in 
practice we classify the work as “safety, health and welfare”, which is a more realistic 
appraisal of its balance, both from the official and industrial point of view.’25 As David 
Eves, HSE’s former Deputy Director-General remarked, ‘the health side of the 
business was quite problematic. It wasn’t that we didn’t know about industrial 
diseases, quite a lot was known …, but the enforcement of the law was quite tricky.’26 
 Other statutes had a similar ‘physical’ bent. The Mines and Quarries Act 1954, 
for example, extended detailed controls over matters such as the provision of shafts 
and outlets, maintenance of underground roads, ventilation and dust. One important 
provision, not reflected in the Factories Act, was the empowerment of workmen to 
undertake inspections, for instance to ascertain the causes of an accident.27  
                                                
 
 
24  Jim McQuaid, Interview, June 27, 2014. 
25  Kenney, “Memo.” 
26  David Eves, Interview, May 12, 2014, pt. 2. 
27  Mines and Quarries Act, Ch. 70, 1954. 
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 Despite the emphasis on physical conditions, inspectors were increasingly vocal 
in the 1960s about the social or organisational factors behind workplace accidents and 
ill-health, calling for arrangements to secure safe and healthy systems of work, and for 
workers to participate in safety management. Trade unions and safety charities 
demanded that safety organisations should be established at workplace and industry 
level as a focused response to the accident problem. Contemporary economic and 
political developments amplified these concerns, encouraging regulators to focus on the 
promotion of voluntary effort, as opposed to the further extension of health and safety 
law.  
 
2.5.  From the Physical to the Social Environment 
 
2.5.1.  Voluntary effort and safety management 
By the 1960s, therefore, British inspectors were increasingly concerned about the 
social or organisational factors behind safety performance. However, this movement in 
regulatory attention, from the physical environment of the workplace, to the social or 
managerial, was not a new phenomenon.  
 Since the First World War, voluntary organisations such as the Royal Society for 
the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA), and later, the British Safety Council, had 
encouraged the management of safety as part of everyday business.28 These 
organisations promoted arrangements such as training schemes, the appointment of 
professional safety officers, local safety groups, and joint safety committees, bringing 
                                                
 
 
28  The British Safety Council was established in 1957. 
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together worker and management representatives to discuss workplace safety 
problems.29 As early as 1913, factory inspectors noted how the ‘reduction of accidents 
can be best secured by obtaining the interest and co-operation of operatives and 
officials through Safety Committees’, and in 1927, the government threatened certain 
heavy industries with legislation if they did not do more to promote them.30 In 1956, 
the NJAC re-emphasised the importance of safety organisation and demanded an 
increase in safety committees.31 These developments urged industry to bear greater 
responsibility for safety and take proactive steps to prevent accidents, instead of 
addressing hazards after an accident had occurred, or following statutory intervention 
(for example, inspection). Despite these efforts, in 1961 the Chief Inspector of 
Factories, McCullough, painted a grim picture of industrial safety organisation:  
 
Too many firms still have no safety organisation whatever, or where it exists it is 
ineffectual.… Many employers appear to rely on H.M. Inspectors to deal with the safety 
problems in their works. Inspectors are, of course, always ready to give advice on the best 
means of promoting safety and health, but responsibility in these matters rests on the 
occupier. Only through better realisation of that responsibility leading in turn to better 
                                                
 
 
29  Richard T. Booth and Anthony J. Boyle, “Occupational Accident Prevention,” 
in Occupational Hygiene, ed. Kerry Gardiner and J. Malcolm Harrington (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2005), 404–5; Eves, Interview, pt. 2. 
30  Factories and Workshops, Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and 
Workshops for the Year 1913, Cd. 7491, 1914, 18; Factories and Workshops, Annual Report 
of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1927, Cmd. 3144, 1928, 15. 
31  Ministry of Labour and National Service, Industrial Accident Prevention: A Report 
of the Industrial Safety Sub-Committee of the National Joint Advisory Council (London: 
HMSO, 1956), 9–13. 
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safety organisation at the place of work, and constant day-to-day attention to safe working 
practices, is substantial progress to be expected.32 
 
A sharp rise in the number of reported accidents under the Factories Act had by this 
point called into question industry’s commitment to accident prevention. Reversing the 
downward trend of previous years, the number of reported accidents rose almost 13 
per cent between 1958 and 1961.33 Successful accident prevention, McCullough 
explained, depended on industry incorporating various safe behaviours into its 
everyday operation. Industry had given safety insufficient priority: 
 
A successful accident prevention policy must be related to the general policy of the firm; 
production planning should include safety planning, personnel policy should include safety 
training, proper induction and supervision; and efficient management will ensure the 
maintenance of high standards of tidiness and housekeeping, which would help to reduce 
many of the accidents from such simple causes as falls and handling, which go to make up 
the greater part of the accident totals.34 
 
2.5.2.  A Quality of Mind: Safety Consciousness and Industrial Self-Help 
In an attempt to reverse the deteriorating accident trend, the British government 
embarked on a new drive in the 1960s to encourage industry to manage safety more 
effectively. In the ‘industrial self-help campaign’, the government tried to promote 
health and safety as part of the efficient management of the workplace in several ways: 
                                                
 
 
32  MOL, Annual Report of Chief Inspector of Factories 1961, 8. 
33  Ibid., 7. 
34  Ibid., 25. 
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workers’ safety representatives; joint safety committees; the safe supervision of 
employees, particularly young recruits; the introduction of training courses and 
industrial health services; local safety groups and other arrangements to increase the 
participation of workers and management in accident prevention. One important 
element of the campaign was the MOL’s decision to cooperate with the TUC and BEC 
in developing accident prevention organisations in industries where they were absent, 
such as shipbuilding.35 Such organisations could assist the government by collating and 
processing accident statistics, operating training schemes, and producing publicity and 
guidance material.36 Another example of the government’s cooperative approach was 
its invitation, in 1965, to fund RoSPA in developing safety organisation on a regional 
basis throughout Britain. Seven ‘regional industrial safety organisers’ were appointed 
to encourage local efforts, such as accident prevention groups.37 Financial difficulties, 
however, meant that the scheme was scaled back just two years later.38 
 Crucially, the industrial self-help campaign was not motivated by any desire on 
the part of government to legislate for safety organisation, although the sluggish 
response of industry to the demand for safety committees later prompted the 1964–70 
Labour government to attempt to legislate in this particular area. Rather, taking its cue 
from the Factory Inspectorate’s conciliatory enforcement philosophy, and the British 
government’s abstentionist stance towards industrial relations, the campaign was 
                                                
 
 
35  Ibid., 8. 
36  “Safety and Health,” BEC Bulletin 177, February 28, 1962, 2, TNA LAB 
14/1197. 
37  MOL, Annual Report of HM Chief Inspector of Factories 1965, Cmnd. 3080, 1966, 
15. 
38  DEP, Annual Report of HM Chief Inspector of Factories 1967, Cmnd. 3745, 1968, 3–
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driven by a paternalistic desire to help industry ‘voluntarily’ meet its legal obligations. 
Committed to collective bargaining with a minimum of statutory interference, the TUC 
at this time also believed that safety organisation was best pursued by voluntary means. 
While its Social Insurance and Industrial Welfare Committee urged the government to 
boost the number of factory inspectors and enforce the law more vigorously, it also 
conceded that ‘legislation [alone] could not not invariably prevent accidents and that it 
was very necessary to educate people to work safely.’39 
 The British government framed the industrial self-help campaign as a drive to 
inculcate a ‘safety consciousness’ in industry. ‘Safety consciousness’, McCullough 
explained, ‘is a form of foresight or alertness, a quality of mind which has to be 
developed and nurtured.’40 Hence, the government relied on strategies such as 
education, advice and persuasion to encourage voluntary effort. These strategies were 
delivered through a variety of media including face-to-face advice, publications, films, 
conferences and exhibitions.41 One such conference was the TUC/BEC conference on 
industrial safety in November 1962, which precipitated several joint efforts to stimulate 
safety awareness over the 1960s.42 The Industrial Health and Safety Centre on 
Horseferry Road, London, also served as a physical forum for safety education until 
financial cuts forced its closure in 1980.43 Opened in 1927 as the Home Office 
                                                
 
 
39  “Prevention of Industrial Accidents. Report of Meeting with Minister of 
Labour,” January 22, 1962, 2, TUC MSS.292B/146/1. 
40  MOL, Annual Report of HM Chief Inspector of Factories 1962, 56. 
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Industrial Museum, the Centre featured several exhibits demonstrating the latest 
thinking about safety engineering and protection, and attracted a wide audience, from 
industrial apprentices to trade unionists.44  
           One form of safety education still widely used in the 1960s was the safety poster. 
Since 1917, RoSPA had used posters as a graphic and colourful way to engage 
workers’ attention in safety issues45. In 1968, as many as one million were still being 
printed each year.46 However, over the decade officials in the safety movement began 
to question the effectiveness of this device. As The Observer reported in 1968, ‘at the 
moment, it is commonly agreed, there is too large a gap between the safety poster on 
the factory wall, and actually seeing that its exhortation is acted upon.’47 Undertaking a 
survey to ascertain the causes of the accident increase in 1967, two factory inspectors 
observed that while ‘nearly all the factories visited were making use of safety posters 
… management and unions alike seemed to lack faith in [their] impact’.48 While 
RoSPA viewed safety posters to be an effective promotional device, they cautioned 
they were not ‘the be-all and end-all of industrial accident prevention’ and more 
research was required to assess their effectiveness.49 As Lord Robens wrote in 1970, 
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‘safety in the place of work is so important from every point of view that it just cannot 
be left to the display of safety posters.’50 
 It would be over-simplistic to suggest that this voluntarist approach extended 
from the government’s desire to shirk its responsibility for health and safety. From the 
perspective of Foucault’s work on ‘governmentality’, it also represented an attempt by 
government to exercise its power more diffusely.51 Attempts by officials to encourage 
‘safety consciousness’ in industry relied on it instilling discipline among employers and 
workers: forms of behaviour and workplace organisation that were seen to promote 
health and safety. As shown above, a variety of media were used to promote the safety 
message. As such, the self-help campaign reflected the British government’s ambition 
to get industry to govern itself: factory inspectors and other officials would only step in 
where necessary, for instance to advise and prosecute employers who flouted the law. 
 
2.5.3.  The Big Five 
The industrial self-help campaign was premised on an important belief about accidents, 
which was reinforced over the 1960s. Factory inspectors and other government 
officials increasingly accepted that the vast majority of workplace accidents, the so-
called ‘Big Five’, included an intrinsically ‘human’ dimension that resisted legislative 
control. The ‘Big Five’ were accidents resulting from manual handling, falls, use of 
hand tools, strikes against objects, and strikes from falling objects. In 1962, they 
                                                
 
 
50  Lord Robens, Human Engineering (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), 126. 
51  Foucault, Discipline and Punish; Burchell, Gordon, and Miller, The Foucault Effect. 
 91 
accounted for 64 per cent of all reported accidents under the Factories Act (Figure 4). 
As R. K. Christy, the Chief Inspector of Factories, explained in his 1963 report, 
 
While a proportion of the “Big Five” accidents may be connected with breaches of factory 
legislation, experience has shown that the majority occur in circumstances which cannot 
readily be controlled by legislation, for example lack of attention to good industrial 
housekeeping…. The errors arising from human behaviour unlike the requirement to fence 
a dangerous machine do not, except to a very limited extent, lend themselves to control by 
legislation.52 
    
This was later reduced ad absurdum: ‘Passing a law does not prevent a man from 
dropping something on another man’s head or from attempting to lift or move a weight 
beyond his capacity.’53  
 
                                                
 
 
52  MOL, Annual Report of HM Chief Inspector of Factories 1963, Cmnd. 2450, 1964, 8–
9. 
53  MOL, Annual Report of HM Chief Inspector of Factories 1966, Cmnd. 3358, 1967, 8. 
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Figure 4. Causes of reported factory accidents, 1962.54 
 
 
 While this belief was undoubtedly influenced by the Factory Inspectorate’s 
enforcement philosophy, prevailing models of accident causation also entrenched the 
assumption that many accidents were beyond legislative control. In his seminal 1931 
volume, Industrial Accident Prevention: A Scientific Approach (the fourth edition of which 
was published in 1959), the American safety engineer Herbert William Heinrich 
claimed that 88 per cent of all workplace accidents were attributable to ‘man failure’ or 
                                                
 
 
54 MOL, Annual Report of HM Chief Inspector of Factories 1962, 16. 
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error on the part of workers. Just 10 per cent were due to problems in the physical 
environment, such as dangerous machinery.55 
 By the 1960s, the scientific discourse on industrial accidents had begun to widen 
beyond a concern with the individual worker to address wider social or managerial 
factors. In 1959, Heinrich suggested that for every 300 non-injury events, there were 
29 minor injuries and one major or severe injury. Visualised as a triangle or pyramid 
(Figure 5), these ratios encouraged employers to record and study ‘near misses’ to 
guide accident prevention efforts. Developing this model, the safety engineer Frank E. 
Bird showed how costs arising from physical injuries were the tip of the iceberg of 
wider costs to the business, in terms of damage to property, plant and equipment. 
Accidents could thus be used by firms (and insurers) as an inroad to wider 
organisational problems.56  
 
                                                
 
 
55  H. W. Heinrich, Industrial Accident Prevention (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1931); Burnham, Accident Prone, 92–3. 
56  S. Mannan, ed., Lees’ Loss Prevention in the Process Industries: Hazard Assessment, 
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Figure 5. Heinrich/Bird accident triangle.57 
 
 
 The effect of these developments was that by the end of the 1960s, factory 
inspectors and other government officials suspected that most accidents preventable by 
physical, engineering means, such as machine guards, had already been prevented.58 
With the diminishing returns of engineering solutions, it was suggested, the solution to 
Britain’s accident problem was not more regulation, more inspectors or stronger 
enforcement, but a more scientific approach to accident prevention and a more 
concerted effort by industry to manage hazards. As the Chief Inspector of Factories, 
Bryan Harvey argued in his 1970 report, ‘some of the traditional hazards of the 
physical environment have been brought under control over the past years. What we 
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must now increasingly tackle is the social or management environment which may 
underlie poor safety performance.’59 
 
2.5.4.  The Accident Trend 
As mentioned above, the British government’s campaign to encourage industry to 
develop safety organisation was linked to concerns about the rising number of reported 
accidents under the Factories Act. From 1959, an upward trend in the number of 
reported accidents was observed, reversing the decline seen in previous years. Between 
1958 and 1961, the total increased from 167,697 to 192,517, almost 15 per cent.60  
 In 1964, however, a further, more significant spike was recorded.61 The total of 
268,648 accidents in 1964 represented an increase of almost a third since 1963, and the 
highest reported figure since the Second World War.62 The underlying causes of this 
increase were unknown, although improved reporting since the start of the campaign, 
increased industrial production, and the serious winter of 1962/3 (the ‘big freeze’) were 
all thought to have contributed.63 Nevertheless, the increase was a great concern, 
especially to the TUC, and the Chief Inspector of Factories, Christy believed that even 
with these mitigating factors, it was clear that a serious deterioration had occurred.64 
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 Developments in the 1960s demonstrated how accident statistics could stimulate 
regulatory action, despite the significant uncertainty that accompanied them.65 
Accident statistics were a particular cause for political concern in the 1960s, owing to 
the recognised problem of under-reporting (see below), lack of knowledge about 
numbers at risk, and inconsistencies in the way accidents were recorded.66 
Nevertheless, crude ‘headline’ totals of accidents were sufficient in the 1960s to 
galvanise political attention, even though the number of fatal workplace accidents 
continued to fall, and the increase in reported accidents was largely confined to 
premises under the Factories Act (Figure 6, a–c). During a Parliamentary debate on 
accident causation in 1965, the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the MOL, Ernest 
Thornton, argued: 
 
The conclusion that there has been a real and substantial rise in the incidence of accidents 
seems, I am afraid, quite inescapable. This is an intolerable situation. It is one of which all 
of us, Government, employers, workers, and the public, ought to be ashamed. A sense of 
shame is often a prerequisite for reform, and it is reform that we need—a new sense of 
determination through industry to stop the human suffering and waste of our scarce 
manpower resources which these appalling accident figures represent.67 
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He added, ‘I think that we must appreciate that accidents of this kind cannot easily be 
reached by legislation, or prevented by factory inspectors. They can, however, be 
prevented if management and workers develop an active safety consciousness.’68 
Figure 6. Work accidents in Great Britain, 1961–70.69  
(a) all premises 
 
(b) Factories Act 
 
 
(c) Other premises 
                                                
 
 
68  Ibid. 
69 Robens, Safety and Health at Work, 161–2. Figures for ‘other premises’ between 1961-
4 include estimated figures for accidents in offices, shops and railway premises before 
OSRPA 1963. 
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The accident trend generated a scientific as well as political response. Since the reasons 
behind the increase were unknown, from 1965 regulatory attention focused on 
understanding the causes of accidents and the factors affecting workplace safety 
performance. Firstly, the Factory Inspectorate detached two inspectors from normal 
duties to undertake a pilot study into the accident experiences of 45 factories across the 
country. While the study did not produce any clear conclusions about the accident 
increase, it controversially claimed that improved employee benefits were partly 
responsible. In response to a hostile reaction from the TUC, in 1968 the MOL, now 
the Department of Employment and Productivity (DEP), published a watered-down 
version of the report in its Employment and Productivity Gazette.70  
 Secondly, in 1970 a dedicated Accident Prevention Studies Unit was established 
in the Factory Inspectorate to study, among other things, why some firms had a better 
accident record than others.71 
 Thirdly, in 1965 the British government placed a £45,000 research contract with 
the National Institute of Industrial Psychology (NIIP) to undertake a four-year 
comparative study on accident causation.72 The study found, among other things, that 
‘at shop floor level, there is often what appears to be an attitude of apathy towards 
safety matters.’ Workers, supervisors and managers often blamed accidents on 
‘carelessness’, resulting in a pessimistic attitude towards prevention, while an ‘us and 
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them’ attitude between the office and shop floor allowed hazards to persist.73 The 
NIIP’s 1971 report supported the Factory Inspectorate’s focus on safety organisation, 
arguing the emphasis of future prevention efforts should be the promotion of training 
and safe systems of work.74  
  
2.5.5.  Accident Reporting 
Whatever the reasons behind the rising number of accidents in the 1960s, the accident 
trend focused political attention on recalcitrant employers. The sharper increase after 
1964 followed soon after reports suggesting that a significant section of industry had 
either ignored, or was unaware of, its obligation to report accidents. In the early 1960s, 
the government observed that claims to industrial injuries benefit outweighed the 
number of non-fatal accidents reported to the Factory Inspectorate.75 To evaluate this 
discrepancy, in 1962 the MOL, in conjunction with the Ministry of Pensions and 
National Insurance, carried out a survey comparing the level of non-fatal accidents 
reported under the Factories Act, with industrial injuries benefit, correcting for 
accidents which were not reportable. The survey revealed that out of 3,928 reported 
accidents, fewer than 60 per cent were correctly reported.76 The MOL suggested that 
‘failure to report is, in many cases, due to ignorance both of the need to report 
accidents and of the type of accident for which a report is required.’77 Its proposals, 
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therefore, included educating employers about reporting requirements, crucially, as 
part of the wider drive to inculcate ‘safety consciousness’ in industry. A flyer was 
subsequently sent to factory occupiers reminding them of the need to report, and that 
failure to comply could incur prosecution or a fine.78  
 Despite such efforts, however, a follow-up enquiry in 1964 revealed that industry 
had made poor progress. In general, across the whole of the Factories Act, two out of 
every five reportable accidents went unreported. A shocking 70 per cent of all 
accidents to young persons in the construction in industry were never notified, while in 
small factories (those which employed fewer than 100 people), half of all accidents 
were never reported. These factories employed a third of Britain’s entire factory 
workforce.79 
 
2.5.6.  Safety Committees and Safety Representatives 
The sheer level of under-reporting exposed by these surveys demonstrated that despite 
the government’s efforts, many employers were unprepared to prevent accidents. 
Unfortunately, the slow response of industry was not confined to accident reporting. 
As described above, since 1956 the NJAC had promoted joint works committees as a 
way to prevent accidents. A paper prepared for its Industrial Safety Subcommittee in 
1964 revealed that despite industry’s promise to increase the number of safety 
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committees, the number in the largest, and supposedly better organised firms had 
decreased since 1956, rather than increased.80  
 It was at this point that the TUC called for the compulsory establishment of 
safety committees, in a resolution moved by the Amalgamated Union of Foundry 
Workers at the 1964 Blackpool Congress: ‘While the General Council have hither to 
[sic] favoured voluntary development of joint consultation, they have repeatedly made 
it clear if this failed, a compulsory system was the only alternative.’81  
 The BEC steadfastly opposed any question of compulsion. While they were open 
in principle to joint consultation, they believed that a legal requirement would 
undermine voluntary efforts already underway, and encourage a minimal, begrudging 
response by employers.82 This was a claim the BEC’s successor, the CBI, repeated in 
its submission of evidence to the Committee on Safety and Health at Work (see 
Chapter 3).83 
 Examining the previous reassurances made by industry, the MOL concluded that 
industry’s commitment to joint consultation was ‘open to serious doubt’.84 At a 
Parliamentary question on works safety committees in 1966, Shirley Williams warned: 
 
                                                
 
 
80  “Note for ISSC Meeting of 17 November 1964 Prepared by National Union of 
Dyers, Bleachers and Textile Workers. Comments on Paper 59,” 1964, TUC 
MSS.292B/146.17/1. 
81  “Note for ISSC Meeting of 17 November 1964 Prepared by National Union of 
Dyers, Bleachers and Textile Workers. Comments on Paper 60,” 1964, TUC 
MSS.292B/146.17/1. 
82  “Joint Consultation on Safety,” July 1965, TUC MSS.292B/146.17/1. 
83  Robens, Selected Written Evidence, 118–20. 
84  “Joint Consultation on Safety.” 
 103 
[U]nless there is satisfactory progress over the next few years in the setting up of joint 
works safety committees on a voluntary basis, [the Minister of Labour] will feel obliged, 
when the next major revision of the Factories Act takes place, to seek power to require the 
establishment of machinery for joint consultation in appropriate cases.85 
 
Following this threat, the number of safety committees in British industry increased by 
69 per cent, from 5,826 in 1966 to 9,847 in 1969.86   
 That same year, the Employment and Productivity Secretary, Barbara Castle, 
attempted to legislate for safety committees in the Employed Persons (Health and 
Safety) Bill.87 The Bill provided for recognised trade unions to appoint worker safety 
representatives in premises where 10 or more persons were employed. In premises 
where over 100 persons were employed, the employer was required to establish a 
safety committee if the representative(s) requested.  
 While Castle’s Bill was lost following Labour’s election defeat in 1970, the desire 
to increase worker involvement in health and safety decision-making accorded with the 
British government’s wider industrial relations policy. The white paper In Place of Strife, 
introduced by Castle in 1969, attempted to strengthen collective bargaining in the 
workplace by encouraging workers to participate in management decision-making, for 
instance by sitting on company boards.88 It was not until 1977, following the HSWA, 
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that recognised trade unions won the right to appoint safety representatives, in one of 
the few significant changes to the CSHW’s recommendations.89 
 
2.6.  Safety, Productivity and Self-help 
In addition to accidents, economic and political concerns in the 1960s promoted a 
movement of regulatory attention onto safety organisation. Anxiety about Britain’s low 
industrial output compared to its competitors, and its disorganised industrial relations, 
encouraged the government to closely scrutinise the management of British industry. 
By 1970, a growing synergy between questions of safety, productivity and industrial 
self-help had emerged in British regulatory discourse, creating a unique set of 
circumstances that promoted regulatory reform. 
 The 1960s were not the first time that concerns about productivity had 
encouraged the British government to examine workers’ health and safety. Historians 
have written at length about how the militaristic needs of the British state in both the 
First and Second World Wars acted to focus political attention on the needs of the 
industrial worker. In the Second World War, for example, new orders were made 
under the Factories Act, introducing requirements for lighting, canteens and first-aid. 
There was an implicit understanding in government that national productivity went 
hand-in-hand with improved working conditions: in the 1918–39 inter-war period, as 
Long suggests, the physical and mental health of the industrial worker was viewed 
more holistically, set in wider social and environmental context.90 The link between 
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productivity and health and safety—‘good health is good business’—has been 
expressed at various times over the last century, most recently by Dame Carol Black in 
her 2008 Review of the Health of Britain’s Working Age Population.91 In the 1990s, the HSE 
explicitly invoked this link to appeal to employers’ self-interest. However, the link does 
not appear to have been invoked consistently: in different times and contexts, the link 
has been invoked in different ways. 
 In the 1960s, it was not the militaristic needs of the British state, but the 
exigencies of global trade that highlighted the economic consequences of workplace 
accidents and disease. Over the decade, Britain’s share of world trade declined, from 
20 per cent in 1955 to 13 per cent in 1970.92 In 1965, comparative levels of industrial 
output per capita were 32 per cent higher in West Germany, and a remarkable 84 per 
cent higher in the USA.93 Annual growth rates in 1960s Britain averaged at 2.8 per 
cent, compared 4.8 per cent in Germany and 6 per cent in France.94 Britain’s declining 
productivity fuelled a growing trade deficit, prompting the Prime Minister, Harold 
Wilson, to devalue sterling in November 1967. Within this economic context, the costs 
of absenteeism, sickness and injury resulting from industrial accidents and disease 
became an increasingly thorny political issue (Figure 7). In 1967, the number of 
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working days lost per year to occupational accidents and disease was estimated at 23 
million—ten times the comparable number lost to strikes, both official and unofficial.95  
Figure 7. Number of working days lost as a result of industrial accidents and prescribed diseases in 
Great Britain, 1961-1970.96 
 
 
 In an era of full employment and concerns about inflation, generating 
government calls for the unions to exercise wage restraint, the key to productivity was 
increasingly seen to lie in improving industrial efficiency, of which safety was a core 
component. Industrial training was one area where safety and economic needs 
converged. In 1962, the government established that lack of skilled labour was one of 
the main factors holding back Britain’s economy. Comments about the ‘barely 
adequate’ standard of many industrial training schemes chimed with comments by 
factory inspectors about the cursory treatment given to safety training in many firms, 
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especially for young persons entering work for the first time.97 The Industrial Training 
Act 1964 attempted to remedy this situation by establishing Industrial Training Boards 
in the major industries, financed by a levy on employers.98 Their role was to coordinate, 
develop and operate training schemes, establish policy, standards and qualifications, 
and approve schemes run by external bodies, such as RoSPA. The Act provided an 
invaluable opportunity for the government to influence young people before they 
started work.99 As Christy explained, ‘young men and women do not become 
responsible overnight. Safety consciousness must be inculcated as part of the transition 
from school to factory environment. To disregard the safety training of young persons 
is not merely short-sighted but is also culpably negligent.’100 
 The link between safety, productivity and self-help was also reflected in British 
industrial relations. Between 1956 and 1966, the number of strikes in industries outside 
mining increased 142 per cent.101 The growing problem of strikes motivated the 1964–
70 Labour government to appoint a Royal Commission in 1965, ‘to consider relations 
between managements and employees and the role of trade unions and employers’ 
associations in promoting the interests of their members and in accelerating the social 
and economic advance of the nation.’102 Chaired by the judge and former Labour MP 
Lord Donovan, the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations 
brought together members from across the political spectrum, including the TUC 
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General Secretary, George Woodcock, and the professor of labour law, Otto Kahn-
Freund. Lord Robens, then chair of the National Coal Board (NCB), was also a 
member.  
 In its 1968 report, the Donovan Commission concluded that there were ‘two 
systems’ of British industrial relations, in conflict with one another. There was the 
‘formal system’, comprising official institutions and industry-wide collective 
agreements, and there was the ‘informal system’, comprising the actual behaviour of 
workers, managements, shop stewards and others in the workplace.103 The 
fundamental problem with British industrial relations, the Commission argued, was 
that the informal system was beginning to dominate, and undermine, the formal 
system.104 Their proposed solution was statutory intervention to bolster voluntary 
arrangements that regulated industrial relations at workplace level, including a new 
Industrial Relations Commission and Industrial Relations Act (later implemented by 
the 1970-74 Heath government). Safety was included as an explicit objective in these 
proposals, providing for ‘regular joint discussion of measures to promote safety at 
work.’105 While the Donovan Commission did not recommend the statutory regulation 
of industrial relations (‘there is no case for legislation which would transform … 
[collective] agreements into legal contracts’), the state was conceptualised as providing 
a supportive framework that strengthened voluntary arrangements.106 In a similar vein, 
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the CSHW would later advance the HSWA as a statutory framework to improve self-
regulation by employers and employees.  
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2.7.  The Changing Dimensions of Occupational Risk 
 
2.7.1.  A New Technology 
Thus far, we have seen how economic and political developments over the 1960s 
conspired to focus regulatory attention on the management of health and safety at 
work. These developments revealed the limitations of a prescriptive legal approach, 
and instead focused attention on the strengthening of voluntary arrangements, such as 
safety committees, which were seen to promote accident prevention. 
 However, this movement in regulatory attention left intact the underlying 
structure of the regulatory system. As highlighted above, in 1961 as many as 16 million 
British workers were excluded from health and safety legislation. Although the 
OSRPA 1963 reduced this to 5–8 million, in workplaces such as schools, hospitals, 
airports and universities, ordinary members of the British public were also excluded, 
who could be injured or made ill by work activity. 
 Pressures in the latter part of the 1960s, however, accumulated that demanded a 
fundamental rethink of regulation, including the need to take into account the health 
and safety of the public. In addition to the economic and political pressures described 
above, one of the key pressures was the changing dimensions of the risks 
accompanying industrial development. However, these pressures only gave added 
urgency to what had already become, by 1967, a recognised administrative problem 
with health and safety legislation. 
 The Chief Inspector of Factories, Bryan Harvey, expressed his anxiety about 
these changing dimensions of risk in his 1970 report: 
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We now face a new technology. The Inspectorate is now concerned with an industrial 
system where virtually anything is possible. Not only can natural materials be handled and 
worked in totally new ways, but we can manipulate molecular structures to make new 
materials with virtually any property or characteristic which we desire. Above all, we can 
now do this on a scale which only a few years ago would have been regarded as wholly 
unbelievable.107 
 
2.7.2.  Risk and Industrial Hygiene 
Factory inspectors were among the first to recognise that industrial development, 
which accelerated over the 1960s, was changing the very nature of the risks confronted 
by workers. As industrial risks became more complex, the Factory Inspectorate, in 
response, had to become better informed and more proactive. This professional 
development is evident from the Inspectorate’s attempts to improve the calibre of its 
recruits (from 1970, the Inspectorate began to forge links with the University of 
Aston), as well as improvements in the science which underpinned its work, notably 
industrial hygiene.108 
 Industrial development had long generated new risks. In the late nineteenth-
century, for example, regulatory concern about workers’ safety broadened to 
encompass the health of workers in the ‘dangerous trades’, including match-making 
and lead smelting.109 As early as 1900, regulators were aware of the dangers of 
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asbestos, while in the twentieth century, ‘miners’ lung’ or pneumoconiosis became one 
of the greatest areas of occupational health concern.110 
 In the late 1960s, however, factory inspectors recognised that occupational risks 
were rapidly changing on both a macroscopic and microscopic scale. On the 
macroscopic scale, the scale of major hazards, inspectors identified that industrial 
processes were becoming bigger and faster. Chemical plants, for example, were storing 
and processing explosive or flammable substances (such as liquid oxygen) in 
unprecedented quantities, and increasingly jeopardised the safety of surrounding 
communities.111 
 On the microscopic scale, the scale illuminated by sciences such as industrial 
hygiene, industrial chemicals were being produced, virtually unchecked by regulators, 
at an accelerating pace. In the early 1960s, the environmental effects of chemical 
pesticides were brought home to British and American audiences by Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring, helping fuel a burgeoning environmental movement.112 The ongoing 
asbestos controversy highlighted how, unlike ‘physical’ hazards such as machines, 
chemical hazards often exerted their effects insidiously, with a long time lag between 
exposure and the onset of symptoms. This complicated regulatory intervention in work 
activity, serving to reinforce the focus on self-help. For example, it became important 
for employers in some industries to proactively measure risk through routine 
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environmental monitoring, and take commensurate steps to protect their employees, 
such as medical surveillance and the use of personal protective equipment.113  
 Political concern about toxic substances was reflected in new regulations and 
tighter standards. The Carcinogenic Substances Regulations 1967, for example, 
required controlled carcinogenic substances to be kept in sealed containers displaying 
the name of the substance. It also required factory occupiers to take necessary steps to 
protect workers from exposure, including medical examinations of workers every six 
months.114 The 1969 Asbestos Regulations adopted new quantitative exposure limits 
for airborne concentrations of asbestos dust. In March 1970, new standards for dust in 
coal mines were also established.115 
 The increasing profile of occupational health risks was linked to their growing 
detectability. Technical improvements in industrial hygiene and toxicology rendered 
risks ‘visible’ by providing tools to identify, measure and control them.  
 The science of industrial hygiene has a long history. Sellers points to its origins in 
early twentieth-century USA, while Carter argues that its various elements were 
evident in Britain at least two centuries before this date.116 However, it was only in the 
1960s that the science began to play a prominent role in setting the health and safety 
policy agenda in Britain, for instance, by setting threshold limit values (TLVs) for 
substances such as asbestos. The relative underdevelopment of industrial hygiene in 
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Britain compared to the USA is reflected in the fact that, until the 1980s, Britain 
continued to rely on figures produced by the American Conference of 
Intergovernmental Industrial Hygienists.117 Nevertheless, the increasing centrality of 
industrial hygiene to British health and safety policy was reflected in the establishment 
of a dedicated Industrial Hygiene Unit in the Factory Inspectorate in 1966. 
Encouraged by the British government, from 1967, factory inspectors were equipped 
with portable instruments, allowing them to measure environmental contaminants in 
the work environment without relying on central laboratories. By 1969, the Factory 
Inspectorate’s laboratories occupied more than 10,000 square feet, and between 1969 
and 1970 tests of toxic substances increased by almost a half.118   
 The ascendancy of industrial hygiene was also reflected in the changing place of 
clinical medicine in occupational health and safety regulation. As Harvey explained in 
1970: 
 
Formerly, basic standards of good practice, coupled with a vigilant medical arm of the 
Inspectorate to identify physical changes in the health of workers, was for the most part 
used to ensure proper control of health risks. But it is now possible to set down generally 
agreed standards for a safe working environment…. Instead of relying solely on physical 
appearances and the application of basically sound principles, it is now possible to quantify 
risk and to advise on measures to control it on a scientific basis without waiting for actual 
symptoms of ill-health to prove that conditions need to be improved.119   
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By the early 1960s, therefore, questions had emerged about the use of doctors in 
factory regulation, and the application of medical services in the wider employment 
field.120 In 1964, an IHAC subcommittee was established to review the operation of the 
Appointed Factory Doctor Service—doctors within industry appointed to undertake 
routine examination of young persons, and adults entering hazardous occupations. The 
subcommittee reported in 1966, and recommended the abolition of the service along 
with the routine examination of young persons, which it considered a waste of scarce 
medical manpower. This was in favour of its more discriminating deployment under a 
new Employment Medical Advisory Service (EMAS), which would focus on 
examining young people whose school medical records suggested were at particular 
risk. EMAS’ brief would encompass the entire field of employment and, concordant 
with the wider political focus on productivity, provide a centre of expertise for 
government and industry, providing medical advice in relation to employment, 
training, and the rehabilitation of disabled persons.121  
 Although clinical medicine continued to play an important role in health and 
safety regulation after 1970, especially in hazardous occupations where medical 
surveillance was required, industrial hygiene thus increasingly took its place in the 
primary control of occupational risk. Consequently, parallel to the movement in 
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regulatory attention from the physical to the social conditions of work, there was a 
scientific movement, from biological to environmental monitoring. This observation 
concurs with other historical evidence about a wider ‘environmental turn’ in twentieth-
century health and safety discourse.122 
 
2.7.3.  Risk, Reactivity and the Public 
As this chapter has demonstrated, a significant feature of 1960s health and safety 
regulation was that despite the plethora of legislation, some 5–8 million British workers 
(after 1963) remained outside its scope. In addition to these workers were millions of 
ordinary members of the British public, who had no specific protection against 
occupational risks. Incidents and disasters over the 1960s, however, challenged the 
fragmentary nature of the existing system. As a result, by 1967 the trade unions and 
British government increasingly considered that comprehensive health and safety 
legislation was necessary, to protect every worker, regardless of occupation or 
workplace. Further, there had to be a statutory, as well as common law duty for 
employers to consider public health and safety. 
 One such incident occurred in June 1964, when the jib of a crane in Brent Cross, 
London, collapsed over a passing coach, killing seven passengers. The subsequent 
investigation revealed that a faulty gate section made for the crane by its 
manufacturers was primarily to blame. However, a crucial recommendation was that 
consideration should be given to bringing the public under the Factories Act. Since the 
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notional definition of a factory had broadened since the nineteenth century to include 
such varied premises as docks and construction yards, the inquiry noted, it was only 
logical that the public should now be encompassed.123 However, the MOL resisted this 
proposal at the time, believing that the incidental protection afforded by the Factories 
Act was sufficient.124 
 A second incident in 1966, however, challenged the government’s assumption 
that public safety was adequately protected under existing legislation. On the 21 
October 1966, a colliery spoil heap, positioned on a mountainside above the Welsh 
mining village of Aberfan, collapsed, burying a school and eighteen houses. 144 people, 
including 116 children died: the worst mining catastrophe in Britain since the 
Senghenydd Colliery Disaster of 1913.125  At the Davies Tribunal, convened to 
ascertain the causes of the disaster, the Divisional Inspector of Mines submitted that 
HM Mines and Quarries Inspectorate had never before considered tips to be a 
danger—to miners, let alone the public: ‘while the coal industry has had a high 
accident rate, until this horrible disaster there is no previous case of loss of life due to 
tip instability known to the Inspectorate…. The problem of tip stability has never been 
looked on as a safety problem meriting close inspection or recommendation by the 
Chief Inspectors.’126 Indeed, unlike for inspections underground, there was no official 
requirement for inspectors on the surface to record which area, or item of plant, 
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machinery and equipment they had inspected.127 Nor, disturbingly, was there a 
statutory requirement for colliery owners to report accidents or dangerous occurrences 
affecting the public—only ‘death of, or serious bodily injury to, a person employed at 
the mine.’ Consequently, since no worker was injured or killed that day, the colliery 
manager was not obliged to report a single casualty.128 
 The Aberfan disaster dramatically demonstrated how, not just individuals, but 
entire communities could be devastated by modern industry. Occurring in an era of 
television news, footage of the disaster scene and relief operation was relayed to 
members of the British public in their homes. Aberfan was significant in a second 
crucial way: it demonstrated the essential reactivity of the British system of health and 
safety regulation. This was demonstrated once again in 1969, when in response to the 
disaster, the government passed the Mines and Quarries (Tips) Act, empowering local 
authorities to prevent danger to the public arising from tips.129 Writing in 1972, the 
CSHW took up this theme of reactivity, placing Aberfan alongside the thalidomide 
scandal as evidence of the reactivity of British legislation in general (see Chapter 3).130 
According to the Committee, as industry became increasingly complex, and threatened 
workers and the public in new ways, a new, more proactive system of risk surveillance 
was needed. The existing legal framework, this chapter has shown, was inadequate to 
deal with the evolving risks of British industry. 
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2.8.  The Reform Process, 1967–1970 
Despite these various pressures, by 1967 administrative developments had already 
suggested that health and safety legislation required urgent revision. On 30 June 1967, 
Ray Gunter, the Minister of Labour, announced that preliminary work had begun to 
revise the Factories Act 1961 and OSRPA 1963, and consolidate them under a single 
statute.131 In December that year, the MOL circulated detailed proposals. 700 
organisations were invited to comment, including trade unions, employers’ 
associations, professional associations, and government departments.132 In a letter to 
the TUC’s General Secretary, George Woodcock, Gunter assured that the plans would 
go some way to meet the TUC’s calls for comprehensive safety and health legislation, 
voiced at that year’s Congress.133 
 In 1970, the DEP, which had inherited responsibility for health and safety 
legislation after the MOL’s dissolution, outlined its rationale for why a new 
comprehensive statute was required. Firstly, technical matters had accumulated which 
required revision of the Factories Act. Secondly, there was dissatisfaction with the Act 
because it was overly long, detailed and confusing. Much of its wording was obscure or 
vague, and many of its provisions were inconsistent or antiquated. Thirdly, with two 
Acts administered by the DEP in force side by side (the Factories Act and OSRPA), 
administration and enforcement of health and safety legislation had become overly 
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complicated. Demarcation issues arose where it was difficult to tell which Act applied, 
and if one Act and its subordinate regulations had to be revised, there was pressure to 
follow suit with the other.134  
 These problems are insightful insofar as they demonstrate bureaucratic 
disapproval with the existing system. While the various developments described above 
were integral to the demand for regulatory reform, purely on an administrative level 
the maintenance of existing law had become too onerous. 
 The MOL’s ‘First Consultative Document’ attempted to address these problems, 
and ‘meet the needs of a rapidly developing industrial society’, by proposing a new 
comprehensive Act of a more ‘enabling’ character than existing legislation.135 By 
‘enabling’, it was meant that the proposed Act would contain requirements of a more 
general or widely applicable nature, with matters of detail left to subordinate 
regulations. Drafted in such a way, it was argued, safety and health legislation would 
be more flexible and adaptable, able to keep pace with industrial development.136 The 
First Consultative Document also acknowledged various ongoing concerns. The 
proposed legislation advanced new requirements relating to safety training and 
instruction, and extended new controls over the safety of machinery, plant and 
equipment.137 
 However, there was a critical problem with these proposals, which remained 
unresolved by 1970. They remained trapped within the established logic of the 
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Factories Act model of regulation. For example, while intended to be ‘enabling’, the 
proposed legislation continued to prescribe detailed requirements for matters such as 
temperature and space. Workplace, as opposed to employment, continued to be used as 
the basis for statutory coverage, although included at this stage were select ‘work 
operations’, such as window cleaning, which would be covered regardless of where 
they were performed. Although the proposals included ‘any premises, whether in the 
open air or otherwise, in which … persons are employed’, there were significant 
exceptions, including premises covered by laws administrated by other government 
departments.138 Excluded from the proposals, implicitly or explicitly, were the self-
employed, homeworkers, and most seriously, the public. Effectively, the 1967 
proposals thus left intact the existing fragmented arrangements. 
 The First Consultative Document’s fundamental problem, therefore, was its lack 
of an imaginative solution to health and safety problems in, and beyond, the British 
workplace. What was being proposed, in effect, was a cautious re-enactment of the 
existing state of affairs, albeit on an augmented scale. Although consultations with 
interested parties continued throughout 1968, they were not fruitful. By 1969, it is 
evident that Castle and her DEP colleagues were dissatisfied by the lack of progress. 
The wider government shared their pessimism: in January 1969, the Home Affairs 
Committee ruled out comprehensive legislation in the 1969–70 session, effectively 
placing responsibility for the proposals in the hands of the next (as it transpired, 
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Conservative) government.139 Consequently, Castle’s Employed Persons (Health and 
Safety) Bill, introduced in February 1970, attempted to make progress on just two of 
the many problems requiring attention by the late 1960s, namely, joint consultation 
and the establishment of EMAS. While it was not the all-embracing Act sought after 
by the government, Castle hailed the Bill an important step forward in ‘industrial 
democracy’, and a repudiation of the belief that health and safety could be promoted 
‘simply on paternalistic lines’.140 Charles Sisson, a DE official, perhaps put it more 
accurately: the Bill was an example of ‘practical politics’.141 
 In reality, progress was stuck on all other issues and Castle was resigned to the 
conclusion that more time was needed to study them. In September 1969, Sir Denis 
Barnes, the DEP’s Permanent Undersecretary, mooted the prospect of a wide-ranging 
inquiry into health and safety legislation among government departments. While 
officials cautiously welcomed the plans, concerns were expressed about the possible 
extension of DEP legislation onto territory occupied by other departments, such as 
schools.142 This was a polite precursor to a much more vicious Whitehall row that 
erupted over the CSHW’s recommendations in 1972 (see Chapter 3). 
 Despite these concerns, Castle was convinced that an inquiry was necessary. In a 
letter to Victor Feather, the TUC General Secretary, Castle explained that while the 
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First Consultative Document’s proposals were useful, they did not go far enough. They 
retained the existing patchwork of legal coverage, which had its recognised flaws: 
 
The conclusion I have come to is that the matter can be satisfactorily dealt with only by 
having a high-level outside enquiry. I have in mind a small body—perhaps a chairman and 
3 or 4 members—who could, without going into the detail of the existing legislation, take a 
general look at the way the present system works right across the field.143 
 
At Feather’s suggestion, on the 29 May 1970, just as Parliament dissolved pending the 
general election, Castle appointed Lord Robens of Woldingham to head this enquiry. 
   
2.9.  Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the development of the British system of health and safety 
regulation at a critical historical juncture. Between 1961 and 1970, the Factories Act 
model of regulation, based on an ever increasing corpus of law covering separate 
industries and processes, began to be called into question by inspectors, politicians, 
civil servants and others. Developments over the 1960s highlighted the inherent limits 
of statutory intervention in the workplace, including the effectiveness of detailed, 
prescriptive legislation in controlling hazards. Regulatory attention thus increasingly 
shifted onto the management of health and safety by workers and employers 
themselves, and the promotion of voluntary effort.  
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 In the late 1960s, the innate reactivity of the regulatory system was exposed by 
the rapidly changing industrial landscape and dimensions of occupational risk. This 
was confirmed by the 1966 Aberfan disaster, which demonstrated how occupational 
risks could now extend far beyond the factory fence. Officials thus recognised the need 
for health and safety legislation to encompass all workers, as well as non-employees 
such as the public who could be injured or made ill by work activity.  
 By 1967, administrative developments had already highlighted the need to revise 
health and safety law. However, while the First Consultative Document envisaged the 
significant expansion of legislation, it left intact the established model. Castle’s decision 
to appoint an independent committee of inquiry in 1970 not only reflected political 
realities, but also the fact that a more radical and creative solution was considered 
necessary. 
 A paradox is perhaps evident here. It seems counterintuitive that the government 
campaign to promote voluntary effort or ‘safety consciousness’ in the 1960s was borne 
out of government efforts to penetrate deep in the everyday running of the firm, 
initially, through a voluntarist campaign of education and encouragement, later, 
compulsion. Christy once remarked, ‘safety consciousness cannot be inculcated by 
legislation.’144 However, in terms of safety committees and safety representatives, that 
is exactly what happened by the end of the 1960s, as the Labour government relaxed 
its abstentionist stance towards industrial relations, and threatened to legislate if 
industry did not do more to improve standards. 
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 This paradox can be easily resolved. Firstly, industry was too slow to react to 
voluntary encouragement in the early 1960s, particularly in respect of accident 
reporting and safety committees. As in the 1920s and 1950s, industry did not live up to 
its promises, and the post-1964 Labour government lost patience. Although 
encouraging progress was seen in the late 1960s, this was not merely due to greater 
effort on the part of industry, as the CBI later argued, but the direct threat of 
legislation.145   
 Secondly, while legislation was deemed a blunt instrument to promote health and 
safety, it was still considered necessary to bring into line the worst offenders and lay 
down common standards for industry. The conciliatory enforcement philosophy 
developed by the Factory Inspectorate in the nineteenth century was alive and well in 
the 1960s: the law could be used symbolically to promote ‘voluntary’ compliance.146 
 Thirdly, from a Foucauldian perspective of governmentality, the 1960s approach 
was not about the British state relinquishing its responsibility for health and safety. 
Rather, governmental power was exercised more indirectly: state resources were put 
into moulding an individual and collective sense of responsibility, or discipline for 
health and safety, what was referred to as ‘safety consciousness’ (the term health and 
safety ‘culture’ is more commonplace today). Through the use of various media, 
employers and workers were encouraged to shoulder greater responsibility for health 
and safety, by internalising and enacting various ‘safe’ behaviours. Like Foucault’s 
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argument about panopticism, the government’s approach was about getting employers 
and workers to govern themselves, only stepping in to punish where necessary.147  
 It has been customary for academics to view the 1972 Robens Report as the 
effective start of the ‘modern’ British system of health and safety regulation. However, 
this chapter has shown that this view is too simplistic. Many of the Committee’s most 
important arguments about health and safety regulation, such as the counter-
constructive effects of prescriptive legislation, were in currency among those who 
administrated and enforced regulation before 1970. This chapter has thus begun to 
place the CSHW in wider historical context, by showing how its appointment was not 
inevitable. A unique set of circumstances converged in the 1960s which meant that an 
expected revision of the Factories Act, along traditional lines, was transformed into 
something more radical.  
 The next chapter elaborates these arguments by demonstrating how the HSWA 
and HSC/E were by no means established facts even after the CSHW presented its 
conclusions. Exploring the appointment and operation of the Committee, as well as its 
aftermath, the chapter reveals that in the two years between the publication of the 
report and the passing of the HSWA, a vicious Whitehall row erupted. Disagreements 
between officials over the report’s recommendations exposed the divergent sympathies 
of government departments as well as differing ideas as to what a proposed new 
regulatory agency would look like. What ultimately transpired was significantly shaped 
by the CSHW, but had several critical differences. 
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3.  Transforming the System, 1970–1974 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
This chapter analyses a period of profound transformation in the structure and style of 
British health and safety regulation. Under Lord Robens, in 1972 the Committee on 
Safety and Health at Work (CSHW) recommended a radical overhaul of the existing 
approach to health and safety regulation. Embodied in the HSWA 1974, which 
remains on the statute book to this day, the Committee’s conclusions continue to frame 
the way occupational hazards are conceptualised and addressed in twenty-first-century 
Britain. 
 The CSHW’s overriding conclusion was that the existing mass of health and 
safety legislation no longer sufficiently protected workers and others, such as members 
of the public, who could be harmed by work activity. Fragmented and overly 
prescriptive, the law generated considerable confusion among employers and workers, 
and led them to believe that health and safety was primarily the government’s concern. 
Instead, the Committee argued, ‘a more effectively self-regulating system’ was needed 
to ensure that employers and workers exercised greater responsibility.1 The Committee 
recommended a wholesale redistribution of responsibility, away from government 
effort and statutory regulation, towards voluntary effort and ‘self-regulation’ by 
employers and workers. While health and safety regulation would still remain, it would 
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be reconfigured to support ‘the conditions for more effective self-regulation by 
employers and workers jointly.’2  
 The far-reaching consequences of this reconfiguration are analysed in the later 
chapters of this thesis, which focus on the HSC/E. This chapter is concerned with the 
administrative processes through which the CSHW’s work was organised, its ideas 
developed, and recommendations translated into policies which had significant 
implications for the way health and safety was subsequently regulated in Britain. By 
focusing on these processes, this is not to argue that the CSHW developed its ideas in 
isolation. As suggested previously, it has been customary for many academics and 
professionals to view the CSHW in just this way. In contrast, this chapter draws upon 
a range of material, including archival material from the Committee itself, to 
deconstruct the historical conditions that shaped its key arguments and proposals. It 
also covers the immediate aftermath of the Robens Report, marked by a fierce 
Whitehall row which reveals the opposition of various government departments 
towards the CSHW’s proposals. Such an account enables a more nuanced 
understanding of the emergence of the present (post-1974) regulatory system than 
previously developed by historians, as well as an appreciation of the considerable 
practical and conceptual difficulties that confronted civil servants when navigating the 
CSHW’s far-reaching proposals. 
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3.2.  Overview 
Several of the trends which influenced British health and safety regulation in the 1960s 
continued to have implications for the development of regulatory policy in the early 
1970s, and in fact grew in significance. Section 3.3 elaborates the argument on 
consensus, arguing that between 1970 and 1974, health and safety emerged as an area 
of relative political agreement in a country otherwise embroiled in industrial conflict. 
In the early 1970s, politicians and regulators perceived more clearly the deleterious 
consequences of industrial development on health and the environment. Section 3.4 
highlights the key role played by the British media and environmental movement in 
shaping the political perception of risk. In response to the changing risk environment, 
the CSHW recommended a more all-embracing vision of health and safety regulation, 
to embrace the health and safety of the public and the emission of toxic gases into the 
atmosphere.  
 The important work of the CSHW is analysed in section 3.5. Among its many 
recommendations was the establishment of a National Authority for Safety and Health 
(NASHW), to physically embody the concept of self-regulation and act as a centre of 
expertise in the health and safety field. Section 3.6 highlights how, despite the 
Committee’s sweeping recommendations, one of the few areas of political controversy 
was the NASHW’s consequences for the machinery of government. Following the 
Robens Report, there was ‘a prolonged and intensive period of interdepartmental 
consultation’ (actually, a vicious Whitehall row), during which the proposed NASHW 
was separated into two institutions: the HSC and HSE.3  
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 Section 3.8 moves beyond the administrative detail to consider the HSWA’s 
major implications for British health and safety regulation. Firstly, health and safety 
regulation ceased to be merely ‘occupational’: after 1974, regulation expanded to 
encompass issues of public safety and the environment, which not only brought every 
British employee under the remit of statutory protection, but also (theoretically) every 
British person.  
 Secondly, the role of the British state was recast as providing, in the first 
instance, a framework of law, advice and good practice through which employers and 
employees could take the initiative in promoting health and safety. While the British 
government extensively promoted voluntary effort before 1974, following the HSWA, 
the British health and safety system was openly presented as a regime of self-
regulation. 
 Finally, the HSWA embedded certain ideas and policies which were integral to 
the development of an overt, risk-based philosophy in health and safety regulation. For 
example, the requirement for written safety policies was predicated on the idea that 
employers should assess occupational risks, and take proportionate steps to control 
them. British health and safety regulation after 1974 was thus implicitly ‘risk based’, 
although in practice it was still a long way from the explicit, systematic and formalised 
approach to risk management HSE developed in the late 1980s and 1990s.     
 
3.3.  Conflict and Consensus: Health and Safety in the 1970s 
As explained previously, little has been written on the politics of health and safety 
immediately prior to the CSHW. In contrast, early-seventies British industrial relations 
have received a great deal of historical attention.  
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 Between 1970 and 1974, health and safety emerged as a remarkable area of 
political consensus in a country engulfed by industrial conflict. The period 1970–1974, 
corresponding with the Conservative government of Edward Heath, is often regarded 
by historians as a period of ‘tumult’.4  In a context of rapid inflation, worsened by the 
1973 oil crisis, trade union demands for pay rises and widespread opposition to a new, 
more restrictive industrial relations law (the Industrial Relations Act 1971) resulted in 
increased militancy, power shortages, and ultimately, emergency measures introduced 
by the government to conserve energy (the ‘three-day week’). As Kessler and Bayliss 
observe, ‘industrial relations reached right into people’s homes—their lights went 
out—and that raised the significance of industrial action … to a new political level.’5 By 
1972, the number of working days lost to industrial disputes surged to 24 million, 
primarily due to the national coal strike.6 This exceeded the figure of 23 million 
working days lost as a result of occupational injury and illness, first advanced by the 
Donovan Commission in 1968.7  
 Following the election victory of the Conservative Party in 1970, pressure on the 
supposed ‘post-war consensus’ mounted further. The Conservatives entered under a 
mandate to liberalise the economy, abolish Labour’s prices and incomes policy and 
curb trade union power. The Industrial Relations Act 1971 closely followed the 
Donovan Commission’s recommendations, establishing a new Commission on 
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Industrial Relations and National Industrial Relations Court. These policies, however, 
are widely interpreted to have been a failure: the need to reintroduce an incomes policy 
following the 1972 national coal strike, as well as the depth of political opposition to 
the Industrial Relations Act, meant that consensus was reinforced.8 In the ‘social 
contract’, Labour returned to power in 1974 offering the trade unions a raft of political 
concessions in exchange for support on wage restraint. Consequently, the HSWA 
formed part of a series of measures to appease the unions and improve workers’ rights, 
including the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and Employment Protection Act 1975.9 
 Within this context of unrest, health and safety was a rare oasis of calm, forging 
substantial agreement between the TUC, CBI and two main political parties. As 
Dawson argues, health and safety represented ‘a relatively stable framework of … law 
across an economically and politically turbulent period.’10 This is evident from the fact 
that in 1973, following the Robens Report, the TUC and CBI jointly lobbied the 
government to have the HSWA speedily enacted. This reveals how the need for 
systemic reform was seen to transcend any differences of opinion between them, for 
instance in terms of the form and content of new legislation.11 In 1972, shortly after the 
controversial imprisonment of five striking dockworkers, Feather remarked just how 
progressive the Robens Report was, and how history needed to remember its 
publication.12 This was in spite of the TUC losing out in the Robens Report, having 
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pushed for more detailed, rigorously enforced regulation while the CSHW 
recommended a greater emphasis on voluntary effort and self-regulation.  
 Consensus is also evident from the way political action on health and safety was 
sustained despite two successive changes of government. The Conservatives inherited 
the CSHW from the previous Labour government, and were receptive to its proposals. 
Likewise, the HSWA was passed by a minority Labour government in July 1974, with 
only minor changes to a Conservative Bill introduced seven months earlier. Some of 
these minor changes, however, had major consequences: one of Labour’s concessions 
to the trade unions was a clause whereby they alone had the right to appoint worker 
safety representatives.13 This was a significant departure from the CSHW’s argument 
that every worker, unionised or not, had the right to participate in health and safety 
management, and provided the grounds for one of the few areas of political contention 
in the passing of the Act. 
 Pressure to secure cooperation came from multiple sources. Ultimately, both 
sides of industry had a common interest in seeking reform of the regulatory system, 
despite differences over the exact nature of these reforms. The TUC believed that the 
system was too weak and required strengthening, while the CBI believed that the 
system was overly prescriptive and detrimental to voluntary effort. The two main 
political parties, on the other hand, were publicly committed to action on health and 
safety, and feared a political backlash if they either reneged on their commitment, or 
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presented watered-down proposals.14 Moreover, the recommended reforms were 
diverse enough to garner cross-party political support, even if they did not meet every 
demand or criticism. Self-regulation appealed to business interests, for example, while 
the proposed extension of legislation to cover all employees also met some of the 
demands of labour. Pressure to secure cooperation also came from economic and 
political developments. This is evidenced by a revealing letter from Jim Prior, the Lord 
President of the Council, to Maurice Macmillan, the Employment Secretary, 
reminding him of ‘the value [of the HSWA] in providing an opportunity for fruitful co-
operation between the Government, employers and employees, and in contributing 
towards the establishment of a climate which will be helpful for … our counter-
inflationary policies.’15  
 At least on one level—the need for systemic reform—there were thus pressures 
during 1970–74 that promoted political agreement on health and safety, even if the 
outcome of reform was not visualised in the same way on all sides. This is not to 
overstate ’consensus’: as demonstrated below, there were some serious criticisms of the 
Robens Report from certain quarters of British politics, academia, the press and safety 
movement, largely revolving around its philosophy of self-regulation. Nevertheless, the 
source of major conflict during 1970–74 was from Whitehall itself. Certain 
departments, including the Department of the Environment (DOE), bitterly opposed 
the Committee’s recommendation they should rescind their policymaking functions to a 
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new NASHW. This was a significant barrier to the wider, more all-embracing concept 
of health and safety advanced by the CSHW. 
 
3.4.  Risky Business: Occupational Risk in the 1970s 
The early 1970s saw major developments not only in industrial politics, but the 
occupational and environmental risk environment. These had substantial bearing on 
the CSHW’s conclusion that a ‘thoroughgoing overhaul’ of the health and safety 
system was needed.16 
 As Chapter 2 explained, in the late 1960s regulators were increasingly conscious 
of the rapidly changing industrial landscape, which altered the nature of the risks 
workers confronted. This awareness was linked, in part, to the newfound 
sophistication of industrial hygiene and its growing centrality to health and safety 
policymaking. The industrial experience of factory inspectors also informed them that 
plants were growing in scale and catastrophic potential. However, the British media 
and nascent environmental movement also played a critical role in this development, 
helping focus the political perception of occupational risk.  
 In 1968 alone, the British media reported adeno-carcinoma of the nose among 
furniture workers in High Wycombe, mesothelioma in asbestos workers, and scrotal 
cancer in workers handling mineral oil.17 At the time, factory inspectors and other 
officials interpreted such media attention as an increase in public interest in health and 
safety, although, in reality, such ‘interest’ is difficult to disentangle from actual 
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concern. John Plumbe and his successor, Bryan Harvey, wrote of the fragile and 
symbiotic relationship between media and regulator, how the power of the media 
needed to be exploited to ‘harness the force of … informed opinion to the improvement 
of industrial conditions’, while being aware of how it could ‘magnify the effect on the 
public conscience of a happening which in earlier years might have received little 
attention.’18  
 Media interest in health and safety corresponded with growing public interest in 
the environment in general: in the 1960s, Owens explains, ‘the environment … 
emerged as a  distinct category of public and political concern.’19 In particular, the 
publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962 helped stimulate public interest in 
the environment, and imparted momentum to a burgeoning environmental movement.20 
The book, about the ecological and health effects of chemical pesticides, was first 
published in Britain in 1965. Following public concerns about atomic energy and 
thalidomide, the book generated significant political awareness about the risks industry 
posed to human health and the environment. The relevance to health and safety is that 
while Carson was careful not to recommend a complete ban on chemical pesticides, she 
emphasised their possible long-term health effects, words which resonated among a 
British audience waking up to the insidious risks of asbestos, smoking and thalidomide. 
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Carson’s work suggested, at least implicitly, that regulators had failed in their duty of 
preventing risks to the public in relation to new technologies. Lord Shackleton, 
introducing the British edition, made this connection clear: ‘the tragedies of 
Thalidomide, of lung cancer from smoking, and many other examples, all these are a 
measure of the failure to foresee the risk and act quickly enough.’21 
 In the early 1970s, Carson was joined by authors such as Taylor and Ehrlich in 
predicting a dystopian future brought about by humankind’s unbridled faith in 
technological and industrial ‘progress’.22 Alongside other events that brought 
conservation issues to the forefront of public and media attention, such as the moon 
landing, by the early 1970s ‘the environment’ had become a major media topic, 
appearing as a regular column in Time magazine as early as August 1969.23 New 
voluntary organisations were also established around this time: Friends of the Earth 
was established in 1969, while Greenpeace originated around 1970. 
 Wider social and epidemiological trends were interwoven with this ‘awakening’ 
of media interest in environmental and occupational health.24 Harvey recognised how 
as acute infectious and childhood diseases declined, more insidious, chronic diseases 
were coming under regulatory focus.25 In his book Human Engineering (1970), Lord 
Robens wrote evocatively of new social expectations about health and the environment 
in general: 
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In recent years there has been a bold renewal of man’s urge to ‘have a say’ in the things 
that happen around him. In some instances this has resulted more in ‘having a go’ than 
‘having a say’. Unfortunately these cases have been the ones that have attracted the sharp 
focus of public attention. I certainly do not know why this movement has recurred just 
now—we must leave future historians to unravel the causes—but it has happened and it is 
force to be reckoned with.26 
  
Certainly, improved living and social conditions were partly responsible for rising 
public awareness of risks. As incomes rose and the post-1945 welfare state removed or 
ameliorated many of the ‘bread and butter’ problems facing British workers, public 
attention shifted to wider environmental problems. As Robens wrote: ‘There are 
demands to eradicate the pollution of the air, to clean up the rivers and the seas around 
the populated coasts, and to clear up the thousands of acres of blighted areas of 
dereliction left by the ravages of industry on its way by.’27 
 As a consequence of these developments, workers and the general public grew 
more aware of occupational hazards, and demanded greater information about risks 
they were exposed to. This demand placed increasing pressure on regulators over the 
last third of the twentieth century. It was met through traditional means of 
communication such as face-to-face advice, publications and exhibitions, as well as 
innovations such as the technical data note, leaflets that displayed information about 
hazards in condensed form, which were handed out free of charge by inspectors when 
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visiting workplaces.28 Over, the 1970s, informational films also became a prominent 
source of public information about health risks, sponsored by organisations such as the 
Central Office of Information. Films about work safety were circulated to a 
widespread audience including workers, safety professionals, and at least in one 
notable case (the 1977 film Apaches, about the dangers of playing on farms) to 
schoolchildren. As one commentator wrote in 1980, ‘from a time when there were 
precious few training films, and nobody was prepared, speculatively, to produce any, 
we have moved to a time when there is almost an embarras de richessse of training 
programmes for sale or hire.’29 
 In the early 1970s, public demand for information about risks became 
transformed into something approaching a democratic right. Political demands for joint 
consultation were complemented by a demand for access to information about 
hazardous materials. Following cases of lead poisoning at the Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ) 
smelter in Avonmouth in 1972, a Committee of Inquiry was sent to investigate under 
the chairmanship of the radiologist, Sir Brian Windeyer. The RTZ smelter was newly 
built in 1969, and at the time was the largest lead and zinc smelting plant in the 
world.30  The Windeyer Committee was tasked with finding the cause of the 
poisonings, and reporting in relation to the work of the CSHW, of which Windeyer 
and his colleagues were also members. Windeyer recommended that RTZ workers 
should be better informed about health hazards, and that more information should be 
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provided to workers about levels of environmental contamination and absorption of 
lead into the blood.31 In his 1971 report, Harvey remarked how such an obligation was 
not confined to the lead industry, but existed across industry as a whole: at a time 
when the public expected to be better informed about risks they were exposed to, and 
reassured that preventive measures were being taken, communication about risks 
needed to be industry-wide.32  
 Cause and effect in this period is difficult to unravel. Increasing public concern 
about environmental and occupational health risks—or more precisely, increasing 
regulatory perception of such concern—grew in tandem with science unveiling those 
risks. The identification of new occupational health risks further accelerated in the 
1970s. New occupational hygiene laboratories were opened in Cricklewood, North 
London in 1973, and between 1970 and 1973 tests of toxic substances in the Industrial 
Hygiene Unit further rose from 7,100 to 12,850. This represented an enormous 
increase of 836 per cent since 1966.33 The newfound power of these sciences was 
confirmed in 1974, with the ‘sudden recognition’ that vinyl chloride, a monomer used 
in the production of the plastic, PVC, resulted in the cancer angiosarcoma. As HSE’s 
former Director of Medical Services, Tim Carter recalled, this resulted in a widespread 
panic, especially in the British chemical companies responsible for its production.34 The 
rapid development of a code of practice for vinyl chloride revealed how even under 
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conditions of scientific uncertainty, the findings of these regulatory sciences could be 
quickly translated into practical action to minimise workers’ exposure.35 
 Outside occupational health, major hazards such as chemical plants continued to 
develop as sources of public and regulatory concern. With memories of Aberfan still 
recent, a string of high-profile industrial accidents at Mitcham, Pembroke, Sheffield 
and Flixborough brought into sharp relief the deadly implications of the scaling-up of 
industrial plants. These added to the growing public anxiety around new industrial 
developments, such as plans for an oil terminal on Canvey Island, sensationally 
described as ‘an Island of Fear’ by the British Safety Council’s magazine, Safety and 
Rescue.36 As the local MP, Bernard Braine, warned, ‘I have no wish to be alarmist…. 
But the Aberfan disaster crept upon us largely unawares precisely because no one ever 
thought that it was his responsibility to calculate the risks being taken.’37 
 Such comments were perceptive, for as Harvey remarked in 1972, a reactive 
approach to major hazards, like environmental contaminants, could no longer be 
tolerated: 
 
It is clear that we can no longer afford to take a chance in many plants. In these 
circumstances a very detailed calculation of the sorts of problems which are likely to arise 
will be necessary…. If it is not possible to develop adequate measures of controlling the 
hazards which some processes create then industry may well have to take a decision not to 
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develop a particular plant or process until the way ahead for both workers and the 
environment is clear.38  
 
These developments prompted a striking change in the role of factory inspectors in the 
early 1970s. In his 1973 report, Harvey remarked how ‘the whole of the Inspectorate is 
now geared to the enforcement of the health requirements of the legislation in terms of 
the scientific measurement of risk and the scientific monitoring of precautions which 
are taken to minimise it’: the factory inspector was adopting a new scientific persona.39  
 HSE’s former Deputy Director-General, David Eves, recounted the basic 
equipment offered to trainee factory inspectors in the mid 1960s: 
 
 The equipment was rudimentary, to say the least. It was a six-inch metal ruler—imperial, 
not metric …, there was a pair of internal and external callipers …, for measuring the 
diameter of shafting …, no protective clothing, and no eye protection, no safety boots, no 
overall, nothing. So the culture was to inspect in your suit, looking … as smart as 
possible…. You get a notebook, and you’d get a government-property pen …, [but] that 
was about it really.40 
 
 By the early 1970s, however, this was beginning to change. Supported by improved 
regulatory science, trained to an increasingly high calibre, and armed with new 
portable sampling instruments, factory inspectors were assuming a new ‘forensic 
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capability’.41 ‘Empirical’ approaches to regulation and enforcement, such as the routine 
cyclical inspection of workplaces, were questioned during this period as inspectors 
moved towards more technical, ‘risk based’ approaches.42 These included the 
prioritisation of larger premises, or those which statistics revealed to pose a 
disproportionate risk to employees (through a numerical rating system), and the 
promotion of environmental monitoring in hazardous industries.43 
 It was in this context of regulatory, technological and epidemiological change 
that the CSHW carried out its detailed review. From the perspective of factory 
inspectors and the British government, the existing approach to health and safety 
regulation was no longer effective in protecting workers and the wider public against 
occupational risks. As Harvey’s comments about risk indicated, a more proactive 
system was desired, one that could keep abreast of technological change, and put the 
burden of evaluating and controlling risk on those who generated them in the first 
place.  
  
3.5.  The Committee on Safety and Health at Work 
 
3.5.1.  Appointment and terms of reference 
The CSHW was the first ever comprehensive inquiry of the British health and safety 
system. Although several committees and Royal Commissions had been established 
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over the decades to inquire into specific aspects of health and safety, never before had 
their remit been so vast.44 The Committee’s terms of reference are worth quoting in 
full. These were: 
 
To review the provision made for the safety and health of persons in their course of 
employment (other than transport workers while directly engaged on transport operations 
and who are covered by other provisions) and to consider whether any changes are needed 
in: (1) the scope or nature of the major relevant enactments, or (2) the nature and extent of 
voluntary action concerned with these matters, and to consider whether any further steps are 
required to safeguard members of the public from hazards, other than general environmental 
pollution, arising in connection with activities in industrial and commercial premises and 
construction sites, and to make recommendations.45 
 
As these terms suggest, the Committee’s role was carefully drafted to avoid contention 
with policy domains that other government departments controlled, or considered to be 
outside the remit of ‘health and safety’. From 1970, the question of environmental 
pollution was also under consideration by a Royal Commission, chaired by the 
botanist, Sir Eric Ashby.46 Thus, the Committee’s terms of reference were written to 
provide it with maximum depth of focus, while avoiding these sensitive areas.  
 However, the interconnectedness of health and safety problems, exacerbated by 
the delocalisation of risk, meant that the CSHW found it extremely difficult to restrict 
its work. An integrated approach to the control of dangerous substances, for example, 
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naturally raised the issue of their transport, while the control of toxic substances within 
the workplace highlighted contradictory standards concerning the same substances 
when emitted into the external environment. ‘Safety and health at work,’ Robens 
conceded in 1972, ‘is not a subject that is easily delimited.’47  
 Considering the enormity of the subject, the DEP wanted the CSHW to reflect a 
broad range of industrial and technical expertise. Robens himself was an interesting 
choice of chair for the Committee. Having had both direct and indirect experience of 
health and safety policy over his long career, as well as experience in industrial 
relations, Robens was uniquely placed to weave together contemporary ideas about 
safety, productivity and self-help into a coherent regulatory philosophy. 
 The son of a cotton salesman, Robens had industrial relations experience from an 
early age. Robens began his career as a clerk for the Manchester and Salford 
Cooperative society and later, as an official for the Union of Shop and Distributive 
Workers. Following the Second World War, Robens became a Labour MP for the 
mining constituency of Wansbeck, and then Blyth in Northern England. A swift rise in 
the ministerial ranks saw Robens briefly in the role of Minister of Labour and National 
Service, before the Conservative’s 1951 general election victory.48 In opposition, 
Robens was a passionate advocate of industrial safety, lobbying the government to 
expand health and safety legislation to non-industrial premises.49 In 1960, despite his 
socialist leanings, the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan invited Robens to chair the 
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organisation running the nationalised coal industry in Britain, the NCB. This 
combined Robens’ two great passions: ‘mining and men at work’.50  
 As NCB chair, Robens became closely acquainted with health and safety in a 
major hazardous industry, albeit one in serious decline. Even though the coal industry 
contracted sharply over the 1960s (output fell from 194 million tons per year in 1960 to 
142 million by 1970), 316 men were killed and over 1,500 suffered serious injury in 
1960 alone.51 As a nationalised industry able to draw upon public funds, the NCB 
developed a more comprehensive approach to health and safety compared to other 
industries.52 In response to the high accident rate among miners, Robens raised the 
status of professional safety staff, and pioneered a variety of methods to disseminate 
the safety message: publications, posters, league tables, as well as shock films, ‘more 
horrific than any Hammer Films production.’53  
 Robens became infamous for his love of the trappings of power, including a 
Daimler (registration NCB1), a private plane, and an exclusive apartment in Eaton 
Square, London. At a time when the coal industry was declining, Robens earned 
himself the unfortunate nickname, Old King Coal. However, it was the events of 21 
October 1966 that defined much of his later career. As NCB chair, Robens was 
lambasted by the media for his mishandling of the relief effort at Aberfan. Notoriously, 
rather than attend the scene immediately, Robens preferred to honour his instatement 
as Chancellor of Surrey University.54 At the Davies Tribunal, Robens was criticised for 
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his inconsistent evidence. The Tribunal demonstrated that while Robens had suggested 
to a reporter ‘it was impossible to know that there was a spring in the heart of this tip 
which was turning the centre of the mountain into sludge’, the NCB had technology at 
its disposal which could have detected its presence.55 
 Despite the reputational damage Robens suffered at Aberfan, the fact it was 
Feather, the TUC General Secretary, who proposed his name to Castle suggests that 
Robens retained credibility among the trade union movement.56 Indeed, having been 
appointed to the NCB by a Conservative Prime Minister, Robens had a degree of 
political acceptability across ‘both sides of industry’, and was well versed in arbitrating 
between employers and trade unions. In the 1960s, Robens was a member of the 
Donovan Commission, which recommended statutory support (but not regulation) of 
industrial relations. As NCB chair, Robens was also aware of the link between safety 
and productivity, claiming that the pits with the best safety records were generally 
those which hauled the most coal out of the ground.57 
 In 1970, before he was appointed to the CSHW, Robens published an 
evocatively titled book which demonstrated the influence of contemporary political and 
economic trends on his thought. In Human Engineering, Robens advocated a 
comprehensive overhaul of British industrial relations, boosting national productivity 
by finding ways to exploit ‘the vast potential of the manpower of this country, the 
native genius and natural initiative.’58 Robens suggested that the primary reason why 
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Britain was lagging behind its competitors, such as the USA, was because it was 
unable to utilise its labour efficiently. In Robens’ view, poor health and safety 
standards were symptomatic of an inefficient and badly managed workplace, where 
workers had little stake in the decision-making affecting their work. Arrangements 
such as safety committees that encouraged safety as part of everyday business should 
therefore be encouraged by the government, and used in preference to detailed 
legislation, which encouraged the notion it was the government, not industry, who had 
primary responsibility for controlling hazards. Suggesting how Robens had in mind a 
redistribution of responsibility for health and safety before the CSHW was even 
formed, he wrote: ‘Not until wise managements recognise the importance of safety at 
the place of employment as an integral part of efficiency will the requirement for 
inspectors and enforcement virtually disappear.’59 Robens carried these ideas and 
beliefs into his deliberations on the Committee. 
 The other members of the CSHW were carefully assembled by Castle and her 
DEP colleagues, before the 1970 general election called time on Labour’s six years in 
government. In addition to Robens, members included the Professor of Law, John 
Wood; the Conservative MP, Mervyn Pike; the radiologist and chair of the University 
of London, Brian Windeyer; the General Secretary of the National Union of Shoe and 
Boot Operatives and chair of the TUC Social Insurance Committee, Sydney Robinson; 
the chair of British Titan Products and the British Standards Institute, George Beeby; 
and the management consultant, Anne Shaw.60  
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 The place of these individuals on the Committee was highly significant. Not only 
were ‘both sides of industry’ represented, but also a broad spectrum of political 
opinion. Robens, for example, was a former Labour Minister, while Pike was a 
Conservative backbencher. Wood’s place on the Committee highlighted the importance 
of legal knowledge, while Beeby’s recognised the centrality of non-statutory standards 
to health and safety policy. Shaw’s membership of the Committee was also significant, 
suggesting how management consultancy was becoming more prominent as a 
profession and field, at a time when the efficient management of industry and the wider 
British economy was a top political priority. Shaw was a British pioneer of motion 
study, a scientific management technique, and a student of Frank and Lillian Gilbreth, 
two notable American early industrial psychologists.61  
  
3.5.2.  Operation 
The CSHW’s first official meeting was on 23 June 1970 at Hobart House, London, 
although due to the absence of several members, the Committee first met in full on 14 
July. Robens opened the June meeting by declaring how the Committee had ‘accepted 
a task of great magnitude and complexity’, with ‘a great impact on future developments 
in safety and health arrangements affecting many millions of workpeople.’62 
 Indeed, the task at hand was so complex that it would have been inordinately 
difficult for a small committee to go about it alone. The Committee was thus assisted by 
a secretariat composed of seconded civil servants, led by Matthew Wake of the DE. 
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The secretariat helped organise the Committee’s work, preparing briefing notes, 
processing written and oral evidence, and scheduling meetings and visits. They acted 
as a vital bridge between the Committee, which was largely composed of individuals 
with limited or indirect health and safety experience, and those in the British 
government with direct, full-time experience of health and safety policy. In the early 
stages of its work, the CSHW was also assisted by the DE itself, which prepared 
several detailed background documents to get the Committee started.63 
 The Committee processed a veritable mountain of material. In two years, the 
Committee collected written and oral evidence from over 200 individuals and 
organisations with an interest in health and safety, including government departments, 
local authorities, trade unions, employers’ associations, insurers, professional 
associations and safety charities. Before written evidence was invited between August 
and November 1970, a series of informal talks was held with senior figures of these 
bodies, helping the Committee form an initial impression of the regulatory system, and 
identify the main differences of opinion.64 Outside research was commissioned, aiding 
the understanding of complex topics such as accident prevention. This exhaustive 
process of evidence gathering was complemented by a programme of visits at home 
and abroad. In Britain, Committee members shadowed inspectors on their daily work, 
and visited mines, factories, farms and construction yards. International visits included 
West Germany (March 1971), Sweden (September 1971), Canada (May 1971) and 
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the USA (May 1971). These junkets were intended to familiarise the CSHW with 
foreign regulatory and industrial compensation systems. 
 These visits were highly orchestrated, intended to attract maximum media 
interest. Newspapers were given advance warning about Committee visits, and press 
releases circulated to give workers, employers and the general public the impression 
the Committee was serious about tackling Britain’s health and safety problems. 
Despite this effort, media exposure fell short of the Committee’s initial expectations, 
with only two photographers attending the Committee’s first full meeting in July 1970, 
one of whom had been specifically invited as an ‘insurance’.65 Disappointment was later 
expressed by trade unions, safety charities and the government about the level of 
publicity attracted by the Robens Report (see below). 
 
3.5.3.  International Visits 
As mentioned above, the CSHW embarked on several international visits between 
March and September 1971, to experience the health and safety systems of other 
countries. 
 Health and safety was regulated in these countries very differently to in Britain, 
although each had potential lessons to offer. In the USA, President Nixon had recently 
passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1970 (OSH Act). Designed ‘to assure 
so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful 
working conditions’, the Act was the first federal foray into occupational health and 
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safety legislation. Previously, such legislation was handled by individual states: 
Massachusetts was the first state to advance industrial safety legislation, requiring the 
fencing of dangerous machinery from 1877.66  
 As with the HSWA, the OSH Act was prompted by political concerns about the 
rising level of industrial accidents. In 1970, a shocking 14,000 American workers were 
killed at work. The OSH Act established a general duty for employers to provide work 
free from recognised hazards, and enabled the Secretary of Labor to make new 
standards. These were developed through a network of advisory committees and 
national standard-making organisations, after taking into account the views of 
interested parties.67 The CSHW considered that the use of voluntary standards, given 
statutory approval by the government, was an important regulatory tool, and that 
further weight should be attached to them in Britain in future.68 
 Another similarity with the HSWA was that the OSH Act provided for new 
national institutions to develop and enforce health and safety standards. The 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) was established as a new 
federal enforcement agency, while the National Institute of Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) conducted scientific research and developed new standards. 
 Sweden offered an alternative vision of health and safety regulation, firmly 
grounded in joint consultation. There, the Workers’ Protection Act had established 
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comprehensive protection against occupational accidents and disease in 1949, and 
provided for the appointment of safety representatives and safety committees.69 
Swedish arrangements for joint consultation were looked upon by British trade unions 
particularly favourably in the 1960s and 1970s, and were considered a possible model 
for British arrangements at a time when industry’s commitment to accident prevention 
was open to doubt.70  
 
3.5.4.  Evidence 
While domestic and international visits were crucial to the development of the 
CSHW’s ideas, the Committee was also heavily influenced by the people who 
supported and administrated its work. The role of the secretariat and DE in filtering 
the CSHW’s conceptualisation of health and safety regulation has not been 
acknowledged by historical studies to date. These have tended to focus on the 
Committee and its published report, which obscure the influences on its collective 
opinion. What becomes apparent through an analysis of their work is that while the 
Committee was ostensibly free to draw its own conclusions, the close relationship 
between the CSHW and its sponsoring department, the DE, meant that the Committee 
was necessarily more exposed to the DE’s political agenda than any other government 
department or organisation.71 
 An early background paper prepared by the DE, for example, painted a picture 
of the British regulatory landscape that was wholeheartedly accepted by the CSHW, 
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highlighting ‘the multiplicity of enforcing agencies, the multiplicity and overlap of 
statutes, the distinction between safety and health of employed persons and safety and 
health of members of the public, [and] gaps in the coverage of the legislation.’72 
Moreover, an early review of evidence, just six months into the Committee’s 
proceedings, noted ‘the existence of a mass of detailed restrictive legislation may inhibit 
the natural development of self-help and continuous self-regulation by industry itself.’73 
This was uncannily similar to the Committee’s eventual conclusion: ‘the existence of 
such a mass of law has an unfortunate and all-pervading psychological effect. People 
are heavily conditioned to think of safety and health at work as … a matter of detailed 
rules imposed by external agencies.’74 
 Economists such as Stigler have pointed to the capture of regulatory bodies by 
special interests such as large industries.75 This can occur when the composition of 
regulatory bodies is biased towards a particular viewpoint, or when the thinking of 
such bodies is slanted towards a particular ideology, or perception of problems. In this 
case, the CSHW’s thinking was skewed towards the DE and its Factory Inspectorate. 
DE officials had been preparing comprehensive safety and health legislation since 
1967. By presenting a vision of the health and safety system that was already largely 
accepted, officials gently prodded the CSHW towards reforms under the DE’s sphere 
of influence. 
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 The CSHW’s written and oral evidence also suggests a cognitive bias towards the 
DE and Factory Inspectorate’s views. One of the first presentations delivered to the 
Committee was from the Chief Inspector of Factories, Plumbe, who repeated his 
assertion that the Factory Inspectorate’s work was suffering from diminishing returns. 
An increase in prosecution, Plumbe suggested, would be counter-constructive to health 
and safety, since it would ‘reduce the “public image impact” of prosecution action.’ 
Instead, the Factory Inspectorate considered the law ‘a powerful reinforcement of their 
persuasive functions …one to be kept in the background and used as last resort.’76 This 
belief, of huge importance to the enforcement of health and safety, received no critical 
scrutiny from the CSHW and found its way directly into its report. The idea that 
excessive legislation undermined or deterred individual responsibility, of course, 
accorded with Robens’ own expressed opinion in Human Engineering. 
 On the other hand, the CSHW appears to have dismissed alternative views out of 
hand. In its submissions of evidence, the TUC argued that the government needed to 
devote more resources to accident prevention, in both human and financial terms. The 
government needed to increase the number of factory inspectors, as well as the level of 
fines imposed in court. In his oral evidence, C. R. Dale, the Secretary of TUC’s Social 
Insurance and Industrial Welfare Committee, argued for the continuation of detailed, 
prescriptive laws, because more general and flexible requirements were harder to 
enforce. For the TUC, the primary question concerning health and safety regulation 
was not whether the balance between statutory and voluntary effort was correct, as the 
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CSHW’s terms of reference implied, but whether this balance could be sustained.  In 
Dale’s view, neither was there sufficient enforcement, nor too many regulations.77  
 With the exception of joint consultation, the CSHW was more sympathetic to the 
CBI.78 The CBI argued in contrast to the TUC that the proliferation of health and 
safety law was no longer tenable. Detailed, prescriptive legislation obscured the 
employers’ common duty of care, and the CBI proposed that legislation should 
emphasise general duties. As a CBI briefing note suggested, ‘what is wanted is not just 
new legislation but a completely new approach and method of presentation centred 
upon the predominance of the basic common law principle which places responsibility 
on every individual for reasonable conduct in his relationship with others.’79 
 The CBI agreed with the DE that existing health and safety law was 
unintelligible and required urgent rationalisation. Just like the DE, the CBI argued 
that an ‘enabling’ Act would be more easily understood by employers; complex matters 
could be dealt with through subordinate regulations and codes of practice. On the 
vexed issue of safety committees, the CBI repeated its belief that statutory compulsion 
was unlikely to work, since it depended on the goodwill of both sides of industry.80 For 
the CBI, the CSHW’s secretariat noted, ‘“compulsory joint consultation” was a 
contradiction in terms.’81 
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 Submissions of evidence to the CSHW help illuminate the wider considerations 
that informed its thinking. They are more revealing than the minutes of the Committee 
itself, which largely concentrate on logistical matters (such as upcoming visits), and 
tend to obscure differences of opinion between Committee members. Nevertheless, 
minutes reveal that the CSHW reached some of its most fundamental decisions 
relatively early in its proceedings. By January 1971, for example, the Committee had 
already determined there should be a new comprehensive Act applying to all 
employees. However, there was a limit to what legislation could achieve, and in future, 
there should be renewed focus on voluntary effort and individual responsibility for 
workplace health and safety.82  
 
3.5.5.  The Robens Report 
The Robens Report was published on 19 July 1972. Like its subject, the Report was 
vast, exceeding over 200 pages. Taking a panoramic view across Britain’s health and 
safety landscape—not just regulation—it covered such diverse topics as accident 
prevention, occupational medicine, statistics and insurance. However, it had a single, 
fundamental conclusion: ‘There are severe practical limits on the extent to which progressively 
better standards of safety and health at work can be brought about through negative regulation by 
external agencies. We need a more effectively self-regulating system.’83  
 This argument was not just based on the wealth of industrial experience the 
Committee had tapped into through its industrial visits and submissions of evidence. It 
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was based on a singular, controversial diagnosis which continues to divide academic 
opinion to this day: ‘the most single reason for accidents at work is apathy.’84  
 In making this assertion, the CSHW was not necessarily blaming workers for 
their own accidents and ill health, as some commentators have argued.85 The 
Committee considered ‘apathy’ to be pervasive and industry-wide, applying equally, if 
not more, to employers: ‘The primary responsibility for doing something about the present levels 
of occupational accidents and disease lies with those who create the risks and those who work with 
them.’86 The sheer mass of law, the Committee believed, undermined health and safety 
since it encouraged employers and workers to think of it as the government’s 
responsibility.87 The law had developed piecemeal and unsystematically over time, 
reacting to events through a process of ‘practical empiricism’.88 However, this 
empiricism and creeping legislative extension was now being called into question, not 
least because of the growing toll of industrial accidents, disasters, and the changing 
dimensions of risk.89 
 The state’s role in health and safety regulation, the Committee argued, did not 
encourage employers to understand and honour their legal responsibilities. Since 
existing laws were overly prescriptive, they encouraged employers to meet minimum 
standards rather than do their utmost to promote safe and hygienic working 
conditions. The law was immensely confusing, even for those who administrated and 
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enforced it.90  Moreover, many health and safety requirements were archaic and 
inappropriate for modern industrial conditions. The law was thus highly atavistic, as 
requirements persisted that reflected a by-gone industrial age.  
 Another significant problem was the tendency of health and safety legislation to 
focus on physical conditions and hazards, at the expense of social conditions, personal 
attitudes, and safety organisation.91 As factory inspectors had argued over the 1960s, 
the most common workplace accidents were due to factors beyond legislative control. 
 The CSHW believed that it was not only health and safety legislation in urgent 
need of rationalisation. The institutional machinery for health and safety regulation 
also required reform. The jungle of legal provisions was a constant headache for 
officials: multiple statutes led to demarcation problems and disputes between 
authorities; often, significant time would be spent simply deliberating whether the law 
applied. On the one hand, some complex workplaces, such as chemical plants, were 
subject to multiple statutes, conflicting legal standards and systems of inspection. On 
the other hand, other workplaces, such as hospital wards, were excluded from health 
and safety legislation altogether.  The ‘labyrinthine’ structure of health and safety law 
resulted in gaping blind spots where up to 5 million employees had no legal protection 
from occupational hazards.92 Outside employment, ‘third persons’, such as members of 
the public, were also at risk from occupational accidents and ill-health. As Brent Cross, 
Aberfan, and later, Flixborough revealed, such persons required statutory protection.  
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 Unsurprisingly, considering their close relationship, the CSHW largely followed 
the DE’s template for reform. The CSHW argued that a more comprehensive and 
ordered system of regulation was needed, one which anticipated risk and kept abreast 
of technological change. It needed to be structured in such a way that industry bore the 
brunt of responsibility, while also being flexible and amendable with new 
developments. To counteract ‘apathy’, and stimulate safety awareness, ‘an 
accumulation of influences and pressures’ was needed across the health and safety 
system.93 The CSHW’s recommendations thus applied to all three levels of the British 
health and safety system: the workplace, industry and the British state.  
 
3.5.5.1.  Workplace 
At workplace level, the CSHW’s view of statutory regulation was indebted to the 
paternalistic, managerial approach of the Factory Inspectorate, who considered the law 
a blunt instrument to prevent occupational accidents and disease. The Committee 
argued that the most effective way to improve health and safety standards was by 
‘creating the conditions for more effective self-regulation by employers and 
workpeople jointly’, using tools such as education, advice, and voluntary standards to 
raise the profile of health and safety in the firm.94 As in Human Engineering, Robens 
emphasised that health and safety was an essential feature of good management, and 
needed to be treated in the same way as other business operations, such as personnel 
management.95 Safety performance could only be improved if everyone at work, from 
                                                
 
 
93  Ibid., 1–2. 
94  Ibid., p.151. 
95  Ibid., 15–16. 
 161 
the company director to shop-floor operative, knew what their responsibility was, and 
exercised it accordingly. In order to clarify and allocate responsibilities, the CSHW 
recommended there should be a legal requirement for companies to produce a written 
statement of their safety policy, detailing safety procedures and arrangements. Written 
safety policies placed an implicit demand on employers to consider the particular 
hazards in their workplace, and take commensurate steps to protect the health and 
safety of their employees.96 
 According to the Committee, for this redistribution of responsibility to be 
successful, there needed to be regular joint discussion of health and safety issues in the 
workplace. The question of joint consultation, of course, was a complex and sensitive 
issue at a time of strained industrial relations. Throughout the early 1970s, the TUC 
continued to push for the statutory recognition of safety committees and 
representatives, a position it had maintained since 1964. The CBI, on the other hand, 
remained firmly opposed, arguing that for such arrangements to work, they needed the 
full support of both sides of industry.97 While the CSHW recognised the importance of 
joint consultation, it ultimately stopped short of recommending the statutory 
compulsion of safety committees. As the CBI, it believed that industrial conditions 
varied so widely it was unwise to define particular arrangements, or threaten existing 
arrangements by imposing a particular model. Instead, there should be simply a 
statutory requirement for employers to consult their employees, an approach endorsed 
by Windeyer in his report on the RTZ lead poisoning controversy.98 
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3.5.5.2.  Industry 
At the level of industry, the CSHW acknowledged the valuable work of voluntary 
organisations such as RoSPA and the British Safety Council. In addition, it praised the 
role of the TUC and CBI in directing and coordinating accident prevention efforts, the 
various joint standing committees appointed under existing health and safety 
legislation, and voluntary industry-based safety committees, trade and research 
associations. The CSHW believed that these arrangements should be allowed to 
continue without being unnecessarily hindered by legislation or the state. However, it 
also accepted that without statutory coordination, they lacked aim and focus; this was 
exacerbated by fragmented legislative and administrative arrangements. What was 
needed, therefore, was a ‘better mechanism for linking up voluntary and statutory 
activities in a more comprehensive way.’99       
 
3.5.5.3.  Unified Legislation 
The CSHW’s most far-reaching recommendations concerned health and safety at the 
level of the British state. The Committee argued that the nine main groups of Acts and 
500 regulations that littered the statute book should be scaled back, simplified, and 
reorganised under a single ‘enabling’ Act.100  
 By presenting enabling legislation as the solution to many of the problems that 
beset British health and safety law, the CSHW endorsed the views of the DE and CBI 
as they had developed from the late 1960s. The Committee pictured a central Act of a 
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general and widespread application to all employees, with specifics left to an organised 
framework of subordinate regulations, standards and codes of practice. The Act would 
detail the basic responsibilities of all individuals, presented in flexible, ‘goal based’ 
terms. In this way, health and safety law would complement the general duty of care of 
all individuals. 
 In future, the Committee stressed, codes of practice and voluntary standards 
should be used in preference to prescriptive statutory regulation. Overall, the quantity 
of health and safety regulations should be reduced.101 This structure of law was 
perceived to have manifest benefits. It was arguably more flexible and amendable, 
allowing redundant legal provisions to be more quickly removed or replaced. By 
prioritising the use of voluntary standards and codes of practice, industry was given 
greater responsibility for health and safety regulation. The use of more general and 
flexible legal requirements also reflected the Committee’s aim to promote greater safety 
awareness in industry. As it asserted, ‘a positive declaration of over-riding duties, 
carrying the stamp of Parliamentary approval, would establish clearly in the minds of 
all concerned that the preservation of safety and health at work is a continuous legal 
and social responsibility of all those who have control over the conditions and 
circumstances in which work is performed.’102 
 The relegation of legal detail to a second tier of law also had a crucial role to play 
in the rationalisation of health and safety legislation. According to the Committee, the 
detail of existing statutes, such as the Factories Act 1961, could be re-enacted through 
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subordinate legislation, and reshaped to conform with the style and character of the 
new Act. This programme of legal rationalisation would likely take many years to 
achieve, and the Committee was conscious of the demands it placed on administrators. 
To ensure statutory protection remained unaltered while rationalisation took place, it 
would be necessary for existing Acts to remain in force as ‘relevant provisions’ of the 
new, comprehensive Act.103 This is why, albeit nominally, the Factories Act 1961 
remains in force today. 
 Perhaps the Committee’s most far-reaching proposal was that comprehensive 
legal protection should be extended to all employees against occupational accidents and 
disease. The CSHW believed that the existing patchwork approach not only generated 
many of the system’s legal and administrative problems, but also promoted confusion 
and inertia on the part of employers. From the Committee’s perspective, it was bizarre 
that workers in schools, airports and hospitals were still excluded from health and 
safety legislation, unless they happened to work in notional ‘shops’, ‘factories’ or 
‘offices’ within them. It was also strange how one workplace could be protected under 
health and safety legislation, while another, because of its purpose, could be excluded, 
even if for all intents and purposes it was identical to the first. As the Committee 
argued, ‘we consider the present anomalous situation to be indefensible.’104 By 
switching the basis of legal protection to employment, such anomalies could be avoided, 
while extending coverage to the estimated 5 million British workers without statutory 
protection. 
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 Remarkably, the Committee proposed that this comprehensive system of 
protection should be extended still further. At the time, the self-employed had no 
obligations under health and safety legislation. The CSHW argued that, insofar as their 
actions endangered others, they too should be encompassed.105 Even more significantly, 
the Committee recommended the extension of health and safety legislation to cover 
members of the public and other ‘third persons’ at risk from work activity. The CSHW 
argued that the legislative demarcation between ‘occupational’ and ‘public’ health and 
safety was artificial—‘as if there were some invisible ring-fence around the 
occupational safety system, with the general public left outside.’106 While many 
occupational hazards posed only small-scale risks to the public in terms of numbers 
affected at any one time (for example, slips, trips in shops), others were potentially 
large-scale, and dramatic. The Brent Cross and Aberfan inquiries had criticised the 
exclusion of the public from health and safety legislation, on account of these 
delocalised effects. Although some government officials believed that the public would 
be covered by default if existing legislation was followed, these incidents demonstrated 
that unless the public was explicitly recognised, unforeseen and potentially 
catastrophic situations could arise.107 
 The CSHW did not stop there. Another major recommendation, which was to 
prove more contentious among government officials, was that relevant environmental 
and public safety statutes should be incorporated under the new Act, to ensure a 
coordinated approach to the control of dangerous and toxic substances. As mentioned 
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above, environmental pollution was excluded from the Committee’s terms of reference, 
since it was being considered separately by Ashby’s Royal Commission. However, 
since the CSHW’s terms of reference embraced the issue of public safety in relation to 
industrial and commercial activity, the Committee felt compelled to comment in this 
area. The Committee argued that while existing Acts, such as the Alkali Act 1906, were 
primarily oriented to public health or ‘amenity’ rather than workers’ health and safety, 
it was unwise to separate control arrangements when the offending substances came 
from the same technical source (that is, the factory). However, as the RTZ lead 
poisoning scare demonstrated, toxic substances could have delocalised effects far 
beyond the originating workplace. The CSHW thus recommended that existing 
control arrangements should be brought together where relevant.108   
 
3.5.5.4.  Unified Administration 
According to the CSHW, for this new integrated framework of health and safety 
legislation to work, there should be a new, single authority to supervise and enforce it, 
one that could act as the definitive ‘voice’ of health and safety in Britain. The 
Committee’s major innovation in this area was its proposal to establish a new, quasi-
independent National Authority for Safety and Health at Work (NASHW), with 
policymaking, research and enforcement functions. This authority would be free from 
the day-to-day control of central government, having its own director, staff and 
budget. However, it would be ultimately reliant on the Treasury for funding (through a 
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grant-in-aid) and legally accountable to Parliament through the Employment 
Secretary.109  
 There was a significant precedent for such an arrangement in the British 
government. While semi-independent bodies had long been part of the British political 
landscape, the role of quangos in advancing policy was extended following the election 
victory of Labour in 1964, in pursuit of a more interventionist economic strategy (the 
National Board of Prices and Incomes being a major result). In 1968, the Fulton 
Report on the Civil Service further extended the role of quasi-government by 
promoting the hiving-off of government functions to new independent authorities. The 
rationale was that public bodies were more accountable when separated from the 
‘central government machine’; as Robens argued in Human Engineering, ‘hived off’ 
authorities could play a crucial role in making the British government more efficient 
and business-like. Consequently, in 1969, the Post Office was established as a separate 
agency of the British government, while in 1971 the Civil Aviation Authority was 
established as the regulatory body for civil aviation.110 
 Another significant feature of the proposed National Authority was its 
corporatist structure. In the same way that the CSHW advocated a formal dialogue 
between employers and employees elsewhere, the Committee argued that trade union 
and employer representatives should play a central role in the management of the new 
authority, actively taking over a regulatory role previously assumed by the British 
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government. The NASHW’s management board would be executive in character, 
rather than advisory. It would thus be able to directly intervene in health and safety, 
rather than simply make recommendations, as was the case with the government’s 
existing advisory committees, such as the IHAC. The management board would be 
composed of representatives of various ‘user interests’: trade unions, employers, local 
authorities and medical organisations. It would have a full-time chair, an executive 
director responsible for day-to-day operations, and several paid, part-time directors.111 
 The CSHW saw ‘little logic in any organisational separation between general 
administration and inspection services’, a stance that would be substantially modified 
by the government between 1972 and 1974 (see below).112 The various inspectorates 
that enforced health and safety legislation would be amalgamated under the new 
organisation, along with supporting bodies of research and scientific expertise.113 This 
required an extensive reorganisation of inspectorates in the field, and the CSHW 
recommended a new field structure of 30 large area offices, situated in major centres of 
industry and commerce.114 Local authorities, on the other hand, would continue to 
enforce health and safety legislation in non-industrial workplaces. However, their role 
would be widened to encompass new premises, such as primary schools, that would 
enter health and safety legislation for the first time.115 
 In recommending a radical overhaul of existing statutory arrangements, the 
CSHW went further than either TUC or CBI recommendations. The CBI, while 
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supporting a unified inspectorate, resisted a hived-off authority, arguing that a unified 
inspectorate would be better placed in a government department, ideally the DE.116 
The TUC, in contrast, was not so much interested in institutional arrangements as the 
overall resources dedicated to health and safety. They preferred an organisation with a 
coordinating role across the field: privately, in the 1960s, they had toyed with the idea 
of a national safety and health council.117 As described below, however, while the DE 
supported the hiving-off of health and safety to a new quasi-independent authority, 
other government departments with existing policymaking and enforcement functions 
were bitterly opposed. 
 
3.5.6.  A Warm Reception? 
The Robens Report was accompanied by an extensive publicity campaign. Lord 
Robens appeared on radio and television, and gave a press conference where he 
stressed how the Report tackled ‘real flesh-and-blood problems, concerning the well-
being of millions of people in their daily work’.118  
 Despite this publicity campaign, the Robens Report did not achieve its 
anticipated impact, and there were various criticisms in print and private that it had 
gone unnoticed. While the Report did receive some exposure in the national press, 
coverage was uneven. The prominent tabloid, The Sun, did not mention the Report at 
all, much to the chagrin of its industrial correspondent. In a letter of sympathy, the 
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government’s Chief Information Officer, Bernard Ingham wrote, ‘please do not be 
upset … safety and health is a very difficult subject to get in the newspapers.’119   
 Frustration was also felt by the trade unions and safety charities. The TUC 
General Secretary, Victor Feather fumed that ‘more people are interested in the antics 
of a certain lady and her butler … than safety in industry’ (a reference to the ITV 
television series Upstairs, Downstairs).120 The British Safety Council, meanwhile, 
conducted a straw poll suggesting that a majority of people were either unaware of the 
Report, or misinformed about its conclusions.121 In private, the CSHW’s own members 
expressed concern about industry’s responsiveness to the Report: Beeby, invited to 
speak at an industry conference, complained that his audience was ‘totally and 
absolutely uninterested’.122  
 In general, however, the Report was welcomed, with both the CBI and TUC 
believing that they had taken something away from it, even if they had not won on 
every issue. For example, in an article for the Amalgamated Union of Engineering 
Workers, Feather suggested that the Report was a major landmark, writing how at a 
time of sensitive industrial relations, history needed to remember its publication.123 
Commentators in the press praised the speed at which the Committee had come to its 
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conclusions. The Daily Mirror favourably reported how the Report formed ‘a real drive 
to improve [Britain’s] shaming record of human suffering and economic loss.’124 
 Nevertheless, there were some significant criticisms of detail, in particular the 
Report’s emphasis on self-regulation. While the CSHW believed that employers and 
workers shared a common interest in health and safety (‘there is no legitimate scope for 
‘bargaining on safety and health issues’), some commentators thought this idea was at 
best, naive, and at worse, deadly.125 For instance, the safety campaigner Patrick 
Kinnersly, writing in 1973, argued that the idea of an ‘identity of interest’ was ‘a 
dangerous myth’, while The Guardian reported how by emphasising self-regulation, the 
Committee placed ‘too much faith in human nature.’126 Safety and Rescue reported how a 
pressure group connected to the American environmental activist, Ralph Nader, was 
attempting to muster opposition to the Robens Report, on the basis that it was ‘little 
more than a statement of faith in the existing principles.’127 In Parliament, the Labour 
backbencher Neil Kinnock characterised the Report as ‘if we have less law, we shall 
have more safety.’128 
 Criticism came from other quarters. Medical professionals, such as Richard 
Schilling of the TUC Centenary Institute for Occupational Health, criticised the 
Report’s treatment of occupational health, which focused on the prevention of 
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occupational hazards and safety management as opposed to occupational medicine’s 
positive contribution to workers’ health. A letter to the British Medical Journal 
Supplement warned that by accepting the DE’s evidence at face value, the CSHW had 
‘unquestionably weakened the intended purpose to achieve better safety and health at 
work.’129 Such contemporary criticisms support Long’s argument that the Robens 
Report advanced a reductive view of occupational health, proclaiming ‘a more 
circumscribed discourse of risk minimisation’.130 
 For his part, Robens appears to have anticipated some of these criticisms. For 
example, following the Report’s publication, Robens was at pains to show that his 
proposals did not represent a structural weakening of workers’ protection. Rather, he 
suggested, his proposals allowed for the more ‘discriminating’ use of health and safety 
law—in some areas, especially those of a more technical or catastrophic nature, the 
CSHW argued that even stronger legal provisions were needed.131 
 While the Robens Report attracted significant criticism, there is little evidence to 
suggest they truly hit the mark. Contemporary criticisms were relatively few in 
number, and directed at specific aspects of the Report, rather than its overall 
recommendations. By the early 1970s a broad political consensus had emerged that 
urgent regulatory reform was needed. Since the perceived need was so great, and the 
CSHW’s proposals so wide-ranging, specific criticisms relating to the form or content 
of new legislation had little catch. The perceived advantages of the Committee’s 
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reforms, most notably the extension of comprehensive legislation, were generally seen 
to outweigh any disadvantages. This explains the broad welcome given by groups such 
as the TUC towards the CSHW’s proposals, despite specific criticisms over the style of 
the proposed new legislation.   
  
 
3.6.  'A Prolonged and Intensive Period of Interdepartmental 
Consultation' 
 
3.6.1.  A Wrench in the Machine 
Although the Robens Report was generally welcomed, it posed enormous difficulties 
for officials in terms of the administration of health and safety regulation. Its 
recommendations proposed meddling with arrangements that had developed virtually 
untouched for over a century; as the CSHW itself realised, this was not a task to be 
taken lightly. 
 The major issues of contention were the structure and status of the proposed 
NASHW, and its relationship with ministers and Parliament.132 In their evidence to the 
CSHW, several government departments made the case that their policy domains 
required special treatment. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), for 
example, maintained that mines and nuclear power stations were sufficiently different 
from factories to warrant separate legal provisions and enforcement, while the Ministry 
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of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) argued that farm safety required specialist 
inspectors acquainted with the problems of agricultural machinery.133 
 Of course, such anxieties also stemmed from ministerial anxieties about political 
prestige and power. Ministers feared that loss of their inspectorates to a new ‘hived off’ 
authority would undermine the links with industry and technical expertise they relied 
upon for policymaking. This amounted to a rejection of the CSHW’s integrated 
approach: although the Employment Secretary, Maurice Macmillan attempted to 
placate ministers by suggesting they could still exercise direction over the new 
authority, a vicious Whitehall row erupted over the contents of the Robens Report.134 
This was euphemistically described by the Labour Employment Secretary Michael 
Foot, on presenting the HSW Bill in 1974, as ‘a prolonged and intensive period of 
interdepartmental consultation’.135  
 As we have seen, the DE anticipated administrative conflict before the CSHW 
was even established. Yet, such ‘inter-departmental sensitivities’ were not merely an 
esoteric administrative concern.136 Whitehall departmentalism constituted a significant 
practical and conceptual barrier to the more all-embracing vision of health and safety 
demanded by the Robens Report. It threatened to confine health and safety regulation 
within the work gates, and propagate a fractured and disjointed system. It also slowed 
the passage of new health and safety legislation: frustration is evident from the way the 
                                                
 
 
133  Robens, Selected Written Evidence, 374; “Subject Brief 2,” n.d., TNA LAB 96/485. 
134  “Follow Up of Robens Report.” 
135  HC Deb 3 April 1974 vol. 871 col. 1287. 
136  “Document 10,” n.d., TNA LAB 96/214. 
 175 
TUC and CBI, in 1973, jointly lobbied the government to bring forth legislation as 
soon as possible.137 
 The resolution of these debates ultimately permitted occupational health and 
safety regulation to encompass contingent policy domains, such as public safety in 
relation to occupational hazards, and the release of noxious industrial gases into the 
atmosphere. It conferred newfound status and significance to health and safety: after 
1974, British health and safety regulation ceased to be merely ‘occupational’. 
 
3.6.2.  A National Authority for Safety and Health at Work 
During these strained months, the Civil Service Department (CSD) arbitrated 
between government departments, attempting to broker agreement on the Robens 
Report by constructing a series of models for the new NASHW.138 Closely assisting the 
DE, they analysed the work of existing inspectorates, and formulated tests to 
determine whether or not they should be included in the new authority. These included 
asking departments questions, such as ‘what effect would exclusion of the inspectorate 
have on the viability of the concept of an Authority for safety and health strategy over 
all of industry?’139 The CSD’s role here was as a supposedly ‘impartial’ mediator with 
none of the baggage of the departments with existing administrative responsibilities. 
This included the DE, to whom responsibility for coordinating the new arrangements 
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fell to the career civil servant, John Locke, who became the HSE’s first Director-
General.140  
 Three models were eventually constructed, envisaging authorities of various size 
and degrees of ministerial control. Having abandoned the idea of a fully independent 
executive authority owing to departmental objections, these models ranged from Model 
A, a semi-independent executive authority amalgamating all the inspectorates 
(favoured by the DE), to Model B, an authority without any central inspectorates or 
executive functions, only a broad, coordinating role. A third intermediate model 
proposed by the DTI, MAFF and DOE proposed an authority with executive control 
over uncontested policy domains such as factories, while exercising an advisory and 
coordinating role over other areas. The contested inspectorates would remain with 
their respective departments.141 
 Model B was rapidly discarded since it did not meet any of the Robens Report’s 
recommendations. This situation was potentially embarrassing to the government 
owing to its stated intention to enact its proposals. By April 1973, however, nearly nine 
months after the CSHW had reported, agreement had still not been reached between 
departments, and the Home Secretary, Robert Carr, was forced to refer the decision to 
Cabinet.142 At the Cabinet meeting of 10 May 1973, Carr suggested that unless urgent 
action was taken to rationalise existing arrangements, it would appear that the 
government had caved to ‘vested departmental interests’. Moreover, ‘acceptance of the 
Report should yield substantial political advantages, whereas its rejection would 
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involve the loss of a valuable opportunity for tripartite co-operation; and any 
suggestion that the Government were indifferent to the safety and health of workers 
would be liable to produce a hostile reaction by public opinion.’143 The Prime Minister, 
Edward Heath, along with fellow Cabinet ministers, subsequently concluded ‘Model C 
would involve so substantial a reduction in the benefits to be expected from the 
reorganisation that it might well not be worth disturbing arrangements.’144 Ultimately, 
ministers thus adopted Model A, although a compromise was allowed, whereby 
minimal deviations could be permitted from the model, on application to the Home 
Secretary.  
 Anthony Stodart at MAFF, and Geoffrey Rippon of the DOE subsequently 
wrote to Carr, justifying their respective cases. However, only Stodart was eventually 
successful: while the various other government inspectorates were amalgamated under 
HSE in 1975, agriculture was retained by MAFF until 1976. In relation to Rippon and 
the possible exclusion of the Alkali and Clean Air Inspectorate (ACAI), Carr wrote to 
Heath, ‘this seems a major departure from the Robens recommendations and one 
which—despite the views of some of the interests concerned—we should not find too 
easy to justify.’145 
 Jenny Bacon, HSE’s Director-General from 1995–2000, was part of the working 
group that planned the HSC/E in the 1970s: 
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Virtually nobody wanted their inspectorates to be put into HSE to begin with, and I think 
at a very early stage we said, ‘come on’, and got a pretty firm diktat come back down, 
‘make this work chaps!’… 
 I think the logic was publicly accepted that it makes a great deal of sense to try and 
regulate what goes up the chimney and what comes out of the chimney and the process that 
leads to things going up the chimney all as part of one…. Apart from Ministerial 
opposition—Geoffrey Rippon—I think most people on the working group and indeed on 
the steering group said, look, it would make a great deal of sense for the Alkali Inspectorate 
to come in.146 
 
3.6.3.  The HSC and HSE 
Another significant development during this period was officials’ decision to separate 
the single authority proposed by the CSHW into two separate, but closely linked 
statutory bodies: a ‘Safety and Health Commission’ and ‘Safety and Health Executive’. 
While the CSHW had not seen any benefits from separating administration from 
enforcement, a two-tier structure had various practical and constitutional advantages. 
Firstly, it mirrored the approach to other employment services such as rehabilitation 
and training, which in the early 1970s were hived off to two new agencies, the 
Employment Services Agency and Training Services Agency, under the control of the 
tripartite Manpower Services Commission.147 Secondly, it eased inspectors’ concern 
that they would lose their independence or authority if they were subject to the direct 
control of trade unions and employers’ associations. It was important that while 
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employers and unions had a say in the making of health and safety regulation, and 
were accountable to ministers for general policy, they could not interfere with 
enforcement.148 Enshrined in statute, an institutional separation between 
administration and enforcement could ensure this independence. 
 However, this two-tier structure was opposed by the Treasury, who thought it 
was overly complicated and made financing more difficult.149 Furthermore, civil 
servants expressed a practical concern that if they left the central government machine 
to join a non-Crown body, they would cease to be civil servants, with all their 
attendant perks and privileges.150  A two-tier structure thus ensured that civil servants 
transferred to the new Executive would continue to be civil servants, and responsible 
to the Crown, while members of the new Commission would be ‘Crown appointees’, 
performing functions on behalf of the government, but not directly employed by it. 
John Rimington, HSE’s former Director-General, explained this relationship further: 
 
 [I]t’s very difficult to invent a body that can go about telling people what to do, and 
prosecuting them and having this disciplinary relationship with them, if those people 
haven’t got the firm hand of the government on them; if they’re not civil servants. It’s a 
kind of different idea: they’re warranted individuals, rather like the police. In fact a HSE 
inspector has more power, many more powers, than the police. And HSE is itself a 
prosecuting authority, like the Crown Prosecution Service. So for that reason … HSE 
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people remained civil servants. So in effect you had this situation where representatives of 
industry, trade unions and the public, were telling civil servants what to do.151 
 
3.7.  The Health and Safety at Work Bill 
William Whitelaw, the new Conservative Employment Secretary, introduced the HSW 
Bill on the 24 January 1974.152 However, despite the long and and protracted debate 
over the Robens Report and HSW Bill, progress was lost following the snap general 
election of February 1974, which occurred in the midst of a second major national coal 
strike. The general election saw the Labour party returned to power under a minority 
Wilson government. 
 Despite major political differences between the Conservative and Labour parties 
elsewhere, Labour was supportive of the HSW Bill and pledged to enact it early in the 
new session. A Labour Bill was introduced by Michael Foot on 21 March 1974 with 
only minor changes to the Whitelaw Bill, namely a concession to the trade unions 
whereby they had exclusive right over the appointment of safety representatives in the 
workplace.153 The HSWA received Royal Assent on the 31 July 1974. The Act is 
summarised in Appendix III. 
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3.8.  Implications of the Robens Report and Health and Safety 
at Work Act 
The HSWA instigated a profound transformation in the structure and form of British 
health and safety regulation. In this section, I move beyond the administrative detail of 
the CSHW and HSWA to analyse the nature of these changes. I deconstruct them 
along three interrelated dimensions: the movement of health and safety regulation 
beyond the workplace to address wider issues of public safety and the environment; 
the establishment of a self-regulatory system of health and safety; and the evolution of 
a risk-based approach to regulation.  
 
3.8.1.  Beyond the Workplace 
According to Ulrich Beck, over the last fifty years western industrialised countries 
have witnessed a ‘break within modernity’. Enormous changes have occurred in the 
social, political and technological dimensions of risk, dissolving many of the former 
institutions and certainties of life in the ‘classical industrial society’, which was 
predominantly based on a logic of wealth distribution. In their place, a new society has 
emerged based on the production and distribution of societally generated risks, which 
Beck terms the ‘risk society’.154 
 The notion there has been a rupture, or shift in industrialised society remains 
controversial among academics. In particular, since Beck’s work is theoretical, it 
remains to be fully historicised, although notable efforts on this front have commenced 
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in recent years.155 However, one of Beck’s defining features of the ‘risk society’ is that 
risks over the last fifty years have become delocalised: they have extended beyond the 
workplace and even the geographical confines of the nation-state to affect the entire 
world. 
 In the early 1970s, Chapter 3 has shown, British regulators were increasingly 
conscious of how workplace risks could extend beyond the work gates, threatening 
entire communities and ecosystems. As a result, ‘occupational’, ‘public’ and 
‘environmental’ concerns came into alignment, requiring a more complex and 
coordinated statutory response. Political concern converged around areas such as 
pollution, where the idea of separate statutory controls and standards for the ‘external’ 
and ‘internal’ environment of the workplace was perceived to be no longer workable. 
The RTZ lead poisoning controversy, for example, not only generated concerns among 
politicians and trade unions about workers’ health, but parallel concerns among 
Medical Officers of Health about the effects of lead on vegetation and the health of 
local residents.156 Similar fears about lead poisoning were expressed in other British 
towns and cities in the 1970s, including Birmingham and London.157 These 
controversies demonstrated that even the oldest occupational hazards, when combined 
with the latest technology and industrial processes, could have major public health 
effects beyond the work gates.158 
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 The effect of this delocalisation was that by the early 1970s, occupational health 
and safety policy, which had hitherto been largely confined to questions of workers’ 
health and safety, intruded, or threatened to intrude, upon wider questions concerning 
public health, safety and the environment (Figure 8). These areas were traditionally 
the responsibility of government departments other than the DE, and as we have seen, 
the CSHW’s recommendations posed considerable practical and conceptual difficulties 
for officials in terms of the administration of health and safety regulation. 
 
Figure 8. Delocalisation of occupational health and safety legislation 
 
 
 Effectively, the Robens Report and HSWA instigated a shift in the nature of 
administrative boundary problems in occupational health and safety regulation. The 
fragmentation of health and safety legislation before 1974 meant that debates had 
frequently emerged among officials about whether a particular workplace fell under 
the ambit of legislation, or which inspectorate had jurisdiction. By extending 
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comprehensive legislation to all employees, regardless of workplace or occupation, the 
HSWA largely resolved such internal questions. Administrative boundary problems 
now shifted to the periphery of health and safety legislation: that is, where ‘occupational’ 
health and safety legislation ended, and where ‘public’ health, safety or environmental 
legislation begun. This shift was invoked by a DOE official when warning Macmillan 
about the implications of the HSW Bill for the control of dangerous substances: ‘In an 
attempt to unify one aspect of a highly complex subject, the legislation you have in 
mind will in fact produce much worse divisions elsewhere.’159 
 In practical terms, the HSWA augured a new era of comprehensive statutory 
protection against occupational risks. The Act not only brought under statutory 
protection some 8 million workers in premises such as hospitals and schools, but also 
(at least in theory) extended statutory protection to all British citizens. Section 3 of the 
HSWA required employers to consider the impact of their activities on persons other 
than their employees. The implications of this were staggering: prisons had a statutory 
duty of care for their prisoners, teachers their pupils, and factory owners the residents 
in the surrounding community. While, in one sense, this was merely a statutory 
elaboration of existing common law duties, the fact that this radical extension of health 
and safety law was not debated in Parliament is remarkable.160 It only serves to 
underline the depth of contemporary divisions over the nature of political 
representation in the workplace, as well as the consensus that surrounded regulatory 
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reform. After 1974, British health and safety regulation ceased to be merely 
‘occupational’.  
 
3.8.2.  Enshrining Self-Regulation 
Another major implication of the HSWA was the recognition that statutory effort alone 
was ineffective in protecting the health and safety of British workers and citizens. 
Instead, the state’s role was recast as providing an institutional, legal and judicial 
framework that allegedly supported voluntary effort in the control of occupational 
accidents and disease. The regulatory system after 1974 was overtly described as one 
of ‘self-regulation’, even if statutory regulation still remained, and the judicious 
enforcement of existing legislation resulted in something approximating self-regulation 
in practice.161 In promoting self-regulation, the HSWA united two threads of historical 
development that had previously been separate. Voluntary and statutory effort were 
brought together in a coherent regulatory framework.162 
 This did not entail, as some commentators have suggested in light of later 
deregulatory trends, the retrenchment of the state from health and safety. Instead, its 
fundamental roles and responsibilities were reconfigured. To draw upon a Foucauldian 
argument once again, the government was attempting to exercise its power more 
indirectly, equipping others with the concepts and tools they needed to successfully 
regulate themselves. In a practical sense, this meant that the government now 
supported the HSC/E financially, via a grant-in-aid from the Treasury. Civil servants 
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in the HSE enforced health and safety legislation, and advised the HSC about the form 
and content of health and safety policy. In these respects, and more, the state 
continued to exert authority over the HSC. However, responsibility for the negotiation 
of national health and safety policy was now vested in representatives of major interest 
groups, endowed with legal authority to make new regulations and codes of practice. 
 The incorporation of government research laboratories under the HSE, and its 
role giving policy advice to the HSC, also indicated a new regulatory role for the state: 
the provision of information and expert guidance about risk. Chapters 4–6 reveal how 
HSE’s role in ‘risk communication’ expanded enormously between 1974 and 2001. 
Risk, however, played a more widespread and implicit role in the regulation of health 
and safety after 1974. 
 
3.8.3.  A Risk-Based Approach to Health and Safety 
Perhaps the most important change prompted by the HSWA was a movement from an 
empirical, piecemeal approach to regulation, to an approach that was ostensibly more 
considered, proportionate, and ‘risk based’. The CSHW’s key insight was that the 
existing ‘architecture’ of health and safety law (the Factories Act, OSRPA, etc.) bore 
little relationship, in conceptual or practical terms, to the ‘actual’ risks of the British 
workplace. Central to restoring balance was not only placing the burden of 
responsibility for controlling risks on employers and employees, but reorganising 
existing statutory arrangements so that these risks could be addressed more effectively.  
 For example, the demand for employers and employees to take the lead from the 
government in preventing accidents and ill-health relied on them assessing risks and 
taking commensurate steps to control them. As the CSHW argued, ‘the nature of the 
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problems must be methodically assessed, and the assessments translated into practical 
objectives and courses of action.’163 While this was by no means the explicit, formalised 
approach to risk management HSE promoted in the 1980s and 1990s, the requirement 
for companies to produce written safety policies, in particular, recognised that 
employers needed to evaluate the hazards created by their activities.164 
 An implicit, unwritten form of risk assessment was promoted elsewhere in the 
Act. The legal qualification ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’ (SFAIRP), used 
throughout the general duties of the Act, suggested that employers should embark on a 
process of risk calculation when adopting particular health and safety controls. The 
phrase was given legal definition by the Court of Appeal in the 1949 case, Edwards vs. 
National Coal Board. There, Lord Asquith concluded: 
 
‘Reasonably practicable’ is a narrower term than ‘physically possible’ … a computation 
must be made by the owner in which the quantum of risk is placed on one scale and the 
sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk (whether in money, time 
or trouble) is placed in the other, and that, if it be shown that there is a gross disproportion 
between them— the risk being insignificant in relation to the sacrifice—the defendants 
discharge the onus on them.165 
 
The concept of risk, therefore, was only implied in the HSWA, evident between the lines 
of the legislation. While the word ‘risk’ was used extensively throughout the Act (for 
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example, employers had the duty, so far as was reasonably practicable, to provide plant 
and systems of work that were safe and without risks to health), the Court of Appeal 
ruled in 1993 that it carried the meaning of ‘hazard’—that is, anything which had the 
potential to cause danger, regardless of its likelihood or severity.166 Thus, it was only 
later, in the 1980s and 1990s, that the concept of risk began to be fully drawn out and 
explicated in British health and safety discourse. In the early 1970s, the concept of risk 
was still embryonic. 
 On an administrative level, however, developments in this period also paved the 
way for a more implicitly risk-based approach. For example, the abandonment of 
routine cyclical inspection in the Factory Inspectorate, and the use of targeted 
inspection based on accident statistics, represented a move to a more scientific, risk-
based approach to enforcement. More broadly, the increasing use of quantification in 
regulatory science and standard-setting reflected the notion that a balance should be 
sought between economic development and workers’ health. For instance, TLVs for 
substances such as asbestos implied that while there was an upper boundary of 
exposure above which a substance should be prohibited, under this there were 
permissible concentrations or doses under which exposure could legitimately occur.  
 Over the next thirty years, this thesis argues, the political demand for health and 
safety regulation to be related more explicitly and proportionately to risk grew ever 
louder. This demand culminated, by the 1990s, in the requirement for employers to 
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conduct formal written risk assessments, and the HSE developing a systematic risk-
based regulatory framework. 
   
3.9.  Conclusion 
Chapter 3 has focused on a major period of reflection and change in the British system 
of health and safety regulation. Between 1970 and 1974, the nature and scope of 
existing health and safety regulation was questioned, and the administrative structure 
of a new, integrated, ‘risk based’ system deliberated. This had major ramifications for 
how health and safety was subsequently conceptualised and regulated in Britain. The 
HSWA established a new legislative basis for health and safety, extending 
comprehensive statutory protection to workers by virtue of their employment, rather 
than occupation or workplace. It also established a new institutional focus for the 
promotion and enforcement of health and safety: the HSC/E. More broadly, the Act 
marked a sweeping change from a fragmented, confusing, prescriptive and reactive 
system, to a system that was supposedly more rational, flexible, anticipatory, and 
geared towards greater responsibility on the part of those who created and worked 
with risks. The state’s role was reconceptualised as providing the supportive 
arrangements for effective ‘self-regulation’ by employers and workers. 
 However, by extending the scope of occupational health and safety regulation to 
cover industrial air pollution, and ‘third persons’ at risk from work activity, the HSWA 
had more significant, far-reaching effects. The Act established a new and more 
‘universal’ conceptualisation of ‘health and safety’, which extended beyond the work 
gates to encompass contingent issues of public safety and the environment. ‘Health and 
safety’ was cemented as a new, more powerful field, multi-disciplinary in character, but 
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arguably more coherent and with the possibility of a unified, more corporate regulatory 
identity. McIvor’s recent argument that the HSWA represented ‘the most important 
change since the Second World War in the regulation and control of workplace 
dangers’ is thus, if anything, understated.167 
 The Act culminated the lengthy reform process that began in 1967 in the MOL. 
The CSHW, while supposedly given the freedom to recommend a new basis for British 
health and safety regulation, can actually be seen to have formed part of this longer-
term process. As this chapter has argued, the full ‘independence’ of the Committee is 
debatable. Sponsored and assisted by the DE, and seconded DE staff, the Committee’s 
thinking was heavily skewed towards DE proposals. The same weight was simply not 
attached to proposals from elsewhere, whether from trade unions or government 
departments. Within a matter of months, the Committee had concluded that reform 
along DE lines was the most desirable course of action. The CSHW thus justified 
Castle’s original decision to set up a committee of inquiry. It cut through the inertia 
that previously hindered reform, and conferred an aura of critical independence and 
objectivity that promoted public and political support. 
 However, this capture of the Committee—not by employer or worker interests, 
but by its sponsoring department—was tacitly recognised within Whitehall, an 
unspoken secret explaining much of the initial angst generated by the Committee’s 
terms of reference, as well as the subsequent Whitehall row. It is highly revealing that 
on presenting the Committee’s Report in 1972, Robens remarked: ‘It has been said that 
a Committee of Inquiry is not a device for digging out the truth, but for digging it in…. 
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Certainly, when we started, it was well dug in.’ 168 A sense of direction was already 
apparent in the DEP’s 1967 proposals. Further reflection and deliberation was needed, 
however, to make this direction clear and politically acceptable. 
 This begs the question, other than supposed critical objectivity, what else the 
CSHW offered that an alternative political strategy, such as commissioned research, 
could not. The CSHW displayed many of Hennessy’s three signs of success, namely 
‘speed’, ‘terseness of presentation’ and ‘vitality of language’.169 The Committee 
examined an enormous field and came up with its recommendations within two years, 
an admirable feat considering its complexity. It also presented its arguments rationally, 
coherently, and with a vim which has prompted academic and professional reflection 
ever since. This promoted an awakening of political interest in health and safety at the 
time—perhaps the real point of the Robens Report. 
 The Whitehall row of 1972–74 reveals how health and safety was an area of 
broad political and public consensus at a time of great industrial and economic turmoil. 
With the exception of worker safety representation, there were few areas of political 
disagreement in the passing of the Act and certainly none over its more radical 
elements, such as the extension of legislation. In any case, disasters such as 
Flixborough served as a dramatic reminder to officials of the need to bring members of 
the public under health and safety legislation. By 1974 this matter was therefore 
uncontroversial.  
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 Conflict was instead Whitehall-focused. Arguably more so than the Robens 
Report, the arguments and agreements of Whitehall officials defined the subsequent 
shape, scope and structure of the regulatory system, allowing a wider, more universal 
conceptualisation of health and safety to become possible. Fear of public 
embarrassment and a backlash from trade unions and employers ensured action was 
taken on the Robens Report rather than abandoning or diluting its proposals. Even so, 
the Whitehall row postponed action on the HSWA until 1974, when Labour was 
returned to power and therefore able to control its enactment. The important changes 
that took place over this period—not least the decision to create two statutory 
authorities in place of a single NASHW—reveal the significant compromises that had 
to occur before this landmark Act could be passed. 
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4.  Integrating the System, 1974–1984 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
Chapter 4 analyses the historical conditions that shaped the development of the ‘new’, 
integrated system of health and safety regulation in its inaugural decade, 1974–1984, 
described as a ‘period of initiation and consolidation’ by HSC’s second chair, John 
Cullen.1 During this time, the newly established HSC/E attempted to ‘initiate’ the 
CSHW’s vision of a comprehensive, forward-looking and goal-based system. Under 
the leadership of two individuals—HSC’s chair, Bill Simpson, and HSE’s Director-
General, John Locke—HSC/E began the difficult task of replacing fragmented pre-
1974 laws with more comprehensive regulations, codes of practice and guidance under 
the HSWA. New regulations were introduced, such as the Health and Safety (First 
Aid) Regulations 1981, which applied health and safety legislation across the entire 
British labour force for the first time.  
 Between 1974 and 1984, HSC/E also attempted to ‘consolidate’ their authority as 
regulatory bodies, and create the conditions for ‘self-regulation’ in British industry. 
Not least, this took the form of statutory and administrative efforts to extend joint 
consultation throughout the regulatory system: in 1977, new regulations were made to 
formalise the appointment of safety representatives and safety committees, giving the 
exclusive right to appoint safety representatives to recognised trade unions.2  
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 The period 1974–1984 was ‘consolidative’ in another, more literal respect. For the 
first time, the various inspectorates, policy units and research laboratories that 
administered, enforced or supported health and safety regulation operated alongside 
each other, in a unified framework. This framework was now hived-off from central 
government, under the control of quasi-independent agencies, with the HSC acting as 
a negotiating body, directly representing the interests of employers, employees and the 
public (through local authority members). The period 1974–1984 was thus the first 
time that health and safety crystallised as a coherent domain of regulatory policy in 
Britain, rather than a subject pertinent to the regulation of particular industries.3 
 The transition from a fragmented to an integrated system, however, was not an 
easy one to navigate for HSE’s constituent organisations. These were recognised as 
authorities in their particular fields, and were accustomed to working independently. 
Over the decade, HSE thus struggled to gel as a single corporate entity.4 Initially, the 
ten organisations amalgamated under HSE maintained their own distinct professional 
identities. The distinctiveness of their particular fields, and differences in their 
histories, working cultures and enforcement practices, inhibited their seamless 
integration. Professional rivalry among the different groups, revolving around issues of 
relative size, status and pay, resulted in Locke abandoning his attempts to establish a 
single chief inspector, as recommended by the Robens Report. Eventually, by 1987, 
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this tribalism secured the extraction of the Industrial Air Pollution Inspectorate (IAPI) 
from HSE.5  
 In its formative years, therefore, HSE was not the single unified inspectorate 
envisaged by the CSHW. Rather, it was a loose federation of separate bodies, loosely 
bound by the HSWA.6 Further, since the HSC had not been delegated responsibility 
for all areas of health and safety policy from central government, including offshore 
and railway safety, it could not speak as the definitive health and safety authority. 
While much improved from before 1974, coordination remained a central issue, 
especially in relation to local authorities.7 In administrative terms, therefore, the post-
1974 system of health and safety regulation was still very much divided. 
 Chapter 4 considers the policies, regulations and other measures enacted by the 
HSC/E to further the ‘Robens philosophy’ of health and safety regulation outlined in 
the previous chapter. It also considers the many difficulties HSC/E encountered 
furthering their aims, most notably the complexities introduced by membership of the 
European Community (EC), economic recession, budgetary constraint and the 
Thatcher government’s deregulatory agenda. The burdens imposed by these 
developments had lasting implications for HSC/E and their regulatory priorities. By 
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the 1990s, they encouraged HSC/E to systematise their ‘risk management’ approach to 
health and safety policy (see Chapter 6). 
 
4.2.  Overview 
Chapter 4 consists of five main sections. Section 4.3 elucidates the politics of health 
and safety in the new HSC, arguing that one of its great successes during its inaugural 
period was the promotion of a consensual approach to policymaking. 
 Section 4.4 explores the HSC/E’s immediate steps to realise the CSHW’s 
ambitious proposals, and the teething problems they encountered. These steps included 
the extension of joint consultation throughout the regulatory system, as reflected in 
safety representatives, safety committees, and HSC’s advisory committees. The HSC/E 
also had to make arrangements for enforcing the newly expanded sphere of health and 
safety legislation, which brought around 8 million workers under statutory protection 
for the first time. Despite these considerable challenges, exacerbated by constraints on 
public expenditure from 1979, the HSC/E had to ensure that momentum on pre-1974 
policy was not lost, and that health and safety standards did not deteriorate as industry 
and workers adjusted to the HSWA. 
 Section 4.5 explains how European legislation assumed a growing influence over 
British health and safety regulation after the UK joined the European Community 
(EC) in 1973. While the influence of Europe over British policy was tempered by the 
voting situation in the European Commission, whereby the UK could exercise a veto 
over new proposals, international, and in particular European policy developments 
added considerably to HSC/E’s workload during their inaugural period.  
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 Section 4.6 examines the constraints imposed by economic and political 
developments on the HSC/E’s work, in particular the impact of Margaret Thatcher’s 
Conservative government from 1979. Entering government with a neoliberal, free-
market agenda, the Conservatives set about cutting the civil service, of which the HSE 
remained part. Government funding of HSC/E was reduced, and the number of 
inspectors declined through redundancy and natural wastage. Consequently, HSE 
inspectors made fewer visits and prosecutions, and the average duration between 
workplace inspections increased. Despite the assumption of new responsibilities over 
the 1980s, such as the safety of mains gas supply, the HSE encountered a ‘damaging 
contraction’ in manpower that persisted into the 1990s.8 Such pressure threatened to 
undermine the HSWA, and even reverse progress in reducing occupational accidents 
and disease. 
 The final section, 4.7, explores policymaking in three of the most important 
domains of HSC/E’s activity: major and nuclear hazards, asbestos, and other toxic 
substances. It focuses on the role played by HSC’s representative advisory committees, 
and highlights their shared need for comprehensive information on risk to support new 
policies. These committees, in conjunction with HSE’s policy branches, formulated 
some of the most significant pieces of legislation in the modern regulatory system (for 
example, the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations, COSHH). 
Their work between 1974 and 1984 anticipated important later developments in terms 
of the evolution of HSC/E’s risk management approach. 
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 Chapter 4’s central argument is that while the HSWA implicitly placed risk at the 
heart of British health and safety regulation, scientific and political demands between 
1974 and 1984 were instrumental in establishing the conditions for an explicit risk 
management approach. In response to political concern about toxic substances and 
major hazards, for example, techniques of risk analysis and assessment were pioneered 
during these years that were later promoted in health and safety regulation generally. 
The emergence of a strong deregulatory rhetoric in the British government, 
culminating in the demand in 1980 for HSC/E to conduct formal cost-benefit analyses 
of all new regulations, also placed pressure on HSC/E to justify new regulations on the 
basis of risk. This was fundamental to the development of an explicitly risk-based 
approach, since risk allowed conflicting political interests to be weighed against each 
other, and accounted for, in an ostensibly transparent and principled manner. The 
systematisation of HSC/E’s approach demanded that concepts and beliefs which had 
previously been implicit in British health and safety regulation were explicated, 
defined, and related to each other in an orderly way.  
 
4.3.  A Healthy Consensus? HSC and the Politics of Health 
and Safety 
While the Conservative Party was influential during the latter half of this period in 
shaping the British system of health and safety regulation, HSC/E’s establishment 
must be seen in the context of the 1974–79 Labour government and its industrial 
relations policies. Labour was re-elected in 1974 in the midst of a second major 
national coal strike, seeking to repair the damage inflicted by the Conservatives’ 
Industrial Relations Act, and restore British industrial relations to an earlier, 
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voluntarist framework. The ‘social contract’, agreed between the government and trade 
unions, offered the unions a raft of political concessions in exchange for commitment 
on wage restraint, during a turbulent inflationary period. Between July 1974 and July 
1975, inflation soared by 26 per cent.9 Concessions included greater consultation on 
government policy, new workers’ rights (for example, on sexual and racial 
discrimination), as well as representation on a host of state bodies and quangos.10 As 
McIlroy and Campbell argue, ‘the “corporate bias” of the British state, its tendency to 
progress policy by involving capital and labour in informal consultation, bargaining 
and compromise in “the corridors of power”, blossomed.’11 
 The HSWA and HSC, therefore, were fundamentally linked with this movement 
to extend workers’ rights, and the prevailing belief in corporatism as a means of 
reaching political settlement. They were also established in the context of strong 
labour, when trade union influence over government policy was at its peak. In 1979, 
13.3 million British workers, over 50 per cent of all employees, were members of trade 
unions. This compared to just 8.3 million workers in 1994 (Figure 9).12  
 Notwithstanding the extraordinary influence of trade unions at this time, one the 
great successes of British health and safety regulation after 1974 was the empowerment 
of workpeople and other interests with policymaking responsibility for health and 
                                                
 
 
9  Kessler and Bayliss, Contemporary British Industrial Relations, 29–32; C. Wrigley, 
A History of British Industrial Relations, 1939-1979: Industrial Relations in a Declining 
Economy, ed. C. Wrigley (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), 7. 
10  Wrigley, A History of British Industrial Relations, 8. 
11  McIlroy and Campbell, “The High Tide of Trade Unionism,” 94. 
12  P. Maguire, “Labour and the Law: The Politics of British Industrial Relations, 
1945-79,” in A History of British Industrial Relations, 1939-1979, ed. C. Wrigley 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), 59; Walters and James, Robens Revisited, 11; 
McIlroy and Campbell, “The High Tide of Trade Unionism,” 99. 
 200 
safety, both at the level of the workplace, and at the level of national policy. Former 
TUC and CBI commissioners recalled the professional and organised nature of HSC 
meetings, with members working to large, and frequently technical agendas on a 
Figure 9. Trade union membership in Britain, 1961–2001.13  
 
 
fortnightly basis. While members worked to the brief of their respective organisations, 
and lively debates occurred from time to time (notably over the SRSC regulations), my 
interviewees suggested that relations on the HSC were generally cordial, even friendly. 
The decision by HSC’s first chair, Bill Simpson to make decisions by consensus meant 
that HSC policymaking was defined by persuasion and compromise. As one former 
CBI commissioner described, ‘we were all pals outside the meeting and you didn’t fall 
out over it, it was a negotiation.’14 
                                                
 
 
13   “Trade Union Statistics 2014.” Accessed September 4, 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/trade-union-statistics-2014. 
14  Rex Symons, Interview, January 30, 2015. 
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 At workplace level, the SRSC regulations gave unionised workpeople an 
unprecedented platform to influence health and safety policy.15 At national policy level, 
HSC’s consensual approach conferred a degree of resiliency that allowed health and 
safety regulation to weather choppy economic and political waters.16 As Wilson notes, 
consensus avoided the adversarial relations that characterised American health and 
safety regulation, by giving employers and workpeople a direct stake in 
policymaking.17 The CSHW’s principle of ‘self-regulation’ was thus realised in this 
important respect, although the wider success of this principle is open to debate.18 As 
Steve Tombs, Matthias Beck and others have argued, consensus had its downsides. 
Political consensus exposed health and safety to ‘regulatory degradation’, whereby 
standards are compromised if fewer resources are put into enforcement, as happened 
following cuts to HSE’s budget in 1980.19 While political controversy was avoided in 
the making of new health and safety regulations, consensus also came at the expense of 
speediness, and a degree of ambition that can accompany policymaking when 
unconstrained by compromise.20 Consensus allowed the regulatory system to weather 
the political storm, but in the process the ship became progressively weakened. 
 On the other hand, a point that is neglected by critics of self-regulation such as 
Tombs is that trade unions acquiesced to this consensus, since they attained greater 
                                                
 
 
15  Peter Jacques, Interview, November 21, 2013. 
16  HSC, Report 1979-80 (London: HMSO, 1980), 1. 
17  Wilson, The Politics of Safety and Health, 152. 
18  See Tombs and Whyte, “A Deadly Consensus.” 
19  Ibid., 46–65; Beck and Woolfson, “The Regulation of Health and Safety in 
Britain.” 
20  House of Commons, Sixth Report from the Employment Committee. The Working of 
the Health and Safety Commission and Executive: Achievements since the Robens Report, HC 
400, 1982, v. 
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leverage over health and safety policy. It was not without reason that the TUC argued 
to the House of Commons Employment Committee in 1982 that the HSWA had 
‘greatly extended the opportunities which … unions [had] to influence the scope and 
content of new health and safety proposals.’21 Moreover, by handing political power to 
interest groups, policymaking responsibilities were removed from government 
departments which had a sponsoring role for particular industries. As the inquiries into 
the Piper Alpha disaster and Clapham rail crash in the 1980s demonstrated, major 
conflicts of interest can occur when the same government department has regulatory, 
enforcement and sponsorship functions. 
 
 
4.4.  Establishing the Framework 
 
4.4.1.  Institution and Identity 
As the 1972–74 Whitehall debate testified, the creation of an integrated system of 
health and safety regulation generated significant political and administrative 
challenges for British officials. The CSHW’s radical proposals required innovations 
not only in regard to policymaking—the delegation of policymaking responsibility to 
representatives of interest groups—but also enforcement. In particular, the merger of 
thousands of civil servants into a single HSE posed considerable difficulties for the 
governance of the new regulatory body and the promotion of an éspirit de corps.  
                                                
 
 
21  House of Commons, “Employ. Cttee. Wed 16 June 1982,” 33. 
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 The HSC was inaugurated on 1 October 1974. For a new corporate body, 
composed of mostly part-time officials, HSC’s early programme of work was 
substantial. With the exception of its very first meeting, held at Baynard’s House in 
Westbourne Grove (headquarters of the Factory Inspectorate), HSC’s meetings were 
held fortnightly at the DE in St James’s Square, Westminster. Bill Simpson, the 
former General Secretary of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers and 
chair of the Labour Party, was appointed full-time chair of HSC by the Employment 
Secretary, Michael Foot.22 His first majority priority, along with his eight fellow 
Commissioners (three representing trade unions, three representing employers’ 
associations, and two representing local authorities) was overseeing arrangements for 
bringing the HSWA into force. 
 Being a vast and complex piece of legislation, the HSWA was implemented 
gradually. Sections of the Act relating to the HSC came into force on 1 October 1974, 
with sections relating to the HSE and enforcement coming into force on 1 January 
1975. Sections related to the general duties of employers, employees and the self-
employed followed on 1 April.23 During these formative months, the HSC played an 
important role, along with the staff of existing departments, such as the DE, in 
bringing the new system into operation. The HSC had to quickly appoint the HSE’s 
first Director-General, as well as the two additional members of the statutory 
Executive (the legally defined body of three individuals as opposed to the entire 
                                                
 
 
22  Dawson et al., The Limits of Self-Regulation, 183. 
23  The Health and Safety at Work Etc. Act 1974 (Commencement No. 1) Order 1974, 1439 
(C. 26), 1974. 
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organisation of inspectors, scientists and administrators).24 This was important not only 
because of the HSE’s enforcement role, but because of its vital administrative 
responsibility, servicing the HSC in terms of policy advice and expertise. At its seventh 
meeting on 19 November 1974, the HSC recommended that John Locke, the former 
Director of Occupational Safety and Health at the DE, should be appointed HSE’s 
first Director-General.25  
 Former members of the HSC/E recalled Locke as a gifted and colourful official 
with a fearsome and shrewd reputation.26 A statistician and mathematician by training, 
Locke was a career civil servant for thirty years, serving as an under-secretary in the 
Cabinet Office before being ‘lured’ by Castle into the Ministry of Transport, where he 
assumed responsibility for the rationalisation of passenger transport services. There, 
Locke impressed Castle sufficiently for her to invite him to join the DEP.27 As Director 
of the DE’s health and safety division, Locke was one of the primary ‘architects’ of the 
HSWA, overseeing the interdepartmental negotiations which resulted in the HSC/E. 
As Locke reflected on his invitation to head the HSE in 1974, ‘I felt enough 
responsibility for the new creation—and enough curiosity about whether I could run a 
sizeable organization—to accept.’28  
 Locke’s enormous task, as its first Director-General, was to corral the new 
organisation together. On 1 January 1975, some 2,800 personnel from ten separate 
                                                
 
 
24  HSC, Report 1974-76, 21. 
25  HSC, “Minutes,” November 19, 1974, 2, TNA EF8/8. 
26  Eves, Interview, pt. 4. 
27  Locke, “The Politics of Health and Safety,” 1; Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries 
1964–1976 (London: Papermac, 1990), 132. 
28  Locke, “The Politics of Health and Safety,” 1. 
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government bodies transferred to the HSE (Figure 10).29 In March 1976, these 
officials were joined by staff from agricultural departments, following the removal of 
the special provisions for agriculture in the Employment Protection Act 1975. This 
process of institutional consolidation was completed in 1977, when farm safety 
inspectors entered the fold. By 1 April 1976, the total complement of HSE staff stood 
at 3,400, a 20 per cent increase over its inaugural level.30 An organisation chart of 
HSC/E as of January 1975 is provided below (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 10. Organisations amalgamated under HSE in 1975 
PARENT	DEPARTMENT	 INSPECTORATES	AND	OTHER	UNITS	
TRANSFERRED	
Department	of	Employment	(DE)	 Directorate	of	Occupational	Safety	and	
Health	(DOSH)	
HM	Factory	Inspectorate	
Explosives	Inspectorate	
Employment	Medical	Advisory	Service	
(EMAS)	
Department	of	Energy	(DEn)	 Safety	and	Health	Division	
Mines	and	Quarries	Inspectorate	
Nuclear	Installations	Inspectorate	(NII)	
Safety	in	Mines	Research	Establishment	
Department	of	the	Environment	(DOE)	 Alkali	and	Clean	Air	Inspectorate	(ACAI)	
Other	 British	Approvals	Service	for	Electrical	
Equipment	in	Flammable	Atmospheres	
	
 
                                                
 
 
29  HSC, Report 1974-76, 24. 
30  HSC, Report 1974-76. 
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 In 1976, an Order in Council subsequently extended the HSWA to divers and 
other offshore workers, in recognition of the hazards associated with North Sea oil and 
gas. Under this arrangement, the HSC was charged with developing occupational 
health and safety policy for both onshore and offshore workers. However, the 
Department of Energy (DEn) retained responsibility for ‘structural’ aspects of 
offshore safety, such as the prevention of blowouts, as well as the inspection of offshore 
installations, conducted by its Petroleum Engineering Division.31 Effectively, the  
  
                                                
 
 
31  Ibid., 3. 
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Figure 11. HSC/E organisational structure, January 1975.32  
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enforcement of offshore health and safety was left with the government department 
responsible for sponsorship of the energy industry: this was a fraught arrangement 
that, in the words of HSE’s second Director-General and Chief Scientist, ‘unravelled 
spectacularly’ following the 1988 Piper Alpha explosion.33 
 Considering the fracas that accompanied the HSE’s inception, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that Locke found it problematic to merge the HSE’s constituent parts into 
a coherent whole. David Eves was appointed Director of Corporate Services by Locke 
in 1978, with responsibility for finance, training and pay. He recalled how 
 
Locke … held the thing together, but with difficulty…. [W]e had a particular problem … 
in that, looking just at the inspectorates … there were a host of different grades and each 
one had a particular pay scale attached to it. And some inspectors were paid more than 
others, historically, and this bred a certain amount of resentment among those who weren’t 
paid as much.34 
 
The new HSE was beset by tribalism and in-fighting, and relative pay was only part of 
the problem. The Factory Inspectorate was the oldest and largest of the pre-1974 
inspectorates, and in the words of its own Chief Inspector, ‘tended to think of 
themselves as a group apart.’35 Other inspectorates were resentful of the Factory 
Inspectorate’s size and pull over health and safety policy: as the Factory Inspectorate 
                                                
 
 
32   HSC, Report 1974-76, 36. 
33  Rimington and McQuaid, “A Systems-Based Approach to Health and Safety 
Regulation,” 4. 
34  Eves, Interview, pt. 4. 
35  “Note of Committee’s Informal Discussion with W. J. C. Plumbe.” 
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was allied to the DE, many of the Inspectorate’s staff, such as Harvey, had moved into 
more senior positions in the new authority than personnel from elsewhere.36 Due to 
their divergent histories and working cultures, the separate inspectorates also had very 
different enforcement standards. Although the Factory Inspectorate had long 
promoted a conciliatory approach to enforcement, it ultimately prosecuted firms who 
failed to make improvements. In contrast, other inspectorates, such as the Alkali and 
Clean Air Inspectorate (ACAI), prosecuted rarely. Each inspectorate also had its own 
constituency. The Mines and Quarries Inspectorate, for instance, was staffed by 
former mining officials and remained closely aligned to the coal industry, while ACAI 
retained close relationships with the chemical industry, and wished to retain a certain 
degree of control over their operations.37  
 The incorporation of ACAI under HSE was a continuing bone of contention in 
HSE’s inaugural decade. In 1976, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
criticised the CSHW for recommending ACAI’s inclusion:  
 
There is clearly a need for liaison between the Alkali and Factory Inspectorates where 
internal and external air pollution arises from the same sources. However … This ignores 
the great differences in the nature and scope of the interests of the two Inspectorates. The 
Factory Inspectorate are principally concerned with the protection of workers, and of the 
public near the workplace, from hazards arising directly from industrial processes…. The 
Alkali Inspectorate, on the other hand, are concerned solely with air pollution and with its 
effects on the population on the whole and on the wider environment…. [T]he 
                                                
 
 
36  Rimington, Interview. 
37  Carter, Interview. 
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incorporation of the Alkali Inspectorate in the Health and Safety organisation is potentially 
damaging to the interests of the environment.38 
 
As the debate over ACAI indicated, questions of regulatory identity were not just 
relevant in terms of HSE’s status or authority. Decisions about where the inspectorates 
belonged affected the integrity of the regulatory system and the coordination of the 
regulatory response to risks: in other words, what the field of health and safety 
legitimately encompassed. The HSWA had not definitively answered these questions, 
at least to the satisfaction of those officials who found themselves in the HSE. 
Ultimately, in 1987 ACAI—renamed the Industrial Air Pollution Inspectorate 
(IAPI)—was extracted from HSE, to form part of an integrated pollution inspectorate 
in the DOE.39 This shows that an integrated field of ‘health and safety’ regulation was 
by no means a fait accompli in the 1980s. It would be several more years, the 1990s, 
before the inspectorates were fully integrated, and HSE began to look and behave like 
a single organisation. 
 
4.4.2.  Self-Regulation and Participation in Policymaking 
A fundamental principle of the ‘self-regulatory’ framework was that employers, 
workers and other interests had access to forums where they could deliberate and 
influence health and safety policy. One of HSC’s major priorities in its early days was 
thus the extension of joint consultation throughout the regulatory system. As my 
                                                
 
 
38  Sir Brian Flowers, Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Fifth Report: Air 
Pollution Control: An Integrated Approach, Cmnd. 6371, 1975, 69–71. 
39  This eventually morphed, by 1995, into the new Environment Agency. 
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previous chapters showed, this was a sensitive political issue, particularly in regard to 
the recognition and status of trade unions. The extension of joint consultation required 
arrangements to formalise the appointment of safety representatives and safety 
committees, as well as the establishment of expert advisory committees to advise the 
HSC on particular aspects of health and safety policy. By the early 1980s, these efforts 
created a chain of collective effort, ranging from safety representatives and safety 
committees in the workplace, to voluntary advisory committees and accident 
prevention bodies at the level of industry, HSC’s advisory committees, and at the apex, 
the tripartite HSC (Figure 12). 
Figure 12. Levels of joint consultation in the post-1974 regulatory system 
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 Described by Simpson as HSC’s ‘most important single package of legislation’, 
the Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations (SRSC) were made in 
1977.40 The regulations brought to an end over a decade of political wrangling over the 
statutory compulsion of safety committees. However, an issue that confronted the HSC 
when drafting them was concern about the potential costs they imposed on the public 
sector, at a time when public finances were under considerable strain. In September 
1976, Britain was forced to apply for an emergency loan of $3.9 billion from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), to control inflation and support the pound. 
Repayment of the loan was conditional upon swingeing cuts in public expenditure, 
which were announced by the Chancellor, Denis Healey, in December 1976. As part of 
these cuts, the mechanism which funded local authorities in Britain, the rate support 
grant, was frozen.41   
 Local authorities were concerned about the potential cost of implementing the 
new arrangements in the public sector. In 1978, the DOE estimated that the cost of 
implementing the SRSC regulations among English and Welsh local authorities was 
£25.8 million.42 This prompted the government to delay the coming into force of the 
new regulations until 1978, a decision that angered the HSC’s trade union members. 
The TUC believed that the costs of implementing the regulations had been 
exaggerated, while the long-term benefits, in terms of improved health and safety 
                                                
 
 
40  HSC, Report 1982-1983 (London: HMSO, 1983), iv; SI 1977/500. 
41  See Kathleen Burk and Alec Cairncross, “Goodbye, Great Britain”: The 1976 IMF 
Crisis (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), HC Deb 15 December 
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awareness and prevention of accidents and ill-health, ignored.43 It seemed that the 
government wished to apply one rule for itself, and another for industry. However, 
impatience and frustration also lay behind the TUC’s response: the TUC had pressed 
for the statutory appointment of safety representatives and safety committees since 
1964. Unions had also pledged support for wage restraint in exchange for political 
concessions in the social contract. The delay for a further year was thus inflammatory.  
 Initially, it appears that the SRSC regulations were successful in boosting the 
number of safety committees in organised firms, not least because of the new 
bargaining power they offered unions. A HSE survey in 1979 revealed that almost 
three quarters of workers in manufacturing now had safety representation, although 
uptake in some problematic industries, notably construction, remained slow.44 In a 
revealing memo submitted to the Employment Committee in 1982, the TUC described 
how ‘over 130,000 health and safety “watchdogs”’ safeguarded workers as a result of 
the SRSC regulations; unsurprisingly, the TUC considered the regulations ‘one of the 
most successful pieces of legislation enacted within the framework of the HSW Act.’45 
For the TUC, the success of the SRSC regulations demonstrated their commitment to 
health and safety and bolstered their image as the only true advocate of workers’ 
rights.  
 Evidence elsewhere, however, paints a more nuanced picture of this 
development. As Dawson et al show, many safety committees had been established in 
                                                
 
 
43  HSC, Report 1976-77 (London: HMSO, 1978), 7. 
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name only, and empty positions indicated that workers were not always eager to 
participate as safety representatives.46  Such studies dispel the TUC’s rhetoric around 
safety committees, and suggest that workers and trade unions were not uniformly 
enthusiastic about health and safety. Rather, trade unions were enthusiastic only when 
it suited their immediate purposes. 
 The TUC’s reaction to the issue of non-unionised employees is illuminating in this 
respect. The SRSC regulations did not benefit all working people. Since the 
regulations only applied to recognised trade unions, safety representatives could not be 
appointed in workplaces without recognised union representation, and safety 
committees were only required if two or more trade union safety representatives 
requested the employer in writing.47 For non-unionised workers, a vital mechanism to 
influence decision-making was thus absent, and it does not appear that the TUC was 
particularly concerned about their interests. As the former HSC Commissioner Peter 
Jacques put it: 
 
[W]e weren’t going to let non-unionists be safety representatives, or necessarily members 
of the safety committee. They had to be members of recognised trade unions, that was our 
concession to the employers, that the unions had to be recognised. And anybody from a 
union which was not recognised, they didn’t have to have representation. So there was no 
question of non-unionists as far as we were concerned of being part of this system at all…. 
                                                
 
 
46  Dawson et al., The Limits of Self-Regulation, 268; Beck and Woolfson, “The 
Regulation of Health and Safety in Britain,” 43. 
47  SRSC Regulations 1977, no. 9. 
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We’re not having non-trade unionists representing trade union members who are at risk. 
It’s as simple as that.48 
 
This suggests that TUC support for the SRSC regulations extended just as much from 
a political desire to consolidate their bargaining position, as from a moral desire to 
protect workers and the general public. 
 This issue was highly pertinent. The health and safety representation of non-
unionised workers was a growing issue in the 1980s and 1990s, as trade union 
membership declined, and the workforce moved to sectors with historically weak union 
representation. By the late 1990s, HSC’s chair, Sir Frank Davies mooted the problem: 
‘Who else is there … with the knowledge, representative nature and commitment of the 
TUC?’49 Deindustrialisation and industrial fragmentation was a direct threat to the 
TUC’s legitimacy on the HSC, and the wider effectiveness of joint consultation. 
 Trade union and employer input to health and safety policy was secured 
elsewhere in the regulatory system. Following the SRSC regulations, one of the most 
significant tasks for the HSC and its chair, Bill Simpson was to develop a 
representative advisory committee structure. The aim behind this was to ‘reflect the 
interests concerned in a similar fashion to the Commission, but with more specific 
remits to consider problems related to particular hazards or industries.’50 In order to 
develop a ‘self-regulatory’ system in which major interests took the lead in policy 
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development, it was essential that their views were incorporated in a far tighter and 
more coordinated way than before 1974. Advisory committees created formal spaces 
where interests could discuss and develop policy, and provide expert advice to the 
HSC. They acted as a vital link between workplace safety committees and the HSC, 
acting as an ‘early warning system’ that kept the HSC abreast of technical and other 
developments.51 In addition, advisory committees allowed more interests to contribute 
to policymaking, without diluting the HSC’s tripartite composition.52 Their existence 
thus freed the HSC to concentrate on higher and more general levels of policy, rather 
than on technical matters. Advisory committees resolved basic disagreements before a 
particular proposal was handed to HSC for final deliberation. In this way, advisory 
committees preserved HSC’s ability to make decisions by consensus.53 
 The separation between policymaking and enforcement functions in the HSC/E 
was not clear cut. The HSE played a central role servicing and chairing HSC’s 
advisory committees, bringing its significant operational and technical experience to 
bear.54 In addition to employer and worker representatives, members of HSC’s 
advisory committees typically included academics, industrialists, safety officers, 
physicians and other professionals. The number of members varied, with some of the 
largest (such as the Advisory Committee on Major Hazards) incorporating almost 
twenty members. Additional members were co-opted to serve on subcommittees and 
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working groups.55 The absence of a particular organisation did not mean they were 
excluded from consultation altogether: these organisations were invited to respond to 
consultations directly, or had the opportunity to respond to proposals once they were 
published. Hence, the HSC/E attempted to foster the total involvement of British 
industry, commerce and workpeople in policymaking. This was vital to secure the 
CSHW’s vision of a self-reliant health and safety culture. 
 An urgent task confronting the HSC upon its formation was the appointment of a 
Committee of Experts on Major Hazards, following the devastating explosion at 
Flixborough in June 1974. The Advisory Committee on Major Hazards (ACMH), as 
it became known, assumed operation in January 1975. In subsequent years, the HSC 
appointed many other committees to consider and advise on particular issues. Subject 
Advisory Committees (SACs) considered hazards that occurred industry-wide, such as 
asbestos, while Industry Advisory Committees (IACs) considered the problems of 
particular industries. The HSC’s first IAC, for agriculture, first met in January 1977. 
IACs allowed a more detailed analysis of industrial hazards than the HSC could 
perform on its own, and while many of these committees were new, others, such as the 
Foundries Advisory Committee, replaced standing committees set up under pre-1974 
legislation.56 Alongside the HSC itself, this advisory committee structure therefore 
enabled pre-1974 advisory bodies, such as the IHAC, to be gradually replaced. The 
CSHW had considered these committees to be ineffective, and they had declined in 
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importance since the late 1960s.57 The work of four of HSC’s advisory committees, the 
Advisory Committees on Major Hazards, the Safety of Nuclear Installations, Asbestos 
and Toxic Substances, is examined below. 
 
4.4.3.  A Comprehensive System of Health and Safety 
Given the enormous increase in scope of health and safety legislation after the HSWA, 
one of the HSC’s urgent priorities upon its establishment was securing the protection 
of the 8 million workers coming under the ambit of health and safety legislation for the 
first time. This entailed clarifying the enforcement roles of HSE and local authorities, 
and signing agreements with smaller official bodies to act as agents where their advice 
or expertise was needed. Besides HSC’s arrangement with the the Department of 
Energy, other agents included the Railway Inspectorate of the Department of 
Transport, which enforced the HSWA on the railways, and the National Radiological 
Protection Board, which carried out inspections in workplaces with radiation hazards, 
such as dental surgeries.58 
 The HSC had many issues to consider when making new regulations to allocate 
enforcement functions between the HSE and local authorities. Firstly, there was the 
question of their general relationship and field of responsibility. The Robens Report 
had supported the demarcation in enforcement responsibility established in the 
OSRPA 1963, arguing that local authorities should be primarily responsible for ‘non-
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industrial’ workplaces such as offices, while the HSE (or more precisely, the proposed 
NASHW) should be primarily responsible for ‘industrial’ concerns such as factories.59 
Complexities, however, were introduced by the large number of new premises coming 
under legislation for the first time, many of which presented special hazards despite 
their ‘non-industrial’ status. For example, universities often used complex laboratory 
and industrial equipment which posed hazards to staff, students and the public. For 
this reason, the CSHW had argued that inspectors should exercise flexibility, taking 
into account the workplace’s purpose, and any special hazards involved.60 The HSWA 
incorporated this flexibility, allowing for adjustments in enforcement responsibility to 
be made by local agreement.61 
 Secondly, there was the need for enforcement to be efficient and equitable. While 
the HSWA simplified enforcement arrangements, improving the coordination of 
inspection and advice, it was important that HSE and local authority inspectors 
(Environmental Health Officers) were not responsible for enforcing health and safety 
in their own type of premises. This was because employees had the right for their 
working conditions to be independently assessed; with local government and much of 
the public sector coming under health and safety legislation for the first time in 1974, it 
was unfair that local authorities potentially had responsibility for local government 
premises, while workers elsewhere were subject to external inspection. This problem 
was compounded by the fact that local authorities could not prosecute themselves.62 
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This was a problem for Crown bodies in general, including the NHS, and meant not 
only that HSE could not prosecute them—thereby protecting workers in these 
premises—but it could not serve them with improvement and prohibition notices. This 
was an embarrassing situation which undermined the HSWA’s principle of shared 
responsibility for health and safety. It implied that the British state enjoyed a form of 
legal immunity that was not available to private-sector employers.63 
 In its early years, therefore, HSC/E campaigned to have Crown immunity 
revoked. In the meanwhile, they developed an administrative sanction, coming into 
effect by 1978, whereby special Crown enforcement notices could be served on Crown 
employers as if they were regular enforcement notices.64 These notices had no formal 
legal status, and hence were purely symbolic. However, by shaming Crown employers 
into action, they had their intended effect, and very few were formally challenged.65 
Between 1988 and 2001, HSE recorded 25 cases (censures) whereby, if not for Crown 
immunity, there was sufficient evidence to prosecute a Crown employer for health and 
safety offences.66 
 Finally, there was the need for close liaison between HSE and local authorities, 
and the uniform application of health and safety standards across Britain. This was a 
longstanding issue in British health and safety regulation, and continued to be a 
problem after 1974. As of 1972, there were over 1,600 local authorities enforcing health 
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and safety legislation across Britain. A decade later, the CBI was still complaining to 
the Employment Committee about the variability and inconsistency of local authority 
enforcement standards.67 Coming from a different regulatory context and working 
culture, Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) had very different standards to HSE 
inspectors. As Rimington explained: 
 
Now … health and safety got itself a bad name, not because the Environmental Health 
Officers are stupid or bad inspectors, it’s partly because of course they have different 
standards. HSE is all about reasonable practicability, balancing against cost, but if what 
you’re most used to is inspecting food shops, the restaurants and things like that, your 
standards are absolute. So you’re not used to the kind of inspection that HSE [does]…. 
And of course in service premises the risks are on the whole much lower. So HSE do the 
high-risk end of the business, as far as inspection is concerned. But they set the standards, 
and actually setting standards for local authorities is very difficult.68  
 
The need for consistency at the highest levels of policymaking was reflected in local 
authority representation on the HSC. In the HSE, a new Health and Safety 
Executive/Local Authority Liaison Committee (HELA) was established to harmonise 
enforcement policy with local authorities, and discuss matters of mutual concern.69 
Coordination was also strengthened in the field. A new arrangement was established 
whereby a member of HSE staff, normally the Area Director, would take an active role 
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coordinating the efforts of HSE and local authority inspectors in his or her area. This 
‘partnership’ extended to formal and informal meetings between inspectors, for 
instance between alkali inspectors and EHOs in cases of pollution, or between factory 
inspectors and EHOs in cases of occupational noise.70 In 1982, these arrangements 
were cemented by the establishment of a dedicated Local Authority Unit in HSE, to 
prepare and publish guidance on matters relevant to local authorities.71 These 
coordinating arrangements became increasingly important over the 1980s and 1990s, 
as occupational risks became delocalised, and workers transferred from industries 
primarily under HSE’s jurisdiction, such as manufacturing, to industries under local 
authorities’ jurisdiction, such as financial services. 
 The allocation of enforcement functions, however, ran into the same 
administrative hurdle as the SRSC regulations. Financial constraints in the public 
sector meant that local authorities were unable to assume the full range of functions 
originally envisaged for them.72 In 1975, local authorities’ funding was frozen, and this 
constraint, amounting to a reduction of 1.5 per cent in ‘other environmental services’ 
(including health and safety), severely impacted their ability to assume additional 
responsibilities.73 The HSE was reluctantly forced to absorb responsibility for these 
premises, a situation that imposed considerable financial and physical burdens.74 
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Following negotiations, local authorities agreed only to a limited increase in their 
responsibility to cover residential and catering premises, which could be met under 
existing funds.75 Regulations embodying this agreement, the Health and Safety 
(Enforcing Authority) Regulations, were made in 1977.76 
 Eves was briefly chair of HELA in the 1980s. He explained how HELA was 
developed to share thinking between HSE and local authorities on matters of mutual 
concern, and supported the CBI’s view that local authority enforcement was 
inconsistent, though not always tending towards over-enforcement: 
 
I don’t think it was the case that we in HSE were pretending to know it all, because we 
didn’t. We were learning as we went about applying this new Act, we had … 8 million 
employees who’d suddenly come under the Act for the first time…. We soon discovered 
through this Committee … a very uneven range of performance, as you would expect 
actually, [with] the 460-odd [local authorities]…. But when we discovered that some were 
practically not expecting anything at all, it rather put the lie to the idea that local 
authorities over-enforced….77  
 
On the HSC, local authority representatives do not appear to have held the balance of 
power between CBI and TUC representatives, as might be assumed in such a tripartite 
configuration. As Wilson notes, ‘as local authority representatives on the Commission 
are not assertive, it is in practice dominated by the TUC and CBI…. [T]he CBI and 
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TUC dominate the Commission both in members and in ethos.’78 My oral history 
evidence supports Wilson’s observation. While my interviewees recalled local authority 
representatives making important contributions, they all agreed that the essential 
dynamic of HSC policymaking was set by the TUC and CBI. For example, as 
Rimington recalled: 
 
The big boys, you know, when you’ve got top trade unionists on the committee and people 
who were directors of major firms, they’re not people who can be sort of brushed aside by 
people representing local authorities…. No, the true battle was always between the ‘two 
sides of industry’, as they used to be called…. Sometimes the local authority 
representatives exerted a kind of mollifying influence; they made a contribution….79 
 
As a CBI representative, Rex Symons informed me, the TUC and CBI representatives 
on the Commission were extremely well briefed and supported by their organisations.80 
It is insightful however that neither my TUC or CBI interviewee remembered the 
names of local authority commissioners, while they readily recalled personal exchanges 
between TUC and CBI members. My TUC interviewee, Peter Jacques, summed up 
the local authority issue most succinctly: ‘I don’t know what they were doing there.’81 
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4.5.  International Developments: The European Equation 
As evident from the previous discussion, the HSC/E had a formidable task in bringing 
to life the CSHW’s vision of a comprehensive, self-regulatory system. However, on top 
of their domestic policy programme, they also had important international obligations 
to fulfil.  
 The international influence over British health and safety policy stemmed from 
two main sources. The first was the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Since 
1919, the ILO had established the right for employees to be protected against accidents 
and diseases resulting from work, and promoted international standards on worker 
protection.82 In 1974, the HSC assumed responsibility for advising the British 
government on the ratification of ILO conventions and recommendations, such as the 
1974 Convention and Recommendation on Occupational Cancer.83 
 The second major source of international influence was the European 
Community (EC). European legislation assumed a growing influence over British 
health and safety policy after the UK joined the EC in 1973. Europe’s role in 
promoting national cooperation on health and safety standards was established in the 
1950s, when the European Coal and Steel Community initiated a programme of 
research and standard-setting in the steel and coal industries. In 1957, the Euratom 
Treaty promoted national cooperation on radiological and nuclear standards. In terms 
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of general worker protection, the 1957 Treaty of Rome allowed the Council of 
Ministers to adopt health and safety standards by unanimous decision.84  
 Two particular articles of the Treaty of Rome were significant in terms of the 
historical development of European health and safety legislation. Article 100 provided 
for measures to harmonise national legislation affecting the functioning of the common 
market, such as the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade. While worker protection 
was not its explicit aim, Article 100 allowed maximum standards to be made in relation 
to goods and materials (such as work equipment), which could produce barriers to 
trade if member states adopted different standards. Article 118 concerned collaboration 
between member states on social issues such as employment, workers’ rights and social 
security. Industrial hygiene was included within this remit, and the article provided for 
minimum standards to protect workers against occupational accidents and disease.85 
 European health and safety policy, therefore, was dominated by an inherent 
tension and dual concern. On the one hand, health and safety was an important 
dimension of economic harmonisation—that one nation was not at an economic 
disadvantage to another if it adopted more stringent standards (for instance, on the 
protection of workers from exposure to asbestos). On the other hand, health and safety 
was fundamentally related to workers’ rights and protection. This concern was not 
necessarily moralistic: from the late 1980s, the ambition of the European Commission’s 
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president, Jacques Delors, was to advance the ‘social’ dimensions of the common 
market in tandem with economic and political integration.86 Health and safety was thus 
related to a wider desire on the part of European officials to promote common 
European ideals and a shared sense of citizenship. 
 Although European health and safety legislation became more prominent in the 
late 1980s and 1990s, the achievements of Europe during the inaugural decade of the 
HSC/E were limited, and the domestic policy agenda retained precedence.87 In 1974, 
the Council of Ministers initiated a Social Action Programme that included workers’ 
health and safety as an explicit policy aim. In June 1978, the European health and 
safety agenda was developed further in an Action Programme on Safety and Health at 
Work. Shortly after, the European Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene and 
Health Protection at Work was established as a mechanism to debate European health 
and safety policy. Tripartite representation was provided by all member states, with 
nominees from the HSE, TUC and CBI providing UK representation.88 While the 
Social Action Programme gave impetus to European health and safety policy, between 
1970 and 1985 only six directives were adopted that specifically concerned workers’ 
health and safety: a directive on safety signs, a framework directive on physical, 
chemical and biological agents (80/610/EEC), and four daughter (subordinate) 
directives on lead, asbestos, noise and vinyl chloride. While other directives were 
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passed with major implications for British health and safety policy, such as the Seveso 
Directive on Major Accident Hazards (see below), worker protection was not their 
primary or exclusive aim. Economic harmonisation, public safety and environmental 
protection were also important goals.89 
 One of the factors that impeded European health and safety legislation before 
1986 was the condition of unanimity attached to votes in the Council of Ministers. This 
meant that proposals originating from the European Commission could be held up if 
member states exercised a veto. For example, in the 1980s, European asbestos 
regulations were delayed owing to German objections about their effect on workers’ 
overtime.90 While obstructing new legislation, however, unanimity served British and 
other national interests. It increased the power of national legislatures relative to the 
European Commission, and gave the HSC/E considerable opportunity to influence 
European regulations.  
 In the 1970s, John Rimington was posted to Brussels to help negotiate health 
and safety policy. He described Britain’s influence over European health and safety 
legislation after it acceded to the EC in 1973: 
 
As it happens, when I was in Brussels, one of the things that crossed my desk was the very 
first health and safety regulation that Europe ever attempted …, the Safety Signs 
regulations. I must say I didn’t know much about safety [at the time] …, I thought the 
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whole thing was … ridiculous as a matter of fact. It all resolved into arguments about 
whether there should be a sign of a running man, ‘cause it was doctrine in the UK at that 
time that for fire precautions you should never run, you must always walk…. Now it 
wasn’t until later that Europe began to take a really big interest in [health and safety]. It all 
began with the Asbestos Regulations, and the control of hazardous installations. Now at 
the beginning HSE ran the European show. No doubt about that. The Asbestos 
Regulations, the Seveso directive, those things were very much influenced by HSE. Why? 
We had the expertise to do it.91 
 
As Rimington explained, several European directives during HSC/E’s inaugural period 
were closely based on established British legislation. In particular, the Seveso directive 
on major hazards and the asbestos directives closely reflected British expertise and 
experience.92  
 The European political dynamic of the 1970s and early 1980s benefitted the 
HSC/E in another crucial way. It gave them considerable freedom to impart their 
regulatory ideals across the continent. For example, before 1987, Britain was 
successful in basing many European controls on the test of reasonable practicability: 
that is, that cost should be taken into account alongside risk when deliberating control 
measures. This defining principle of British health and safety regulation went 
unchallenged until changes in the European Commission’s voting system in 1986 side-
lined British interests (see Chapter 5).93 This relative success in influencing European 
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policy meant that between 1974 and 1984, the impact of the European policy agenda 
on Britain was ameliorated.94 
 This is not to say, however, that the impact of Europe on British health and 
safety policy was somehow insignificant before 1984. European obligations placed a 
considerable strain on HSC/E’s resources. In particular, following the Action 
Programme on Safety and Health at Work in June 1978, the number of directives 
requiring UK implementation increased significantly. During negotiations, the HSC 
pressed Europe to prioritise and reduce the sheer number of directives. It believed ‘the 
workload to be expected from the directives alone would overstretch the resources not 
only of the Executive but also of industry.’95 Certainly, the negotiation of European 
directives took up ever more of HSC/E’s time and effort between 1974 and 1984. As a 
result of European policy developments, British proposals that originated months or 
even years earlier were frequently delayed or modified.96 This slowed British 
policymaking, although in several cases (such as major hazards) the HSC decided to 
proceed with interim legislation. By 1984, the HSC’s chair, John Cullen, argued that 
‘sole responsibility for British health and safety legislation no longer rests with 
ministers, advised by myself and my colleagues. In order to ensure that standards are 
maintained and improved, we have taken a very active part in negotiating … European 
Community directives so that the finished instruments will be broadly acceptable to all 
concerned: workers and their employers, and manufacturers and users of equipment.’97 
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 Throughout the entire period under review in this thesis, the HSC/E’s aim was to 
ensure that European proposals were ‘no less stringent than those … in Great 
Britain.’98 At first glance, such a statement could imply that British officials had an 
interest in bringing other member states up to speed with Britain, and promoting 
workers’ health and safety across Europe. However, just as the Treaty of Rome 
embodied concerns about economic harmonisation, Britain’s European negotiating 
strategy was underpinned by anxieties about economic competitiveness. Significant 
trade distortions could occur if British standards (for example, of work equipment) 
were stronger than those of Britain’s competitors, encouraging capital to move to states 
with more relaxed or non-existent health and safety standards. As Britain’s 
machinations in defence of reasonable practicability demonstrated in the late 1980s 
(see Chapter 5), considerations of cost, trouble and competitiveness were central to 
Britain’s international as well as domestic health and safety agenda.  
 
4.6.  Constraining the Framework 
 
4.6.1.  Counting the Costs of Health and Safety Regulation 
The issue of cost became even more central to British health and safety policy when the 
country’s economic fortunes declined in the mid 1970s. As explained in Chapters 2 and 
3, a relatively simple economic argument underpinned the reform of British health and 
safety regulation in 1974. This was that the number of working days lost as a result of 
occupational accidents and disease would decrease if companies paid as much attention 
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to health and safety as their bottom line. In 1972, workplace injury and illness was 
estimated to the cost the economy some £200 million.99 At a time when politicians 
believed that Britain was lagging behind its international rivals, such figures carried 
significant weight, especially when the comparable level of working days lost to 
industrial action was much lower. 
 However, at the time these figures were advanced, the British economy was still 
growing, albeit slowly (Figure 13). In such a climate, the capital expenditure needed to 
reform regulation, implement new health and safety controls, and reap efficiency 
savings was more easily justified from a political perspective. Financial constraints and 
economic recession in the late 1970s and early 1980s upset this balance, showing how 
despite the reformist zeal of the early 1970s, health and safety declined in political 
priority at a time when the public purse was under pressure.  
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Figure 13. Real annual GDP growth in the UK, 1961–2000.100  
 
 
 As Simpson wrote in 1980, ‘the balance sheet of health and safety cannot easily 
be quantified.’101 What he meant is that the direct impact of regulation on rates of 
occupational accidents and disease could not be disentangled from confounding factors 
such as the changing structure of employment, industrial development, economic 
performance or levels of reporting.102 The ‘benefits’ of health and safety regulation, in 
terms of accident reduction or health promotion, are not easily calculable. However, 
the ‘costs’ of regulation, such as new physical controls, are easily represented in pounds 
and pence. Indirect costs and benefits to wider society are also tricky to establish.103 
This conceptual imbalance in the economics of health and safety was (and remains) 
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highly significant, for as pressures on the economy mounted and the costs of health and 
safety regulations to industry became clearer, their supposed benefits became more 
elusive. Nevertheless, between 1975 and 1982 the number of fatal accidents in British 
workplaces fell by almost 30 per cent, suggesting that the HSWA was beginning to 
have some, if ambiguous impact.104 
 Despite this improvement, economic and political developments threatened to 
undermine progress in reducing workplace accidents since 1974. The lingering effects 
of the 1973 oil crisis, recession and the conditions attached to the 1976 IMF loan bit 
hard into public expenditure. By 1978, Locke recognised how  
 
[T]here are those who consider that in a time of economic difficulty we can afford little 
improvement in health and safety at work. Of course the cost is one of the factors to be 
taken into account when considering what is reasonably practicable. But those who depict 
health and safety legislation as an obstacle to industrial profitability and national prosperity 
overlook the costs imposed by accidents.105 
  
This sentiment was repeated by the TUC in its evidence to the Employment 
Committee in 1982.106 Indeed, by 1976 some 16 million working days a year were still 
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being lost through workplace accidents and disease. As the chair of the National Oil 
Corporation pointed out, this represented ‘a loss in today’s terms of some £1,800 
million a year—not much less than the nation’s current earnings from North Sea 
Oil.’107 Even so, the HSC/E was not immune from the wider economic pressure on 
government and employers to find efficiency savings. This pressure encouraged the 
HSC/E, and from 1980 compelled them, to justify their proposals in economic terms. 
 Cost was already an implicit consideration in British health and safety policy. 
The SFAIRP qualification in the HSWA implied that employers could weigh cost 
against risk when determining control measures. Moreover, cost was debated 
extensively on the HSC’s advisory committees. In coming to a judgment about a 
particular course of action—regulations, codes of practice, guidance or other 
instruments—employers, trade unions and other bodies had extensive opportunity to 
discuss cost and other practical consequences of the proposed control. Nevertheless, in 
1981 the Employment Secretary, Norman Tebbit, demanded that HSC/E conduct 
formal cost-benefit analyses of all new regulatory proposals.108 This had been a major 
recommendation of Sir Leo Pliatzky’s report on non-departmental public bodies in 
1980. It also formed part of the HSE’s contribution to the scrutiny of waste in 
government, supervised by Sir Derek Rayner.109 
 As a form of economic appraisal, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was by no means a 
new phenomenon. In the context of the environment and social welfare, it had long 
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been used by governments to evaluate the private costs and social benefits of 
infrastructure projects. The US Treasury Secretary, Albert Gallatin, recommended its 
theoretical use in water projects as early as 1808, while the nineteenth-century French 
economist and civil engineer, Jules Dupuit, is credited with devising one of the major 
foundations of CBA (and modern economics generally), the concept of diminishing 
marginal utility. By the 1960s, CBA was being used to evaluate other ‘public goods’, 
such as air quality and human health, and ensure that public funds were being used 
efficiently. Since the 1970s, CBA had been a formal requirement of all US 
environmental regulations.110 
 In Britain, the application of CBA in public policy was more recent. Since the 
1960s it was applied in transport policy to evaluate schemes such as the M1 
motorway.111 However, in terms of health and safety regulations, one of the major 
factors behind the emergence of CBA was the election victory of the Conservative 
Party in May 1979. 
 The Conservatives’ election victory had immediate, profound and lasting 
consequences for the British system of health and safety regulation. The re-energised 
Conservative party entered government with a broad ‘neoliberal’ agenda, promising to 
reduce the size of the state, curb the power of trade unions (following the bitter ‘winter 
of discontent’ of 1978/79), and implement market-based measures to boost the 
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economy.112 The Pliatzky report on non-departmental public bodies, referred to above, 
highlighted the ‘considerable extra costs for industry’ imposed by the HSWA, in 
particular the costs associated with the expansion of health and safety legislation. The 
report argued that local authorities ‘allocated resources for activities which do not 
demonstrably bring commensurate benefits’, and suggested that, considering the 
lengthy process of joint consultation inherent in HSC/E policymaking, ‘the case is 
strengthened for more explicit attention to the assessment of costs in relation to 
benefits at earlier stages in the policymaking process as well as the stage of final 
approval.’113  
 The early eighties recession further threatened to disrupt progress in promoting 
health and safety following the HSWA. As Beck and Woolfson argue, it played into 
the hands of Conservative ideology, creating ‘a definite imperative to limit the cost 
impact of health and safety legislation on business.’114 HSE officials reported that 
employers were not only less willing to make improvements to the working 
environment, but that workers were also less willing to demand them.115 
Unemployment reached 3 million by January 1982, suggesting that, in an uncertain 
financial climate, some workers were willing to prioritise job security over health and 
safety.116 On retiring from HSC in 1983, Simpson warned how ‘the stimuli of new 
health and safety legislation, new duties, realignment of responsibilities, new advisory 
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committees and new enforcement penalties and measures will not endure in some of 
our workplaces. Already, in the recent recession, there are signs that many good 
intentions are melting like snowflakes in the warm chimney of competitive and 
financial pressures.’117 
 Only a decade after the HSWA, therefore, the CSHW’s optimistic economic 
message threatened to fade. It was being drowned out by contemporary economic 
anxieties and the immediate financial demands faced by employers and workers. The 
CBI, while praising the HSWA generally, argued to the Employment Committee that 
‘the HSC must recognise that industry’s capacity to produce wealth, provide 
employment and compete effectively in overseas markets are priorities just as vital as 
the maintenance of good health and safety standards.’118 In response to such 
arguments, Simpson stressed how it was more important than ever that employers and 
workers did not take ‘unnecessary risks’, and that they worked together to maintain 
safety improvements.119  
 
4.6.2.  Reducing the Inspectorate 
Government policy and economic recession not only threatened to turn back the clock 
on Britain’s accident record, but attack and weaken the HSC/E. The TUC, for their 
part, argued to the Employment Committee that progress in reducing accident rates 
was jeopardised ‘directly and indirectly as a result of Government policy’.120 The 
                                                
 
 
117  HSC, Report 1982-83, iii. 
118  House of Commons, “Employ. Cttee. Wed 9 June 1982,” 2. 
119  Ibid., 9–12; HSC, Report 1982-83, iv. 
120  House of Commons, “Employ. Cttee. Wed 16 June 1982,” 41, 55. 
 239 
HSC/E’s capacity to protect newly covered workers, for instance, was impaired by the 
government’s decision in December 1979 to reduce the HSC/E’s staff-related budget 
by six per cent, as part of wider cuts in the civil service as a whole. This was followed 
in 1981 by a further demand for an eight per cent cut.121 The TUC made it plain that 
‘the total amount of money saved by cuts will be trifling and more than outweighed by 
the cost of accidents and ill health resulting from failure to enforce and develop health 
and safety legislation.’122 The HSC warned the Employment Secretary that cuts on this 
scale ‘could not be achieved without a reduction in our programmes directly concerned 
with improved health and safety both for workers and the general public.’123 They 
demanded that the Employment Secretary specify where cuts could be made, but this 
fell on deaf ears.124 
 By any account, these cuts were damaging, although HSE attempted to cushion 
the blow through natural wastage and redundancies in administrative staff.125 
Rimington first joined HSE in November 1981, as Director of Safety Policy. He 
recalled the devastating effects of cuts on HSE’s morale and resources: 
 
[T]he way it was done was nonsense, really, as it always is when you get these peremptory 
orders…. What happened was that HSE had to lose 25 per cent of its staff, whether it 
needed them or not….  
                                                
 
 
121  Ibid., 36. 
122  Ibid. 
123  HSC, Report 1979-80, 3. 
124  James Prior, “Letter to William Simpson (HSC),” May 30, 1980, TNA 
EF7/765. 
125  HSC, Report 1979-80, 15. 
 240 
 All inspectors’ recruitment had to be immediately suspended, and remain suspended 
for five years. What that does to an organisation is nobody’s business. First of all, people in 
the organisation felt, well, what’s the future here? If they’ve got a chance they’ll get out…. 
It’s the best ones, of course, that go. The second and really major thing is that you get a … 
huge gap in expertise. You know, you’ve recruited no-one for five years …, you have got 
rid of all your training courses, all your expertise…. You’ve also totally unbalanced the 
force…. What do you do? You’ve got no choice….126 
 
 
Figure 14(a–b) and Figure 15 show the effect of cuts on HSC/E’s finances and 
manpower, correcting for inflation.127 They reveal how, despite increases in 
responsibility, HSC/E’s income effectively flat-lined, and even fell below 1975 levels by 
1984. Adjusting for inflation, the effect of financial cuts is clearly discernible. Between 
1980 and 1985, the number of HSE inspectors fell by over 12 per cent, only recovering 
by 1992. This severely impacted the HSE’s ability to proactively respond to existing 
and emerging risks. Locke was unequivocal: ‘I much fear that our work could become 
increasingly reactive—dealing only with those things which have already visibly gone 
wrong. I would regard that as a most dangerous tendency.’128 This, of course, struck at 
the very heart of the HSWA: to avoid a reactive approach to health and safety 
regulation, and keep abreast of changes in technology and industry. 
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Figure 14. HSC/E grant-in-aid, nominal and real (adjusting for inflation).129  
(a) 1975–1984 
 
(b) 1975–2000 
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Figure 15. HSC/E staffing levels, 1975–2000.130 
 
  
 The effects of financial cuts on HSC/E were insidious. Since recruitment was 
frozen and older inspectors continued to retire, valuable expertise and experience 
evaporated from HSE.131 In 1982, Simpson suggested than in order to fulfil its various 
statutory obligations, 400 additional inspectors were needed.132 The attrition of HSE’s 
staff was also reflected in the declining number of prosecutions brought by HSE 
inspectors. In 1977, inspectors carried out approximately 1,600 prosecutions. By 1984, 
inspectors carried out just 1,269, a decline of over 20 per cent.133 Moreover, the 
average duration between routine workplace inspections increased, and even fell below 
1974 levels. In the early 1960s, the average duration between visits to factories was 
once every four years. By the early 1980s, this had increased to between six and seven 
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years, and many smaller workplaces were exempt from inspection altogether, since 
they were not deemed to present ‘special hazards’.134 As Rimington recalled, ‘small 
firms saw very little of us … probably…. The idea that you should prioritise your 
approach to small firms would be rubbish, is rubbish. You haven’t a hope of seeing 
anything like ten per cent of them.’135  
 Although the HSC/E recognised the particular health and safety problems 
confronted by small firms in the 1970s and early 1980s, for various reasons, they were 
not HSC/E’s primary focus.136 HSE’s targeted inspection system meant that many 
smaller workplaces were overlooked, since workers in larger premises were thought to 
be at higher risk. Many small firms were offices, shops and other premises in the local 
authority sphere of responsibility, and were not inspected by HSE. Since many 
service-sector premises were low risk, accidents were infrequent events, and thus did 
not trigger investigations. Furthermore, the CBI, standing for big business, was 
directly represented on HSC. Thus, the interests of big business were more directly 
reflected in HSC/E policies and priorities.  
 HSE enforcement was affected by other government policies in the early 1980s. 
Reactive visits, those launched in response to accidents or investigations, were 
impacted by the government’s decision to abolish industrial injuries benefit in 1983. 
Under the Notification of Accidents and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1980 
(NADOR), the industrial injuries benefit scheme had provided a valuable input to 
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HSE statistics, helping to correct for under-reporting by drawing on benefit claims to 
the Department of Health and Social Security. Its abolition in favour of sickness 
benefit in 1983 hollowed out HSE’s information base, forcing the reappraisal of HSE’s 
inspection priorities.137 The short-lived NADOR regulations were quickly replaced by 
the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1985 
(RIDDOR). These improved HSE’s intelligence on accidents, and ill-health in 
particular: RIDDOR introduced a new system for reporting occupational diseases.138 
 
4.7.  Developing the Framework 
In this final section of Chapter 4, I discuss developments in three important areas of 
HSC/E policy that had significant ramifications for British health and safety 
regulation: major and nuclear hazards, asbestos, and other toxic substances. 
 
4.7.1.  Major and nuclear hazards 
HSE was concerned about major hazards from its earliest days. While regulators had 
been acutely aware of the dangers of chemical plants and other large hazardous 
installations since the 1960s, the Flixborough Disaster in June 1974 was a powerful 
reminder of the problems associated with the storage of flammable and explosive 
substances, and their use on an ever-increasing scale. Although industrial development 
had contributed to the long-term decline of workplace accidents in Britain, replacing 
hazardous manual occupations with ostensibly ‘safer’, automated ones, the Flixborough 
                                                
 
 
137  HSC, Report 1982-83, 13; HSC, Report 1983-1984, 25. 
138  HSC, Report 1985-86, 14. 
 245 
Disaster illuminated the sinister flip-side of such development. This was elucidated by 
Ulrich Beck in his seminal thesis, Risk Society, first published in 1986: as older risks 
came under control, science and technology unveiled new risks to workers, the public 
and wider environment that affected them in more insidious, uncertain and irreversible 
ways.139 As a DE memorandum explained in 1974, ‘these new industries have a 
potential for disaster and multiple deaths not previously encountered, not only amonst 
[sic] those who are employed in them, but in the area which surrounds the plants.’140  
 The Flixborough Disaster promoted a flurry of regulatory activity. Shortly after 
the explosion, Michael Foot announced a public inquiry into the causes of the disaster, 
as well as the establishment of a new unit to compile and evaluate information on major 
hazards. Furthermore, an expert advisory committee was established to examine major 
hazards in Britain, and advise the HSC on possible courses of action.141 The Advisory 
Committee on Major Hazards (ACMH) was first appointed on 18 October 1974, a 
little over a fortnight after the establishment of HSC. It was chaired, fittingly, by 
Bryan Harvey, the former Chief Inspector of Factories who in the late 1960s had made 
repeated and prescient warnings of the dangers of large chemical plants. 
 The ACMH’s first report in May 1976 highlighted how demand for technological 
efficiency since the Second World War had driven the development of ever larger 
plants, and the clustering of related industrial processes in particular locales. This had 
increased the numbers of people at risk from industrial accidents, and reduced the 
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margin error for failure: ‘Because of their present-day size and throughput there are 
now many plants throughout the world where a critical first mistake can result in 
disaster.’142 
 One area at particular risk, as Chapter 3 described, was the community of 
Canvey Island in Essex. Since 1970, fears had grown there about proposals to build a 
new oil refinery, despite the already cramped conditions in terms of several oil, gas and 
chemical facilities in close proximity to each other. From March 1976, HSE was 
closely involved in the assessment of risks on the island. They were joined by members 
of the Safety and Reliability Directorate of the UK Atomic Energy Authority 
(UKAEA), which the HSE jointly managed under a 1976 agreement.143 The local MP, 
Sir Bernard Braine, was an outspoken critic of the proposed development, highlighting 
how it endangered up to a quarter of a million people in the South East of England.144  
 With a research background in the dispersal of explosive gas clouds, HSE’s 
former Chief Scientist, Jim McQuaid, was closely involved in the Canvey Island 
survey. He recalled how Braine was ‘a thorn in HSE’s side for quite a while, asking 
questions in the house all the time.’145 The publicity and political scrutiny attracted by 
Braine’s campaign placed considerable pressure on HSE to explain their work on the 
island and describe their approach to control, a demand that developed more generally 
in the 1980s and 1990s in response to concerns about nuclear, major and toxic hazards 
(see Chapter 6). 
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 A major innovation in this period was the use of risk quantification as an aid to 
regulatory policymaking. As McQuaid argued, ‘Canvey Island was the first time, away 
from the space programme, and from nuclear installations … that attempts had been 
made to ascribe a probability to a particular accident scenario—you know, the failure 
of a storage tank … how often is it going to fail, and why would it fail….’146 Before this 
time, McQuaid asserted, ‘the word “risk” hardly featured in the [official] language. It 
was all about the hazard. Hazardous area in a mine, hazardous area in oil refineries, 
and so on’.147 With the exception of the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, the pre-
1974 inspectorates conducted ‘relatively little sophisticated work … on the quantitative 
assessment of accident probability’—the kind of work that might have anticipated 
disasters such as Flixborough.148 Regulators assumed that a well-designed, constructed 
and managed installation had a zero probability of failure. With disasters such as 
Flixborough, however, regulators began to question this assumption. Regulators 
turned their attention to the quantitative evaluation of consequences, a core component 
of the regulatory approach to risk assessment.149 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly in the wake of incidents such as Flixborough, ACMH 
noted that society’s response to industrial and technological development had changed. 
While industrial development was still widely considered to be Britain’s ticket to 
prosperity, certain quarters of the population had started to ‘dispute the wisdom of 
continued technological expansion.’150 Such questioning was by no means new; as 
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argued previously, regulators had acknowledged increasing political and public 
concern about risks since the early 1960s.  
 A major problem identified by ACMH, repeated in other areas of British health 
and safety policy at this time, was the lack of comprehensive and reliable information 
on risks to guide policymaking. Disturbingly, there was no requirement in the 1970s 
for operators of large chemical plants to notify regulators about their activities. 
Consequently, as McQuaid argued, regulators ‘didn’t really know what was going on 
behind the factory fence. You would have an almost anonymous chemical installation 
and nobody knew what possible things might happen to people around about, and how 
dangerous it was and how safe it was.’151 A central recommendation of ACMH’s first 
report was thus a statutory scheme for the notification of major hazard sites, a proposal 
enacted in the Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances 
Regulations 1982 (NIHHS).152 Under the regulations, occupiers of installations 
handling or storing certain dangerous substances (such as acrylonitrile) above a 
specific threshold were required to supply HSE with basic information about their 
activities. In line with the HSWA’s self-regulatory ethos, the ACMH also 
recommended that companies conduct a ‘hazard survey’, indicating the systems they 
had put in place to remove or mitigate hazards. HSE experts would scrutinise these 
surveys, and if necessary could demand a more thorough ‘hazard assessment’.153  
 While it took the Flixborough Disaster to initiate concerted political action on 
major hazards in Britain, it was an industrial disaster in the town of Seveso, 13 miles 
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north of Milan, that triggered corresponding political action on the European level. On 
10 July 1976, a bursting disc on a chemical reactor operated by the Icmesa chemical 
company ruptured, leading to the release of a potent dioxin. Demonstrating the 
delocalised character of many modern health and safety risks, a cloud of this chemical 
drifted offsite, affecting local communities and the wider environment. While no 
fatalities were reported, many people fell ill, including several pregnant women who 
were forced to undergo abortions.154 A European Directive on the Major Accident 
Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities, commonly known as the Seveso Directive, 
was subsequently drafted aiming to prevent and limit the impact of such catastrophes 
in the future.155 The directive required manufacturers to ensure the safety of their 
operations, and, if they used or stored a defined dangerous substance above a certain 
quantity, notify the relevant ‘competent authority’, providing technical details of the 
substance in question and their procedures in relation to handling, storage and fire (in 
Britain, the ‘competent authority’ was HSE). Additionally, manufacturers were 
required to assist local authorities in preparing off-site emergency plans, and provide 
information to local people potentially affected by their activities.156 
 The Seveso Directive shared many similarities with Britain’s NIHHS 
regulations, and the British experience of major hazards helped shape European 
developments. ACMH’s expertise suggested that the regulation of major hazards relied 
on the notification of dangerous operations and substances to regulators. Once relevant 
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data was obtained, only then could regulatory attention turn to control.157 The Control 
of Industrial Major Accident Hazard Regulations (CIMAH), implementing the Seveso 
Directive in Britain, were made in December 1984.158 Alongside the NIHHS 
regulations, CIMAH established a comprehensive regulatory regime for hazardous 
operations, one where regulatory authorities were aware of sites that had the potential 
for disaster, and could take pre-emptive measures.  
 The demand for operators of hazardous installations to conduct hazard surveys 
and assessments was central to the development of a risk management approach to 
major hazards. Unlike other areas of risk, the potential for catastrophe in hazardous 
installations meant that operators needed to ensure the safety of their installations, and 
demonstrate legal compliance, before regulators allowed their hazardous operation to 
proceed—what is known as a permissioning regime. The requirement to construct a 
‘safety case’ placed the primary responsibility for controlling risk on the operator, as 
per the self-regulatory principle. However, as an adverse side effect, the permissioning 
regime placed considerable resource burden on the regulator, since it also had 
responsibility for assessing and approving safety cases. The implication of major 
hazard control for local land-use planning, for instance, meant that even before the 
NIHHS regulations were made, referrals by local planning authorities for HSE advice 
and assistance increased by almost fifty per cent between 1977 and 1979.159  
 The contemporary approach to major hazards in Britain owed much to work on 
nuclear energy. As with other risks, regulators acknowledged deepening public 
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concern about nuclear power in the 1970s and 1980s. Although the extent of such 
public concern is difficult to assess, a succession of nuclear incidents in the 1970s and 
1980s raised the political profile of nuclear safety in Britain: a leak of contaminated 
water at Windscale, Cumbria in 1976 (the site of Britain’s first nuclear reactor); the 
partial nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island, USA in 1979; and a leak of radioactive 
waste at the Sellafield nuclear reprocessing facility in 1983, which contaminated 
nearby beaches. In 1986, the Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine stimulated global concern 
about the transnational effects of radioactive gas clouds. Arguably, radiation was the 
delocalised risk par excellence.160  
 Nuclear power was a particularly urgent regulatory concern in Britain owing to 
the government’s decision in 1979 to expand Britain’s nuclear power programme. 
Partly because of this decision, and partly because of the recognised consequences of a 
nuclear incident, more and more resources were injected into nuclear safety in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. In fact, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate bucked the 
overall downward trend in HSE staffing: while total HSE staff fell by 3 per cent in 
1982/3, staff working on nuclear and hazardous installations increased.161 Moreover, a 
large proportion—perhaps one sixth—of HSE’s extra-mural research expenditure was 
devoted to nuclear safety.162 Much of this effort concerned the evaluation of nuclear 
reactor designs: in 1982, the Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear 
Installations (ACSNI) published Some Aspects of Safety in Pressurised Water Reactors, in 
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advance of the public inquiry into the proposal to build a second reactor, Sizewell B, in 
Suffolk.163 This inquiry, chaired by Sir Frank Layfield QC, had far-reaching 
consequences for British health and safety policy: in response to Layfield’s 
recommendations, the HSE produced a sophisticated treatment of its risk management 
philosophy (see Chapter 6). 
 Regulators believed there were fundamental similarities between nuclear safety 
and the safety of other large hazardous installations, such as oil refineries. Most 
obviously, major and nuclear hazards presented complex causation chains, and 
demonstrated large-scale, dramatic consequences in the event of an incident.164 These 
perceived similarities informed HSE’s decision in 1976 to bring the UKAEA Safety 
and Reliability Directorate under joint HSE/UKAEA management. By combining 
resources in such a way, the Safety and Reliability Directorate’s expertise in risk 
analysis could be applied across the wider major hazards field. As the 1976/77 HSC/E 
report explained, this arrangement ‘improved capacity for the complex assessment of 
potential hazards arising from changes in technology’: the kind of proactive, joined-up 
approach to regulation the CSHW had recommended in 1972.165 
 
4.7.2.  Asbestos 
Asbestos, a highly versatile natural mineral fibre used in the production of everything 
from insulation to brake pads, was by no means a new health risk in 1970s Britain, 
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although members of the public waking up to its dangers for the first time could be 
forgiven for thinking it had only just attracted medical, political and regulatory 
attention. The first fatal case of asbestosis, a chronic fibrosis of the lungs resulting from 
exposure to asbestos dust, was originally diagnosed in 1899 by a physician at Charing 
Cross Hospital. In the 1920s, asbestos was identified as an occupational hazard, and in 
1931, the British government extended controls over asbestos dust.166 The first 
quantitative exposure limits for airborne concentrations of asbestos dust were 
established in 1969. 
 By the mid 1970s, however, the asbestos controversy was beginning to assume a 
new, more insidious dimension. Doubts emerged among regulators about the adequacy 
of existing standards to protect employees against cancer, while concern also 
developed about members of the public who could be exposed to asbestos outside the 
work gates.167 Global production of asbestos had accelerated since the 1930s, 
increasing 40 per cent in the period 1968–73 alone. By 1975, an estimated 15,000 
British workers were thought to be employed in factories subject to asbestos 
regulation.168 Over the 1970s and 1980s, the British media widely publicised the 
dangers of asbestos. Television exposés, such as the Yorkshire Television documentary 
Alice: A Fight for Life (1982), not only graphically depicted the effects of asbestos 
exposure on individuals and their families, but revealed how asbestos was all-pervasive 
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in modern society—in our homes, schools, hospitals and workplaces. This generated a 
public scare that threatened to discredit the authorities responsible for asbestos 
regulation.169  
 One government report in particular stirred controversy. In 1976, Alan Marre, 
the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, published a critical report into 
the Factory Inspectorate’s record of inspection at Acre Mill, an asbestos factory in 
Hebden Bridge, West Yorkshire.170 His investigation, launched in response to 
allegations of maladministration, concluded that the Inspectorate had taken an unduly 
soft approach to enforcement at the factory, and placed insufficient pressure on its 
management.171 Marre demonstrated that while the Inspectorate had known for some 
time that dust control in the factory was inadequate, and had even used the factory as a 
training facility for inspectors, the factory’s owners, Cape Asbestos, were never 
prosecuted in thirty years prior to the factory’s closure. This was despite an 
appreciable increase in the asbestosis rate over the same period. While Marre did not 
uphold the specific allegation that the Factory Inspectorate had been ‘overfriendly’ 
with Acre Mill’s managers, the report was a damning criticism of the Inspectorate’s 
conciliatory approach to enforcement. Indeed, on hearing of the Mill’s closure in 1970, 
the District Inspector felt fit to write to the firm, ‘I am very sorry to hear that you are 
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closing and I should like to thank you, on behalf of my colleagues, for all the co-
operation we have had from you over the years.’172 
   It was within this critical context that in May 1976, the HSC appointed an 
Advisory Committee on Asbestos (ACA), led by HSC’s chair, Bill Simpson. 
Considering the expanded scope of health and safety legislation under the HSWA, 
ACA was briefed with examining the risks asbestos posed to workers and the public, 
and considering whether any new measures were needed.173 ACA’s first report, 
published in July 1978, proposed new controls over work involving asbestos in 
sprayed coatings and acoustic and thermal insulation. These included prohibiting new 
work involving these applications, the licensing of contractors, and the notification of 
work to the HSE.174 Its final report, published in October 1979, responded to concerns 
about the wider public health impact of asbestos by recommending several measures to 
control asbestos inside and outside the workplace. Stringent new control measures for 
‘white’ and ‘brown’ asbestos were adopted, as well as a prohibition on the import and 
use of ‘blue’ asbestos.175  
 However, in a sign of how European developments increasingly dictated British 
health and safety policy, the development of British asbestos regulations was delayed 
owing to work on two directives: a directive on worker protection, and a directive on 
the marketing and use of asbestos and asbestos products.176 Negotiations over these 
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directives, eventually agreed in September 1983, proceeded extremely slowly owing to 
disagreements between member states over exposure limits and the scope of the 
proposed controls.177 The need to coordinate the ACA with European developments 
meant that it was not until 1983 that new licensing regulations were eventually made. 
However, as with major hazards, the pre-existence of a dedicated body of expertise in 
Britain meant that HSE entered European negotiations with a strong hand. 
Consequently, as Cullen described, the European directive on the protection of 
workers from asbestos ‘reflected British experience and practice.’178 In 1985, the 
licensing regulations were followed by regulations prohibiting the use of asbestos in 
spraying and insulation, and the marketing, import and use of ‘blue’ and ‘brown’ 
asbestos.179 However, it was not until 1987 that the European directives and ACA’s 
recommendations were fully implemented in Britain, in the Control of Asbestos at 
Work Regulations.180 
 
4.7.3.  Toxic substances 
Besides nuclear radiation, asbestos was perhaps the archetype of the ‘new’, modern 
health risk, exerting its delocalised effects far beyond the workplace. However, other 
significant developments between 1974 and 1984 helped extend regulatory control 
over toxic substances. In August 1981, the Control of Lead at Work Regulations 1980 
(CLAW) and its accompanying code of practice came into effect, applying quantitative 
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control limits for lead across the whole of British industry.181 A novel requirement in 
these regulations was for employers to conduct ‘assessments’ of the ‘nature and degree’ 
their employees were exposed to lead. These assessments would be revised, and steps 
taken to control the risk, as appropriate.182 While the HSWA had incorporated an 
implicit requirement for employers to assess risks, CLAW was the first time that such 
an explicit demand had been placed on employers outside the nuclear and major 
hazards field to undertake assessments as a way of maintaining and improving 
standards.183 In embryonic form, CLAW thus embodied the risk management approach 
to regulation that HSC/E expanded, promoted and codified in the late 1980s and 
1990s. 
 In February 1977, an Advisory Committee on Toxic Substances (ACTS) was 
established to advise the HSC on the risks to workers and the general public associated 
with the manufacture and use of toxic substances. One of its early tasks, in addition to 
work on specific substances, such as lead, was the preparation of proposals for a 
statutory notification scheme for toxic substances. As with hazardous installations, the 
rationale behind notification was to provide regulators with data so they could 
anticipate risk: in this case, advance warning about chemicals that could produce 
adverse health effects in workers and the general population.184  
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 Once again, however, European developments interfered with the development 
of domestic proposals. A major directive in September 1979, on the classification, 
packaging and labelling of dangerous substances, required European manufacturers 
and importers to submit, at least 45 days before a dangerous substance was marketed, 
a notification to regulators. This notification included technical data allowing 
regulators to evaluate the risks posed by the substance, as well as a declaration of any 
known adverse effects in its intended application.185 The directive’s requirements 
relating to the testing and notification of new chemicals came into force in September 
1981. In relation to this, the European Commission began the process of compiling a 
database, known as the European Inventory of Existing Commercial Chemical 
Substances (EIECCS), which listed chemicals marketed in the EC between 1971 and 
1981. EIECCS acted as a baseline against which ‘new’ chemicals marketed in the EC 
could be identified, allowing regulators, for the first time, to get a handle on the 
proliferation of toxic chemical substances.186 The Notification of New Substances 
Regulations, implementing the directive in Britain, were laid before Parliament in 
1982.187  
 
4.8.  Conclusion 
The inaugural decade of the HSC/E resulted in many positive changes for the British 
system of health and safety regulation. Whether it stemmed from concern or genuine 
interest, HSC/E officials reported that workers and members of the public were 
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increasingly aware and vocal about health and safety issues. Health and safety became 
a much more prominent topic in the national media, illuminated by television 
documentaries such as Alice: A Fight for Life. Political concern developed about the 
wider public health and environmental consequences of occupational hazards such as 
asbestos. The regulatory framework introduced by the HSWA enabled a more 
coordinated and concerted response to hazards in comparison to the fragmented and 
piecemeal arrangements of the old Factories Act system.188 
 As demonstrated by their evidence to the House of Commons Employment 
Committee, both the TUC and CBI believed that the HSWA had led to improvements 
in health and safety. In particular, arrangements for consultation and participation in 
decision-making had been enhanced at all levels of regulation. The consolidation of 
policy, enforcement and research resources under the HSC/E had also transformed the 
regulatory response to workplace hazards. Whereas before 1974, these resources were 
compartmentalised and had little to offer beyond their immediate area of focus, the 
amalgamation of resources under the HSC/E offered a more sophisticated approach, 
drawing upon the combined expertise of numerous professional groups and 
specialisms. The Safety and Reliability Directorate’s input in the risk analysis of major 
hazards at Canvey Island was just one example of the new integrated approach in 
operation. Crucially, health and safety policymaking and enforcement was now 
divorced, on the whole, from government departments with a sponsoring role for 
particular industries, such as nuclear energy. Health and safety, in a sense, had come 
into its own, crystallising as a singular domain of regulatory and professional activity. 
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 The HSWA generated a new regulatory and industrial impetus against 
occupational accidents and illness: particularly the former, although the need to 
confront occupational health risks was increasingly recognised. Consultation and 
coordination, both weak before 1974, were considerably strengthened over the decade. 
They were improved through statutory means, such as the SRSC regulations, as well 
as through administrative means, such as advisory committees. The political consensus 
forged through these arrangements, especially on the HSC itself, created a sense of 
growing commitment to health and safety, demonstrated by the rising number of safety 
representatives and committees in firms.189 The British Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey estimates that the proportion of British workplaces (of 25 or more employees) 
with worker safety representatives but no committee increased from 21 per cent in 
1980 to 41 per cent in 1984, although subsequent developments painted a more 
nuanced picture, with the proportion declining to 24 per cent by 1990.190 Regardless, in 
this inaugural period of the new regulatory system, health and safety became an object 
of everyday management in many workplaces, as the CSHW had intended. 
Encouraged by the SRSC regulations, many trade unions began to take a more active 
role in health and safety, and employed professional safety officers.191  
 While controversy was generally avoided, consensus resulted in a remarkable 
degree of public and political acceptability for health and safety regulation, certainly in 
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comparison to other countries, such as the USA.192 Evidence from former CBI and 
TUC commissioners suggest that relations on the Commission were invariably cordial, 
even relaxed. As one former TUC Commissioner remarked, ‘that’s the job, isn’t it? 
You’ve got to be diplomatic.… I mean you can’t be on this thing for so long and start 
knocking lumps off everybody at every meeting.’193 It is telling that in 1982, as political 
and economic scrutiny of health and safety regulation grew, the TUC was accused by 
the Employment Committee of mounting a better defence of the CBI’s attitude towards 
health and safety than the CBI could muster itself.194 Consensus appeared to be paying 
off: the number of fatal and non-fatal accidents fell over the decade. 
 Yet, economic recession and financial constraint revealed just how fragile this 
consensus was. Once again, health and safety began to be neglected in some quarters 
of industry, and HSC/E could not meet all the demands on their time and energies—a 
situation exacerbated by the EC’s growing influence over British health and safety 
policy. Cuts in HSC/E’s grant-in-aid were cushioned by redundancies in clerical and 
support staff; however, HSE’s capacity to respond to risks, both existing and 
emerging, was weakened. If was not until the 1990s, with even more responsibilities to 
shoulder, that HSC/E’s finances and staffing began to recover. 
 These constraints illuminated the fair weather that accompanied reform in the 
early 1970s. The self-reliant health and safety ‘culture’ endorsed by the CSHW, far 
from being engrained, was still precarious. The reduction in workplace accidents in the 
1970s and early 1980s is not just attributable to better attitudes on the part of 
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employers and employees, but the fortuitous consequences of industrial change. As 
manufacturing declined, workers transferred to less hazardous occupations in the 
service sector. Nevertheless, progress in reducing accidents was sustained in part 
because of measures to increase participation in health and safety decision-making. 
Consensus conferred resiliency to health and safety regulation and allowed it to 
weather choppy political and economic waters. 
 In evaluating this period, one cannot ignore the professional and other difficulties 
that prevented HSE’s operational integration. While externally, health and safety 
emerged as a unified domain of regulatory activity, internally, HSE was beset with 
tribalism and suspicion. Locke’s attempts to appoint a single Chief Inspector were 
soundly defeated in the early 1980s. It was not until the 1990s that the various 
organisations amalgamated under HSE began to look and behave like a single 
organisation.  
 In terms of regulation, however, the HSWA permitted a new, more integrated 
approach to industrial hazards. By 1984, a comprehensive regulatory regime for major 
hazards had been introduced, and one for toxic substances (COSHH) was underway. 
New regulations had been introduced, such as NADOR, which applied health and 
safety legislation across the entire scope of British industry for the first time. 
Meanwhile, many of the piecemeal regulations that littered the pre-1974 statute book 
began to be swept away. In this regard, action on the legislative components of the 
‘Robens philosophy’ proceeded apace. 
 However, perhaps the most significant development lay under the surface. The 
CLAW regulations, HSE’s approach to major hazards, and the rise of CBA signalled 
the growing importance of risk management as an explicit regulatory technique and 
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philosophy. Crucially, both risk assessment and CBA were more vigorous, formalised 
ways of making decisions and judgements about risk that were already performed 
under health and safety legislation. As we have seen, the HSWA implicitly required 
employers to assess risks when coming to a decision about what was ‘reasonably 
practicable’ to do in particular circumstances. Further, the HSC’s consultation 
procedures implicitly took into account cost when making decisions about particular 
control instruments— regulations, codes of practice or guidance.   
 Chapters 5 and 6 develop this theme further, demonstrating how, after 1984, 
formal risk assessments became a central part of the regulatory control of occupational 
hazards in Britain. Risk assessments moved from being the concern of nuclear power 
plants and large industrial operations to the concern of every employer, regardless of 
their size or intrinsic hazard of their operations.  
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5.  Expanding the System, 1984–1992  
 
5.1.  Introduction 
Chapter 5 argues that, between 1984 and 1992, risk crystallised in Britain as an explicit 
and formalised means for employers to evaluate and control occupational hazards: risk 
management. As Chapter 4 described, the 1980 CLAW regulations were significant in 
that they made explicit, for the very first time, the employer’s duty to conduct 
assessments of work which could expose employees to hazards, be it physical injury 
from a machine, or exposure to a harmful substance. Previously, such a duty had only 
been implied in the HSWA, embodied in the SFAIRP qualification, and the 
requirement for employers to produce a written safety policy.  
 Between 1984 and 1992, however, risk assessments became an overt requirement 
for employers under a host of new regulations, including the Control of Asbestos at 
Work Regulations 1987, the Electricity at Work Regulations 1989, and the Noise at 
Work Regulations 1989. Most notably, the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health 
Regulations 1988 (COSHH) extended a formalised risk management process across 
the entire occupational health field, requiring employers to conduct ‘suitable and 
sufficient’ assessments as the basis for control decisions.1 By 1991, Rimington could 
state with some conviction that ‘on risk assessment, significant progress has been made 
in consolidating HSE’s leading position among the world’s regulators.’2 
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 HSE’s ‘leading position’, however, was somewhat tempered by the increasing 
dominance of the EC over British health and safety policy. Chapter 5 analyses why, by 
the early 1990s, the engine of health and safety policy had firmly switched from 
London to Brussels. Since 1957, occupational health and safety legislation had been 
subject to unanimous decision-making in the Council of Ministers, meaning that 
member states including Britain had considerable leeway to shape the direction of 
European law. Following the Single European Act in 1986, however, health and safety 
at work became subject to qualified majority voting (QMV). No longer able to exercise 
a veto over proposals emanating from the European Commission, Britain’s capacity to 
influence the direction of European health and safety legislation was severely 
weakened.  
 The new dynamic of European politics was brought home during the frantic 
negotiations over the Framework Directive on Safety and Health, adopted in June 
1989: the single largest package of European health and safety legislation to date. 
Demonstrating how considerations of time and cost were central to the British 
regulatory approach, officials’ plea that new controls should be based on risk 
assessment was inadvertently transformed into the absolute requirement for employers 
to conduct and revise written risk assessments.3  Consequently, the new ‘six-pack’ of 
regulations that came into force in Britain in 1993, covering such matters as display 
screens and manual handling, contained the requirement for employers to conduct 
written risk assessments, even though many of these laws were not considered a 
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domestic priority. What was originally, for most areas of health and safety risk, a 
largely informal, mental device to evaluate and control hazards was now transformed 
into a formalised procedure and physical object.  
 In other respects, however, the crystallisation of HSC/E’s risk management 
approach enhanced their reputation and power, and expanded the scope of the British 
regulatory system. In response to several major disasters in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
HSC/E assumed responsibility for several new areas of policy and enforcement, 
including mains gas supply, genetically modified organisms, railway passenger safety, 
and offshore oil and gas. As a result, the HSC/E acquired a remit that was unparalleled 
among health and safety regulators worldwide, and a virtual monopoly over the 
regulation of risks arising from industrial activity. HSC/E’s influence extended from 
the smallest of offices to the largest of oil rigs, and over the entire spectrum of hazards, 
from manual handling to nuclear radiation. As Cullen wrote in 1988, ‘safety and health 
is a dimension of all work activity, entering into the way every industrial process is 
carried out and every business is organised.’4  
 It is in this expansion of HSC/E’s policymaking responsibility that Chapter 5 
illuminates a central paradox. While functionally, the HSC/E’s field was the largest it 
had ever been, financially and in terms of political rhetoric, British health and safety 
regulation came under concerted pressure. HSC/E’s acquisition of new functions was 
counteracted by continuing demands from government to increase efficiency, a 
demand that gained added momentum under John Major’s Conservative government 
(1992–1997). Whereas previously, health and safety had been identified as a problem 
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of big government in general, and the HSE shared cuts which were directed across the 
civil service as a whole, by the mid 1980s health and safety legislation was specifically 
implicated as an area of legislation which imposed excessive ‘red tape’ on business. 
Consequently, the HSC/E were subjected to sustained political and financial scrutiny. 
As Rimington mused, ‘for a time HSC/E appeared the principal inhabitants of death 
row.’5  
 The origins of this scrutiny and anti-regulatory sentiment in the British 
government were related to both the emergence of a free-market political ideology in 
the British Conservative Party—neoliberalism—and a connected series of changes in 
public administration, referred to by Hood as the ‘new public management’ (NPM).6 
NPM emphasised the need, among other things, for governments to employ private-
sector standards of performance monitoring and financial control. Accordingly, risk 
gained centrality as a supposedly objective lens through which important policy 
decisions could be made concerning the costs and benefits of regulation—CBA being a 
tangible outcome of this development. Chapter 6 elaborates this theme, showing how, 
between 1992 and 2001, HSC/E systematised its risk-based approach as a way of 
legitimising its activity, and opening up its decision-making to public and political 
scrutiny. 
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5.2.  Overview 
As in previous chapters, Chapter 5 emphasises the importance of wider social and 
economic trends in shaping the political environment in which British health and safety 
regulation developed between 1984 and 1992. Section 5.3 highlights how 
deindustrialisation and industrial fragmentation challenged many of the assumptions of 
the post-1974 (HSWA) regulatory framework, and forced the HSC/E to adjust their 
priorities. In particular, small firms became a central political issue, while privatisation 
generated questions about how safety could be secured in the fragmented 
organisational structures of former nationalised industries. 
 Sections 5.4 and 5.5 expand on Chapter 4’s focus on deregulation, showing how 
British health and safety policy was influenced by the emergence of ‘new public 
management’ (NPM). Emphasising the virtues of private-sector styles of governance, 
the politics of NPM exposed British health and safety regulation to considerable 
financial and political scrutiny.  
 At the same time that HSC/E were encouraged to become more transparent and 
accountable, their field of responsibility expanded massively over the late 1980s and 
1990s. This apparent contradiction in the British government’s attitude towards health 
and safety is the subject of sections 5.6 and 5.7. These sections demonstrate how, by 
the 1990s, a considerable proportion of HSC/E’s work was devoted to public 
protection, as opposed to workers’ health and safety—an extraordinary transformation 
in the object of British health and safety regulation. While the HSWA embodied 
concerns about public protection, HSC/E’s bias towards workers’ health and safety 
meant that their public responsibilities were not fully accepted in the 1970s. However, 
a succession of major disasters over the 1980s, such as the fire at Bradford City FC in 
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May 1985, reaffirmed the need for HSC/E to protect the public. By the 1990s, a major 
proportion of HSE’s resources was devoted to public health and safety issues.  
 Section 5.8 considers another pivotal transformation in the British regulatory 
approach to health and safety in the late 1980s: the emergence of an explicit demand 
for employers to undertake risk assessments. While the 1980 CLAW regulations were 
the first to directly require employers to assess risk, risk assessments became an 
explicit requirement of many new regulations in the 1980s and early 1990s, most 
notably the 1988 COSHH regulations.  
 The final section highlights why by 1992, the European Commission rather than 
the HSC had become the dominant driver of British health and safety regulation. The 
Framework Directive on Safety and Health, agreed in June 1989, was designed to 
create an integrated framework of European health and safety legislation in much the 
same way as the HSWA in Britain, albeit on a much grander scale. The Framework 
Directive’s ‘daughter’ laws on matters such as manual handling and workstations (the 
so-called ‘six-pack’ of regulations coming into force by 1993) introduced many new 
requirements into British law which are now part of the established ‘fabric’ of health 
and safety: for instance, employers’ obligation to provide eye tests for habitual users of 
computer screens. They also clarified aspects of British law which were previously 
ambiguous, such as the requirement for employers to undertake risk assessments. Over 
the course of European negotiations, this was amplified into the requirement for 
employers to undertake formal written assessments of work which could expose 
employees and other persons to risk. The European Framework Directive, therefore, 
established many of the current contours of the British system of health and safety 
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regulation. However, in so doing, it also created the conditions for significant 
controversy. 
 
5.3.  Health and Safety in the 1980s: Industrial Change, Risk 
and Regulation 
The changing structure of employment had profound effects on British health and 
safety policy between 1984 and 1992. While policymakers had recognised many of 
these trends long before HSC/E’s establishment (for example, the decline in 
manufacturing), these changes accelerated over the 1980s, requiring the HSC/E to 
adjust their regulatory priorities. Significant changes occurred in both the composition 
of the British workforce and the relative size of industrial sectors, calling into question 
many of the underlying assumptions of the post-1974 regulatory model. These were 
based on early-seventies vision of British industry, which was still dominated by large 
industrial firms.7  
 In manufacturing, HSE’s historic stronghold, employment declined by over 20 
per cent between 1980 and 1990 alone.8 This continued a much longer trend: in 1954, 
8.2 million workers, 35 per cent of Britain’s entire workforce, was employed in 
manufacturing. By 1986, this had declined to just 5.5 million, or 22 per cent. In 
contrast, employment in business and other services rose from 2.1 million (9 per cent) 
to 4.9 million (20 per cent) over the same period (Figure 16).  
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Figure 16. Employment by industrial sector, 1961–2011.9  
 
 Self-employment also figured more prominently in late-1980s health and safety 
policy, having risen from 7.3 per cent of all employment in 1979, to 11.2 per cent in 
1984. Meanwhile, the number of small firms also rose significantly, a product of both 
industrial fragmentation (the splitting-up of large businesses into several smaller ones) 
and new start-ups. By 1993, 44 per cent of British workers were employed in 
businesses with fewer than 50 employees.10 Sub-contracting, temporary, part-time and 
flexible work also increased (especially in construction), posing problems for how 
HSC/E directed its policies, and how safety was organised in firms.11 The principal 
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driver of such developments was deindustrialisation, but economic recession in the mid 
1980s exacerbated the collapse of primary and secondary industry, encouraging the 
transfer of labour to the service sector. Government policy, such as the promotion of a 
flexible, deregulated labour market, further promoted small firms and self-
employment.12  
 These structural changes in employment posed significant challenges for HSC/E. 
As Cullen wrote in 1984, ‘the continuing decline in primary manufacturing industry 
with the accompanying increase of the number of small firms, often in high technology 
fields, has become increasingly pronounced in recent years. The replacement of 
individual large units by a multiplicity of separate ones poses obvious difficulties for 
our inspection policies.’13 
 One of the more pronounced difficulties accompanying industrial change was the 
question of HSC/E’s continuing relationship with local authorities. Local authorities 
had assumed important new enforcement functions after 1974, and deindustrialisation 
promoted the movement of workers to premises in their field of responsibility. This 
was problematic in terms of policy dissemination, the regulation of non-industrial risks, 
and HSC’s supervision of local authority enforcement. While HSE’s Local Authority 
Unit attempted to interpret HSE standards for local authority use, this was a 
complicated and sensitive issue, considering that risks in the service sector were 
generally much lower than in industry, and often poorly grasped by the public. 
Allegations of over-regulation or over-enforcement could arise if HSC/E set standards 
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that were too voluminous or detailed.14 At the same time, HSE’s resources were 
stretched by the large number of service-sector premises it had taken on after 1975, 
outside its historical area of expertise. This included responsibility for such places as 
public swimming pools, for which HSC published new guidance in 1988.15 Following 
negotiations, local authorities assumed additional responsibility for places of worship, 
entertainment, leisure and sport facilities in April 1990.16 
 A second major difficulty for HSC/E was promoting health and safety in many of 
the smaller firms that were now beginning to receive political and regulatory attention. 
As Chapter 4 explained, in the 1970s small firms were low on HSC/E’s priorities, and 
were often overlooked in inspection. As the Labour MP Michael Meacher argued in 
1987, 'firms employing fewer than 25 persons are virtually left to their own devices, 
without any visits at all, even though small firms are notoriously recognised to be far 
more accident-prone.'17 However, by the mid 1980s, industrial change and the 
deregulatory agenda had highlighted the need for small firms to be given greater 
recognition. Their size and more informal organisation meant that many were poorly 
equipped to manage safety, and had a more limited understanding of legal 
requirements. Their knowledge of occupational health was frequently poor or non-
existent, while many were unable to bring in specialist expertise or establish 
occupational health services because of their cost. At the same time, their scattered 
geographical nature meant that small firms were much harder than larger companies 
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for HSC/E to reach in publicity efforts, especially for regulatory agencies which were 
more in tune with the workings of big business.18  
 This is not to say that risks in small firms were insignificant. A 1991 study 
showed that workers in small manufacturing companies (under 50 employees) were 20 
per cent more likely to suffer accidents than workers in medium-sized firms, and 40 per 
cent more likely than workers in very large firms.19 What the deregulatory agenda 
overlooked was that in contrast to larger firms, many small firms preferred the older, 
prescriptive style of regulation under the Factories Act to the HSWA’s goal-based 
approach. This is because they did not have the time or resources to determine how to 
comply with the law.20 As Meacher explained, 'small firms do not consider health and 
safety inspections a burden. They do not want deregulation. They want more help, not 
less—after all, it is given free—to learn how to prevent and tackle uncontrolled 
hazards, accidents and health damage to their work force.'21 
 By the mid 1980s, HSC/E had thus begun to recognise their responsibility to 
small firms. HSC’s third chair, the businessman Frank Davies, took a particular 
interest in smaller workplaces, holding a regular series of breakfast meetings with 
business leaders to familiarise himself with their priorities.22 Measures such as the 
establishment of a small firms working group in 1986, and a concentration on smaller 
firms during the European Year of Safety, Hygiene and Health Protection at Work 
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(1992–3), also helped address this imbalance. By 1988, HSE produced its first 
guidance booklet tailored to small firms, Essentials of Health and Safety at Work.23  
 Industrial fragmentation was not confined to the private sector. In the public 
sector, the British government privatised several nationalised industries between 1984 
and 1991, including British Gas and British Rail. This directly impacted health and 
safety regulation, since not only did the HSC/E assume regulatory responsibility for 
these industries, but new regulatory regimes were established which encompassed 
dozens of private operators in place of former state monopolies. Privatisation was 
central to the emergence of the ‘regulatory state’, since in place of a direct role in 
providing public services, such as an integrated rail network, the state (including the 
HSC/E) began to assume a more indirect, regulatory role.24 
 These industrial changes were also reflected in the risks HSC/E and the 
European Commission confronted in the 1980s and 1990s. The growing importance of 
office work, for example, was reflected in 1992 regulations on workstations and display 
screens, incorporating ergonomic principles to combat musculoskeletal and eye 
complaints. As acute occupational accidents and diseases declined, the economic 
consequences of long-term occupational ill health became more visible. By the late 
1980s, British health and safety policy had widened to encompass issues which had 
previously been occluded: alcoholism, smoking, stress and violence at work, even the 
impact of HIV/AIDS on nurses and other healthcare professionals.25 Some of the 
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factors underpinning this movement in the regulatory gaze, such as improved statistical 
knowledge, are considered in Chapter 6. 
   
 
5.4.  Neoliberalism and Deregulation: 'Lifting the Burden' of 
Health and Safety, 1984–1994 
Throughout this thesis, I have shown how the development of the British system of 
health and safety regulation has been intimately linked to wider trends in British 
politics, economics and industrial relations. In particular, in Chapter 4 I highlighted the 
emergence of a deregulatory political rhetoric in the British government after the 
Conservative election victory in May 1979. As I explained, the Conservatives entered 
government with a pro-business agenda, seeking to reduce perceived government 
waste. While cuts to the HSC/E were certainly severe, the HSC/E shared cuts which 
were directed across government as a whole. 
 However, as the deregulatory agenda gathered pace over the 1980s, health and 
safety was specifically implicated as an area of legislation which imposed unnecessary 
‘burdens’ on business, particularly the smaller firms the government was attempting to 
encourage. The 1985 white paper Lifting the Burden highlighted how ‘regulations have 
grown over the years to a stage where many of them are too heavy a drain on our 
national resources.… The tide of legislation has risen inexorably over the years in all 
countries of the western world.’26 Consciously inspired by the efforts of President 
Reagan in the USA, health and safety was placed alongside the environment, planning, 
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tax and social security as areas where excessive legislation and administrative demands 
could be removed. Although it asserted that ‘the Government … have no intention of 
downgrading health and safety standards’, it identified a number of priorities, 
including the need to increase inspectors’ training in relation to small firms, designate a 
member of the HSC to act as small firms representative, and increase the threshold for 
employers to produce a written safety policy from five to twenty employees.27  
 A follow-up white paper, Building Businesses Not Barriers in 1986 similarly 
identified health and safety as part of an insidious problem of ‘red tape’. Even though a 
government consultation had shown that ‘relatively few of the smaller employers … 
found the cost of compliance with health and safety regulations to be a significant 
burden’, the document reiterated the need for HSC/E to engage with small firms and 
remove redundant legal provisions.28 The results of the government’s own consultation 
highlight that the issue of ‘red tape’ and ‘over-regulation’ was by no means universal, 
and that small firms, far from being simple to understand, were actually rather 
complex. Like the trade unions, small firms did not speak with one coherent ‘voice’. As 
Meacher’s comments above indicated, many small firms preferred the old-style, 
detailed regulations under the Factories Act. From the perspective of the Conservative 
Party, regulation was a barrier to market entry and an inhibitor of competition.29 For 
many small firms, the exact opposite was the case: the new-style, goal-based 
regulations under the HSWA were more costly, conceptually and financially, since 
they placed the onus for determining how to control risk on the employer. Statements 
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such as Meacher’s directly challenged the neoliberal orthodoxy that by removing 
regulations, economic growth would be secured and employers freed to pursue their 
own ends. 
 This ideological shift towards deregulation was embodied in the British 
government. In 1986, the Enterprise and Deregulation Unit was established in the DE 
to act as a ‘central task force’ for deregulation in government. In other departments, 
Deregulation Units were formed to carry out compliance cost assessments (CCAs), 
evaluations of the costs to businesses resulting from existing and proposed regulations. 
The EDU, renamed the Deregulation Unit in 1987 and transferred to the DTI, was 
supported by an advisory panel of businessmen with links to small firms, known as the 
Deregulation Task Force.30  
 The Conservatives’ deregulatory agenda received new impetus against the 
backdrop of the Maastricht Treaty and an influx of new European legislation in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. European health and safety legislation represented a direct 
challenge to deregulatory ideology, since the British government considered it to be 
overly prescriptive and thus antithetical to the British regulatory approach. Despite 
Britain’s opt-out of the ‘social chapter’ of the Maastricht Treaty, the British 
government was unable to prevent the transposition of European directives into UK 
law.31 With Europe directly in its sight, the Conservatives’ 1992 manifesto argued ‘a 
proper balance needs to be struck between essential protection for the public, and 
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over-zealous and intrusive controls aimed at the elimination of all conceivable risk. It is 
wrong that new regulations, designed to deal with isolated problems, should interfere 
with the private arrangements of citizens or with reasonable commercial practices that 
have earned broad public acceptance.’32 The government pledged that ‘outmoded and 
burdensome’ regulations would be removed, that the compliance costs of new 
regulations more closely assessed, and that greater priority would be given to the work 
of the DTI’s Deregulation Unit.33  
 The deregulatory drive did not only exist at the level of political rhetoric. In 1994, 
the Conservatives gave it a statutory basis in the Deregulation and Contracting Out 
Act. This Act gave ministers almost absolutist power to remove or reduce legal 
provisions deemed ‘to impose … a burden affecting any person in the carrying on of 
any trade, business or profession.’ Section 37 of the Act specifically highlighted health 
and safety, giving ministers almost free rein to revoke regulations while providing little 
in the way of oversight to avoid ‘downgrading’ the law. One of the few checks in place, 
ironically, was European law, which obliged the UK to maintain minimum standards 
of worker protection.34 
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5.5.  Regulating the Regulator: NPM and the Scrutiny of 
Health and Safety Regulation 
At first glance, an apparent paradox lay at the heart of British health and safety 
regulation between 1984 and 1992. On the one hand, the escalation of the 
Conservatives’ deregulatory agenda resulted in ever more forensic scrutiny of HSC/E’s 
activity, and calls to reduce the burden of health and safety regulations on business. 
On the other hand, the scope of British health and safety regulation increased 
dramatically over the same period. By 1992, the HSC/E’s regulatory ‘empire’ stretched 
across almost every British workplace, and across the entire range of occupational 
hazards. These ranged from everyday slips, trips and falls in shops and offices, to the 
explosion risks of large chemical installations and the radiation hazards of nuclear 
power plants.   
 These trends were not, however, coincidental. As the state hived off more of its 
direct responsibilities as policymaker and service provider, and assumed a more 
indirect, supervisory role, continuous scrutiny and audit were one of the key ways in 
which the state continued to exercise control over arm’s-length regulatory bodies such 
as HSE.35 The politics of NPM espoused the virtues of private-sector management 
styles in government, and urged public-sector organisations to employ stricter methods 
of performance monitoring and financial control.36  
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 There had always been an element of government oversight of HSC/E’s work. 
Due to its broad remit, HSC/E was answerable to several Secretaries of State 
(principally the Employment Secretary), to whom it gave advice on particular aspects 
of health and safety policy. To receive funding, the HSC had to submit formal plans of 
work which were scrutinised by government. Ad hoc questions also arose in 
Parliament which the HSC/E had to respond to. In these and other respects, HSC/E 
were never entirely independent; though they had day-to-day autonomy over their 
operations, the government was able to exert significant influence.37 
 From the mid 1980s, however, the level and pressure of such oversight 
intensified. Political scrutiny extended to National Audit Office (NAO) reviews of 
HSC/E’s operation and administration, Public Accounts Committee questioning of 
their financial management, and Employment Committee enquiries into their 
workings. Several government probes occurred in 1985/6 alone, the beginnings of what 
Rimington referred to as a political ‘firestorm’.38 The HSE, like other public-sector 
bodies, was encouraged to develop more sophisticated methods of financial and 
operational planning, and justify its activities in cost-benefit terms.39 By 1987, the HSE 
had developed a ‘zerobase’ system whereby it could measure its ‘activities’ and 
‘outputs’ in a functional sense, despite the inherent difficulties associated with this in 
the health and safety context: as discussed previously, not all outputs, such as hazards 
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or accidents prevented, were amenable to quantification. As Rimington argued to the 
government in 1991, 'the difficulty is that no ready means exists of taxonomising 
hazards, e.g. overcoming the conceptual difficulty of comparing (1) remote risks; (2) 
day to day serious injury; (3) non-serious but economically expensive hazards; and 
attributing “value” on a common scale to each type.'40   
 The pressure of responding to political reviews was personally intense for HSC/E 
officials. As Rimington recalled, 
 
It nearly killed me. I mean one of them was … a so-called Fundamental Expenditure 
Review. Now that did affect all departments. It began with the question, should any 
department exist. And in the course of that I had to write I think eight major papers … in 
something like twelve weeks. And one of the things I will always remember in HSE is that 
a huge burden falls on whoever has to run it, because it’s this mixture of policy and 
technical things potentially affecting the whole of industry. And only the chaps near the 
top, the three members of the [statutory] Executive, see the whole effort.41  
 
Despite such gargantuan efforts on the part of HSE officials, there was only so far the 
organisation could go to become more efficient, while at the same time assuming more 
and more responsibilities. By 1986, improvements in efficiency could no longer keep 
pace with inflationary pressures, leading to an acute financial crisis. As Chapter 4 
explained, due the retirement of senior inspectors and a freeze on new recruitment 
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following cuts in the early 1980s, the number of HSE inspectors declined significantly 
over the decade, from 1,444 in April 1980 to just 1,231 in April 1986.42  
 The reduction in HSE’s resources was bitterly resisted by the trade union 
movement, who elevated their ‘anti-cuts’ campaign. The TUC graphically brought 
home the consequences of cuts in a poster in December 1984. Covered with fake blood 
and the image of a disfigured hand, the poster read, ‘the first cut was the health and 
safety inspector. The second was the operator’s fingers.’ The campaign implored trade 
union members to take action by bringing the cuts to the attention of their local trade 
union branch and workplace safety committee, writing to their MP, and forwarding 
letters to the local press.43 The Parliamentary debate on health and safety in December 
1987, tabled by Labour, directly linked a spate of recent disasters and decline in safety 
standards to the government’s deregulatory agenda.44  
 HSC/E’s financial crisis gained a new political dimension after the DE refused to 
allocate extra funds for new responsibilities on pesticides, despite assurances to the 
contrary in Parliament.45 A strongly worded letter was sent to the Secretary of State, 
but although ministers agreed to a slight increase in funding in subsequent years, 
Kenneth Clarke rejected HSC/E’s annual plan of work in March 1987, on account of 
‘insufficient figured information as to the purposes for which extra money was 
required.’46  
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 On one level, as Rimington privately explained, much of the problem stemmed 
from the fact that HSC/E and central government officials lived in different technical 
worlds: 
  
[T]here was insufficient mutual understanding between HSE's and the Department's [of 
Employment] financial advisers; nor was there any link between the relatively 
sophisticated planning and information systems already existing in HSE and the 
Department's own developing systems … plans and bids had been made in HSE largely on 
the assumption that the same money as had been available last year would be available this, 
and the coat had been cut accordingly. So, though perhaps no Department had done more 
than HSE to explore its way into FMI [the Financial Management Initiative], no part of 
these efforts was visible to the Department or the Treasury.47 
  
On another level, however, the financial crisis reflected a certain political ambivalence 
towards HSC/E’s work. This was demonstrated in 1986, when the government failed 
to defend the HSE against attempts by the DOE, with the support of the chemical 
industry, to bring IAPI back into its fold.48  The extraction of IAPI undermined the 
integrated approach to health and safety regulation, and highlighted the continued 
fragility of health and safety’s borders.49  
 The effects of a simultaneous decline in resources and increase in responsibility 
were insidious, as Meacher explained in 1987: 
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By back-door deregulation through continuous cuts in their own inspectorate, by shifting 
some of the responsibility to local authorities and insurance companies and by allowing 
more and more employers to self-regulate without health and safety inspections, the 
Government are signalling to industry that safety standards are being downgraded and that 
profitability now overrides health and safety. I am not saying that the Government are 
unconcerned about safety. I am saying that they are far too concerned about profits and 
their privatisation goals to let their concern about safety stand in their way. The same 
message is transmitted by the infrequent inspections, rare prosecutions and derisory 
penalties.50 
 
5.6.  From Worker to Public Safety 
Despite the loss of IAPI in 1987, most of the movement of regulatory responsibility 
between 1984 and 1992 was firmly in HSC/E’s direction. In February 1984, HSE 
assumed responsibility for the safety of mains gas supply, previously exercised by the 
Department of Energy. This notionally extended HSE’s remit even to gas safety in the 
home, since HSE was empowered, under the 1972 Gas Act, to make regulations 
concerning the installation and maintenance of gas fittings.51 In 1986, following the 
Food and Environment Protection Act, responsibility for enforcing pesticides 
regulations was transferred to HSE from MAFF.52 In 1990, after the Clapham rail 
crash, major new responsibilities for railway safety were allocated to HSE, with the 
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transfer of HM Railways Inspectorate from the Department of Transport.53 Then, in 
1992, the Offshore Safety Act enshrined the transfer of policymaking and enforcement 
responsibility for offshore installations from the Department of Energy to the HSE, 
following the catastrophic loss of life in the 1988 Piper Alpha disaster. In other areas, 
too, HSC/E’s remit expanded over the 1980s and 1990s: responsibility for advising 
ministers on the occupational hazards of genetically modified organisms (1983), and 
conducting research on the safety of existing nuclear systems, following the 
government’s decision to expand Britain’s nuclear power programme.54   
 One of the significant features of this inflation of responsibility was the 
externalisation of health and safety regulation beyond a narrow concern with workers 
and the workplace: the health and safety of the general public, as opposed to 
employees, became a far more prominent feature of HSC/E’s work. Before 1974, the 
public was largely given indirect protection under health and safety legislation. The 
government’s rationale was that if health and safety legislation sufficiently protected 
workers, the public were protected by default. However, disasters such as Aberfan and 
Flixborough demonstrated that this was not the case: industrial activity could have 
catastrophic and unanticipated consequences beyond the workplace. Following the 
Robens Report, section 3 of the HSWA recognised the need for health and safety 
legislation to address public safety. As Eves described, the extension of health and 
safety legislation under section 3 had many unforeseen consequences for officials: 
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Section 3 of the Act was really new territory because it had this public safety issue…. We 
had all sorts of issues…. One of my staff even suggested that we ought to form an 
ecclesiastical national interest group because there were so many problems in churches…. 
It was all ridiculous….all these questions were coming up.55 
 
Nevertheless, the HSC accepted this responsibility begrudgingly. As Rimington 
explained, while the Robens Committee had recognised the problem of public safety in 
relation to industrial activity, the Commission as originally constituted by the HSWA 
effectively prioritised workers’ safety. The Executive found it difficult to convince the 
Commission to take responsibility for such matters as nuclear safety and toxic 
materials, and hence the HSE had to largely deal with these problems without 
Commission support.56 
 As Rimington’s comments suggest, there was a constitutional bias against public 
health and safety in the HSC/E. On the one hand, the inspectorates were historically 
oriented to workers’ health and safety, and were only concerned about the general 
public when industrial activity directly threatened them (as at Canvey Island). On the 
other hand, the interest groups represented on HSC were overwhelmingly more in 
tune with the thinking of workers and businesses. While local authority representatives 
had nominal responsibility for public safety, local authorities had assumed only limited 
enforcement responsibilities for offices, shops, residential and catering premises.57 The 
public, therefore, did not feature heavily in HSC’s inaugural programme of work. 
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 Over the 1980s and early 1990s, however, this situation changed. HSC/E’s new 
responsibilities for areas such as railway safety reflected how, in tandem with wider 
shifts in employment, technology and society, the HSC/E increasingly considered the 
public to be a legitimate object of health and safety policy. By 1991, as much as 40 per 
cent of HSE’s total work was devoted to issues of public, as opposed to worker 
protection.58  
 This awakening of regulatory interest in public health and safety emerged from a 
complex social, political and epidemiological background. Public recognition about the 
wider health consequences of toxic substances, for example, was reflected in television 
documentaries such as Alice: A Fight for Life, the surge of public inquiries to HSE’s 
telephone lines, parliamentary questions on public health and safety, and major 
political debates, such as the one in December 1987.59 Administrative concerns also 
highlighted the need for HSE to focus more on public safety: the demarcation of 
enforcement responsibility between HSE and local authorities, and the need to ensure 
consistent enforcement standards, required HSE to publish guidance, such as the 
guidance on public swimming pools published in 1988. However, as before 1974 it was 
arguably a spate of major disasters in Britain and abroad that did most to reinforce the 
need to protect ‘third persons’ from occupational harms. 
 One disaster above all confirmed the relevance of section 3 of the HSWA, that 
employers had a duty to protect the health and safety of members of the public who 
could be endangered by their operations. On 11 May 1985, an accumulation of rubbish 
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beneath the wooden stands of Bradford City’s football ground, Valley Parade, caught 
fire, resulting in the deaths of 56 people. Prior to the disaster, a HSE inspector had 
spotted the build up of litter beneath the stands, and in accordance with the 
memorandum of understanding between the HSE and fire authorities, warned the fire 
brigade about the potential risk.60 However, this advice was not acted upon and the 
problem was left to grow.61  
 Following the disaster, HSE was sued by the victims’ families for £35 million. 
While the families’ case was dismissed, the disaster acted as a stark reminder of 
HSC/E’s responsibility for public health and safety. As Rimington described, all of a 
sudden the ‘Commission realised imaginatively that we did have duties to the public!’62 
This responsibility assumed a new significance following a second stadium disaster, the 
devastating crush at Hillsborough in 1989, which killed 96 people.63 
 
5.7.  Disasters and Risk Management 
Major disasters in the 1980s not only refocused regulatory attention on the need to 
protect the general public, but also reinforced some of the more basic elements of the 
post-1974 regulatory system. The HSWA, for instance, had enshrined the need for 
employers to properly manage risk and create safe systems of work. Several disasters 
in the 1980s, however, exposed major organisational failings in firms both offshore and 
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onshore. While several of these disasters occurred in areas outside the HSC/E’s direct 
field of responsibility, they acted to justify HSC/E’s approach to risk management, as 
well as the separation of regulatory and enforcement functions from sponsorship roles 
within government. New responsibilities were added to HSC/E’s portfolio as a direct 
consequence of their supposed independence from government as well as their 
recognised expertise in risk management. 
 The report by Anthony Hidden QC into the Clapham rail crash, for example, 
drew attention to the ‘distressing lack of organisation and management’ among those 
with responsibility for safety at British Rail.64 Similarly, following the catastrophic 
explosion on the Piper Alpha oil platform in the North Sea which killed 167 workers, 
the Cullen Report highlighted ‘the significant flaws in the quality of Occidental’s 
management of safety which affected the circumstances of the events of the disaster.’65 
 A third major set of disasters occurred not just outside HSC/E’s field of 
responsibility, but outside Britain, and had a more indirect (though no less significant) 
impact on British health and safety policy. Major disasters such as Chernobyl and 
Bhopal, following soon after the Seveso disaster in 1984, exposed the transnational and 
delocalised dimensions of many new industrial hazards. They demonstrated that 
control of these hazards could not be secured by one state alone, but only through 
international negotiation and cooperation. As Cullen wrote in 1986, the Chernobyl 
disaster had ‘immediate and long-lasting physical and psychological effects … a timely 
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reminder of the need for properly managed systems and an effective regulatory 
framework in the nuclear and major hazards field.’66 Following Chernobyl, the Cabinet 
decided to increase the size and pay of the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, 
demonstrating once again how public and political pressure following major disasters 
can influence government policy.67  
 Industrial disasters not only reinforced the need for health and safety legislation 
to protect the public, but also recognised the need for the public to be a key 
stakeholder in health and safety legislation. This was intimately bound with the rise of 
neoliberal governmentality, the movement towards greater accountability and 
transparency in government (as promoted by NPM), as well as ideas surrounding the 
‘democratisation’ of science. These trends sought to empower citizens in terms of such 
considerations as ‘choice’, but also co-opted individuals into decision-making processes 
which had hitherto been carried out by government. Here, the public was not only 
acknowledged as a key recipient of health and safety policy, but an active participant in 
it. Individuals were increasingly construed as their own ‘risk manager’, able to make 
their own decisions on the basis of information supplied by ‘experts’. 
 This focus on individual responsibility and participation (broadly, the neoliberal 
notion of citizenship) was mirrored in wider public health policy. As the lifestyle 
component of diseases such as coronary heart disease became recognised by public 
health experts, public health messages by organisations such as the Health Education 
Authority focused more on what individuals could do to alleviate their condition (for 
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example exercise and better nutrition). However, the flip-side of the neoliberal 
transference of power to the individual was the decentralisation of state control and 
deregulation. As Topçu argues in the context of Chernobyl, ‘public participation does 
not necessarily allow a democratization of science, but rather serves to increase the 
social acceptability of a controversial innovation … or to shift towards a lesser 
commitment of the state in public health protection.’68  
  
5.8.  Assessing Risk: COSHH and the New Risk Management 
Over the 1980s the explicit assessment of risk became central to the management and 
control of risks in the British workplace. In the nuclear and major hazards field, the 
need for formal risk estimation and evaluation had long been recognised, owing to the 
potentially catastrophic effects of component and plant failure, and the need for 
operators to demonstrate the redundancy and reliability of systems.69 Following the 
CLAW regulations in the 1980s, however, assessments became an explicit requirement 
of many new British health and safety regulations, including the Control of Asbestos at 
Work Regulations 1987, the Noise at Work Regulations 1989, and, most notably, the 
Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 1988 (COSHH). While by no 
means as rigorous as those demanded of nuclear and major hazard sites—there, risk 
assessment was predominantly quantitative in form, and probabilistic in character—the 
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extension of risk assessment to areas of lower intrinsic hazard signified its utility as a 
way for employers to identify and tailor control measures. 
 More than any other set of regulations before 1992, COSHH expanded the scope 
of risk assessment, extending it over the entire occupational health field. Hailed by 
Cullen as ‘the most important legislative proposal in our 13 years’ existence’, COSHH 
advanced a single, complete set of controls over hazardous and toxic substances, 
replacing 356 regulations and several Acts which previously controlled these 
substances. Only asbestos, lead and ionising radiation continued to be regulated 
separately.70 COSHH’s objective was to streamline British health and safety law, 
prepare the ground for future EC directives, and take into account changing scientific 
and medical knowledge of hazards.71 Underpinning the regulations was the 
requirement for employers to conduct, and revise where necessary, ‘suitable and 
sufficient’ assessments of work which potentially exposed employees to risk.72 Through 
risk assessment, employers could gauge the appropriate level of response to prevent or 
control toxic exposures, drawing upon a hierarchy of control options including changes 
to workplace design, health surveillance, and personal protective equipment. 
Signifying how British industrial hygiene had improved after 1974, employers had to 
meet exposure limits for several substances set by the HSE itself, as opposed to the 
American Conference of Governmental Hygienists.73 
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 COSHH took many years to negotiate—HSE originally released a consultation 
document in August 1984. Throughout the consultation, some employers expressed 
concern about the costs of complying with the regulations. In particular, the 
requirements to conduct formal risk assessments, monitor workers’ health and keep 
health records were considered burdensome, with some employers believing that risk 
assessment required blanket atmospheric monitoring.74 While this was a 
misunderstanding—other forms of information, including data provided by 
manufacturers and suppliers, could be used to determine control measures—confusion 
over the purpose of risk assessment persisted after 1989. A HSE survey in 1991 
revealed that despite widespread awareness of COSHH, only a small fraction of 
employers had conducted risk assessments to the required standard. Further, many 
employers had ‘incurred excessive costs …, [t]he main reasons being the failure to 
distinguish between hazard and risk, the purchase of unnecessary computer data 
management systems or other equipment, or the use of expensive but inefficient 
consultants.’75 Reflecting the concomitant growth of the health and safety or risk 
‘industry’, this controversy over risk assessment foreshadowed debates that followed 
implementation of the European Framework Directive on Safety and Health in 1992/3. 
Then, employers expressed similar concerns about cost, over-implementation and the 
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alleged tendency of consultants to exaggerate legal requirements, or perform tasks that 
could be easily done by the business itself.76  
 
5.9.  Framing Health and Safety: The Influence of Europe on 
British Health and Safety Policy, 1986-1992 
 
5.9.1.  A SEA Change in British Health and Safety Policy 
The role of Europe as the main driver of British health and safety regulation is a 
comparatively recent phenomenon. While European policy developments had a 
significant bearing on British regulations and standards since the UK joined the EC in 
1973, following the passage of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, the European 
Commission began to supplant the HSC as the primary source of new initiatives. The 
implementation of the ‘six-pack’ regulations in 1993, covering matters such as manual 
handling, work equipment and display screens, signalled that the engine of British 
health and safety policy had firmly switched from London to Brussels: as one former 
CBI member of the HSC, R. F. Eberlie opined in 1990, ‘the [European] Commission 
has seized legislative initiative from the mother of Parliaments.’77 
 The European policy context became increasingly unfavourable to British 
national interests following the passage of SEA in 1986/7. Emerging out of the Milan 
Summit of June 1985, SEA was designed to prepare the EC for the completion of the 
internal market by December 1992, and facilitate the integration of the Community 
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into a closer financial and political Union. Specifically, the Act inserted a new article, 
8A, into the Treaty of Rome, setting as a goal the introduction of an internal market 
comprising the ‘free movement of goods, persons, services and capital’.78  
 An important consequence of this measure, designed to accelerate this process, 
was the introduction of qualified majority voting (QMV) for several policy areas in the 
European Council, including occupational health, safety and welfare.79 While health 
and safety had hitherto been an implicit aim of the Treaty of Rome, advanced in 
relation to wider social and economic policy, SEA gave it an explicit legislative basis 
for the first time. New article 118A demanded that ‘Member States shall pay particular 
attention to encouraging improvements, especially in the working environment, as 
regards the health and safety of workers and shall set as their objective the 
harmonisation of condition [sic] in this area, while maintaining improvements made.’80 
 Consequently, health and safety policy received an explicit focus and sense of 
direction in the European Commission.81 Paragraph 2 of the new article provided for 
directives to advance minimum health and safety requirements, while avoiding placing 
unnecessary burdens on small and medium-sized firms.82 
 SEA had important ramifications for British health and safety policy. Firstly, it 
greatly increased HSC/E’s workload in relation to the negotiation of European 
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proposals, which soon became dominant over proposals initiated domestically. The 
ascendance of Europe is reflected in the fact that, between 1981 and 1990, the number 
of HSC/E projects initiated in response to international demands increased by 22 per 
cent.83  
 Secondly, SEA increased the pace of new European proposals, reducing 
HSC/E’s time and opportunity to influence proposals and undertake domestic 
consultations. QMV entailed the weighting of votes from member states relative to the 
size of their populations. By removing member states’ ability to veto proposals, the 
power of the European Commission relative to member states was strengthened. 
Britain was therefore forced to consult more vigorously with its European 
counterparts. Further, SEA introduced a ‘cooperation procedure’ which boosted the 
European Parliament’s influence over Council decision-making.84 While intended to 
increase the Council’s democratic accountability, the procedure exposed its decision-
making to the prospect of frequent amendment. This complicated British policymaking 
still further, meaning that planning, consultation, and the preparation of new 
regulations took place against a faster moving political background. 
 Thirdly, SEA set in motion the single largest package of health and safety 
legislation hitherto developed by the EC. The Third Action Programme, announced in 
July 1987, was designed to facilitate the internal market by removing technical 
barriers to trade, and advance the internal market’s social dimensions by introducing 
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measures to promote workers’ physical and mental health. The intention behind the 
Third Action Programme was to establish a comprehensive framework of European 
health and safety legislation, in much the same way as the HSWA established a 
comprehensive legislative framework in Britain. In the Third Action Programme, the 
European Commission announced its intention to prepare directives in relation to such 
matters as safety organisation, manual handling, work equipment and display screens: 
in total, some 40 proposals to be adopted by December 1992. The Third Action 
Programme marked a watershed not only in the profile and importance the EC 
attached to health and safety, but in the scope of European health and safety legislation 
to encompass general, as opposed to technical matters.85 
 
5.9.2.  The Framework Directive on Safety and Health 
The first, and arguably most significant of the new laws under the Third Action 
Programme was adopted in June 1989. The EC Framework Directive on Safety and 
Health (89/391/EEC) aimed to ensure that the health and safety legislation of EC 
member states rested upon a common legal foundation. Structurally, the Framework 
Directive bore more than a passing resemblance to the HSWA, passed some fifteen 
years earlier: the Framework Directive was heavily influenced by British ideas and 
practice. As in the HSWA, primary responsibility for securing safe and hygienic 
working conditions rested with the employer. Employees also had several legal 
obligations, such as making proper use of personal protective equipment. The 
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Framework Directive was universal in scope, applying to all areas of work activity 
including commerce and leisure; as in the HSWA, all employees were covered with the 
exception of domestic servants. 
 Another similarity was that the Framework Directive mirrored the HSWA’s 
pattern of law making. The Framework Directive itself expressed basic principles, 
such as the need for safety organisation, while ‘daughter’ directives advanced controls 
in relation to specific hazards, in much the same way as regulations and codes of 
practice under the HSWA. Perhaps most significantly, the Framework Directive 
adopted a risk-based approach to health and safety that had long been the model in 
Britain. Article 6(3)a specified ‘the employer shall, taking into account the nature of 
the activities of the enterprise and/or establishment … evaluate the risks to the safety 
and health of workers, inter alia in the choice of work equipment, the chemical 
substances or preparations used, and the fitting-out of workplaces.’86  In the same way 
that the HSWA demanded that employers conduct risk assessments to identify the 
basis of control measures, the Framework Directive placed risk assessment at the heart 
of the European legislative approach. 
 There were, however, several critical differences between the Framework 
Directive and HSWA, and between European and British law more broadly. These 
differences had major implications for the way the Framework Directive and its 
‘daughter’ directives were received and interpreted in Britain. Firstly, while the 
Framework Directive concentrated on worker protection, the HSWA went much 
further, extending protection to the self-employed and certain non-employed persons. 
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Secondly, while the Framework Directive replicated most of the HSWA’s general 
requirements, it contained certain novelties, such as the requirement for employers to 
appoint competent persons or services from outside the workplace, if such persons or 
services could not be sourced from within.87 Thirdly, the Framework Directive was 
more detailed and prescriptive than its British counterpart. This stemmed from the its 
basis in the Napoleonic or Roman legal tradition, in which the law embodied general 
principles, phrased in absolute terms. In practice, it was the courts who interpreted 
these requirements flexibly, taking into account the circumstances of the employer. In 
contrast, flexibility was built in to the British regulatory system, embodied in the 
SFAIRP qualification. This implicitly allowed employers to consider cost, time or 
trouble (in tandem with risk) when implementing control measures. For the European 
Commission however, such considerations were anathema.88 A regulatory risk that 
emerged in the Framework Directive, therefore, was that British courts would 
interpret the new European legislation absolutely, when in practice the same standards 
did not apply in Europe. 
 This affair demonstrated how considerations such as cost were central to the 
British regulatory approach. Except in the case of the most serious or potentially 
catastrophic hazards, the needs of employers and the needs of the economy were 
usually weighed against the benefits to individuals and society obtained through risk 
controls, whether informally (through negotiation) or formally (through CBA). For the 
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reasons described below, while HSC/E were successful in gaining recognition for the 
principle of reasonable practicability during their inaugural decade, this principle 
began to be openly questioned under the new European political dynamic of the late 
1980s and early 1990s. The Framework Directive, therefore, not only represented an 
expansion of European power in the health and safety field—it represented an 
existential threat to the British regulatory tradition. As Rimington warned the HSC in 
February 1989, ‘the [European] Commission may … feel that with majority voting 
they now have the whip hand, and that if a Federal Europe is to be achieved, the Anglo 
Saxon traditions of law must now begin to be firmly subordinated to the Continental 
tradition.’89 
 
5.9.3.  A Brave New World: Risk Assessment and the European Framework Directive 
The Framework Directive posed a threat to the British regulatory system on two inter-
related fronts. The first was that it potentially imposed excessive costs on British 
industry, by requiring employers to implement costly control measures. The second, 
owing to differences between the European and British legal traditions, was that 
British regulations stemming from the Framework Directive would potentially need to 
exclude any reference to time, trouble or cost, undermining the SFAIRP principle. 
HSE policy documents reveal just how far the regulator was willing to go to maintain 
established British practice, and just how much an appreciation of cost, as well as 
safety, was central to its logic. 
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 As HSC/E anticipated, QMV had significant implications for Britain’s European 
negotiation strategy. Negotiations over the Framework Directive were frantic, 
occurring in an intense atmosphere of political pressure and lobbying from the Greek 
presidency, European Parliament and British industry.90 These conditions left limited 
time for HSC/E to carry out domestic consultations, and in certain areas HSE’s senior 
officials questioned the usefulness of the proposed directives, finding the PPE 
proposals, in particular, to be ‘unsatisfactory … confusing and incompetently 
drafted’.91 Throughout the negotiations, the primary objective of HSC/E, the British 
government and business was to ensure that the Framework Directive did not exceed 
British law or impose unnecessary burdens on industry. The spectre of a large package 
of prescriptive law raised concerns among business leaders that they would be forced 
to implement costly controls or modifications, and the CBI lobbied the British 
government to take a tough line. The Conservative Employment Minister, John Cope 
(1987–89), attempted to reassure employers, stating ‘it is the firm aim of the British 
government to maintain the existing system of UK health and safety law.’92  
 However, policy and other documents prepared by HSC/E reveal their private 
concern about the impact of European legislation. In a sombre note to HSC in 1991, 
Rimington noted how the proposals did not ‘reflect any order or priority HSC would 
have chosen, either on the grounds of hazard or logic … British industry is on the 
whole unprepared and unready for this flow of new legislation much of which will 
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strike employers at least as awkward and unnecessary.’ He went on to argue, 
‘cumulatively it is not clear that the overall likely benefits will justify the costs and in 
specific cases (for example, the Display Screen Equipment and PPE) they do not in 
our view either justify the costs or (in the case of DSE) reflect the risk position.’93 
Taking the DSE regulations as an example, cost-benefit analysis by HSE revealed that 
while the benefits were unquantifiable, the regulations would result in an additional 
annual cost to employers of some £40 million, primarily owing to the requirement to 
provide eye tests to habitual display screen users. The associated directive raised 
suspicions among some employers about moral hazard: that opticians would be 
encouraged to offer ‘over-elaborate tests and unsuitable spectacles’.94 Such analyses 
added to the HSE’s impression that some European directives were misguided. In a 
stark reminder of how regulatory politics occasionally trumped worker protection, 
Rimington subsequently advised HSC ‘to find a way to distance itself where 
appropriate from EC measures which it would not itself have wanted to introduce.’95 
While the exact means by which this distancing could occur remained unspecified 
(whether via under-promotion, under-enforcement or under-financing), such 
comments add credibility to accusations by the GMB trade union, that HSE had 
deliberately set out to ‘undermine’ the Framework Directive.96  
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 HSE’s machinations in defence of reasonable practicability further underline how 
cost was a primary concern for the regulator. QMV reduced the prospect of Britain 
integrating the SFAIRP principle in European law, and the principle found very little 
support in countries such as France, whose own legal tradition specifically excluded 
such considerations. From a Continental perspective, qualifications such as SFAIRP 
equated to a watering down of legislation, and the encouragement of ‘social dumping’, 
whereby capital flows to countries with more relaxed safety standards. It also reflected 
‘a genuine notion that “SFAIRP” excuses action where cost is significant.’97 
 The European Commission made some effort to placate Britain and other 
countries concerned about cost. A force majeure clause permitted the exclusion or 
limitation of employers’ responsibility in ‘unforeseeable circumstances’, but the British 
government felt this did not go far enough.98 Privately, HSC warned the government 
that ‘we are … very much concerned that an approach which has secured so a high a 
level of joint commitment should be put at risk or superseded by one which for 
practical purpose could prove inadministrable [sic].’99 
 As Britain became marginalised in Europe, HSC/E’s tactics turned to shoring up 
the principle of reasonable practicability and defending Britain’s standards in the event 
of legal challenge from the European Commission. A possible solution was sought in 
giving legal definition to SFAIRP in statute for the first time, while removing any 
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explicit reference to contentious points such as cost.100 HSC/E decided to implement 
the Framework Directive by means of regulations under the HSWA, an approach 
intended ostensibly to soften the impact of EC law, minimise burdens on industry and 
avoid legal challenge, as much as to encourage safety improvements.101 The 
subordinate regulations would be based on an explicit requirement for employers to 
assess risks, an approach closely in line with Framework Directive’s ethos, and British 
regulations, such as COSHH.102 HSE’s Director of Safety Policy argued to the effect 
that, by basing new regulations on risk assessment, two birds could be killed with one 
stone. First, risk assessments would defend the HSC/E against litigation, since in 
practice they exposed hazards to the test of reasonable practicability, while explicit 
reference to the principle in British law could be minimised or removed. By their very 
nature, risk assessments allowed control measures to be qualified, and operationalised 
the SFAIRP principle. Second, risk assessment would counter accusations by some 
employers that HSC/E was seeking to ‘gold plate’ EC law, by going further than was 
legally necessary in regards to such matters as the self-employed.103 In effect, HSE 
used risk assessment as a political sleight-of-hand. 
 In the event, this scheme seriously backfired. Not only was the British 
government eventually referred to the European Court of Justice in 2005, but also 
some business leaders continued to accuse HSC/E of gold plating. Arguably, HSE’s 
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tactic made the situation even worse.  During the negotiations, HSE’s demand that 
new European legislation should be based on risk assessment morphed into the 
requirement for employers (of five or more employees) to write such assessments down. 
This stemmed from Article 9(1) of the Framework Directive, which required that 
employers ‘be in possession of an assessment to the risks to safety and health at 
work’.104 In other words, legal wrangling in Europe transformed what had previously 
been a common-sense device—a ‘computation’, in Lord Asquith’s 1949 terms—into a 
physical object, the outcome of a formalised, bureaucratic process.105 Every employer, 
regardless of size or the intrinsic hazard of their operations, now had to possess a 
formal written risk assessment. 
 This had never been HSE’s intention. Outside the requirement for employers to 
provide a written statement of their health and safety policy, before 1990 HSE had 
promoted written risk assessments only for the most serious and technical risks—for 
example, the safety cases of major hazard sites. Indeed, HSE’s Director of Safety 
Policy had argued ‘we do not want to create some situation where hazards, however 
mundane or unlikely, have to become subject to some complicated process. A cursory 
examination—even a glance—often will indeed generally be quite sufficient.’106 
 The requirement for employers to conduct written risk assessments generated a 
stir when it came to transposing the Framework Directive, as the Management of 
Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992 (MHSW).107 MHSW systematised much 
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of the British approach to health and safety regulation, clarifying the general 
requirements of the HSWA, and placing risk assessment at the heart of  
employers’ responsibility. While MHSW was supported in principle by the majority of 
respondents to HSC’s consultative document, published in October 1991, 64 per cent 
of respondents made explicit reference to risk assessment, of which over a third, 
largely employers, opposed the universal recording of risk assessments. Written risk 
assessment was believed to be overly bureaucratic and prescriptive, and impose 
considerable costs.108 Such a belief was evidently shared by certain HSE officials, for 
as Rimington wrote in 1995, ‘I believe written risk assessment to be a useful discipline 
so long as it is strictly confined to important risks; but applied too widely it can easily 
become bureaucratic bindweed preventing small firms in particular from seeing and 
doing the obvious.’109 These words were prescient, for as Chapter 6 demonstrates, 
HSC/E came under unprecedented political attack between 1992 and 2001, with the 
growing belief in and outside government that health and safety regulation had begun 
to get out of hand. 
 
5.10.  Conclusion 
Chapter 5 has analysed the development of the British system of health and safety 
legislation between 1984 and 1992, arguing that during this time, HSC/E matured as 
regulatory bodies responsible for negotiating, directing and enforcing national health 
and safety policy. Over these years, the scope of HSC/E’s influence increased 
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significantly, expanding even to railway passenger safety and gas safety in the home. 
Public safety, as opposed to worker safety became a much more central part of 
HSC/E’s work. Despite the loss of IAPI in 1987, HSE assumed a more singular, 
corporate identity.  
 While Europe became the dominant source of health and safety regulation by 
1992, HSC/E acquired an unparalleled regulatory remit among health and safety 
agencies worldwide. Much of this expansion in their policy domain stemmed, implicitly 
or explicitly, from their perceived expertise in risk management: both the Cullen and 
Hidden reports stressed the failure of risk management offshore and on the railways, 
and criticised government for combining regulatory and sponsorship roles in particular 
departments. There was thus both conceptual and practical justification for allocating 
new responsibilities to HSC/E. 
 Chapter 5 has highlighted how risk crystallised in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
in the practice of risk assessment, a formalised device for employers and other duty 
holders to identify and control hazards. In the same way that the concept of risk 
emerged more generally in British health and safety regulation, this process relied upon 
officials elaborating or making explicit various assumptions or ideas that were already 
well-established. Section 2 of the HSWA, for example, specified that ‘so far as is 
reasonably practicable’, employers had a duty to secure the safety, health and welfare 
at work of their employees, as well as produce a written statement of their safety 
policy. The requirement for written risk assessment in the Framework Directive 
stemmed from HSC/E’s insistence to preserve cost as a legitimate concern when 
evaluating the potential effectiveness of safety precautions: in other words, written risk 
assessment was merely an elaboration or distillation of pre-existing concepts. 
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 Chapter 6 elaborates this theme. It argues that the development of a coherent 
risk-based regulatory philosophy in HSC/E, known as Tolerability of Risk (TOR), 
helped relate together the divergent standards and approaches used by HSE’s 
component organisations. With this philosophy, the British system of health and safety 
regulation crystallised as truly integrated for the first time. 
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6.  Legitimising the System, 1992–2001 
 
6.1.  Introduction 
Focusing on several interlinked trends in British society, government, science and 
regulation, Chapter 6 analyses how and why HSC/E systematised their approach to 
risk management between 1992 and 2001. It argues that HSC/E’s risk management 
approach solidified as a complex and multifaceted response to political and economic 
pressure, enabling the regulator to adapt to changing circumstances and legitimise its 
activities from multiple angles.   
 Exploring the consequences of this development in several areas of regulatory 
policy, including occupational health, Chapter 6 demonstrates that HSC/E’s risk 
management approach evolved in response to, and in turn facilitated, the continuing 
transformation of the British state in its role as regulator. This changing role was 
captured in the growing use of the language of ‘partnership’ in HSC/E policy 
documents over the 1990s, reflecting the state’s increasingly passive view of 
intervention in the working environment. Relating these changes to the longer-term 
developments discussed in this thesis (inter alia, the changing dimensions of risk), 
Chapter 6 highlights the distinct climate of the 1990s that allowed HSC/E to elaborate 
their risk-based approach. 
 In Chapter 6, I engage not only with issues of regulation and governance, but 
also the extensive literature on risk in the social and political sciences. In particular, I 
draw upon Beck’s theory of the ‘risk society’ to explain the pervasive sense of 
uncertainty surrounding scientific knowledge and technological development (seen, for 
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example, in the BSE crisis in British agriculture).1 I also examine how developments in 
the science of risk perception acted to open up risk assessment to social, political and 
ethical influences. By the 1990s, the British scientific community largely accepted that 
the science of risk assessment could only partially determine the public’s perception of 
risks, and hence risk policy. The emergence of the public as a key stakeholder in health 
and safety policy was reflected in HSE’s decision in the late 1980s to produce a 
detailed model of the principles informing its approach to risk. Known as Tolerability 
of Risk (TOR), this model was initially developed in relation to nuclear power. 
However, in the 1990s HSE generalised this model across the entire field of its activity, 
from railway passenger safety to factory accidents. The discussion document Reducing 
Risks, Protecting People (1999/2001), not only served as a device to bind the HSE’s 
constituent parts and methodologies together, but also a multi-functional tool to defend 
the regulator from political attack. Reflecting both the new era of uncertainty (the ‘risk 
society’) and the neoliberal assault on overregulation and red tape (the ‘regulatory 
crisis’), Reducing Risks, Protecting People exposed HSC/E’s risk-based approach as an 
iterative process of dialogue, discussion, consultation and compromise. In so doing, it 
highlighted how risks were not objective ‘facts’, but social, political and cultural 
constructs. 
 The constructed nature of risks, and their changing dimensions over time, partly 
explain why by the end of the 1990s, a troublesome paradox had developed in British 
health and safety regulation. While in one sense, Britain was ‘safer’ than it had ever 
been (in 2001, the rate of fatal injury per 100,000 workers was less than half that in 
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1974, and the rate of non-fatal injury had fallen by almost a third since 1986/87), the 
right-wing British media began to widely criticise health and safety as part of a 
problem of over-regulation and red tape.2 As workplace accidents declined, regulators 
were forced to confront risks that were more invisible and complex (such as 
carcinogens), uncertain (such as the millennium bug), or attributable less directly to 
problems in the work environment (such as occupational stress or heart disease). Thus, 
regulators had a comparably greater challenge in persuading employers, workers or 
the public of the benefits of control, and scepticism emerged about the health and 
safety project in general. Rimington captured this problem succinctly: ‘HSE often finds 
itself between a rock and a hard place, with criticism from some quarters of “over-
zealous” behaviour by inspectors, and from others a lack of “zeal”, e.g. in pursuing 
individuals for health and safety offences.’3 Chapter 6 thus concludes with an analysis 
of the ‘health and safety gone mad’ rhetoric in British regulatory discourse. As the 
twentieth century drew to a close, the foundations for the current public and political 
malcontent with ‘elf and safety’ had been firmly laid. 
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6.2.  Overview 
Chapter 6 argues that HSC/E’s need to explain its regulatory approach stemmed from 
four main interrelated imperatives.  
 First, in section 6.3, I show how the British government’s renewed deregulatory 
agenda placed pressure on regulators (including HSC/E) to justify their approaches to 
risk. In December 1992, HSE was asked to review the legislation under its control, 
with the aim of removing outdated or burdensome regulations. At the same time, it was 
required to consider whether any of its activities could be contracted-out to private 
organisations. While the HSE concluded that privatisation of enforcement was 
inadvisable, by the end of the 1990s the seeds had been sown for a more market-based 
system of regulation, seen for example in the extension of fees for enforcement 
interventions under new regulations in 2012.4 
 Second, in section 6.4, I highlight the influence of wider changes in governance 
and public administration. At the same time that government implored departments 
and agencies to become more open and accountable, the emergence of the public as a 
key stakeholder in health and safety policy, and the demand for participation in 
decision-making, established a wider social context that supported transparency in 
health and safety regulation. This was premised on a subtle reconfiguration of statutory 
responsibility for health and safety, which further circumscribed the regulatory role of 
the state. Under the rhetoric of ‘partnership’, statutory intervention was perceived to 
be possible only with the active support of ‘stakeholder’ groups (for example, 
                                                
 
 
4  The Health and Safety (Fees) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/1652; Tombs and 
Whyte, “A Deadly Consensus.” 
 314 
employers). The state was thus envisaged as an equal partner in the fight against 
workplace accidents and disease, rather than a powerful force for shaping behaviour.
 Third, in section 6.5, I analyse developments in the theoretical understanding of 
risk and the factors influencing risk perception. As scientific understanding of risk 
advanced in the 1980s, a pressing regulatory need emerged to show how policymaking 
took into account scientific uncertainty and subjective criteria. Risk communication 
therefore developed as an important role of the state, posited as an alternative to 
further regulation or enforcement.  
 Fourthly, in section 6.6, I argue that HSE’s need to explain its decision-making 
approach stemmed from an internal, administrative need to relate together principles 
and approaches used across the organisation. I show how the HSE generalised a model 
initially developed in relation to nuclear power as a basis for risk management 
decisions across industry. The 2001 discussion document Reducing Risk, Protecting People 
explained in detail HSE’s policymaking process, and showed how risk assessment and 
subjective criteria influenced its decision-making. 
 The sub-field of occupational health has been one of the most actively studied 
areas of health and safety policy by historians. Although historians have focused on the 
period before 1960, a common argument in recent years is that as risk management 
became established in British regulatory practice after 1974, and ideas of a preventive 
‘national industrial health service’ in parallel to the NHS faded away, occupational 
health declined in importance and political priority.5 Hence, historians have used their 
                                                
 
 
5  e.g. Long, The Rise and Fall of the Healthy Factory; Johnston and McIvor, 
“Whatever Happened to the Occupational Health Service?”. 
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empirical studies of earlier periods to make points about occupational health after 1974, 
which may not be entirely justified. Chapter 6 thus includes an important case study of 
the British regulatory approach to occupational health under the HSWA. Over the 
1990s, I argue, occupational health became linked to the wider public health agenda. 
This imbued occupational health with newfound importance, but also enmeshed 
occupational health within wider deregulatory concerns. 
 Chapter 6 concludes with an analysis of one of the major paradoxes that 
constituted the so-called ‘regulatory crisis’ faced by regulators in the 1980s/1990s.6 
While the increasingly complex nature of industrial hazards meant that regulators 
including HSC/E were looked upon as sources of expert knowledge and guidance on 
risk, regulators believed that their authority was being eroded by public mistrust in 
science and regulation. Sensing how health and safety regulation was the object of 
growing scepticism in Britain, towards the end of the 1990s Tony Blair’s Labour 
government (1997–2007) looked to ways to ‘reboot’ the health and safety system and 
make it fit for the twenty-first century. In so doing, however, they further entrenched 
the logic of risk management in British regulatory discourse, enshrining assumptions 
which are now difficult, if not impossible to overturn. 
 
6.3.  The Politics of Health and Safety in the 1990s: From 
Deregulation to Better Regulation 
One of the primary motivations behind HSC/E’s need to deconstruct their 
policymaking in the 1990s was the renewed deregulatory drive in the British 
                                                
 
 
6  Hutter, “The Attractions of Risk-Based Regulation,” 1. 
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government. In an economic and political climate where excess regulation was 
considered undesirable, placing unnecessary ‘burdens on business’, the development of 
a comprehensive risk management framework provided a useful tool for HSC/E to 
legitimise their activities on multiple fronts: in the eyes of the Treasury that funded 
them, the government that audited their operations, trade unions, employers and other 
groups affected by their decisions. Risk management helped justify contentious 
decisions, and thus convince different interests that HSC/E was taking sound 
decisions, taking into account such factors as best practice, cost-effectiveness, public 
opinion, scientific evidence and uncertainty. 
 As we have seen, the Conservatives’ deregulatory agenda was renewed after 
1992. In its 1992 election manifesto, the Conservatives pledged to remove ‘outmoded 
and burdensome’ regulations, and give further priority to the work of its central 
deregulation task force.7 Despite some efforts by HSC/E to rationalise health and 
safety legislation since 1974, however (most of which had been achieved through the 
making of new general regulations such as COSHH and MHSW), 28 statutes and 367 
sets of regulations still remained on the statute book by the early 1990s. In response to 
political concerns about overregulation and European legislation, in December 1992 
the Employment Minister, Michael Forsyth, asked HSC/E to review the entire body of 
health and safety legislation under its administration. HSC/E responded in February 
1993 with a comprehensive review of regulations, eventually completed in May 1994. 
                                                
 
 
7  “1992 Conservative Party Manifesto,” accessed July 29, 2015, 
http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1992/1992-conservative-manifesto.shtml. 
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 The review identified several areas of concern. Evoking the original findings of 
the Robens Report, the review highlighted that many employers found the law to be 
‘too voluminous, complicated and fragmented.’8 In particular, EU directives had 
introduced widespread confusion about employers’ legal responsibilities, especially in 
regard to risk assessment. This had resulted in ‘a substantial misdirection of effort by 
some firms’, such as investment in expensive computer equipment.9 The HSC/E’s 
review suggested that 17 sets of regulations could be immediately revoked while 
maintaining improvements in workplace standards, another 38 after further 
consultation.10 
 In general, however, the review found widespread support for the HSWA’s goal-
based principles. In a letter to the Environment Secretary, John Gummer (to whom 
responsibility for occupational health and safety was transferred in 1995 following the 
merger of the DE and Department for Education), the HSC expressed bewilderment 
at the government’s agenda: 
 
[I]ndustry is not now demanding early change to the structure of the six pack. Rather, we 
are being urged to deliver a period of calm, without further upheavals…. 
 It is not our function to advise you on deregulation but we are puzzled by the differences 
between out own soundings and what we understand to be the representations of the 
                                                
 
 
8  HSC, “HSC Review of Regulation. Draft Final Report,” 1994, 1, TNA 
EF7/4116. 
9  Ibid., 2. In April 1993, a separate survey by the Institute of Directors (IOD) 
argued that misunderstanding about risk assessment had encouraged some employers 
to employ “expensive consultants or institute bureaucratic procedures.” See HSC, 
“HSC Review of Regulation. Draft Final Report”, Annex 5, 1. 
10  HSC, Annual Report 1993/94, xiv; Williams, “Deregulating Occupational Health 
and Safety,” 136. 
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Deregulation Task Force to the effect that there is a pressing need for a radical revision of the 
law.11 
   
Seemingly, the government’s agenda was dictated more from an ideological position 
about the costs of regulation, than from a practical standpoint about the wider merits 
of health and safety. Despite this, the HSC/E were aware of the government’s agenda, 
and looked for ways to derive political advantage. The civil servant Jenny Bacon 
joined HSE as Deputy Director-General in 1992, just as the review of regulation was 
getting underway. She argued that the review was not a wholly negative experience for 
the HSE, as a narrow focus on deregulation might suggest. While it did lead to a 
reduction in health and safety regulation, it also presented the HSE with an 
unprecedented opportunity to remove deadwood from the British statute book, and 
explain its decision-making principles: 
 
Michael Forsyth said, I want a review of regulations, and I want to get rid of as many 
regulations as possible…. I’m afraid I saw this as a golden opportunity having relatively 
recently come back and found that the cleaning out of the Augean stables which had been 
part of the original sort of Robens remit, if you like, had not happened, that there had been 
new regulation but there just hadn’t been time for anybody to sit back and look across the 
piece and get rid of all the old stuff…. 
 I said … let’s make it a review of regulation, how we do the job, and not just regulations, 
and I think Michael Forsyth was extremely suspicious, he thought that I was trying to pull the 
                                                
 
 
11  HSC, “Double-Banking: Revised Draft Letter to the Secretary of State for the 
Environment,” February 1996, 2, TNA EF7/4699. 
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wool over his eyes, and I suppose in one way I was, except I was being completely upfront and 
honest! Anyway he bought it…. 
 All the policy divisions got stuck into reviewing their areas of regulation, and I think 
were absolutely amazed to find just how much crap there was around the place actually. So 
in some ways it turned out into a really quite good process with a far greater understanding 
about what was really necessary and what worked and what didn’t and what we could get 
rid of.12 
 
Thus, while first and foremost a deregulatory exercise, the review provided HSC/E 
with a substantial opportunity to emphasise the benefits of their work to government. 
It also generated a political will for HSC to tackle its rationalisation remit: overall, this 
had been neglected since 1974, with the exception of older, detailed regulations 
removed as a result of new general regulations, such as COSHH. In response to the 
review, the HSC/E began to codify and explain many of their processes. For instance, 
the HSE published its decision-making principles in relation to enforcement and the 
issuing of guidance. This was a resource-intensive process, which perhaps explains 
why the HSC/E was so slow to begin this work after the HSWA. As Bacon explained, 
‘when you’re under sentence, or near sentence of death, there are some things that you 
will give up doing in order to save your life.’ For example, the greater use of 
administrative staff instead of inspectors in policy work enabled the HSE to divert 
resources into the review exercise.13   
                                                
 
 
12  Bacon, Interview, pt. 1. 
13  Ibid. 
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 The review of regulation was not the only aspect of HSC/E’s work where the 
influence of the government’s neoliberal agenda was acutely felt. Part 2 of the 
Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 was significant because it gave ministers 
powers to market-test and contract-out various government services. This signified the 
continuing transformation of the state, from a more direct provider of services to a 
more indirect regulator or supervisor: the so-called ‘regulatory state’.14  
 Of course, the Conservatives’ wider agenda to privatise public services or expose 
them to the workings of the market were felt elsewhere in the 1990s. In 1990, following 
the white paper Working for Patients, an internal market was established in the NHS, 
opening up health provision to competition.15 By 1994, the government had moved to 
privatise the railways, with huge implications for the rail infrastructure and passenger 
safety: the fragmentation of responsibility for safety between the train operators and 
organisation responsible for infrastructure, Railtrack, was one of the contributing 
factors to the Ladbroke Grove rail crash in October 1999.16 
 The HSE was not immune from this exhortation to open up government services 
to competition. Despite questions around whether health and safety counted as a 
‘service’, in July 1992 the HSE was asked to review its operations (other than 
policymaking) to determine whether it was possible to contract-out or charge for 
them.17 HSE’s report, published in November 1992, drew attention to some significant 
                                                
 
 
14  See e.g. Moran, British Regulatory State. 
15  Working for Patients, CM 555 (London: HMSO, 1989). 
16  See Lord Cullen, The Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry. Part 2 Report (Sudbury: HSE 
Books, 2001); Bill Callaghan, A Farewell to Trains (HSC, 2006). 
17  Although the HSE always charged for some of its activities (viz., publications), 
the extension of charging was controversial in the 1990s and remains so today (see 
below). 
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disadvantages, including fragmentation of the regulatory system, breakdowns in 
communication, damage to HSE’s discretionary approach, and erosion of public trust 
in HSE’s (notional) regulatory independence. Of paramount concern, antithetical to 
the government’s wider agenda, was that political transparency in the HSE would 
decrease: ‘We consider that it could represent a real point of difficulty for privatised or 
contracted bodies called upon to explain, or face difficult investigation of the actions of 
their servants, connected as some of those inevitably would be, with questions as their 
operational priorities, use of resources, or general conduct and quality of operations.’18  
 While the privatisation or market-testing of HSE’s enforcement work was 
therefore out of the question, potential opportunities for market-testing were found 
elsewhere. In particular, market-testing was found to be feasible among HSE’s 
research, scientific and certification work. As with the inspectorates, scientific and 
certification services for health and safety were highly fragmented before 1974, with 
numerous laboratories and research establishments existing in different parts of the 
country. After the HSE was established in 1975, these functions were brought under 
one division, the Research and Laboratory Services Division (RLSD). Consequently, 
in 1995 the RLSD was reconstituted as an in-house agency of HSE, the Health and 
Safety Laboratory (HSL), based in Buxton, Derbyshire. While the HSL remained 
functionally part of the HSE, it had its own director and assumed a more business-like 
                                                
 
 
18  John Rimington, David Cain, and Anne Wheatcroft, “HSE. Market Testing of 
HSE’s Regulatory Functions. Feasibility Study,” October 1992, 103; HSC, Annual 
Report 1992-93, xiii. 
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role, contracting its services both to HSE and external ‘customers’ in industry and 
government.19  
 The establishment of HSL was consistent with the government’s ‘Next Steps 
Initiative’, designed to improve government efficiency by hiving off particular 
government functions as executive agencies.20 While HSL had a degree of financial and 
operational autonomy from HSE, the ‘Next Steps Initiative’ conflicted with the wider 
demand to make government more open and accountable: effectively, the HSL was a 
quango of a quango. At the same time that the Conservatives’ pressured to reduce the 
size of the state, the HSL represented the further expansion of government under the 
public ‘radar’, and the empowerment of an unelected bureaucracy. By 1997, as many of 
75 per cent of all British civil servants worked out of executive agencies, rather than 
traditional government departments.21  
 Institutional change was perhaps the most drastic and visible outcome of the 
politics of new public management (NPM)—the movement to make government more 
efficient and entrepreneurial. However, NPM influenced HSC/E policymaking in 
subtler ways. Over the 1990s, the government placed renewed pressure on HSC/E to 
demonstrate that risks were being controlled without placing excessive burdens on 
industry. Utility-based measures to evaluate the economic impact of new regulations, 
namely, cost-benefit analyses and compliance cost assessments, have been a part of the 
                                                
 
 
19  See Buchanan, Health and Safety Laboratory. A Pictorial History. 
20  NAO, “The Next Steps Initiative. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General,” June 6, 1989. 
21  D. Parker, The Official History of Privatisation. Volume II. Popular Capitalism, 1987–
1997 (Abingdon: Routledge, 1992), 26. 
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British regulatory landscape since at least the early 1980s, as we have seen.22 They 
were a fundamental component of the government’s deregulatory agenda. Yet, 
Labour’s victory in the 1997 general election did little to halt this agenda. Despite a 
switch in political emphasis—the language of ‘deregulation’ was substituted by one of 
‘better regulation’, and the Deregulation Task Force was reconstituted as the Better 
Regulation Task Force, operating out of the Cabinet Office—much of the underlying 
focus on regulatory burdens remained the same.23 Regulatory impact assessments, 
introduced in 1998, went much further than CBAs and CCAs in evaluating the 
economic impact of regulations on wider society. However, they continued to prioritise 
utility-based criteria in determining the benefits of regulatory measures.24 Further, the 
five principles of ‘good regulation’ set down by the Better Regulation Task Force in 
1997—proportionality, accountability, consistency, transparency and targeting—
propagated many of the concerns of the previous Conservative administration.25 
 Labour’s election victory, therefore, acted to cement rather than challenge 
contemporary neoliberal ideology regarding regulation and the role of the state. While 
Labour sought to carve out a new centre-left consensus incorporating beliefs both in 
social justice and the free market (the so-called ‘third way’), the belief that health and 
safety regulations could produce burdens on business was enshrined in British 
                                                
 
 
22  See J. Froud and A. Ogus, “‘Rational’ Social Regulation and Compliance Cost 
Assessment,” Public Administration 74 (1996): 221–37. 
23  Robert Baldwin, “Better Regulation in Troubled Times,” Health Economics Policy 
and Law 1, no. 3 (2006): 203; Tombs and Whyte, “A Deadly Consensus,” 5. 
24  NAO, Better Regulation: Making Good Use of Regulatory Impact Assessments. Report 
by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 329, 2001, 1–3; Tombs and Whyte, “A Deadly 
Consensus,” 5. 
25  Better Regulation Task Force, Principles of Good Regulation (London: TSO, 
2003), 1. 
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regulatory discourse.26 Social expectations about the control of risks, HSE explained in 
2001, were ‘complemented in a free market economy by an underlying presumption 
that industry should be able to take advantage of new technologies, unfettered by 
undue State intervention.’27 The British system of health and safety regulation was thus 
further exposed to market-based pressures and imperatives: in recent years, this has 
been demonstrated by the extension of charging (fees for intervention) for various 
enforcement and other activities.28 The elaboration of a comprehensive risk 
management system provided a practical tool to meet these demands. 
  
 
6.4.  Opening Up the Decision-Making Process: The Public in 
Health and Safety 
Pressure on regulators including the HSC/E to explain their decision-making came 
from outside the government as well as within. Accompanying calls for greater 
deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s were demands by citizen’s groups, such as the 
Campaign for Freedom of Information, for greater transparency and accountability in 
government, right of access to government data, citizen/consumer choice, and 
participation in policymaking. As described in Chapter 5, major disasters in Britain 
and abroad reflected the need for the general public to be recognised as a key 
stakeholder in health and safety policy. 
                                                
 
 
26  See Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). 
27  HSE, Reducing Risks, Protecting People, 7. 
28  TUC, “Toxic, Corrosive and Hazardous.” 
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 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, several initiatives commenced on this front. 
The growing recognition of the importance of public opinion was reflected, among 
other things, in the government’s decision to appoint a ninth Commissioner to the HSC 
in March 1990, representing the ‘public interest’. Implicitly acknowledging that local 
authorities were ineffective public representatives, Dame Rachel Waterhouse, the 
former chair of the Consumer’s Association, was appointed to fill this position. In 1988, 
the Environment and Safety Information Act opened up health and safety data to 
public scrutiny by establishing a public register of enforcement notices served under 
the HSWA. Further, the Citizen’s Charter, launched in 1991, instituted a series of 
measures to improve ‘choice, quality, value and accountability’ in public services.29 
These included the publication of league tables in schools and the NHS, and the 
commitment to privatise state monopolies such as British Rail. The use of published 
performance targets was also encouraged, a device that became more commonplace 
over the 1990s as a means for the public to hold government to account.30 
 Between 1992 and 2001, these developments gained added momentum. The 1993 
white paper Open Government built on the Citizen’s Charter by proposing new means to 
increase public access to government information.31 Reflecting how government was 
becoming more and more preoccupied with risk (see below), many of its proposals 
related to health and safety: not just health and safety at work, but wider 
environmental and public safety issues. A prime consideration behind the proposals 
was not only the public appetite for health and safety information HSE officials had 
                                                
 
 
29  The Citizen’s Charter. Raising the Standard, Cm 1599, 1991, 2. 
30  Ibid., 5. 
31  Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Open Government (Cm 2290, 1993). 
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recognised in previous decades, but critically, to improve public-sector standards 
without imposing additional regulatory burdens on business.32 In this way, Open 
Government supported the renewed deregulatory agenda, by positioning public access to 
information as an alternative to regulation. Voluntary organisations such as the 
Campaign for Freedom of Information in turn reinforced this position, by pressuring 
for greater public access to government information and political accountability. By 
placing additional responsibilities, implicitly, on those whom regulation was directed, 
such measures supported the British state’s metamorphosis into a more indirect risk 
assessor, communicator and supporter of self-regulation. 
 The use of one particular term in HSC/E policy documents is indicative of this 
wider transformation. The language of ‘partnership’ reflected the idea that the HSC/E 
or state alone could not improve health and safety. Instead, for progress to be made, 
the public and stakeholder organisations (‘partners’) had to be actively engaged in the 
policymaking process. Effectively, the rhetoric of partnership diminished HSC/E’s 
power and scope for action, placing them more equally alongside employers, trade 
unions and other organisations in tackling workplace accidents and disease. At the 
extreme, partnership provided a recipe for what one critic of British health and safety 
regulation, Greenberg, has termed the British government’s ‘disengagement’ with 
health and safety.33 As the campaign group, London Hazards Centre described to MPs 
in 1999: 
                                                
 
 
32  Ibid., 49–50.; HC Deb 15 July 1993 vol. 228 col. 1114. 
33  Morris Greenberg, “The Last Senior Medical Inspector of Factories and His 
Place in the History of Occupational Health,” American Journal of Industrial Medicine 49, 
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The current philosophy of partnership is acted out by many employers as an abusive 
partnership that kills, maims and diseases workers throughout the UK. The cost of 
industrial disease and serious injuries at work is not only borne by the victim…. [T]he cost 
to the nation’s economy, simply in terms of welfare benefits and the burdens placed on the 
NHS, is estimated to be £16 billion plus each year. It amounts to a subsidy to industry for 
their mismanagement and outright exploitation of workers.34  
 
Intriguingly, the CSHW never used the term ‘partner’ in their 1972 report. While they 
advocated an adjustment in the state’s role for health and safety, emphasising the need 
for greater self-regulation on the part of workers and industry, the Committee’s 
language of tripartism and interest groups reflected the state’s greater field of action at 
this time: the state was still envisaged as an important contributor towards 
accident/disease prevention efforts. Although the term ‘stakeholder’ to some extent 
implied partnership—as Bacon suggested, in dealing with stakeholders one is forging a 
partnership—‘partnership’ began to be used much more frequently following Labour’s 
election victory in 1997.35   
 
                                                
 
 
34  “Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Select Committee. 
Memorandum by the London Hazards Centre. HSE 15.,” 1999. 
35  Bacon, Interview. 
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6.5.  Accommodating Uncertainty: Risk Perception and 
Communication 
While political developments within and outside government encouraged regulators to 
make themselves more accountable and transparent, structural transformations in 
wider society and in the dimensions of risk also illuminated the mediated nature of risk 
decisions: in other words, how risks were not objective ‘facts’, but social, political and 
cultural constructs. In this context, HSC/E systematised its risk management approach 
as a way to show how regulatory decisions took into account scientific evidence, 
uncertainty and subjective political and social values. 
 In the late 1980s the sociologist Ulrich Beck theorised that a major rupture had 
occurred in western industrialised societies. Society had become less concerned about 
the risks of nature, or what Beck termed ‘the classical industrial society’, and instead 
had become more concerned with the risks of modernity itself—with science and 
technology. Accompanying this new phase of modernity, the risk society, was a 
plethora of new risks connected to scientific development, such as genetic manipulation 
and nuclear radiation. According to Beck, the risks of the risk society are often 
delocalised, invisible (except under scientific observation) and insidious, altering the 
environment in irreversible ways and affecting future generations. These risks are 
characterised by widespread scientific uncertainty, resulting in a pervasive, chronic 
anxiety.36 
  As I have argued previously, Beck’s fundamental idea that we have entered a 
new phase of modernity is open to significant historical debate. That said, there is 
                                                
 
 
36  Beck, Risk Society. 
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substantial evidence to support the argument that many of the risks workers and 
regulators confronted in the late twentieth century differed in quite basic respects from 
those faced by workers and regulators in earlier decades. They were often invisible, 
eluding direct sensory perception; delocalised, threatening communities and 
ecosystems outside the workplace; often, they only became apparent after a substantial 
period of time had elapsed and harm had already been inflicted (for example, 
mesothelioma). In Britain, health and safety officials from the late 1960s onwards, such 
as Bryan Harvey, were acutely aware of these developments and their health and 
safety implications, not least, the need for a proactive regulatory approach. Since at 
least the 1980s, regulators have also been conscious of these changes in terms of what 
Giddens has described as ‘a new moral climate of politics, one marked by a push-and-
pull between accusations of scaremongering on the one hand and of cover-ups on the 
other.37’ For example, in some cases (such as European legislation), the HSE was 
accused of ‘gold plating’, going further than was legally necessary and exposing British 
businesses to needless costs and bureaucracy.  In other cases, however (such as 
asbestos), HSE and its predecessors were accused of not doing enough to avert a 
serious risk. From the regulatory point of view, these changes resulted in public and 
political scrutiny, or the ‘rock and a hard place’ Rimington described.38 More generally, 
they generated a ‘crisis of responsibility’ where ‘responsibility [could] neither be easily 
attributed or assumed.’39 Since many of the ‘new’ risks engaging regulatory attention 
had uncertain causes, and could not be unequivocally attributed to deficiencies in the 
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work environment (for example occupational stress), attributing responsibility and 
agreeing upon controls was fraught with technical and political difficulty. 
 These difficulties were compounded by the fact that, as scientific uncertainty 
around risks deepened, the primacy of the expert in guiding regulatory policy was 
opened to question from alternative public and media discourses. The paradoxical 
result, according to the American political scientist Aaron Wildavsky in 1979, was a 
society that was in some respects safer and healthier than ever before, but also more 
anxious and hesitant about technological development:  
 
Will you and I be able to breathe amidst the noxious fumes of industrial pollution? Will we 
be able to eat with poisonous substances entering our orifices? How can we sleep knowing 
that the light of the life-giving sun may be converted into death rays that burn our bodies to 
a crisp? How do we know that our mother’s milk does not contain radiation or our meats 
putrefaction or our water cancer-causing chemicals?… 
 How extraordinary! The richest, longest-lived, best-protected, most resourceful 
civilization, with the highest degree of insight into its own technology, is on its way to 
becoming the most frightened.40 
 
This anxiety not only eroded public trust in science and regulation, but also threatened 
to disrupt technological and economic development, encouraging an overzealous, ‘zero 
risk’ approach to health and safety. From Wildavsky’s perspective, scientific 
uncertainty empowered government and the regulatory bureaucracy, fuelling the 
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growth of health and safety as a discipline and regulatory field. Uncertainty promoted 
a risk-averse society, where individuals and governments were more and more 
obsessed with controlling risks that were invisible or unclear. Since the early 1990s, the 
‘precautionary principle’ has encouraged the idea that absence of scientific evidence 
cannot be used an excuse for government inaction on risk.41  
 Analysing this paradox, scientific understanding developed in the 1980s and 
1990s of the social, cultural and psychological factors underpinning the public’s 
perception of risks. For example, the pioneering work of the anthropologist Mary 
Douglas (together with Wildavsky) revealed the culturally determined nature of risks, 
how risk perceptions emerge from the classificatory systems used by societies (for 
example, notions of good versus bad, dirty versus clean) and normative values 
associated with them. Douglas and Wildavsky’s research highlighted that risks 
perceptions are not only influenced by culture, but in turn structure societies by 
establishing cultural boundaries (taboos) and moral frameworks of responsibility and 
blame. As Giddens has noted, questions of risk are always connected to questions of 
responsibility.42 
 Elsewhere, developments in psychology highlighted the subtle biases that skew 
people’s perception of risks. Psychometric analyses showed that public awareness of 
risks can be biased by media coverage. For instance, risks that score ‘low’ in objective 
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terms (for example, a nuclear meltdown) can be heightened due to a pervasive ‘dread 
factor’ (Figure 17). The psychologist Paul Slovic described this phenomenon in 1987: 
 
[L]aboratory research on basic perceptions and cognitions has shown that difficulties in 
understanding probabilistic processes, biased media coverage, misleading personal 
experiences, and the anxieties generated by life’s gambles cause uncertainty to be denied, 
risks to be misjudged (sometimes overestimated and sometimes underestimated), and 
judgements of fact to be held with unwarranted confidence. Experts’ judgements appear to 
be prone to many of the same biases as those of the general public, particularly when 
experts are forced to go beyond the limits of available data and rely on intuition.43 
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Figure 17. Ranking of risks by different groups.44 
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 The implication, Slovic added, was ‘those who promote and regulate health and 
safety need to understand the ways in which people think about and respond to risk.’45  
 By the mid 1980s, the scientific community in western industrialised countries (as 
represented by institutions such as the Royal Society) increasingly accepted that risk 
perceptions could be shaped by social and psychological factors, although they did not 
necessarily acknowledge the more radical arguments of academics such as Douglas 
that risk was a complete social and cultural construct: ‘risk’ still had an objective 
reality, amenable to computation and evaluation, and science still had its privileged 
part to play in elucidating it. The challenge posed by the social sciences to risk 
management was that if major policy decisions (for example on nuclear power) were to 
be accepted, public policy needed to acknowledge these ‘subjective’ social and political 
criteria. In response to this problem, in 1978 the Royal Society set up a study group on 
risk in order to explore the interfaces between risk assessment, risk perception and risk 
management. The study group’s report, published in 1983, argued that the public were 
not passive recipients of scientific knowledge, but an active force in determining the 
construction of risk: 
 
It is imprudent though common, to attribute the differences between risk perceptions and 
statistical estimates of risk wholly to ignorance or errors on the part of the public. The 
converse if a public mistrust of ‘experts’ which is not without justifying evidence…. 
 At the administrative level, there is a need to acknowledge the validity of public 
perceptions, while at the same time purveying the fullest information on objective risk 
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estimates, not least because these data form a major component of the public’s perceptions. 
The spirit in which ‘education’ on hazards is presented will partially determine its 
acceptance…. If it is not to invoke charges of ‘manipulation’ or ‘restriction of freedom’, it 
must be based on co-orientation from public consultation at the governmental level to 
negotiation at the level of the industrial plant.46 
 
By the mid 1980s, therefore, public policy experts accepted that while ‘objective’ 
scientific evidence was a vital input to policy decisions, it was not the only one. Equally 
important was the way regulators communicated information about risks to the public, 
and incorporated their ‘subjective’ beliefs into policy. The Royal Society made a similar 
distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ risk in a 1992 report.47 
 A 1998 policy document related this changing attitude to the systematisation of 
HSC/E’s risk management philosophy. Risk Communication: A Guide to Regulatory Practice 
provided British regulators with practical advice and tools to improve the way they 
communicated information about risk to stakeholders (especially the public) and 
integrated this communication into their decision-making.48 The document was 
prepared by the Inter-Departmental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment (ILGRA), an 
informal network of government officials established by HSE in 1991 to discuss the 
                                                
 
 
46  Royal Society, Risk Assessment. Report of a Royal Society Study Group (London: 
Royal Society, 1983), 14–15. 
47  Royal Society, Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management (London: Royal Society, 
1992). See also Deborah Lupton, Risk (London: Routledge, 1999), 20. 
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issue of risk and find ways to promote coherent approaches across government.49 
While there were many good examples of risk communication across government, 
ILGRA noted, too often these were seen as a one-way flow of information from an 
expert to lay audience, as opposed to a two-way, iterative process. Some government 
departments also viewed risk communication as an obligatory ‘bolt-on’ to regulation, 
instead of something that was an inherent part of the regulatory process.50 Taking its 
cue from the Better Regulation Task Force, ILGRA argued that good regulation 
allowed ‘people to make or participate in their own decisions about risks’, and reflected 
‘people’s views and preferences in decisions about risks which affect them’.51 In 
contexts where government agreed that individuals should make their own decisions, 
risk communication could be visualised as the ‘principal instrument for putting policy 
into practice. Communication is an alternative to regulation. It can defuse the emotions 
of minority pressure groups, and eliminate the need for excessive legislation.’52 In 
circumstances where regulation was considered necessary, on the other hand, good 
risk communication allowed stakeholders to take an active role in decision-making, and 
translate their views and preferences into policy and practice: for instance, in 
determining the levels of risk individuals or groups may tolerate (see below).53 
 The demand for public participation challenged the place of science in risk 
management. According to ILGRA, ‘research has shown that much of the 
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Government’s communication about risk reflects the scientific, objective aspects that 
underpin risk regulation. If these are carried through into public communication, they 
can easily appear to have taken little account of people’s values and preferences.’54 
Indeed, only a year before Risk Communication was published, the Professor of the 
Public Understanding of Science at Imperial College London, John Durant, had 
described the privileging of science in risk assessment as ‘a morale-sapping, 
confidence-sapping process tailor-made to lead to a decline in public confidence in the 
whole system.’55 
 The perception by regulators of a growing mistrust in science—and 
corresponding pressure on them to open up their decision-making—must be seen in 
the context of the BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) crisis in British 
agriculture. Although BSE had been detected in British cattle since the 1980s, for over 
a decade the government had reassured the public that there was little or no risk of 
people developing the neurological disorder Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) from 
consuming beef, despite considerable uncertainty in the scientific evidence. In March 
1996, however, the Health Secretary Stephen Dorrell announced than ten people had 
died from a suspected new variant of CJD, and he could not eliminate a link with BSE 
beef.56 The resulting health scare, fed in part by the media (which assumed a prominent 
role as risk assessor and communicator), led to plummeting beef sales in Britain and 
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Europe, and a lengthy ban on British beef exports. It is estimated to have cost the EU 
some $5 billion (US) in subsidies for farmers.57 Crucially, the crisis not only resulted in 
significant financial losses, but media and political scrutiny of the British food safety 
regulator, MAFF. Questions emerged about the weight to be attached to scientific 
evidence in risk assessment, and faith in science in general. Other ‘scares’ over the late 
1980s and 1990s, such as the salmonella scare, and the alleged link between the MMR 
vaccine and autism, also served to cast doubt on the competence of regulatory agencies 
and prevailing scientific wisdom. 
 The great task for HSE then, as health and safety regulator, was to show how 
these competing priorities and ideas were taken into account in its policymaking, in a 
way that was transparent, scientifically vigorous, and broadly acceptable to all. In the 
late 1980s, a model for regulatory decision-making in the nuclear field, known as 
Tolerability of Risk (TOR), was posited as a solution to these problems. By the end of 
the 1990s, HSE began to examine how these principles could apply across the entire 
scope of its work. 
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6.6.  The Systematisation of Risk 
 
6.6.1.  Tolerating Risk: Explaining HSE's Approach to Nuclear Risk 
Risk management crystallised in the 1990s, therefore, not only as a comprehensive way 
for employers to control occupational and environmental hazards, but a coherent 
framework for regulatory decision-making in the HSC/E.  
 As described previously, while not explicitly referred to as such, ‘risk assessment’ 
had long been used by HSE and its predecessors as a tool to guide regulatory and 
enforcement action.58 In the late 1960s, for instance, factory inspectors had used 
accident statistics to identify workplaces which required greater attention, moving 
away from routine, cyclical inspection. In the inspectorates, different kinds of risk 
assessment were used depending on the type and seriousness of the hazard under 
scrutiny. They varied from informal, qualitative assessments of the likelihood of a 
particular hazard being realised (for example machinery accidents) to in-depth, formal 
computations of the probability of failure in complex systems, such as nuclear power 
plants. In an epidemiological sense, risk assessment was used to determine the 
probability that individuals were exposed to particular harmful substances, as well as 
evaluate the overall success or failure of regulatory efforts.59  
 Compounding these technical and methodological differences in risk assessment 
were different legal benchmarks against which control was judged. The HSWA, as 
described previously, used the concept of ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’ 
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(SFAIRP). However, subordinate legislation sometimes had different standards: for 
instance, nuclear legislation used the qualification ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ 
(ALARP), while air pollution legislation advanced a technological standard, ‘best 
practicable means’.60  
 HSE’s establishment in 1975 brought inspectors and policymakers directly into 
contact with the different approaches to risk used by their colleagues. These 
differences in approach and regulatory culture exacerbated the tensions between 
HSE’s various ‘tribes’, and inhibited the development of a more corporate organisation. 
As Rimington argued, the language and lexicon of risk had yet to crystallise in this 
inaugural period: ‘What they were all interested in was risk. But there wasn’t a 
language to express it in at that time. Everyone was doing risk and risk management, 
but the necessary language and techniques hadn’t been developed.’61 While this view 
represents, in part, a post-hoc rationalisation of HSE’s attempts to systematise its 
decision-making, it is certainly the case that the common denominator of these 
approaches was the attempt by officials to evaluate the likelihood and consequences of 
a particular event (be it a machinery accident, infection, gaseous discharge or nuclear 
meltdown), and direct regulatory action accordingly. The salient question that emerged 
was how these varied ideas and tools could be related together. 
 It was a public inquiry into the Central Electricity Generating Board’s (CEGB) 
proposal to build a new nuclear reactor at Sizewell in Suffolk in the mid 1980s that 
first begged the question. Conducted over 340 days, at the time, the Sizewell B inquiry 
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was Britain’s longest-running and most expensive public inquiry. At the hearing, Sir 
Frank Layfield QC, a distinguished planning lawyer, heard long and technical 
arguments about the level of risk from reactor designs, including the proposed 
pressurised water reactor. However, these did not fully capture or recognise public 
concerns.62 In response to the growing recognition that the public was a key 
stakeholder in British health and safety policy (and public policy in general), Layfield 
recommended that HSE ‘formulate and publish guidance on the tolerable levels of 
individual and social risk to workers and the public from nuclear power stations, 
recognising the limitations of present risk assessment techniques.’63 Layfield was 
concerned both by the lack of consideration for wider public health and safety in 
CEGB’s risk assessment, and the fact that the public had little say over what 
constituted a ‘tolerable’ level of risk: this was left to ‘experts’ in the CEGB and Nuclear 
Installations Inspectorate. As Layfield explained, ‘the opinion of the public should 
underlie the evaluation of risk; there is at present insufficient public information to 
allow understanding of the basis for the regulation of nuclear safety.’64  
 Layfield’s use of the word ‘tolerable’ was evocative. Firstly, it implied there was a 
level of risk which the public was somehow willing to live with—the risk need not be 
reduced to zero. Secondly, it accepted that social or political criteria were important 
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inputs in the evaluation of risk. Layfield’s statement was an admission, if only implicit, 
that risk management was also a political exercise, not merely a scientific one.  
 HSE’s risk-based approach to regulation crystallised as an administrative 
response to this demand. In response to Layfield’s request, in February 1988 HSE 
published a detailed document, The Tolerability of Risks from Nuclear Power Stations 
(TOR), which outlined its decision-making process and doctrine of risk management 
in relation to nuclear power. Relating the various standards and approaches to risk 
assessment used across HSE, TOR advanced the idea that the public were prepared to 
live with or ‘tolerate’ a risk that conferred a particular benefit, only in the knowledge 
that the risk was being properly controlled and reduced as far as possible. Tolerability 
was distinct from ‘acceptability’, which suggested that risks could be taken without any 
form of control; it was also distinct from other conceptualisations of risk, prevalent in 
other countries, which suggested that the aim of regulation was to eliminate risk 
altogether.65 Represented diagrammatically, the TOR framework could be visualised as 
an inverted triangle (Figure 18). 
 In the ‘unacceptable region’ at top of the TOR triangle, the area of greatest 
individual risk and societal concern, a risk was automatically prohibited (except in  
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Figure 18. The Tolerability of Risk framework.66  
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exceptional circumstances) unless it could be reduced to a level that was deemed to be 
‘tolerable’ or ‘broadly acceptable’. That is, the costs of the risk were seen to be ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ to the benefits obtained, in the legal language of Edwards v. National 
Coal Board. At the bottom of the triangle, the ‘broadly acceptable’ region, risks were 
generally regarded by the wider population as trivial, and no further action was 
required by employers and other duty holders, unless it was ‘reasonably practicable’ to 
do so (that is., the risks outweighed the costs, as specified by SFAIRP). At the centre 
of the triangle, the ‘tolerable’ region, people tolerated risks only in the knowledge that 
they derived certain benefits, and the risks were being properly controlled. After 
controls were put in place, the residual risks had to be kept as low as reasonably 
practicable (ALARP).  
 While risk assessment was used to inform regulatory decision-making, it was 
social and political judgement, as negotiated via HSC’s advisory committees, which 
ultimately determined where a particular risk sat on this spectrum. Of course, as HSE 
realised, this was a dynamic process that was likely to change along with public 
attitudes and scientific knowledge. For instance, a particular chemical substance could 
move from being ‘broadly acceptable’ to ‘unacceptable’ as scientific knowledge of its 
toxic effects evolved (historically, this was the trajectory taken by asbestos). The 
location of a particular risk on the TOR diagram, therefore, did not represent a ‘final’ 
decision on risk: it was simply a heuristic which was used to guide policymaking.  
 TOR’s great innovation was that it seamlessly brought together, for the first time, 
the seemingly divergent legal standards and principles used by HSE’s inspectorates. As 
Rimington explained, ‘everything we did could be related to the concept that risk is 
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tolerable.’67 In practice, there was very little difference between the concepts of 
ALARP in nuclear safety or SFAIRP in the HSWA, except that ALARP was usually 
expressed in quantitative terms, while SFAIRP was most often qualitative.68 In both 
cases the same principle applied, namely that risk should be reduced as far as possible, 
at least to the point where the cost of risk reduction became ‘grossly disproportionate’ 
to the risk itself.69  
 TOR established a ‘lingua franca’ which helped bind the constituent parts of 
HSE together, acting as a catalyst for a more integrated, corporate culture.70 Further, 
by incorporating public and political opinion in the evaluation of risk, TOR 
acknowledged that political and emotional, as well as technical considerations helped 
delineate the boundary between what was ‘broadly acceptable’ and what was 
‘unacceptable’. Most significantly, TOR enshrined an age-old British principle in risk 
evaluation: namely, that financial cost was an integral factor in all such judgements.  
 
6.6.2.  Generalising Risk: Reducing Risk, Protecting People 
In the 1990s, HSE began to consider how the TOR framework could apply to entire 
range of risks under its jurisdiction. The result of this process was the discussion 
document Reducing Risk, Protecting People (R2P2), first published in May 1999. R2P2 
was the most comprehensive and detailed rendition of HSE’s regulatory philosophy to 
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date. Aiming to show how risk assessment and risk management informed its 
policymaking, it combined in a single, comprehensive framework the various 
approaches to risk taken in different areas of its regulatory activity, from nuclear risk 
to railway passenger safety. Designed to be read by stakeholders with an interest how 
HSE went about its work, not as an employers’ guide to risk assessment, R2P2 
attempted to make transparent the social, political, economic, scientific and technical 
factors that informed its decision-making. Following controversies such as the BSE 
scandal and Ladbroke Grove rail crash, it was also intended to reassure the public that 
the regulator was adopting sound decisions.71  
 Behind HSE’s evolving approach were many of the long-term trends I have 
discussed in this thesis. There was growing scientific understanding of the way people 
perceive risk, and appreciation that policymakers need to (and in fact do) take into 
account subjective values when assessing and managing risk. There was the 
increasingly complex and global nature of risk regulation. Further, there were the 
widespread changes in industry and employment that had dissolved many of the 
certainties of regulation in the early twentieth century, not least, the nature of safety 
controls. Most significant of all were the complex changes in wider society, analysed by 
Ulrich Beck.72  
 In R2P2, HSE broke down its decision-making into six key stages (Figure 19). 
An important proviso, as HSE explained, was that these stages were not necessarily 
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taken independently. Intelligence-gathering and consultation, for example, occurred 
throughout all stages, so the process was best described as iterative. 
  
Figure 19. Decision-making in the HSE.73 
STAGE	1	 Deciding	whether	the	issue	is	primarily	one	
for	HSC/E	
STAGE	2	 Defining	and	characterising	the	issue	
STAGE	3	 Examining	the	options	available	for	
addressing	the	issue,	and	their	merits	
STAGE	4	 Adopting	a	particular	course	of	action	
STAGE	5	 Implementing	the	decisions	
STAGE	6	 Evaluating	the	effectiveness	of	the	actions	
and	reviewing	decisions	on	implementation	
 
 In brief, after an issue came to HSC/E’s attention and was determined to be 
primarily one of health and safety (stage 1), the issue was defined and characterised 
(stage 2). Qualitative and/or quantitative risk assessment was used to ascertain the 
nature and scale of the risk, and the level of regulatory response. The particular type of 
assessment used depended on the attributes of the hazard and whether it was amenable 
to definition in numerical or statistical terms. Scientific and technical intelligence was 
gathered through internal and external research (for example epidemiological studies), 
and through HSC’s advisory committees. HSE then evaluated the levels of individual 
and societal risk deriving from the hazard. 
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 A significant innovation in R2P2, as I have already suggested, was the decision to 
show how social, political and economic factors (that is, public perception of risk) were 
taken into account in HSE’s decision-making. During risk assessment, such 
considerations could be taken into account by attaching different weightings and 
preferences to the scientific data, for example, by focusing more on the consequences 
of the risk as opposed to its likelihood (this was especially the case for newer hazards 
or those with potentially catastrophic consequences). Scientific uncertainty could also 
be accommodated by reference to the precautionary principle. In stage 3, possible 
options for managing the risk were identified, drawing on the whole toolkit of actions 
available to HSE, from the publication of guidance, to the making of new regulations 
or codes of practice. To evaluate their relative merits, CBA was employed to weigh up 
costs and benefits in monetary terms. It was in stage 4, when a particular course of 
action was chosen, where the criteria used for reaching decisions outlined in the TOR 
framework had significant impact. 
 The TOR framework was generalisable across all areas of HSE’s activity not 
only because it united the various legal standards and approaches used by HSE 
inspectors, but because it related equity, utility and technology-based criteria for the 
management of risks. According to HSE, the equity-based criterion stemmed from ‘the 
premise that all individuals have unconditional rights to certain levels of protection. 
This leads to standards, applicable to all, held to be usually acceptable in normal life, or 
which refer to some other premise held to establish an expectation of protection.’74 The 
utility-based criterion, by contrast, ‘compares in monetary terms the relevant benefits 
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(e.g. statistical lives saved, life-years extended) obtained by the adoption of a particular 
risk prevention measure with the net cost of introducing it, and requires that a 
particular balance be struck between the two.’75 The technology criterion ‘essentially 
reflects the idea that satisfactory level of risk prevention is attained when “state of the 
art” control measures (technological, managerial, organisational) are employed to 
control risks whatever the circumstances.’76 Effectively, the top of the TOR triangle 
(the unacceptable region) was dominated by concerns about equity, while the centre of 
the triangle (the tolerability region) was dominated by concerns about utility, 
balancing costs against benefits. Technology-based criteria were found throughout the 
TOR framework. 
 TOR’s power as a framework for regulatory decision-making, therefore, 
stemmed from its strength as an ‘integrative template’: not just its ability to unify what 
were hitherto disparate and incompatible criteria for managing risks, but its 
generalisability across the whole spectrum of HSE’s activity, and across wider risk 
regulation in general.77 By relating equity, utility and technological criteria for 
decision-making in a single conceptual model, the HSE could legitimise its activities on 
multiple fronts, by demonstrating how its policies took into account such 
considerations as proportionality and consistency. Moreover, HSE could 
simultaneously claim, at least in theory, to be promoting health and safety, and 
reducing regulatory burdens. HSE could show how it was not standing in the way of 
economic development in two ways: first, that its aim was not to eliminate risk 
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altogether (except in the most serious circumstances), but merely to reduce it to a level 
that was ‘tolerable’ or ‘broadly acceptable’; second, that utility-based judgment (that is, 
CBA) formed an integral part of its decision-making. In HSE’s view, therefore, worker 
safety and business profit were not mutually exclusive.78  
 In practice, of course, this was not always the case. The erosion of HSE’s 
enforcement capacity due to government cuts, and the low level of fines levied for 
health and safety offences gave some credence to criticisms (for example, from the 
London Hazards Centre) that HSE’s ‘partnership’ approach was distinctly one way.79 
Nevertheless, by representing the basics of its decision-making in a single diagram, 
HSE had invented a way to justify its activity against accusations from all sides, and 
thus prise itself from the ‘rock and hard place’ it had fallen into.80 First and foremost, 
TOR was a safety control against reputational risk, criticism and budgetary attack. 
 Another benefit to TOR was that it was seemingly compatible with the 
regulatory approach first outlined by the CSHW. In a way, R2P2 was merely a 
restatement of existing principles and ideas. However, in presenting them 
straightforwardly, and relating them with developments since 1974—most notably the 
emergence of risk assessment—HSE synthesised a coherent vision of its regulatory 
philosophy. As with risk assessment, the ideas present within R2P2 were not a 
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complete innovation, but an ex post facto abstraction, borne out of political necessity. 
Yet, R2P2 cemented risk-based ideas in British health and safety regulation, and firmly 
established risk assessment as the sine qua non of hazard control. 
 As Hutter has explained, however, the systematisation of the HSE’s regulatory 
philosophy may have disadvantaged HSE in the long run. With transparency also 
came the potential for further political conflict: 
 
The systematisation of approaches to occupational health and safety led to a greater 
readiness to challenge regulatory demands and the tools of systematisation have emerged as 
tools of adversarial relations. The systematic approach to health and safety has proved to 
be double-edged. On the one hand it forces a much more serious and sustained focus on 
health and safety through such things as audits and performance indicators. But on the 
other hand it also leads to resistance to accept some regulatory demands.81 
 
An assumption underlying R2P2 was that, somehow, by opening up HSE’s decision-
making to wider public and political scrutiny, popular misconceptions (for example, 
the role of risk assessment) would be laid to rest, and affected groups would be more 
likely to accept its proposals as valid. This was patently false, for as I explain below, as 
the 1990s and early 2000s wore on, HSE came under unprecedented political assault. 
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6.7.  The Workplace and Public Health 
 
6.7.1.  Occupational Health in Britain 
Occupational health serves as an intriguing case study of HSE’s risk management 
approach. As we have seen, a common criticism of British health and safety regulation, 
voiced by interest groups, politicians and academics at various times before and after 
1974, is that it has paid insufficient attention to the health risks arising from work, and 
occupational health generally.82 Instead, regulators have tended to concentrate on 
safety issues, since physical injuries are in general more unambiguously connected to 
deficiencies in management or the work environment, and are therefore simpler and 
more economic to control. While occupational health was included within the HSWA, 
and the Employment Medical Advisory Service (EMAS) became part of the HSE in 
1975, critics have argued that the HSWA’s risk-based approach reduced the prospects 
for occupational health.83  
 Certainly, HSE’s ability to offer occupational health advice to industry and 
government was severely constrained by budgetary cuts and the collapse of EMAS’ 
field organisation in the 1990s. As part of the movement to contract-out government 
services, a 1994 Prior Options Review by HSE’s Director of Medical Services, Tim 
Carter, recommended that 20 per cent of EMAS’ role could be handed to external 
organisations. Reflecting the wider transformation in the British state, the role of 
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EMAS underwent a significant adjustment, from directly advising employers, to giving 
information to employers on where to find advice—a movement from direct service 
provision, to risk communication.84 The number of full-time Employment Medical 
Advisers decreased from over 30 in 1974, to just 10 in 2004. Overall, the number of 
professional EMAS staff halved between 1990 and 1998. As Greenberg argues, this 
was ‘ostensibly … an exercise in efficiency but essentially a practical consequence of 
the ideology of deregulation and disengagement.’85 Yet, it did take a personal toll on 
those in charge: as Carter recalled ‘roughly half the staff went that I was looking after 
…, I spent two really quite unhappy years taking things to pieces….86 
 Against this picture of deregulation and decline, it is tempting to resign British 
occupational health to history. However, the reconceptualisation of occupational health 
within the ambit of risk and deregulation also offered intriguing new possibilities for 
the field as the twentieth century drew to a close. Firstly, the risk management 
framework advanced by COSHH enabled a more systematic response to health 
hazards while greatly simplifying the law. Secondly, under the dominant paradigm of 
deregulation, there was pressure on regulators to express more forcibly the economic 
consequences of work-related ill health. As a result, during the 1990s the British 
workplace became identified not only as a site for the promotion of workers’ health, 
but also public health. 
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6.7.2.  The Conservatives and Occupational Health: The Health of the Nation 
The Conservatives developed their public health policy for England in the white paper 
The Health of the Nation, published in 1992.87 Following the major NHS reforms in 1990, 
Health of the Nation was significant because it ‘represented the first explicit attempt by 
government to provide a strategic approach to improving the overall health of the 
population.’88 Demonstrating some of the wider influences on public policy discussed 
above, including the use of performance targets, Health of the Nation identified accidents 
as a key area for action by government, the NHS, external organisations and 
agencies.89 Central to its approach was the idea of ‘active partnership’ or ‘healthy 
alliances’ between groups and individuals to secure health improvements, an idea that 
was consistent with health and safety policy and the neoliberal view there were 
fundamental limits to state intervention.90 
 It is illuminating why accidents were chosen as a specific area for intervention. 
Accidents, alongside other key areas such as HIV/AIDS, represented areas where 
there were the ‘greatest need and greatest scope for making cost-effective 
improvements in the overall health of the country.’91 Accordingly, it was noted 
‘accidents are an important cause of injury, disability and death, particularly in young 
and elderly people, and can very often be avoided.’92 Accidents constituted ‘the most 
common cause of death in people under 30 years…. Many are preventable by 
                                                
 
 
87  The Health of the Nation. A Strategy for Health in England, Cm 1986, 1992. 
88  Department of Health, The Health of the Nation—A Policy Assessed. Executive 
Summary. (London: TSO, 1998), 1. 
89  Health of the Nation, 3–4. 
90  Ibid., 5, ch. 3. 
91  Ibid., 15. 
92  Ibid., 17. 
 355 
information and education, and through measures like improved planning and design 
of the environment, education [and] better management in the workplace.’93 The 
government’s aim was to use information and education to promote public health, 
rather than placing unnecessary regulatory burdens on individuals and businesses.94 
Once again, risk communication was posited as an alternative to regulation and the 
direct provision of services. 
 Health of the Nation’s focus went beyond health and safety at work to include 
wider issues of public health and safety not regulated by HSC/E, such as consumer 
safety, domestic and road accidents. However, by identifying the workplace as a site 
where important improvements could be made, and highlighting employers as a major 
‘partner’ in this effort, occupational health became subordinated to the wider public 
health agenda. 
 
6.7.3.  Good Health is Good Business 
The government’s success in reducing workplace accidents rested in part on 
convincing employers of the positive economic case for health and safety. This 
endeavour gathered place over the 1990s, as the risk management approach to health 
and safety regulation solidified. While inspectors and other officials had made various 
efforts over the twentieth century to persuade employers of the economic benefits of 
health and safety, such as reduction in sickness and lost time, these efforts were often 
                                                
 
 
93  Ibid., 102. 
94  Ibid., 106. 
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hampered by the paucity of statistical information, particularly on occupational illness. 
Financial estimates of the costs to employers and the nation were thus unclear. 
 As HSE’s knowledge base improved over the 1990s, however, the prevalence and 
costs of work-related injury and ill-health could be more precisely assessed. A major 
turning point came in 1990, when the HSE included a trailer in the Labour Force 
Survey to evaluate self-reported ill-health among a sample of Britain’s entire 
workforce.95 The survey revealed that 2 million people were suffering from illnesses 
they believed were caused or made worse by work, and that an estimated 29 million 
working days were being lost as a result of occupational injury and ill-health. This 
compared to the 23 million lost working days reported by the CSHW in 1972, which 
drew upon more limited returns from the Department of Health and Social Security.96  
 Subsequent surveys, which were periodical until 2003/04, showed a growing 
prevalence of work-related ill-health. The prevalence rate of stress increased by 30 per 
cent between 1990 and 1995, while the prevalence rate of musculoskeletal disorders 
increased by 32 per cent. While this trend later declined, these surveys drew HSE’s 
attention to the wider problems of occupational ill-health in the early 1990s, stress and 
musculoskeletal disorders in particular (Figure 20).97  
                                                
 
 
95  “Health Risks: Programmes for Action,” 1993, 3–4, TNA EF7/3922. 
96   HSC, Annual Report 1990-91, x; Robens, Safety and Health at Work, 1. 
97   http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/lfs/swit3w12.xlsx. Accessed February 11, 
2016. 
 357 
Figure 20. Prevalence and rate of occupational stress and musculoskeletal disorders in England and 
Wales, 1990–2001/02.98 
 
 To a large extent, limitations in the methodological design of these surveys 
prevent the drawing of firm conclusions about trends in occupational ill-health. Firstly, 
they draw upon individuals’ subjective accounts of conditions, rather than expert 
diagnosis. Secondly, differences in the way data are aggregated mean that the surveys 
are not strictly comparable. Thus, the rise in prevalence of stress and musculoskeletal 
disorders between 1990 and 1995 might indicate methodological changes rather than 
any underlying differences in the extent of these conditions. Thirdly, analysts have 
highlighted the influence of social and cultural factors in shaping the public’s 
perception of stress, as well as structural changes in the British workplace. For 
                                                
 
 
98  http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/history. Accessed February 5, 2016. Figures 
for stress in 1990 include cases of hypertension, heart disease and strokes, 1998/99 
onwards include heart disease/attack and related conditions. 
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example, it has allegedly become more socially acceptable to talk about stress, so 
workers are more likely to report it. Industry fragmentation, labour market flexibility 
and increases in personal workloads are all seen to have contributed to an increase in 
worker stress since the 1990s.99 For these reasons, it is problematic to relate self-
reported occupational illness in the early 1990s to failures of HSE policy, though trade 
union campaigners have attributed problems such as stress to wider governmental 
failures (such as the promotion of labour market flexibility and long working hours) 
and bad management practice.100 
 Regardless of what caused this increase, whether it was real, or a statistical 
artefact, the compilation and publication of this data reoriented political attention to 
the consequences of occupational ill-health. So, while stress had been an early concern 
of the HSC—its Medical Advisory Committee had discussed work-related stress in 
1979/80—by the 1990s stress and other occupational illnesses had become considerable 
regulatory challenges.101 It is pertinent to note that considering the complex aetiology 
of occupational stress—it cannot be linked directly to the presence of physical hazards 
in the work environment—it was not amenable to regulation or enforcement as a health 
and safety issue in the same way as, for example, risks resulting from manual handling. 
Nevertheless, the HSE approached stress as a risk management issue, amenable to 
assessment and hence informed action on the part of employers. In 2004 they 
                                                
 
 
99  Andrew Smith et al., The Scale of Occupational Stress. The Bristol Stress and Health 
at Work Study, Contract Research Report 265/2000 (Sudbury: HSE Books, 2000); 
Ricardo Blaug, Amy Kenyon, and Rohit Lekhi, Stress at Work (London: The Work 
Foundation, 2007). 
100 See, e.g. “Get A Life! Don’t Be Worked Into the Ground. Hazards Factsheet 
78,” Hazards, 2002, http://www.hazards.org/haz78/getalife.pdf.  
101   HSC, Report 1979-80, 10. 
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published management standards highlighting the risk-factors of occupational stress, 
including workers’ ability to control their work.102 
 Following these surveys in the early 1990s, studies by HSE economists drew 
political attention to the huge costs of health and safety failures. Updating an earlier 
study in 1994, a 1999 study by Gordon and Risley argued that the total cost to British 
employers of health and safety failures amounted to £3.5–7.5 billion per year, or 4–8 
per cent of their gross profits. To the wider British economy, HSE estimated a cost of 
£2.9–4.2 billion, or 0.6–1.2 per cent of GDP.103  
 The HSC/E’s renewed focus on occupational health came from another 
prominent source: the law. In the late 1980s and 1990s, the proliferation of UK and 
European laws related to the management of health risks, not least COSHH and the 
MHSW regulations, encouraged HSC/E to reappraise their occupational health 
strategy. In 1993, HSE commissioned a series of reviews on the ten most prominent 
occupational health risks, resulting in 90 per cent of all causes of occupational ill-
health: chemical and biological agents, noise and vibration, ionising and non-ionising 
radiation, sick building syndrome, stress, manual handling, and upper limb disorders. 
The reviews suggested that HSE should pay more attention to how employers 
managed health risks, and evaluate the impact of its activities.104 By making the 
positive economic case for health and safety, the HSE could influence employers as 
well as lay further claim to political authority and legitimacy. 
                                                
 
 
102  See e.g. HSE, Good Health Is Good Business. Employers’ Guide. Phase 4. (Sudbury: 
HSE Books, 1999), 3. 
103  HSE, The Cost to Britain of Workplace Accidents and Work-Related Ill Health in 
1995/96 (Sudbury: HSE Books, 1999). 
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 It was against this complex background that HSE launched its largest 
promotional campaign to date, Good Health is Good Business, in May 1995. As its name 
suggests, the campaign was designed to increase employers’ (especially small firms’) 
awareness of occupational health, and sponsor a risk-based approach to control, by 
focusing on the positive financial and business case (for example, reductions in 
accidents and lost time, lower insurance premiums, increased profit and company 
reputation). A five-year strategy, Good Health is Good Business employed a multimedia 
approach, based on advertising, films, seminars, conferences and field activities.105 The 
campaign was conducted in three main phases, each concentrating on a particular class 
of health risk. Phase 1 focused on noise, musculoskeletal and respiratory disorders; 
phase 2 focused on occupational dermatitis and cancer (including asbestos-related 
cancer); and phase 3 on hand-arm vibration and solvents. A supplementary fourth 
phase was used to further convince employers of the need for action.106 An evaluation 
of the campaign in 2000 found some evidence to suggest that it was successful, 
including a statistically significant difference in the perception of risk management 
between firms that were ‘aware’ of the campaign and those that were ‘unaware’. 
However, problems relating to selection bias prevented the drawing of firm 
conclusions.107 
 
                                                
 
 
105  M. Wright et al., Evaluation of the Good Health Is Good Business Campaign, 
Contract Research Report 272/2000 (Sudbury: HSE Books, 2000), 1–2. 
106  HSE, Good Health Is Good Business. Employers’ Guide. Phase 4. (Sudbury: HSE 
Books, 1999), Foreword. 
107  Wright et al., Evaluation of the Good Health Is Good Business Campaign. 
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6.7.4.  New Labour and Occupational Health: Our Healthier Nation and Securing 
Health Together 
Following Labour’s election victory in 1997, occupational health once again became 
linked to the wider public health agenda. Labour’s public health policy, Our Healthier 
Nation (1998), also identified the workplace as an important site for improving the 
health of the general population, alongside locations such as neighbourhoods and 
schools.108 Accident prevention was once again chosen as an objective, with a target to 
decrease the overall accident rate by a fifth by 2010.109 
 The differences in approach between The Health of the Nation and Our Healthier 
Nation help illuminate the wider governmental trends that impacted health and safety 
under the ‘third way’ ideology of New Labour. As in Health of the Nation, regulation or 
legislation was not the goal of Labour’s policy, and indeed was to be avoided unless 
strictly necessary: 
 
Where old threats to health continue or new threats arise we will not hesitate to legislate or 
regulate if this is judged to be necessary. But we will seek to engage the active support of 
the people affected rather than resort to coercion or unwarranted intrusion…. Regulation 
and legislation should be the exception—not the rule—a step taken only where voluntary 
action will not sufficiently protect the public’s health.110 
                                                
 
 
108  Another important step in Labour’s public health policy was the establishment 
of the post of Minister of Public Health, first occupied by Tessa Jowell. 
109  Our Healthier Nation defined the accident in a much wider sense than HSE, in 
accordance with its wider public health aims. It defined accidents as ‘those which 
involve a hospital visit or consultation with a family doctor.’ Department of Health, 
Our Healthier Nation. A Contract for Health, Cm. 3852, 1998, 68. 
110  Ibid., 35. 
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Here, in its public health policy and elsewhere, ‘New Labour’ co-opted the language of 
the political right to forge a new social democratic consensus. Prevailing ideas about 
‘burdens on business’ remained intact beneath the political rhetoric of ‘better 
regulation’.111 The widespread use of the language of partnership in Our Healthier Nation 
circumscribed the role of the government in public health and emphasised the 
importance of individual responsibility. As the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott 
explained in 1999: 
 
We … need to make sure that our approach to regulation continues to be appropriate for 
the changing world of work as we enter the next millennium, but without simply adding 
new and unnecessary regulatory burdens to business, especially small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Our aim must be to reduce the rate of workplace accidents and ill-health still 
further, crucially by working with all stakeholders to demonstrate that a healthy, well 
protected workforce is not only right, but is good for business and good for society.112 
 
The political reconfigurations that accompanied ‘New Labour’ nevertheless had 
significant ramifications for health and safety. In Our Healthier Nation, Labour laid out 
its new political philosophy by way of a ‘national contract for better health’. This 
envisaged an important, continuing role for the state in public health, albeit one which 
sought to avoid the ‘two extremes [of] individual victim blaming on the one hand and 
                                                
 
 
111  See Beck and Woolfson, “The Regulation of Health and Safety in Britain,” 35–
49. 
112  HC Deb 30 March 1999 vol. 328 col. 586W. 
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nanny state social engineering on the other.’113 Accordingly, while the state’s role was 
seen to be ‘national coordination and leadership’ and the development of informed, 
evidence-based policy, individuals were urged to take greater responsibility for their 
health, and adopt healthy lifestyles. Tackling health inequalities was one of the major 
differences setting apart Labour’s public health policy from that of the Conservatives, 
despite health inequalities having surfaced in government policy as early as the 1980 
Black Report.114 
 Most importantly, while individual responsibility was seen to be vital, Labour 
accepted that it could not be promoted without supportive frameworks, such as 
community-based initiatives. For the public to make better, healthier choices, they 
needed to be better informed. Risk assessment and communication were thus further 
engrained in British public policy as the government’s main responsibilities: ‘It is the 
job of the Government to identify risks to health, to assess them, and, where 
appropriate, either take action to reduce those risks or ensure that people who might 
be affected are aware of them.’115  
 On a practical level, too, Our Healthier Nation had significant implications for 
health and safety policy. As part of the HSE’s contribution to Our Healthier Nation, the 
‘Healthy Workplace Initiative’, launched in 1999, concentrated on the areas of health 
risk most expensive to employers and society, such as back pain. HSE also embarked 
on a comprehensive review of its own occupational health activity. In Securing Health 
                                                
 
 
113  Department of Health, Our Healthier Nation, 28–30. 
114  Department of Health and Social Security, Inequalities in Health. Report of a 
Research Group (London: HMSO, 1980). 
115  Department of Health, Our Healthier Nation, 34. 
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Together (2000), HSE launched a ten-year strategic programme, drawing upon an 
explicit partnership approach bringing together government, local authorities, trade 
unions, employers and health professionals.116 Securing Health Together is notable 
because it represented, for the first time, HSC/E’s explicit adoption of targets to 
improve occupational health.117 As HSE explained, ‘the working environment is an 
ideal setting to promote the health of workers and the public alike.’118 Five main 
programmes were initiated to achieve these targets, relating to ‘compliance’, 
‘continuous improvement’, ‘knowledge’, ‘skills’ and ‘support mechanisms’.119 Both the 
Good Health is Good Business campaign and Healthy Workplace Initiative were seen to 
contribute to these programmes. 
 
6.7.5.  Occupational Health: Decline, Resurgence or Reconfiguration? 
As my analysis has suggested, it is overly simplistic to suggest either that occupational 
health completely withered away over the 1990s (as per Long or Greenberg), or that it 
greatly increased in importance and political priority (as per the HSE). Rather, with 
the changing role of the British state and the cementation of risk management, the role 
of occupational health was reconfigured. As British industry fragmented, the direct 
                                                
 
 
116  HSC and HSE, Securing Health Together. A Long-Term Occupational Health Strategy 
for England, Scotland and Wales (Sudbury: HSE Books, 2000). 
117  These targets included a 20 per cent reduction in the incidence of work-related 
ill-health by 2010, a 20 per cent reduction in ill-health to members of the public 
affected by work activity, and a 30 per cent reduction in the number of work days lost 
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and Safety strategy (see below). 
118  HSC and HSE, Securing Health Together, v. 
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 365 
provision of occupational health services declined. The HSE’s own capacity to provide 
occupational health services to industry also disintegrated with the downsizing of 
EMAS. However, at the same time, HSE’s commitment to the assessment, 
communication and management of health risks deepened, as evidenced by the Good 
Health is Good Business campaign and the various public health strategies in the 1990s. 
 This commitment to occupational health management, as opposed to occupational 
health promotion in the more ‘holistic’ manner referred to by Long, stemmed from three 
main imperatives: the subordination of occupational health to the wider public health 
agenda; growing political concern about the costs of occupational ill-health; and the 
recognised need for regulators to capitalise on the legislative developments of the 1980s 
and early 1990s (in particular, European legislation). These imperatives, in turn, were 
interwoven with wider governmental trends that entrenched risk management, notably 
the cementation of the ‘burdens on business’ rhetoric. As we have seen, the rise of 
‘New Labour’ did nothing to halt this trend.  
 Risk management offered an approach to regulation that was politically 
attractive, ostensibly transparent, and cost-effective both to employers and 
government. Just as TOR acted as a universal defence of HSE’s decision-making, risk 
management offered the HSE a universal escape clause for occupational health. 
Through risk management, HSE could claim to be doing more and more about 
occupational health (for example by identifying and communicating risks) at the same 
time that its direct involvement became less and less (for example through field-based 
expertise). Hence the attraction for a regulator under unprecedented scrutiny and 
financial constraint. 
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 The debates around occupational health reflected a wider anxiety about health 
and safety regulation as the twentieth century ended. A gulf had seemingly opened, 
that while British health and safety regulation was seemingly ‘successful’ (in 1999, the 
rate of fatal workplace accidents was 72 per cent lower than in 1974, deaths from 
silicosis had almost halved, and the rate of non-fatal injury among employees had 
declined by 22 per cent since 1986), public confusion and antipathy towards it was 
growing.120 It is this antipathy the chapter now examines, highlighting how, by the end 
of the 1990s, an insidious ‘health and safety gone mad’ rhetoric had become embedded 
in British media discourse. In response, HSE and the Labour government attempted to 
‘relaunch the health and safety agenda’ and recapture some of the original spirit of the 
Robens philosophy.121 Ostensibly, this had been lost in the quarter of a century since 
the HSWA, despite its core ideas having become engrained in the regulatory 
framework. 
 
6.8.  Return to Robens? 
 
6.8.1.  'Gone Mad': Media Origins and Representation of Health and Safety, 1992–
2015 
In this final section of Chapter 6, I analyse the contradictions that accompanied public 
and political scepticism around British health and safety regulation in the 1990s, and 
                                                
 
 
120  See Appendices II–IV. Mesothelioma clearly stands in stark contrast to these 
trends. 
121  DETR, Revitalising Health and Safety. Strategy Statement (London: DETR, 2000), 
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their impact on HSC/E policy. As highlighted above, the rapid transposition of a 
swathe of European health and safety law into UK legislation through the ‘six-pack’ in 
1992/93 was accompanied by growing public scepticism of health and safety regulation 
and political scrutiny of the HSC/E. The obligation to produce written risk 
assessments was questioned by some small businesses and their representatives, some 
of whom demanded a return to the prescriptive style of regulation under the Factories 
Act. Confusion also developed about how the European directives and the requirement 
for written risk assessment fitted in with each other and the UK legislative framework. 
As regulator, HSE was accused by some sectors of the business community, such as 
the IOD, of ‘gold plating’ European legislation by going further than was legally 
necessary.122 The scale and speed of these changes not only encouraged HSC/E to 
petition the European Commission for a slowdown in its legislative programme, but 
also to explain their decision-making more closely to duty-holders. Besides R2P2, this 
was demonstrated in several other HSE publications in the 1990s and early 2000s. For 
example, in 1995 HSE published a detailed explanation of its enforcement policy. 
Further, the January 1994 leaflet Five Steps to Risk Assessment explained the risk 
assessment process to employers in clear, accessible prose (Figure 21). HSE 
distributed almost 3.3 million copies between 1994 and 2004.123 
                                                
 
 
122  As Bacon argued, ‘there were a number of occasions when we gold-plated. It’s 
one of the reasons why on the whole health and safety legislation in this country was 
seen as being the leader others ought to follow…. [T]hose that were in the know 
recognised that the gold plating might actually have a gold payback.’ Bacon, Interview, 
pt. 1. 
123  Institute of Employment Studies, An Evaluation of the Five Steps to Risk Assessment, 
Research Report 476 (Sudbury: HSE Books, 2006), vii. 
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Figure 21. Five steps to risk assessment.124 
STEP	1	 Look	for	the	hazard	
STEP	2	 Decide	who	might	be	harmed	and	how	
STEP	3	 Evaluate	the	risks	and	decide	whether	the	
existing	precautions	are	adequate	or	
whether	more	should	be	done	
STEP	4	 Record	your	findings	
STEP	5	 Review	your	assessment	and	revise	it	if	
necessary	
 
 Despite these measures, the right-wing Eurosceptic press identified health and 
safety as part of a wider problem of bureaucracy and red tape. In a 1993 article, the 
Daily Mail argued how ‘there are health regulations, safety regulations, fire regulations, 
food regulations, government regulations [sic], European regulations, council 
regulations. And in every corner of the country there are officials to see that these 
regulations are obeyed. Or else.’125 The article blamed overregulation not on Europe or 
even local authorities, but on ‘Her Majesty’s Government, the politicians at 
Westminster and civil servants in Whitehall, who between them … act to an extent 
which burdens every business in Britain.’ The article went on to invite readers to send 
in their own examples of ‘bureaucracy gone mad’.126  
 The Daily Mail had evidently struck a nerve, for over the following years it 
published a slew of stories on red tape and overregulation, its campaign fuelled in part 
                                                
 
 
124  HSE, Five Steps to Risk Assessment, Sudbury: HSE Books, 1999. 
125  M. Toner, “Basil Fawlty Takes on the Bureaucrats,” Daily Mail, February 27, 
1993. 
126  Ibid. 
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by a steady stream of letters from the public. A 1995 article by the journalist 
Christopher Booker and the food hygienist-cum-political analyst Richard North drew 
attention to contradictions and inconsistencies in health and safety regulation on a 
dairy farm.127 Booker’s and North’s campaign to encourage the government to ‘tackle 
the tide of bureaucracy drowning so many small businesses’ allegedly received over 
20,000 letters between 1992 and 1995, prompting the Deputy Prime Minister, Michael 
Heseltine, to respond, ‘nobody in their right mind would simply sweep regulations 
affecting health, safety and the environment into the dustbin of history.’128  
 It was not until the early 2000s that health and safety specifically began to be 
latched on as perhaps the single greatest area of overregulation and unnecessary 
bureaucracy in Britain. Conflating statutory law with civil litigation, the Daily Mail 
began to publish a regular series of articles on Britain’s ‘health and safety culture’, 
transforming what was in effect HSC/E’s ultimate goal into the nub of a national joke. 
This included a widely reprinted story in 2002 that alleged schools had banned pupils 
playing conkers owing to health and safety guidelines.129 Later in the decade, 
investigative journalists took up the mantle in television documentaries, as 
demonstrated by Channel 4’s Cutting Edge: The Fun Police and BBC Panorama’s May 
Contain Nuts in 2009.130 By the 2010s, health and safety had become a staple, if 
increasingly tired subject for stand-up comedians. Ben Elton’s sitcom The Wright Way, 
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about a pedantic Environmental Health Officer, was axed after just one series in 2013, 
with The Telegraph referring to it as ‘political correctness gone mad’.131 The public and 
media discourse surrounding health and safety became so damaging to HSE that in 
2012 it set up a Myth Busters Challenge Panel, headed by its chair, Judith Hackitt, to 
‘provid[e] a mechanism for anyone … who receives advice or its told that a decision 
has been taken in the name of health and safety that they believe to be disproportionate 
or inaccurate, to challenge that advice.’132 The panel subsequently published its top ten 
myths about health and safety, to show that many of the supposed decisions made on 
health and safety grounds did not in fact have a basis in legislation. These included the 
conkers myth, trapeze artists being told to wear hard hats, and the banning of hanging 
baskets to prevent people hitting their heads.133 
 In the early 1990s, however, such overt criticism had yet to mature: health and 
safety was identified, as already described, as part of a wider problem of overregulation 
and red tape. Nevertheless, this rhetoric did have an impact on the way health and 
safety was regulated, as demonstrated by HSE publications such as Five Steps to Risk 
Assessment which aimed, similarly, to demystify health and safety and make regulation 
more accessible. However, unlike the judgments of the Myth Busters Challenge Panel 
in the 2010s, in the 1990s the HSE intended these publications to be consumed by 
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safety officers and duty holders, rather than the general public. While the public’s role 
as a key stakeholder in British health and safety policy was recognised in the 1990s, at 
this stage the HSE mainly attempted to correct misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations among those with direct legal responsibilities. 
 
6.8.2.  Revitalising Health and Safety 
It was amidst such public and media criticism of health and safety that the Labour 
government, under the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, attempted to ‘inject 
new impetus and relaunch the health and safety agenda.’134 The ‘Revitalising Health 
and Safety Initiative’, launched in March 1999, acknowledged the HSWA’s 
importance in lowering rates of fatal injury at work. However, echoing the moral and 
economic sentiments of Robens, 25 years on there were still too many deaths at work: 
‘Each death or serious injury in the workplace is a tragedy; a tragedy that causes 
devastation for workers, their families and loved ones; a tragedy which, perhaps could 
have been avoided in the first place…. We estimate that the total cost to society of 
health and safety failures could be as high as £18 billion every year. We can and should 
do something about this.’ The time was ripe, the government argued, for ‘new energy 
and a new strategic direction.’135  
 Revitalising stemmed in part from the Labour government’s belief that the 
European and UK legal framework for health and safety was now complete: ‘sown up’, 
in the words of HSE’s former Director-General, Jenny Bacon.136 It also stemmed from 
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a fundamental conviction in the underlying principles of the HSWA. With the making 
of new general regulations such as COSHH and MHSW, it was assumed, there was 
less need to make new health and safety regulations than in the past—only update the 
general regulations, as scientific knowledge developed. Moreover, as risk management 
became established in British regulatory practice, the onus for controlling risk was now 
placed on the employer. The government’s priority now, revealingly, was ‘to convert 
legal standards into real changes in culture and behaviour in the workplace.’137 As 
Revitalising described, the focus of regulatory efforts should be on ‘ideas capable of 
adding value to the current system without threatening its overall balance…. [W]hile 
appropriate enforcement and deterrence is crucial, this must not be at the expense of 
promoting voluntary compliance and models of excellence.’138 The defining principle of 
the post-1974 regulatory framework, self-regulation, was thus sacrosanct.  
 As in 1972, it was believed that the legislative and regulatory framework had 
contributed to a decline in fatal accidents. However, once again—as in the 1960s—the 
government perceived this decline to be plateauing.139 As the CBI argued to the Select 
Committee on the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs in 1999, ‘in the light 
of the introduction of the framework directive and supplementary directives and the 
development over the last ten years of an extensive body of health and safety 
regulation, HSE should now shift its focus from policy to greater promotion and 
enforcement activities in order to improve standards.’140  
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 Within this self-imposed rhetorical confine, the scope for government 
intervention was much diminished. As in the Robens Report, the focus of Revitalising 
was the promotion of better attitudes, as opposed to regulation. To placate critics of 
this approach, including the TUC, Labour emphasised its pumping of financial 
resources into HSE, its increases in ‘regulatory contacts’ and prosecutions. However, 
health and safety could only be improved if the government actively engaged with 
stakeholders (particularly small firms) and developed its partnership approach: ‘Good 
regulation is about decent standards and protection for everyone, not bureaucracy and 
red tape.’141  
 As Tombs and Whyte have argued, Revitalising represented ‘a significant shift 
closer to a market-based system of regulation’.142 The development of a ‘Ready 
Reckoner’ under Revitalising’s action plan, for instance, drew upon insurance data to 
convince employers of the positive financial case for health and safety management.143 
Further, the strategy considered the use of direct financial incentives, such as grants, to 
encourage investment in safety by small firms.144 Revitalising’s emphasis on guidance, 
education and legislative simplification also represented the incorporation of market-
based approaches in British health and safety regulation, a phenomenon also evidenced 
in the contracting-out of HSE’s work. 
 As in Securing Health Together, Revitalising adopted ambitious targets to drive 
improvements in health and safety. Four targets were adopted: to reduce the number 
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of working days lost per 100,000 workers from work-related injury and ill-health by 30 
per cent by 2010; to reduce the incidence rate of fatal and major injury accidents by 10 
per cent by 2010; to reduce the incidence rate of cases of work-related ill-health by 20 
per cent by 2010; and to achieve half the improvement under each target by 2004145. 
Underpinning these targets was a ten-point strategy emphasising ‘the importance of 
promoting better working environments to deliver a more competitive economy, motivating 
employers to improve their health and safety performance, and simplifying over-complicated 
regulations.’146 
 Bacon was rather cynical about the motives behind Revitalising, describing it as 
‘an unnecessary, unhelpful piece of work.’147 She argued that the strategy represented a 
rhetorical gesture on the part of Labour, an attempt to make a mark on an important 
issue (on the symbolically significant occasion of the HSWA’s 25thh anniversary), rather 
than a genuine drive to tackle workplace accidents and disease. While Labour had 
expressed little interest in health and safety before 2000, and although the government 
had already conducted several reviews of HSC/E in the 1990s, Prescott announced 
another review of health and safety. According to Bacon, on hearing this ‘some of us 
just sort of went down on the table.’148 The use of performance targets constrained 
HSE’s work and provided an inflexible tool for promoting health and safety. In any 
case, statistics could be easily altered, fiddled or buried: although a 2009 progress 
report showed that HSE was ‘on track’ to meet the target concerning fatal and major 
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injury, HSE was trailing behind its target to reduce the incidence of work-related ill-
health.149 As Bacon concluded, ‘I think it’s fair to say that health and safety was 
remarkably low down [Labour’s] agenda. Remarkably so. It [was] much higher up the 
Tories’: for all the Tories might have been attacking and questioning, they paid far 
more attention to health and safety and what was going on and what should go on than 
Labour did.’150   
 
6.8.3.  Reinventing Robens? 
It is tempting to interpret Revitalising simply as a reaffirmation or elaboration of the 
Robens philosophy of health and safety regulation, some 25 years after the passage of 
the HSWA. As I have argued extensively in this thesis, the core components of HSE’s 
risk management approach were embodied in the Robens Report, HSWA, and the pre-
1974 inspectorates. It took the social, political and economic conditions of the 1980s 
and 1990s to make these ideas explicit, and relate them together in a systematic way. 
As Tombs and Whyte have shown, there was a certain symmetry between the Robens 
philosophy and the neoliberal approach to regulation that emerged in the 1980s: an 
emphasis on self-regulation, voluntary compliance, and the use of prescriptive 
regulations and punitive enforcement as weapons of last resort.151 However, this 
interpretation downplays the changing social, political, economic and industrial 
environment of the intervening years. The Robens Report was written in a very 
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different social context. An analysis of Revitalising in comparison with the 1972 Robens 
Report illuminates what—if anything—had fundamentally changed in the 25 years 
since the HSWA. For four main reasons, I argue, Revitalising did not embody the same 
reformist spirit of the CSHW. 
 Firstly, Revitalising reflected a work environment that had changed greatly since 
the 1970s and which obscured many of the CSHW’s basic principles. For example, as 
industry fragmented and the government began to contract-out services, it was often 
difficult to define who had primary responsibility for managing health and safety, thus 
the widespread emphasis on guidance and education. 
 Secondly, the emphasis on ‘partnership’ went much further than the CSHW, who 
primarily concentrated on a tripartite relationship between employers, employees and 
the state. Although ‘partnership’ can be seen as an elaboration of the Committee’s basic 
idea that special interests need to be incorporated into policymaking, the language of 
partnership further relegated the role of the state. Under the partnership mentality, 
statutory intervention was thought to be ineffective without the wider support of 
partner organisations. The CSHW, on the other hand, merely aimed for an adjustment 
in the relative weight of statutory and voluntary effort. 
 Thirdly, the CSHW took the pragmatic view that the weight of prescriptive 
legislation should be reduced, because the existing body of prescriptive legislation was 
beginning to suffer from diminishing returns. Revitalising, on the other hand, stemmed 
from an ideological standpoint, that regulations produced ‘burdens on business’.  
 Finally, while the Robens Report was written at a time when the trade unions 
were at their strongest, Revitalising was produced at a time when their power had 
dramatically declined. The deunionisation of the workforce and fragmentation of 
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industry meant that a much wider range of interests had to be accommodated in the 
policymaking process. The consultation framework was now much more diffuse, and 
power less centralised among the main representative organisations: the TUC and CBI 
could no longer claim to definitely speak for all British workers or employers. These 
changes also had ramifications for HSE’s enforcement policy, since it was now even 
more difficult, under limited resources, for inspectors to directly intervene in most 
workplaces. Risk and market-based approaches to health and safety regulation 
colonised this vacuum, as the state intervened less and less directly in the work 
environment. 
 In summary, Revitalising was no reinvention of Robens. Through risk, the British 
state created a mechanism that allowed it to abrogate its former duties for protecting 
workers’ health, and assume a more indirect regulatory role.  
 
6.9.  Conclusion 
As discussed previously, the HSC/E was by no means unique among British regulators 
in systematising its risk-based approach to regulation in the 1990s and early 2000s. The 
Financial Services Authority, established in 2001, was another regulatory body that 
outlined a risk-based approach, albeit in a very different field.152 ILGRA’s work 
demonstrates how the commitment to develop thinking on risk was government-wide, 
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and coherent with the principles for proportionality, accountability, consistency, 
transparency and targeting in regulation.153  
 On the other hand, the HSE was the most prominent and earliest example in 
Britain of a regulator that adopted an explicit risk management approach, and this 
merits closer attention.154 Publications such as R2P2 cemented HSE’s leadership in 
risk management, and capitalised on over 25 years of technical expertise in controlling 
workplace hazards (or well over a century, if one includes HSE’s predecessors). HSE’s 
leadership was demonstrated on ILGRA, which HSE chaired and provided an 
opportunity for it to promulgate its regulatory philosophy across government. One 
reason why an explicitly risk-based approach developed relatively early in HSE 
compared to other regulators was because the nub of it—the idea of securing a balance 
between the control of hazard and time, trouble and expense—was built in to its 
legislative mandate and enforcement style. Utility-based concerns, this thesis has 
shown, have long been dominant among the HSE’s (and its predecessors’) 
preoccupations, arguably dating back to the earliest statutory interventions in the 
working environment. It took the political and economic pressures of the last two 
decades of the twentieth century, however, to fully elaborate the criteria that 
influenced HSE’s decisions. 
 In regard to the notion of ‘balance’, the elaboration of HSE’s risk-based approach 
helped the regulator survive the successive deregulatory drives that swept British 
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government in the 1980s and 1990s. Risk provided a handy multi-functional device 
that allowed HSE to legitimise its activities from multiple fronts. Through risk, the 
HSE could claim to be fully protecting workers and operating at optimum efficiency, 
at the same time that pressure on its resources mounted. In this thesis, I have shown 
how HSC/E’s field of responsibility expanded enormously over the last third of the 
twentieth century. However, in 2000, HSE has just 63 additional inspectors in post 
compared to 1980. Its overall staffing (including administrative staff) had fallen by 
almost 300.155 Questions, of course, emerged about the true nature of this ‘balance’: the 
focus on partnership, according to the London Hazards Centre, facilitated the 
exploitation of workers by negligent employers.156 Nevertheless, HSE’s fundamental 
existence as health and safety watchdog was secured. 
 Paradoxically, however, the elaboration of risk management also served to 
entrench the deregulatory agenda and further facilitate the withdrawal of the state 
from direct intervention in the work environment. By the 1990s, the British state had 
adopted a more indirect, supervisory role, one in which risk identification and 
communication took the place of legislation and enforcement. This issue once again 
brings us back to Robens: supposedly, the basic idea behind the post-1974 (HSWA) 
system was to facilitate self-regulation and thus moderate the role of the state. From 
Robens’ perspective, a more compact and efficient, even non-existent regulator was a 
basic response to health and safety becoming integrated as a fundamental part of 
business: logically, deregulation was an outcome of the system’s success. However, an 
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analysis of the period 1992–2001 reveals that the state’s changing role was more down 
to ideology than any practical success of ‘self-regulation’. 
 As the Labour government recognised in 1999, ‘the full potential of Robens’ 
vision … is yet to be realised.’157 The £18 billion cost to society of health and safety 
failures, the continuing high rate of occupational fatalities, the plateauing decline in the 
number of workplace injuries: these demonstrated the failure of self-regulation, despite 
notable improvements since 1974. Considering these statistics, arguably more should 
have been done to fund the HSE, increase the number of inspectors, proactive 
workplace visits, levels of fines imposed in the courts, and so on. The reason why this 
did not occur (or occurred only to a limited degree) was because of the entrenchment 
of neoliberal ideas surrounding regulation and the role of the state. The risk-based 
approach to regulation supported the assumption that regulation (and over-
enforcement) produced burdens on business. Thus, the risk-based approach to 
regulation was less a response to the occupational risks confronted by workers, than an 
institutional response to the political, economic and reputational risks confronted by 
HSC/E.   
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7.  Conclusion: Health and Safety in the 
British Regulatory State 
 
7.1.  Risk and the Regulatory State 
This thesis has addressed a complex and important historical question: how and why 
did the British system of health and safety regulation develop between 1961 and 2001? 
In recent years, health and safety has assumed an increasingly prominent position in 
our work and public lives. However, the field has also attracted unprecedented public 
and political scrutiny, with news stories alleging that health and safety has gone too far, 
and recent government policy identifying health and safety as part of a culture of 
overregulation, bureaucracy and red tape.1 In order to examine the place health and 
safety has come to occupy in our lives, I have argued, it is necessary to understand the 
system of laws and standards that has structured efforts to prevent accidents and ill-
health. It is also necessary to understand the state’s evolving approach to health and 
safety: the pressures on the regulatory bodies, both within and outside the British 
government, that negotiated, administrated and enforced health and safety policy. This 
thesis has drawn upon a diverse range of sources to achieve these objectives. Tapping 
in to a rich vein of archival evidence, published sources as well as oral history 
interviews, I have shown that the British system of health and safety regulation was 
dominated by two interrelated trends. 
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 Firstly, the British state’s role in regulating health and safety underwent a 
profound transformation between 1961 and 2001. While voluntarist principles had 
long informed British health and safety regulation, in the last third of the twentieth 
century, the British state found both the legislative and philosophical means to 
progressively distance itself from direct intervention in the workplace.2 The HSWA 
1974, most significantly, wedded a voluntarist regulatory ethos with a goal-based legal 
framework, placing the onus for securing safe and hygienic working conditions on 
employers and workers themselves. The HSC/E were established as regulatory 
agencies outside the day-to-day control of central government, with the representative 
HSC assuming policymaking functions previously carried out by government 
departments. From the 1980s, deregulatory pressures encouraged the further pruning 
and simplification of legislation, while financial pressure and government oversight 
encouraged greater operational efficiency and political transparency in HSC/E. The 
British state adopted a more supervisory guise, providing mechanisms and tools (such 
as risk assessment) by which risk could be managed, and responsibility shifted onto 
those with direct control of the workplace. The state’s role changed, not diminished: as 
older approaches fell out favour (for example prescriptive, command-and-control 
legislation), other approaches were adopted or emphasised (such as risk 
communication). A new regulatory state emerged, exerting its influence over our lives 
more indirectly. 
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 Secondly, the concept of risk itself underwent a major transformation in British 
regulatory discourse. As my thesis has shown, risk did not feature significantly in 
British health and safety regulation before the 1970s, either conceptually or literally. 
Instead, British health and safety regulation was oriented to the elimination or control 
of hazards: anything which had the potential to cause harm to people, regardless of 
their likelihood or severity. In order to promote a more self-regulatory approach to 
health and safety, however, the HSWA incorporated risk-based ideas, such as that 
employers should implicitly assess risks when drawing up safety policies. From the 
1970s, HSC/E gradually honed and elaborated this risk-based approach, making 
explicit ideas and principles which were previously implicit or unstated in regulatory 
discourse (such as the demand for risk assessment). In more recent years, HSC/E 
systematised their risk-based approach as a way of explaining their decision-making 
and securing the support of government and stakeholders. In the regulatory state, risk 
was an important way for the HSC/E to legitimise their activity, and demonstrate they 
had taken informed and cost-effective decisions. 
 To further deconstruct and unpack these trends, my concluding analysis cuts 
across the chronological timeframes of my previous chapters. In explaining the 
development of the British state’s role in health and safety regulation, I make use of 
four labels, ‘command and control,’ ‘self-regulation’, ‘deregulation’ and ‘risk 
management’, which help define particular phases in the statutory transition. These 
phases were not discrete, but rather overlapped with and built on each other, which is 
why they cannot be precisely dated. However, they provide a snapshot of the state’s 
role at particular moments in time, and hence must be seen by the reader as heuristics 
which help make sense of historical developments. 
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7.2.  The Shifting State 
 
7.2.1.  Command and Control 
In Chapters 1 and 2, I explored the development of the British system of health and 
safety regulation under a very different legal and conceptual framework to the one that 
emerged after 1974—a framework I referred to as the Factories Act model of 
regulation. I examined the reasons why, by 1970, British government officials, trade 
unionists and others with an interest in health and safety had begun to question the 
effectiveness of this model, which had evolved piecemeal since the early nineteenth 
century. By 1961, I argued, the British system of health and safety regulation had 
developed into a vast and fragmented mass of law. Four separate Acts governed 
workers’ health and safety, while other statutes extended control over particular 
hazards and industrial processes. In effect, there was not one ‘system’ of health and 
safety regulation, but several; before 1963, up to 16 million British workers fell 
through the gaps of statutory coverage.3 
 At this time, the British government regulated health and safety directly. 
Responsibility for health and safety regulation fell to particular government 
departments, such as the MOL, which administrated the statutes extending statutory 
protection against occupational accidents and disease (such as the Factories Act). 
Existing legislation tended to be highly prescriptive, and focused on particular hazards. 
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That is, the law advanced detailed requirements for a wide range of working 
conditions, and gave employers little flexibility in how they chose to comply (this is 
known as command and control legislation). The concept of risk did not figure 
prominently in either health and safety legislation or rhetoric. While the British 
government and Factory Inspectorate attempted to encourage voluntary effort and 
responsibility on the part of employers and workers (what they termed ‘safety 
consciousness’), legislation was highly specific, directly telling employers and workers 
what they needed to do. 
 By the mid 1960s, however, a unique combination of circumstances converged 
that raised suspicions among officials that the existing regulatory approach was 
beginning to falter. The industrial accident trend, in particular, cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of prescriptive legislation. New risks were emerging, particularly in the 
occupational health field, which required new approaches and ways of thinking on the 
part of regulators and industry (such as environmental monitoring). Industrial 
disasters, notably Aberfan (1966) and Flixborough (1974), demonstrated the 
increasingly delocalised character of occupational risks, those captured by Ulrich Beck 
in Risk Society: risks could now extend far beyond the work gates, causing catastrophic 
and irreversible harm to the wider public and environment.4  In turn, these risks and 
disasters exposed the reactive and piecemeal character of existing legislation, not only 
suggesting that a more proactive approach to risk was needed, but bringing into relief 
the need for health and safety legislation to protect the public, not only workers. 
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 Economic and political developments were particularly important in the 1960s 
and early 1970s not only in focusing regulatory attention on aspects of workplace 
safety organisation, such as safety committees, but creating an environment conducive 
to statutory intervention and regulatory reform. For example, concerns about Britain’s 
industrial competitiveness and the growing problem of strikes encouraged the state to 
intervene more directly in the workplace. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the so-
called ‘post-war consensus’ in British politics began to come under pressure, with both 
the 1964–70 Labour and 1970–74 Conservative governments experimenting with 
interventionist industrial relations policies.5 
 It was in this complex context that the Employment and Productivity Secretary, 
Barbara Castle, appointed the CSHW to review the operation of the existing system. 
The CSHW’s important role has been extensively discussed before, but never to the 
extent or detail as this thesis, which has drawn extensively upon archive material.6 The 
Committee argued, in a nutshell, that the existing regulatory system no longer served 
the interests of workers and employers. Vast, piecemeal and overly prescriptive, 
existing law generated widespread confusion, and promoted inertia on the part of 
employers and workers.7 The Committee’s solution was a radical overhaul of the 
British state’s approach to health and safety. Voluntary effort, or ‘self-regulation’, was 
considered to be the most effective means of preventing occupational accidents and 
disease in the first instance. The existing state apparatus—both legislative and 
administrative—should be reconfigured to promote voluntary effort on the part of 
                                                
 
 
5  Kessler and Bayliss, Contemporary British Industrial Relations, 16–7. 
6  e.g. Beck and Woolfson, “The Regulation of Health and Safety in Britain.” 
7  Robens, Safety and Health at Work, 1. 
 388 
employers and workers. Among the Committee’s many recommendations was a single, 
comprehensive Act applying to all employees and ‘third persons’ at risk from work 
activity, as well as the establishment of a National Authority for Safety and Health 
(NASHW), to act as an institutional focus for health and safety. With a few significant 
changes, most notably the separation of the NASHW into a distinct Commission and 
Executive, the CSHW’s proposals were enacted in the HSWA, passed in July 1974. 
 
7.2.2.  Self-Regulation 
The HSC/E had many distinctive features which reflected the British state’s changing 
relationship with health and safety regulation in the 1970s. Reflecting the 
contemporary zeal for corporatism, the HSC was composed of TUC, CBI and local 
authority members, who took the lead from government departments in developing 
new regulations, standards and codes of practice. As with other bodies established 
around this time, such as the Manpower Services Commission, the HSC/E were 
established as quangos outside central government; this was to ensure the notional 
independence of health and safety policy from political interference. Through the 
HSC/E, the British government divested itself of direct responsibility for health and 
safety regulation, which it had maintained since the early nineteenth century. 
Authority was instead devolved to interest groups, who through negotiation and debate 
could settle health and safety policy on the basis of consensus. While HSE officials 
remained civil servants, health and safety policy was effectively removed from the 
direct control of politicians and government ministers. This was not necessarily 
detrimental: as my thesis showed, it avoided conflicts of interest associated with the 
entanglement of regulatory and sponsorship functions in particular government 
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departments. This came into sharp relief in the 1980s and 1990s following disasters 
such as Piper Alpha and the Clapham rail crash. 
 The HSWA, too, embodied a new vision of statutory effort. The role of the state 
was recast as providing a supportive framework to promote self-regulation. By 
presenting legal requirements in goal-based terms, the onus for determining how to 
comply with the law was placed on employers. Voluntary standards and codes of 
practice were prioritised over regulations as ways of improving health and safety 
standards. Advice and guidance were also used to encourage voluntary effort, and 
create a self-reliant health and safety culture. While factory inspectors had long 
considered prosecution a tool of last resort, new administrative sanctions such as 
improvement and prohibition notices were used to encourage employers to make 
changes to their workplace and systems. 
 Perhaps the most successful development in the 1970s was the extension of joint 
consultation throughout the regulatory system. The 1977 SRSC regulations gave trade 
unions an unprecedented platform to influence health and safety policy, while the 
creation of a representative advisory committee structure in HSC allowed a diverse 
range of interests to have a say in the making of new regulations or codes of practice.8 
This consultative structure put the CSHW’s principle of self-regulation into practice, 
ensuring that it was not the British government, but those with an actual stake in 
health and safety that took the lead in developing policy.  
 What is perhaps surprising is the extent to which HSC policymaking continued 
to be defined by persuasion and compromise, even when health and safety regulation 
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came under considerable political scrutiny in the 1980s and 1990s. Health and safety 
policy was rarely an area of great controversy in HSC, and my interviewees 
emphasised the cordial and professional nature of relations on the Commission. While, 
in no small measure, my interviewees may have wished to present an idealised picture 
of HSC policymaking, this observation is consistent with those made by researchers 
elsewhere, such as Wilson.9 The decision by HSC’s first chair, Bill Simpson, to make 
policy decisions by consensus was pivotal: it meant that, outside arguments about 
resources (particularly in relation to enforcement), health and safety regulation had 
broad political support, enabling HSC/E to weather the political and economic storms 
of the 1980s and 1990s. This broad political support is demonstrated by defences of the 
HSC/E in Parliamentary reviews and probes.10 The role of HSE in establishing 
political conditions suitable for consensus cannot be overstated: the HSE played a 
crucial role drafting and redrafting policy documents until political agreement was 
found. 
 This interpretation of consensus is more optimistic than that of other researchers, 
such as Tombs, who have argued that it exposed British health and safety regulation to 
‘degradation’.11 But Tombs’ argument primarily concerns enforcement, which was 
dictated by government policy through the resources made available to HSC/E. Quite 
simply, HSC/E had little choice but to comply with cuts, and made clear their 
disapproval in public and private writings. Without a solid background of political 
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support, gained through consensual decision-making, it likely that HSC/E would have 
suffered even more during the ‘regulatory crisis’ of the 1980s and 1990s, since interest 
groups would have been more vocal in their criticism of the British regulatory system. 
 
7.2.3.  Deregulation 
Although the HSWA removed health and safety regulation from the everyday control 
of politicians and government ministers, this is not to argue that health and safety 
regulation was no longer political, or subject to the whim of ministers. Indeed, my 
thesis has shown that health and safety regulation continued to be greatly influenced 
by the British government after 1974. By the mid 1980s, the prevailing rhetoric of self-
regulation was beginning to give way to a more overt rhetoric of deregulation, one which 
continues to inform British health and safety policy.  
 In particular, the emergence of a neoliberal, free-market agenda under the 
Conservatives from 1979 had lasting implications for British health and safety 
regulation. The HSWA had greatly streamlined health and safety legislation, 
advancing a single comprehensive Act in place of nine main groups of statutes and 500 
regulations that littered the statute book before 1974.12 However, despite this major 
exercise in rationalisation, by the mid 1980s the government specifically identified 
health and safety as part of a problem of overregulation and red tape, imposing 
unnecessary burdens on business.13 By the 1980s, health and safety had become an 
explicit policy aim of the EC through measures such as the Single European Act. The 
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growing influence of the EC over British health and safety regulation posed a 
particular challenge to officials in respect to regulation, since not only was the UK 
obliged to transpose directives that had little domestic support, but European 
directives stemmed from a very different legal tradition, where the law was viewed in 
more instrumental terms. The influx of European law meant that despite attempts by 
HSC/E to further consolidate and rationalise domestic legislation, most notably in the 
1988 COSHH regulations, there was a growing perception in government and among 
certain business leaders (such as the IOD) that many health and safety regulations 
were at best costly, and at worst, unnecessary.   
 The deregulatory agenda had diverse effects on HSC/E policy. On an 
administrative level, it resulted in demands to evaluate the benefits of new regulations 
in risk terms (i.e., CBA), and a renewed emphasis on deregulation and legal 
simplification (as demonstrated by the 1990s review of regulations). It also resulted in 
growing political scrutiny of HSC/E activity, and the need for officials to carefully 
account for their operations and finances. In the 1990s, the HSC/E was further 
exposed to market-based imperatives, such as the need to contract-out various 
functions (such as its research and laboratory services). The politics of NPM, 
emerging by the 1980s, extolled private-sector styles of corporate governance, and 
encouraged public bodies such as HSC/E to apply stricter methods of auditing and 
financial control.14 (Power has referred to this emphasis on auditing as the ‘audit 
explosion’.15)  
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 On a philosophical level, the impact of neoliberal ideology was perhaps more 
insidious. Despite protests from trade unions, beliefs about the burdensome nature of 
health and safety regulations continued to inform the government’s approach to health 
and safety under New Labour.16 The politics of partnership, emerging by the 1990s, 
saw health and safety regulation as being unworkable without the wider support of 
industry, trade unionists and other stakeholders.17 While this was, in a sense, merely an 
elaboration of the HSWA’s corporatist ideals, partnership reflected the state’s 
diminished field of action, and increasingly passive view of intervention in the work 
environment.  
 
7.2.4.  Risk Management 
By the 1990s, I have argued, a widespread demand emerged both within and outside 
government for regulatory agencies including HSC/E to explain their decision-making 
approach. Demands by the government and citizen’s groups for political accountability 
and participation in the policymaking process reinforced a growing recognition among 
the scientific community that formal, scientific assessments of risk could only partially 
determine policy, and hence health and safety controls. Scientific studies in the field of 
risk perception showed that people’s perceptions of risk were shaped by subjective 
values, such as how ‘dreaded’ a particular risk was (for example, cancer or nuclear 
radiation). Hence, policymakers came under increasing pressure to show how their 
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risk decisions took into account social, political, economic and ethical criteria, as well 
as scientific uncertainty.  
 By the 1990s, regulators’ confidence in the policymaking process appears to have 
been severely shaken. The BSE crisis in British agriculture and food safety had 
resulted in sharp media criticism of another regulator, MAFF, and HSC/E itself over 
the years had acknowledged a growing, if vague, public interest in health and safety 
and environmental issues, such as nuclear power (this ‘interest’, as I have previously 
argued, cannot be separated from genuine concern). In this less deferential political 
environment, where the control of risks such as nuclear power was subject to growing 
uncertainty, and regulatory authority open to question, the HSC/E came under 
increasing pressure to come clean with its policymaking principles. 
 In response to these pressures, the HSC/E produced a definitive statement of its 
risk management principles, TOR.18 While TOR was originally developed in relation 
to nuclear power, by the early 2000s TOR was applied across the entire range of risks 
under HSC/E’s jurisdiction, as demonstrated in HSE’s discussion document, Reducing 
Risks, Protecting People (R2P2).19 TOR and R2P2 reflected how, as the twentieth 
century drew to a close, the state was assuming the role of risk manager and 
communicator, evaluating risks which were communicated to the public and 
stakeholders as a basis for decisions on risk control (this was also demonstrated by the 
work of ILGRA, and HSC/E’s approach to occupational health in the Good Health is 
                                                
 
 
18  HSE, “Tolerability.” 
19  HSE, Reducing Risks, Protecting People. 
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Good Business campaign).20 They also reflected how, in increasingly uncertain times, the 
state had to shield itself from institutional risks (for example, damage to reputation) 
emerging out, and as a result of the policymaking process.21 Under the risk 
management paradigm, risks did not just emerge from outside the regulatory system, in 
terms of new occupational or environmental risks, but from within the regulatory 
system, as a consequence of regulation itself. The HSC/E have thus not only been 
concerned with risk management, but ‘the risks of risk management’.22 
  
 
7.3.  Elaborating Risk: The Evolution of Risk in British 
Health and Safety Policy 
The story of risk is inseparable from that of the British state, since in recent decades, 
health and safety regulation—and many other fields of regulation—have become 
specifically couched in terms of risk. As Hutter has described, ‘in many respects risk 
has become a new lens through which to view the world…. Regulation is no 
exception’.23 In order to understand how and why the British system of health and 
safety regulation developed between 1961 and 2001, it is thus essential to understand 
                                                
 
 
20  ILGRA, Use of Risk Assessment Within Government Departments; ILGRA, Risk 
Communication. 
21  Power, The Risk Management of Everything. 
22  Henry Rothstein, Michael Huber, and George Gaskell, “A Theory of Risk 
Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk,” 
Economy and Society 35, no. 1 (2006): 92, emphasis omitted. 
23  Hutter, “The Attractions of Risk-Based Regulation,” 1; Rothstein, Huber, and 
Gaskell, “A Theory of Risk Colonization.” 
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where these ideas came from, and how they came to proliferate in health and safety 
regulation.  
 My thesis has shown that before 1974, and to a certain extent after, the concept 
of risk did not figure prominently in British health and safety regulation, either literally 
(in legislative terms) or conceptually. Both HSE’s former Director-General and Chief 
Scientist argued that ‘risk’ did not feature in the official language; while the various 
pre-1974 inspectorates and research establishments were ostensibly concerned with 
risk, it was not generally thought of as such, and certainly not as an ‘organising 
concept’ or idea that united their work.24 Instead, ideas about ‘hazard’ tended to 
dominate, in the sense of controlling things that harmed workers and other persons, 
regardless of their likelihood or severity.  
 At the same time, however, technical and scientific improvements in the late 
1960s and 1970s were integral to the development of risk-based thinking. For example, 
improvements in industrial hygiene allowed toxic exposures to be precisely quantified, 
while the Factory Inspectorate began to draw upon accident statistics as a way of 
targeting their inspection activity. In the 1970s, experience with nuclear power and 
major hazards (especially after the Flixborough explosion of 1974) encouraged 
regulators to calculate the probability of accidental events.   
 The HSWA 1974 implicitly placed risk at the heart of British health and safety 
regulation. As the Court of Appeal ruled in 1993, the term ‘risk’ in the HSWA 
effectively carried the meaning of ‘hazard’, since it implied that employers should 
                                                
 
 
24  Rothstein, Huber, and Gaskell, “A Theory of Risk Colonization,” 2; McQuaid, 
Interview; Rimington, Interview. 
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address anything in the workplace that had the potential to cause danger, not just 
things that were likely and/or severe (that is, based on probabilistic thinking).25 
However, reading between the lines of the Act, risk was deeply embedded elsewhere. 
For example, in requiring employers to produce written statements of their safety 
policy, the HSWA implicitly demanded that employers consider the particular risks of 
their workplace, and make arrangements accordingly. Moreover, SFAIRP principle, 
used throughout the general duties of the Act, implied that employers could balance 
time, trouble or expense against risk when deliberating means of control. In other 
words, SFAIRP embodied an implicit concept of risk assessment. This thesis has 
shown that the SFAIRP principle has been a fiercely defended cornerstone of British 
health and safety regulation since 1974, allowing officials to claim that health and 
safety regulation was proportionate to the risk, no more, no less. 
 By the late 1970s, therefore, the concept of risk was deeply engrained within 
British regulatory thought. However, these principles remained to be explicated, 
codified and operationalised. A major innovation in 1980 was the demand in the 
CLAW regulations for employers to conduct ‘assessments’ of the degree to which their 
employees were exposed to lead. While this was merely an elaboration of the implicit 
demand for employers to evaluate risks in the HSWA, risk assessments became an 
established part of British regularity practice by the late 1980s, appearing in a host of 
regulations, most notably COSHH.  
 Europe played a fundamental role in turning what was at heart, a mental device 
to evaluate and control risk, into something far more bureaucratic and controversial. 
                                                
 
 
25  HSE, Reducing Risks, Protecting People, 15. 
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During negotiations over the European Framework Directive, HSE’s demand that 
control should be based on risk assessment was unwittingly transformed into the 
demand for risk assessments to be written down. Hence, what was previously, for most 
employers, an informal tool to inform control decisions (a ‘computation’, in the Court 
of Appeal’s 1949 terms), became a physical object and the outcome of a formal, 
bureaucratic process. Every employer, regardless of the size or intrinsic hazard of their 
operations, had to be in ownership of a formal written risk assessment. 
 This story shows that HSC/E’s risk-based approach to regulation evolved 
through a gradual process of post-hoc abstraction and elaboration. Responding to 
contemporary political and economic demands, officials progressively made explicit 
ideas and principles that already existed in British regulatory thought—for instance, 
the idea that cost was a valid concern when deliberating control measures, and there 
were fundamental limits to safety. In the same vein, HSE’s statement of its risk 
management principles, TOR, relied on officials such as Rimington making explicit the 
relationship between the different areas of HSE’s activity, the divergent legal 
standards of its constituent inspectorates, and the criteria that informed its decisions. 
Risk not only acted as a lingua franca that enabled HSE to come together as a more 
corporate organisation, but a conceptual glue that permitted a more systematic and 
coherent approach to regulation.  
 In a major way, however, this stemmed from political opportunism and wishful 
thinking just as much from any essential or definitive relationship between these 
underlying ideas and approaches. While it took no great leap of the imagination to see 
the similarities between legal standards such as ALARP, ALARA and SFAIRP, it was 
the political and economic demands of the 1980s and 1990s that encouraged officials to 
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explain their decision-making and the principles on which it rested. The need to make 
health and safety regulation comprehensible to the wider public, and justify regulatory 
decisions, became acute in a political context where members of the public demanded 
greater access to the policymaking process, and where excess or ill-thought-out 
regulation was perceived as undesirable or burdensome. The need to find common 
regulatory ground was also particularly pressing in an administrative context where 
certain inspectorates were vying to separate from HSE (the IAPI, of course, 
succeeded). Risk was a thus a powerful way to reconcile these various demands. 
 My argument about the evolution of risk shows that despite the progressive, 
forward-looking aims of the HSWA, on an administrative level there was still an 
element of officials making things up as they went along after 1974. In place of ad hoc 
legislation to meet contemporary demands (as in prescriptive, pre-1974 legislation), 
there was ex post facto rationalisation and abstraction of pre-existing principles to 
meet pressing regulatory needs. The major difference between the Factories Act model 
of regulation, and the HSWA, was that the HSWA was a flexible legal instrument that 
could accommodate both structural changes in the law (for example European 
directives), and major philosophical changes in regulation. In this respect, the rationale 
behind the HSWA was sound. The enabling character of the Act meant that detailed 
changes could be made to the substance of the law without altering its general 
principles. This, in combination with the overall success of the consensual approach to 
policymaking, is a fundamental reason why the HSWA remains the core of British 
health and safety legislation in the twenty-first century.   
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7.4.  ‘Vast, Diverse and Complex’: The British System of 
Health and Safety Regulation, 1961–2001 
This thesis has shown that the development of the British system of health and safety 
regulation between 1961 and 2001 must be seen in terms of a much longer evolutionary 
process dating back to the nineteenth century. While social, political and economic 
conditions between 1961 and 2001 were pivotal in shaping the system of regulation we 
recognise today, many of the system’s dominant ideas and concepts were forged early 
in the history of British statutory intervention in working conditions—for example, the 
persuasive, conciliatory approach to enforcement. Thus, my thesis complements rather 
than replaces existing historical work, showing how the history of British health and 
safety regulation has been marked by great continuity, not only change. 
 More generally, my thesis has shown that the British system of health and 
safety regulation after 1961 developed in response to a myriad of social, political and 
economic pressures. Economic pressures created political conditions conducive to 
regulatory reform (for example, the government drive to increase productivity in the 
1960s and 1970s), as well as conditions conducive to deregulation and financial cuts. 
The economic recession of the mid 1980s, in particular, dispelled much of the 
optimistic economic message that had accompanied the 1972 Robens Report, and 
supported the Conservatives’ deregulatory drives to reduce the perceived burdens of 
health and safety regulation on business.26 The deregulatory paradigm was a logical 
prerequisite of HSC/E’s risk management approach, and it continues to inform British 
health and safety regulation to this day—evidenced by, for example, recent 
                                                
 
 
26 Beck and Woolfson, “The Regulation of Health and Safety in Britain”, 43. 
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government reviews which have sought to further streamline and reduce the legal 
framework.27  
Unsurprisingly, the British system of health and safety regulation has also been 
heavily shaped by the evolving dimensions of British industry, employment, and the 
risks resulting from these structural changes. While political concern developed in the 
1960s and 1970s around large hazardous installations, such as chemical plants, the 
wider decline of manufacturing and the movement of workers to the service sector 
raised the regulatory profile of chronic and non-industrial health risks. A broad 
epidemiological transition has occurred: as fatal accidents and acute occupational 
disease declined, regulators began to confront risks that were more chronic, invisible 
and insidious. Conditions such as occupational stress or heart disease were less 
immediately attributable to deficiencies in the work environment, having a strong 
lifestyle component. Hence, there was a logic to subsuming occupational health within 
a wider public health agenda in the 1990s.   
 Administrative concerns have also been central to the evolving shape and 
structure of the regulatory system. The delocalisation of occupational risk in the 1960s 
and 1970s suggested that health and safety regulation needed to encompass the health 
and safety of the public, as well as the control of toxic substances which had damaging 
environmental effects. Major disasters such as Aberfan demonstrated the anomalies 
and inconsistencies that accompanied a piecemeal and fragmented system. However, it 
was ultimately fierce political debate and negotiation in Whitehall that allowed health 
and safety regulation to expand beyond its ‘occupational’ confines, why a large 
                                                
 
 
27 See, e.g. Löfstedt, Reclaiming Health and Safety for All.  
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proportion of HSE’s total work in 1991 was devoted to issues of public, as opposed to 
workers’ health and safety.28 Health and safety’s expanded scope depended less on the 
expansion of risk, than on ministers’ fear of loss of prestige and power, and their 
willingness to devolve their policymaking functions to a new quasi-independent 
authority. 
 Another major contributory factor to the development of the British system of 
health and safety regulation, albeit one which is more difficult to evaluate, is public 
recognition of hazards, faith in science and regulation, and their desire to have a stake 
in the policymaking process. This thesis has not set out to assess the public’s changing 
views towards health and safety regulation itself. However, officials since the 1960s 
have alluded to a growing public ‘appetite’ for information on hazards, as well as 
accompanying scrutiny of regulation and regulators—seen, for example, in criticisms of 
MAFF during the 1990s BSE crisis. The extent to which the public was genuinely 
interested in health and safety, or anxious about risks, is difficult to separate. So too is 
public interest in risk, from the scrutiny and interest of the British media. HSC/E 
accounts suggest a growing, but vague public concern about risk over the last third of 
the twentieth century, seen for instance in the rising number of public calls to HSE 
telephone lines.29 However, such evidence is little more than anecdotal, and further 
academic research is required to analyse these developments. 
That said, by the 1990s HSE was acutely aware of the magnifying effect of 
media discourse—how it could amplify the public’s recognition of risks that had 
                                                
 
 
28  Rimington, “Management of HSC and HSE,” para. 20. 
29  HSC and HSE, Annual Report 1987/88, 36. 
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previously received little attention.30 In a sense, whether or not the public was 
genuinely concerned about risks, or whether their confidence in science or regulation 
was shaken, is irrelevant. In either case, it was the regulatory perception of public 
concern or scrutiny that was central to the development of the British system of health 
and safety regulation in the 1980s and 1990s, for example, in HSE explaining their 
decision-making approach. This thesis has shown that HSE’s attempts to explain their 
approach in risk-based terms stemmed from a concern to limit reputational and 
institutional risks emerging in and out of the policymaking process. This was deeply 
embedded within wider governmental concerns to make public policy more 
accountable, proportionate and transparent.  
This thesis has deliberately avoided the contentious question of whether British 
health and safety regulation has been ‘successful’. In the absence of comprehensive 
statistical data, such a question is difficult to answer definitively, and in any case 
necessitates political judgement about the ‘correct’ scope of health and safety 
regulation. International comparisons offer us little recourse, since countries differ in 
respect to the recording and reporting of occupational accidents and disease. 
Enforcement and regulatory systems also differ markedly to Britain, with some 
European countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, preferring a more 
prescriptive regulatory style.31   
                                                
 
 
30 See Tom Horlick-Jones, and Graham Murdock, Social Amplification of Risk: The 
Media and the Public, Contract Research Report 329/2001 (Sudbury: HSE Books, 2001), 
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Nevertheless, according to standardised data released by Eurostat, since 1998 
Britain/the UK has consistently out-performed the EU average in relation to rates of 
fatal workplace injuries. Workers in Britain also take less time off due to work-related 
ill-health than workers in other large European economies including France and 
Spain.32 Part of this favourable performance could be attributed to Britain’s long 
history and expertise in risk management: the results of a 2014 European survey 
showed that 92 per cent of UK establishments regularly carried out risk assessments, 
compared to 77 per cent on average across the EU, and just 37 per cent in 
Luxembourg.33 
As my concluding analysis suggests, the history of the British system of health 
and safety regulation since 1961 is both fascinating and immensely complex. A host of 
social, political and economic conditions have shaped and structured it: some short-
term and dramatic (such as industrial disasters), others long-term and insidious (such 
as the impact of neoliberal deregulatory rhetoric). However, the changing role of the 
British state, and the changing conceptualisation of risk in British regulatory discourse, 
bring these conditions into sharp relief. They show how these conditions were 
interconnected, both conceptually and in practice. Critically, these trends provide an 
empirical framework for showing how they influenced evolving regulatory thought. By 
examining policy documents and other material from the HSC/E and British 
government, we can deconstruct these conditions and show how they influenced 
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regulatory policy. This way, we can begin to appreciate the contentious, but pivotal 
role health and safety regulation has come to play in our everyday lives.    
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Appendices 
 
I.  Key regulations, 1974–2015 
 
Regulation	 Abbreviation	 SI	Reference	
Safety	Representatives	and	Safety	
Committees	Regulations	1977	
SRSC	 1977/500	
The	Health	and	Safety	(Enforcing	
Authority)	Regulations	1977	
	 1977/746	
Notification	of	Accidents	and	
Dangerous	Occurrences	Regulations	
1980	
NADOR	 1980/637	
Control	of	Lead	at	Work	Regulations	
1980	
CLAW	 1980/1248	
Notification	of	Installations	Handling	
Hazardous	Substances	Regulations	
1992	
NIHHS	 1982/1357	
Notification	of	New	Substances	
Regulations	1982	
NNS	 1982/1496	
Asbestos	(Licensing)	Regulations	
1983	
	 1983/1649	
Control	of	Industrial	Major	Accident	
Hazard	Regulations	1984	
CIMAH	 1984/1902	
Reporting	of	Injuries,	Diseases	and	
Dangerous	Occurrences	Regulations	
1985	
RIDDOR	 1985	
The	Control	of	Pesticides	
Regulations	1986	
	 1986/1510	
Control	of	Asbestos	at	Work	
Regulations	1987	
CAW	 1987/2115	
Control	of	Substances	Hazardous	to	
Health	Regulations	1988		
COSHH	 1988/1657	
Noise	at	Work	Regulations	1989	 NAW	 1989	
The	Health	and	Safety	(Enforcing	
Authority)	Regulations	1989	
	 1989/1903	
Management	of	Health	and	Safety	
at	Work	Regulations	1992*	
MHSWR	 1992/2051	
The	Health	and	Safety	(Display	
Screen	Equipment)	Regulations	
1992*	
	 1992/2792	
The	Manual	Handling	Operations	
Regulations	1992*	
	 1992/2793	
The	Provision	and	Use	of	Work	
Equipment	Regulations	1992*	
PUWER	 1992/2932	
The	Personal	Protective	Equipment	
at	Work	Regulations	1992*	
PPEW	 1992/2966	
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The	Workplace	(Health,	Safety	and	
Welfare)	Regulations	1992*	
WHSW	 1992/3004	
Gas	Safety	(Installation	and	Use)	
Regulations	1998	
	 1998/2451	
The	Health	and	Safety	(Fees)	
Regulations	2012	
	 2012/1652	
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II.  Incidence and rate of fatal workplace accidents in Great Britain, 1974–2011 
 
Source: “HSE Statistics: Historical Picture.” Accessed August 6, 2015. http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/history/. *Denotes provisional 
figure.
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III. Reported non-fatal injuries to employees in Great Britain, 1986/87–2011/12 
 
Source: “HSE Statistics: Historical Picture.” Accessed February 4, 2016. http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/history/. Data derived from 
the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR).
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IV. Annual mortality from mesothelioma and silicosis in Great Britain, and cases assessed for 
Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit, 1974-2011 
 
Source: “HSE Statistics: Historical Picture.” Accessed January 25, 2016. http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/history/. Data derived from 
Office of National Statistics and Department for Work and Pensions.
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V.  Key provisions of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 
1974 
Section	 Provisions	
2	 All	employers	have	the	duty	to	ensure,	so	far	as	is	
reasonably	practicable,	the	health,	safety	and	
welfare	at	work	of	their	employees.	These	duties	
extend	to:	
• Plant	and	systems	of	work	
• Use,	handling,	storage	and	transport	of	
articles	and	substances	
• Provision	of	information,	instruction,	
training	and	supervision	
• Place	of	work	including	means	of	access	
and	egress	
• Working	environment	including	adequate	
arrangements	and	facilities	for	welfare	
• The	preparation	and	revision	of	a	written	
safety	policy	including	details	of	the	
arrangements	in	force	for	carrying	it	out	
• Duty	to	consult	with	safety	representatives	
and	safety	committees	
3	 Every	employer	and	self-employed	person	has	the	
duty	of	conducting	their	undertaking	in	such	a	way	
as	to	ensure,	so	far	as	is	reasonably	practicable,	the	
health	and	safety	of	persons	other	than	their	
employees	who	may	be	affected	thereby	(e.g.	
members	of	public,	contractors,	visitors,	customers,	
pupils).	
4	 Persons	in	control	of	premises	(e.g.	landlords,	
owners)	have	the	duty	to	ensure,	so	far	as	is	
reasonably	practicable,	that	the	premises,	its	means	
of	access	and	egress,	and	any	plant	or	substance	in	
use	(or	provided	for	use)	there,	is	safe	and	without	
risks	to	health.	
6	 Any	person	who	designs,	manufacturers,	imports	or	
supplies	any	article	for	use	at	work	has	the	duty:	
• To	ensure,	so	far	as	is	reasonably	
practicable,	that	the	article	is	designed	and	
constructed	to	be	safe	and	without	risks	to	
health	
• To	carry	out	any	necessary	testing	or	
examination		
• To	make	available	adequate	information	
about	the	use	of	the	article	and	the	
conditions	necessary	to	ensure	that	its	use	
is	safe	and	without	risks	to	health	
7	 All	employees	have	the	duty	of	taking	reasonable	
care	for	the	health	and	safety	of	themselves	and	
other	persons	who	may	be	affected	by	their	work.	
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They	have	the	duty	of	co-operating	with	persons,	
including	their	employer,	who	have	duties	or	
requirements	under	the	relevant	statutory	
provisions.	
10	 This	section	establishes	the	Health	and	Safety	
Commission	and	Health	and	Safety	Executive,	and	
details	their	composition.	
11	 This	section	lists	the	general	duties	of	the	
Commission	and	Executive.	Briefly,	the	general	
function	of	the	Commission	is	to	do	such	things	as	
necessary	to	further	the	Act.	These	include:	
• Assisting	and	encouraging	persons	in	their	
duties	
• Making	arrangements	and	encouraging	
research,	training	and	the	provision	of	
information	
• Providing	an	information	and	advisory	
service	
• Submitting	proposals	for	regulations	to	
Government	Ministers	
The	general	function	of	the	Executive	is	to	exercise	
such	functions	as	directed	by	the	Commission.	
However,	the	Commission	cannot	direct	the	
Executive	in	the	enforcement	of	any	of	the	relevant	
statutory	provisions	in	a	particular	case.		
Source: Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. Ch. 37, 1974.
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VI. Example consent form 
The	purpose	of	this	form	is	to	allow	the	use	of	your	interview	for	research	purposes.		
Please	ask	the	investigator	if	you	have	any	questions,	and	fill	in	the	form	according	to	
your	wishes.	
	
NAME:		
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………	
	
DATE(S)	OF	INTERVIEW(S):		
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………		
	
I	have	read	the	information	sheet	concerning	this	study	and	I	understand	what	will	
happen	if	I	take	part	in	it.		My	questions	concerning	this	study	have	been	answered	by	
the	investigator.			
	
I	agree	to	take	part	in	this	study	and	understand	that	I	may	withdraw	from	it	at	any	time	
without	giving	a	reason.			
	
I	hereby	assign	copyright	of	my	contribution	for	research	purposes	to	Christopher	Sirrs.			
	
A. 	Audio	recording.		Please	tick	one	only:	
[			]	–	I	permit	the	interview(s)	to	be	audio	recorded	for	research	purposes,	and	
understand	that	I	may	request	a	copy	of	the	recording(s)	to	be	sent	to	me	following	the	
interview.	
[				]	–	I	do	not	wish	the	interview(s)	to	be	recorded.	
	
B. 	Publication.		Please	tick	one	only:	
[			]	–	I	permit	the	use	of	my	name	with	quotations	from	the	interview	
[			]	–	I	wish	to	be	consulted	before	the	publication	of	named	quotations	
[			]	–	I	wish	for	quotations	to	be	used	anonymously	and	in	such	a	way	that	I	cannot	be	
identified	
[			]	–	I	do	not	wish	to	be	quoted	at	all,	even	anonymously	
	
C. Public	archiving.		Please	tick	one	only:	
	
[			]	–	I	permit	this	interview,	including	associated	notes,	transcripts	and/or	any	
recording(s)	made	subject	to	the	conditions	in	section	A	above,	to	be	made	
available	in	a	public	archive:	……………………….	years	from	today’s	date	
											Or	on	the	following	date:……………………………………………………………………	
[			]	–	I	do	not	wish	for	this	interview	to	be	made	available	in	a	public	archive	
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SIGNED:		………………………………………………………………………………………………………			
DATE:		………………………………………………………………………………………………………….	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
